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Abstract
Common shareholding is the simultaneous ownership of shares in many firms active in the
same market. Common shareholders are typically institutional investors (banks, pension
funds, insurance companies or mutual investment funds), who hold stakes below the level
of control and do not actively participate in firms’ decisions. Although traditionally common
shareholding has not been seen as an antitrust issue, in recent years researchers and policy
makers have started to consider its potential anticompetitive effects.
Scholars have raised concerns that common shareholding could have anticompetitive effects
when a common owner has a majority control over at least one of the firms, and minority
stakes in competing companies. Nevertheless, little is known about common shareholding
by institutional investors, whose control seems to be limited to minority voting rights. Such
institutional investors have historically implemented a passive investment strategy, whereby
fund managers invest the assets of their customers following an index. At the same time,
they collect the voting rights of their customers and potentially gain some influence over the
management decisions of the firms they are mandated to invest in. As a result, fund managers
have acquired substantial shares - always on behalf of their customers - in a large number of
firms that in many cases are direct competitors, creating a new corporate governance setup.
Common shareholders can indeed acquire a broad level of participation across a market; for
example, in 2016 we find that the firms in BlackRock’s portfolio in the EU Oil&Gas industry
represented roughly 90% of Total Assets for this market. Moreover, common shareholding has
become increasingly prevalent in recent years. For instance, 60% of US public firms in 2014
had common shareholders that held at least 5% both in the firm itself and in a competitor. This
occurred in only 10% of cases back in 1980 (He and Huang, 2017). In Europe, we find that
common shareholding with at least 5% participation involved 67% of the listed companies in
2016.
Although the existence of the phenomenon is widely witnessed across the globe, little evi-
dence is available to date about European markets. The Finance & Economy Unit of the JRC,
on request of DG COMP, undertook an extensive analysis of common shareholding in Europe.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first comprehensive study on this topic in Europe,
including not only listed firms but also a series of relevant unlisted corporations in select in-
dustries.§
Project: "Possible anti-competitive effects of common ownership (PACECO)", Parts 1 and 2, developed under the
Administrative Arrangements No. COMP/2017/022 and No. COMP/2018/014.
§Recent reports by the Monopolies Commission (2018) and by the European Parliament (2020) also investigate the
extent of common shareholding in Europe, however their investigation is limited in scope to specific geographic areas
or industries. See more details in Chapter 1.
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The aspects of common shareholding investigated in this study are:
(A) Measuring common shareholding: analysis of methodological and measurement issues;
(B) Common shareholding indices: derivation of new indicators (and respective properties)
to overcome the criticisms of the current measures of the phenomenon;
(C) Ownership structure of EU listed firms: construction of a database comprising all listed
firms active in the EU in 2007-2016, with historical ownership data, industry classification,
legal and financial information;
(D) Identification of industries of interest: construction of ad-hoc lists of firms identifying all
relevant actors active in five specific EU markets during 2007-2016 (Electricity, Oil&Gas,
Mobile Telecoms, Trading Platforms and Beverages);
(E) Common shareholding and common shareholders: picture of the extent and trends of
common shareholding in the last decade for the listed firms active in the EU and the five
chosen markets;
(F) Top players: closer look at ownership of top competitors of each industry, and at portfolios
of the largest institutional investors;
(G) Holding thresholds: analysis of level of participation as an expression of effective monitor-
ing of shareholders on companies; effects of holding thresholds on common shareholding
indicators;
(H) Linking common shareholding and market performance of companies: development of a
methodology for testing the link between the level of common shareholding and firms’
performance, with an application to EU data for the Beverages sector (this topic is par-
tially developed in collaboration with the Competence Centre on Microeconomic Evalua-
tion of the JRC).
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Executive Summary
The debate on common shareholding - and its potential antitrust effects - is currently on the
agenda of all major think tanks and institutions worldwide. Common horizontal shareholders
are usually institutional investors - e.g. pension funds and asset managers - holding concomi-
tant shareholdings in a given market.
In the last two decades, these investment funds have grown substantially in Europe and world-
wide, both in total size and concentration, especially channeling savings towards investment
strategies that replicate the performance of stock market indices, such as the S&P500 or the
FTSE100. As a result, wealth fund managers have acquired substantial shares - always on be-
half of their customers - in a large number of firms that in many cases are direct competitors,
creating a new corporate governance setup. According to the Financial Timesi “BlackRock,
Vanguard and State Street, the three biggest index-fund managers, control about 80 per cent
of the US equity ETF market, about $1.6tn in total. Put together, the trio would be the largest
shareholder of 88 per cent of all S&P 500 companies”.
Despite claiming a so-called passive engagement strategy (not intervening directly in firm’s
decisions), institutional investors in fact collect, together with the shares, the associated voting
rights of their customers. This has led some economists to worry about the effects of this
concentration of power, as well as the influence exerted on the management decisions of the
firms that common shareholders are mandated to invest in.
As shown in the seminal paper by Azar, Schmalz and Tecu,ii a major concern is that these
common shareholdings, though in minority shares, may create competition distortions in cer-
tain sectors. However, the possible effects of common shareholders on market efficiency and
competition have only been investigated in a small number of specific industries, and no con-
sensus has been reached concerning a more general effect on the economy.
In the literature, common shareholders are mostly known as “common owners”. The term
“common owners” is somehow misleading, as these investors do not actually own compa-
nies, they rather own (usually small) participations in many companies. In this report, to be
consistent with the literature, the terms common owners and common shareholders are used
interchangeably. Moreover, this reports looks at shareholding participations in the same mar-
ket (horizontal), disregarding concomitant participation in upstream or downstream related
companies.
Over the past months, the debate on common shareholding has continued to gain increasing
attention from academic and policy actors, having generated several interventions and round-
tables, as well as published research in the areas of corporate governance and antitrust law.
iFinancial Times, “Common ownership of shares faces regulatory scrutiny”, January 22, 2019.
iiAzar, J., Schmalz, M. C., and Tecu, I., 2018, "Anti-Competitive Effects of Common Ownership", Journal of Finance,
Vol. 73, No. 4, pp. 1513-1565.
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Even though common shareholding is widely witnessed across the globe, little evidence is
available to date about European markets. Moreover, consistent results are still lacking on its
actual implications, such as possible anticompetitive practices and other negative externalities
affecting firms’ performance and managerial decisions. The present report - to the best of
our knowledge - is the first comprehensive study on common shareholding in Europe and its
possible anticompetitive effects, including not only listed firms but also many relevant unlisted
corporations in selected industries.iii
The investigation of a causal link between the presence of common shareholding in a market
and its competitive outcomes poses several challenges. First of all, the definition of a market
of reference; secondly, the measurement of common shareholding itself; furthermore, the
choice of an appropriate competition indicator, be it based on market power and/or market
concentration; lastly, however no less important, data availability at firm or even product
level. This report principally addresses these questions. Below is a summary of the main
findings.
Common shareholding and common shareholders in the EUiv
The overall results for listed firms activev in the EU in 2007-2016 show that the number of
common shareholders increases over time, from around 14 thousand in 2007 to above
16 thousand in 2016 (Table I).vi
The total number of registered shareholders has also been increasing over the ten years,
reaching a value of almost 127 thousand in 2016. However, the large majority of shareholders
only hold participation in one of the listed firms, being therefore "single" shareholders (more
than 85% of the cases).
The number of listed firms that are cross-held by block-holdersvii has been increasing, going
from around 15.5 thousand to around 17.5 thousand. In relative terms, 67% of all listed
firms active in the EU are cross-held by common shareholders holding at least 5%
in each company, that is more than two-thirds of all listed firms active in the EU are thus
linked to at least one other firm through a common shareholder that holds a non-negligible
amount of shares in both. These results for Europe are in line with those for the US: about
iiiRecent reports by the Monopolies Commission (2018) and by the European Parliament (2020) also investigate the
extent of common shareholding in Europe, however their investigation is limited in scope to specific geographic areas
or industries, and is kept at a descriptive level. See more details in Chapter 1.
ivIn this context the term EU comprises the 28 countries of the EU as of 2017, excluding candidate countries and
countries which are simply associates of the European Economic Area (EEA).
vEither registered in the EU, or registered outside, but holding shares in at least one EU firm.
viWe recall that a common shareholder by definition is an investors holding participation in at least two firms in a
given market, otherwise it is labelled as a "single" shareholder.
viiAn investor is defined as being a block-holder of a firm if holding at least 5% of the shares of the firm. Two firms
are cross-held by a block-holder if the investor holds at least 5% of shares in both firms. This definition, coming from
the US literature on common shareholding, will be maintained also in the sectoral analyses.
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60% of US public firms in 2014 had common shareholders that held at least 5% both in the
firm itself and in a competitor. This occurred in only 10% of cases back in 1980.viii
Table I: Summary statistics for listed firms active in the EU in 2007-2016.
NOTE - Number of firms; number and percentage of firms cross-held by block-holders (BH) at minimum
5%; total number of shareholders (SH); number and percentage of common shareholders (i.e. share-
holders with more than one firm in their portfolio).
Year Number Number (%) Firms Number Number (%)of Firms Cross-held by BH of SH Common SH
2007 23,624 15,454 (65.41) 97,578 14,570 (14.93)
2008 24,453 15,891 (64.99) 100,856 14,799 (14.67)
2009 24,910 15,883 (63.76) 101,190 14,959 (14.78)
2010 25,307 16,001 (63.23) 105,803 15,398 (14.55)
2011 25,493 16,059 (62.99) 104,798 14,772 (14.10)
2012 25,515 16,203 (63.50) 105,237 14,733 (14.00)
2013 26,090 17,800 (68.23) 107,430 14,991 (13.95)
2014 26,375 18,235 (69.14) 113,071 15,599 (13.80)
2015 26,282 17,678 (67.26) 120,307 16,196 (13.46)
2016 25,995 17,460 (67.17) 126,810 16,236 (12.80)
The distribution of the size and intensity of portfoliosix varies enormously, and only a lim-
ited group of top investors presents significant values. Table II reports the indices measuring
common shareholding for the top portfolio in terms of market penetration.
The top portfolio holds as many as 25% of the firms in the market x (column “Density”
in Table II), i.e. more than 6 thousand companies, steadily through the decade. Additionally,
the value-based indices (column “Tot. assets density”) reveal that the firms included in the
largest portfolios represent a significant proportion of the total value of the market, reaching a
coverage of above 80% of Total Assets and more than 90% of Market Capitalisation in almost
all years (column “MKT CAP density”). This means that the top investors not only hold shares
in a considerable number of firms, but also typically choose the largest enterprises, leaving
out only minor players - which together do not account for more than 10-20% of the market
value. Also of note is that both indices have been increasing over time, showing that the
preference for the largest market players has become stronger over time.
Looking at the weighted indices (which account for the concomitant shareholding and the
value of the companies held), we see that the proportion of market value held by the
top common shareholder through its participation shares is rather tangible, showing values
above 3% - and increasing - for Market Capitalisation. For Total Assets even higher
values are observed, with a steep increase in the last years to values above 6%.
viiiSee He, J., and Huang, J., 2017, "Product Market Competition in a World of Cross-Ownership: Evidence from
Institutional Blockholdings". The Review of Financial Studies, vol. 30, no. 8, pp. 2674-2718.
ixA portfolio is defined by the set of firms where an investor holds shares in a specific market. The size of a portfolio
reflects the number of included firms, while the intensity is determined by the amount of shares held in each firm.
xThe term “market” refers, here and onwards, to the set of listed firms active in the EU, unless otherwise stated.
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Table II: Common shareholding indices for listed firms active in the EU: top player.
NOTE - Density: Proportion of firms in a shareholder’s portfolio relative to the total number of anal-
ysed firms. Tot. assets density: Proportion of Total Assets of the analysed firms represented by the
firms in portfolio. Weighted Tot assets density: Proportion of Total Assets of the analysed firms held by
shareholder through participation shares. MKT CAP density: Proportion of Market Capitalisation of the
analysed firms represented by the firms in portfolio. Weighted MKT CAP density: Proportion of Market
Capitalisation of the analysed firms held by shareholder through participation shares.
Year Density Tot. assets Weighted tot. MKT CAP Weighted MKTdensity assets density density CAP density
2007 25.29 75.86 2.29 86.74 2.34
2008 25.79 79.78 3.62 85.95 2.38
2009 25.42 79.04 4.11 89.20 3.11
2010 26.02 81.71 3.21 91.20 3.38
2011 25.81 83.91 2.88 91.84 3.33
2012 25.59 83.83 2.87 90.32 3.11
2013 24.84 85.01 5.52 91.50 3.42
2014 23.92 86.97 5.82 91.16 3.43
2015 23.85 87.65 6.27 91.38 3.67
2016 23.87 88.37 6.32 92.58 3.86
The portfolio composition of common shareholders varies largely with the investor in terms
of nationality of the firms held. For companies based in the EU, the most frequent countries
of registration are the UK, Germany, France and Italy. However, many firms active in the EU
are registered outside Europe (around 40%), with a large representation of the US. Given that
the major common shareholders hold large participation stakes in US-based corpo-
rations, they could be able in turn to influence the European industries through the
firms that US companies hold in the EU. This adds to the direct participation that such
investors hold in EU-based companies, completing the picture of their potential influence in
the EU. Table III summarises some key figures about the top investors in the EU market. The
so-called "Big Three" (BlackRock, State Street and Vanguard) are highlighted in bold.
Four large funds stand out with portfolios currently including more than 20% of the listed firms
active in Europe, namely BlackRock, Dimensional Fund, Norwayxi and Vanguard. In terms of
time trend, both BlackRock and Vanguard show an increase in size over time, while Dimen-
sional has been shrinking a little, and Norway is overall stable. Positioned only slightly behind
are Axa, Deutsche Bank, Fidelity (FMR) and JP Morgan Chase, which started out above 20% at
the beginning of the period of observation, but have decreased their number of firms held over
time, currently holding between 12.5% and 16.2%. On a lower but stable level are Bank of
New York Mellon, State Street and Teachers Insurance, with around 17%, while Credit Suisse,
Goldman Sachs and Invesco show smaller declining portfolios, currently standing at 13%.
xiThe term "Norway" (the state) is used as an abbreviation to indicate the Norwegian Sovereign Fund. The same is
intended for the references to other states, where France or Sweden, for instance, refer to the respective sovereign
funds.
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Table III: Top investors - size and intensity of portfolios of listed firms active in the EU in 2016 (ordered
by % of TOAS held). "Big Three" highlighted in bold.
NOTE - Size of portfolios (number of listed firms active in the EU owned by each investor); Relative size
of portfolios (% of listed firms active in the EU owned by each investor); Intensity of portfolio (Average
participation shares); Proportion of TOAS held in portfolio (through participations in listed firms active in
the EU); Proportion of MKT CAP held in portfolio (through participations in listed firms active in the EU).
Name Country No. Firms % Firms Avg. shares % TOAS % Mkt Cap
BLACKROCK US 6052 23.3 3.26 2.69 3.86
VANGUARD US 6006 23.1 2.84 2.04 3.46
STATE STREET US 4346 16.7 1.37 1.14 2.03
NORWAY NO 5316 20.5 1.27 0.89 1.05
FMR LLC US 3378 13.0 2.87 0.68 1.44
JP MORGAN CHASE US 4208 16.2 1.12 0.61 0.77
INVESCO BM 3335 12.8 1.56 0.42 0.60
DIMENSIONAL FUND US 6204 23.9 1.40 0.41 0.46
BANK OF NY MELLON US 4289 16.5 0.83 0.39 0.74
UBS CH 3331 12.6 0.85 0.37 0.47
NORTHERN TRUST US 3081 11.9 0.83 0.32 0.57
TEACHERS INSURANCE US 3885 15.0 0.60 0.26 0.52
DEUTSCHE BANK DE 3474 13.4 0.70 0.26 0.40
AXA FR 3261 12.5 0.97 0.23 0.35
MORGAN STANLEY US 2976 11.5 0.74 0.22 0.41
GOLDMAN SACHS US 3447 13.3 0.72 0.21 0.37
BNP PARIBAS FR 2070 8.0 0.75 0.20 0.21
CREDIT SUISSE CH 3378 13.0 0.46 0.18 0.26
ALLIANZ DE 2651 10.2 1.00 0.15 0.24
BARCLAYS UK 1841 7.1 0.82 0.10 0.09
Sectoral results
This report analyses in more detail five sectors: Oil&Gas, Electricity, Mobile Telecoms, Trading
Platforms and Beverages. The relative concentration (limited number of firms with large mar-
ket shares) and the existence of a topical expertise on market players (due to recent antitrust
or merger investigations) motivated the choice. For these industries, common shareholding
patterns more or less mirror the general trends found for the listed firms active in the EU.
Portfolios of common shareholders continue to be very large in all five sectors, in some cases
including between 30% to 40% of active companies (Electricity and Oil&Gas sectors). Again,
in all studied sectors the inclusion of firms in the portfolios of common shareholders continues
to be based on size, with excluded firms only representing around 10% of the industry Total
Assets. Once weighted by the respective holdings, the top investors show joint ownership of
large portions of the considered industries, as depicted in Figure I for the Big Three (BlackRock,
State Street and Vanguard).
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Figure I: Total market shares (%) held jointly by the "Big three" - BlackRock, State Street and Vanguard.
Based on Total Assets and Market Capitalisation, over 2007-2016.
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The comparison of portfolios of large investors also highlights:
 a wide overlap of strategies, in many cases without evidence of differential investments.
The largest funds (BlackRock, Vanguard and State Street) show almost coincident portfo-
lios, investing in the same companies, with correlations as high as 90% repeatedly over
the years, in all considered sectors;
 State-owned funds also play a major role in the EU, especially in Norway and in Sweden,
but also in France in the Oil&Gas, Electricity and Telecoms sectors;
 the Energy sectors see the appearance of further public players such as China, Russia
and Korea, especially in Electricity.
As an example, Figure II reports the trend in portfolio sizes of top investors in the Beverages
industry over the decade of observation. The funds steadily hold stakes in between 20 and
25% of the market players, while banks have been diminishing their holdings, initially reaching
about 25% of the market, while currently down to 10-15% of the players. The acquisition
of part of Barclays’ portfolio under the BlackRock-Barclays Global Investors merger of 2009
emerges clearly from the picture.
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Figure II: Beverages Manufacturers sector - Top investors. Relative size of portfolios over 2007-2016:
proportion of firms in market owned by each investor (%).
Thresholds of holdings
A final note examines the intensity of the investments, i.e. specific thresholds for the level of
participation. Recent literaturexii investigated the role of block-holders as effective monitors
of the firms held. Particular attention has been given to investors whose portfolios present
multiple block-holdings, suggesting strong links to the common shareholding investigation.
The very few existing empirical studies on common shareholding, all based on non-EU firms,
consider block-holding as defined by thresholds of 5%. This is mostly due to data availability
and not to a specific economic meaning of the chosen value. In the interest of truly under-
standing the full extent of this phenomenon, particularly in the context of the EU, this report
experiments with new thresholds in the definition of block-holders, namely using minimum
equity investments of 1, 3 and 5 per cent. We perform the analysis only for the five sectoral
studies.
xiiKang, J. K., Luo, J., and Na, H. S., 2018, "Are institutional investors with multiple blockholdings effective monitors?",
Journal of Financial Economics, 128(3), pp. 576-602.
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The proportion of firms cross-held in each of the markets, for different levels of minimum
holding, continues to be very high, as in the case of the general analysis for the listed firms.
Figure III shows that in most markets, more than half of the firms are connected to at least
one competitor through a common shareholder holding 5% or more shares in both companies
(this grows to 60-70% if we consider common holdings above 3%). Only in Beverages is this
proportion slightly lower (about 45%), while in Telecoms we see higher interconnection of firms
through corporate groups.
The general picture suggests a strong presence of common shareholding in all industries, and
in particular the existence of a considerable number of investors with high-intensity portfolios,
influencing a large number of firms even when applying higher holding thresholds.
Figure III: Proportion (%) of firms cross-held over 2007-2016 by one or more investors, relative to total
number of firms in each market. Different thresholds of minimum holdings.
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Linking common shareholding and market performance of companies
The investigation of a causal link between the presence of common shareholding in a market
and its competitive outcomes poses several challenges. The first is the definition of a market
of reference (i.e. the identification of companies belonging to that market). The official code
of activity (NACE code) has proven to be insufficient in identifying the main players in all of
the five analysed markets; the NACE code does not exist for specific activities, such as trading
platforms or mobile telecoms, for example. Therefore, together with specialists, we have
manually identified the relevant companies belonging to each of the five markets.
The second challenge has been the measurement of common shareholding itself. The most
popular tool used in the academic literature to assess the effects of common shareholding
is the so-called Modified Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (MHHI), which captures the increase in
effective market concentration introduced by the presence of common shareholders. Never-
theless, it fails to measure directly the extent of common shareholding itself. As alternatives,
the few existing empirical studies have generally limited the measurement of common share-
holding to a small set of descriptive measures. Examples include the proportion of common
shareholders among all the investors present in a market; or the proportion of firms that are
cross-held by a common holder, for a certain level of ownership. Still, several other aspects
of investors’ behaviour and of portfolios’ composition can help to draw a more precise picture
of the phenomenon. The same applies to the analysis of the firms’ shareholding structures,
which can reveal interesting patterns of overlap in a given market. For these reasons, in the
present investigation, we used techniques based on two main groups of methodologies, com-
ing from the Sparsity and Network literature respectively, to derive new indicators for the
overall investigation of common shareholding and for the econometric analysis.
The choice of an appropriate competition indicator has been another challenge in linking com-
mon shareholding to firms’ performances. The ideal candidate would be the use of prices.xiii
However, data (un)availability at product level, or the extremely high cost of these data, may
compel the consideration of alternative measures of market power and/or market concentra-
tion based on balance sheet information at the firm level. Finally, additional issues need to be
addressed in the specification of an econometric strategy that allows for the identification of
a causal relationship.xiv
Although the economic literature finds some evidence of the existence of an effect of common
shareholding on market performance in specific US industries, overall the results are mixed
and difficult to generalise to other markets/countries. At the EU level, there are only a couple
of studies looking at a few top players in specific industries, and a sector-wide analysis is still
xiiiThe seminal paper of Azar and co-authors use the airlines prices to show to what extent an increase in common
shareholding influences competition.
xivAmong others: exogenous variation of common shareholding that can induce a shift in market competition; the
assessment of the degree of exposure of firms active in the market to the common shareholding variation; and the
choice of appropriate control variables to account for firms’ and market characteristics.
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missing. In this report a tentative empirical model is estimated based on Beverages data, in
which a selection of the new common shareholding indicators is used.
An application: effects of the BlackRock-BGI merger on Beverages manufacturers
The study considers the exogenous shock in ownership that followed the BlackRock-Barclays
Global Investors (BGI) merger of 2009. The impact of the change in common shareholding
induced by the BlackRock-BGI merger is estimated using a difference-in-differences approach.
We compare - before and after the event - the markup of firms exposed to the merger (treated
group) to that of firms that did not have any pre-merger relations with BlackRock and/or BGI
(control group). The markup is measured through the relative price-cost margin, also known
as the Lerner Index.
The specific market under investigation is defined by the set of Beverages manufacturers
active in the EU between 2007 and 2016, namely either through being registered in the EU, or
holding shares in at least one firm in this geographic area. The study includes a set of selected
beverages products, namely soft drinks, mineral waters, juices and beers. Observations over
the two years before the merger permits the study of the degree of dependence of the firms on
each of the two institutional investors, as well as the determination of analogies of behaviour
between such firms and those not connected to any of the investors before 2009.
The estimations performed indicate that the merger between BlackRock and BGI did in fact
have an effect on markups of the firms in their portfolios. After the merger, firms that were
already held by BlackRock and/or BGI show - on average - a Lerner index 0.07 points higher
than that of firms without any participation by BlackRock/BGI, suggesting that the merger trig-
gered an increase in profitability of firms already exposed to BlackRock and/or BGI. Analogous
results are obtained using an alternative competition measure as an outcome. We find that
the increase in profitability seems to be driven more by an increase in revenues rather than a
decrease in costs.
We also find that the impact of the merger seems to be positively related to time, as the
Lerner Index significantly increases with the number of years. Two and three years on from
the merger, treated firms show a Lerner Index approximately 0.06 points larger than that of
control firms, reaching the maximum value of 0.08 difference after 7 years, while disappearing
in the 8th year. The main intuition behind these findings is that the merger event prompted
a sizable increase in the Lerner Index in treated firms during the first years, after which the
market self-correction took place. We also explored the possibility that the degree of exposure
to the merger may influence the actual extent of the effect. We find that the effect is larger
for those companies which were only marginally part of the BlackRock or BGI portfolios before
the merger, having benefitted most from the event. In particular, the impact of the merger
for a firm held at 1% by BGI and/or BlackRock leads to an increase in the Lerner Index of
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0.10 points on average. Such an impact significantly reduces to 0.05 if the pre-merger quota
held increases to 4%. For firms with minority holdings of 5% or more, there seems to be no
significant impact on the Lerner Index.
Our results would appear to suggest a positive association between common shareholding and
the market power of firms. However, the findings of this study should be treated with caution;
in particular, the following caveats should be considered. First, earlier data on the common
shareholding structure of firms would help confirm that BlackRock and BGI in 2007 did not
specifically target companies that would have performed well after the crisis. We do not find
evidence of this, but our sample is limited. In a similar vein, multiple observations prior to the
merger would strengthen the evidence of a common trend between treated and control firms
- a key identifying assumption of the difference-in-differences design underlying the analysis.
Second, the study focuses only on the beverages sector, however, while carefully accounting
for other industries’ specificities and potential data shortcomings, the present methodology
could be applied to possible future investigations in other markets. Third, the Lerner Index
is used, following the literature, as a proxy of market competition; however, data on prices
or other outcome of the competitive process would help reinforce the evidence on common
shareholding and competitive outcomes, as it would facilitate controlling for the heterogeneity
of products sold by firms. Moreover, any country/product specific changes in the market could
be factored in.
A final observation is due, concerning possible unobservable factors that may have affected
profitability, other than the merger under consideration. There are a series of possible mech-
anisms of influence through which asset managers may affect a firm’s competitive outcome.
Typically, such mechanisms include network effects, general policy consensus between asset
managers, or even a specific threshold in ownership that allows for effective leverage, under
which a shareholder in practice does not have a strong impact. These factors were not directly
observable in the present study and potentially could be further investigated, depending on
the availability of additional specific data. In reality, the phenomenon of common sharehold-
ing proved to be particularly complex, and disentangling its various effects continues to be
challenging. Given that the literature in this area has not yet investigated in depth the chan-
nels through which influence is exerted, this certainly constitutes a good candidate for future
research.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Multiple academic papers point out to common shareholding as a new potential anticompet-
itive device, and policy makers acknowledge that the issue merits to be monitored. Scholars
have raised concerns that common shareholding can have anticompetitive effects when the
owners have majority control over at least one of the firms they own in the same compet-
ing market. Yet, little is known about common shareholding by institutional investors: their
control seems to be limited to minority shareholdings; however, they collect the voting rights
of their customers, therefore gaining some influence over the management decisions of the
firms they are mandated to invest in. These funds have grown considerably both in total size
and concentration. As a result, wealth fund managers have acquired substantial shares - al-
ways on behalf of their customers - in a large number of firms that are in many cases direct
competitors, creating a new corporate governance setup.
As shown in the papers published recently by José Azar and Michael Schmalz,1 a major concern
is that these common shareholdings, though in minority shares, may create competition dis-
tortions in certain sectors. However, the possible effects of common shareholders on market
efficiency and competition have only been investigated in a small number of specific indus-
tries, and no consensus has been reached concerning a more general effect on the economy.
Minority shareholders
The case that recently attracted the attention of scholars and policy makers typically refers to
common shareholders of competing firms according to the following distinctive setting: (i) they
legally own shares of stock in a public or private corporation, holding a minority of the given
corporation’s outstanding shares with less than 50% of the voting rights (also called minority
1See for example Azar et al. (2017, 2018, 2019), Schmalz (2017, 2018).
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interest or non-controlling interest), and (ii) they adopt a passive engagement style. Minority
shareholders can take the form of both individual retail investors, or institutional investors
(for example pension funds, mutual funds, hedge funds, endowment funds, investment banks,
insurance companies and commercial trusts).
There are a number of features differentiating institutional investors from individual share-
holders. First, institutional shareholders account for half of the volume of trades on many
Stock Exchanges, and - moving large blocks of shares - have an enormous influence on the
stock market’s movements and prices. Due to their substantial resources and specialised
knowledge, institutional investors are able to extensively research a variety of investment op-
tions not directly accessible to retail investors. Second, the institutional players invest other
people’s financial resources not directly raised by themselves. In addition, being considered
as knowledgeable by Securities and Stock Exchange Commissions, institutional investors are
generally subject to fewer of the protective regulations usually applied to other individual
financial players.
Due to their stakes positions and the power they exert on capital markets, institutional in-
vestors may influence management decisions, such as the election or removal of officers in
the board of directors, or vote or veto against board decisions. In reality, asset management
funds (AMF) are showing growing interest in taking further control over the decisions of firms
they are mandated to invest in.2 The boom in the amount of assets under management
(AUMs) of these funds, together with the enhanced concentration of the industry, is a striking
phenomenon taking place on stock markets.3 As a side effect, the increasing share of interna-
tional savings invested in stock markets and managed by a handful of institutional investors
- together with their associated voting rights - has shaped a new landscape of corporate con-
trol, and the impact of AMFs on the corporate governance of listed firms has received growing
attention. In particular, just as AMFs seek to influence listed firms’ CEOs in favour of socially
sensitive issues, one may wonder whether AMFs influence managerial decisions in other areas
- deliberately or not.
AMFs are typically assumed to be passive shareholders. A passive shareholder is a share-
holder who does not actively attempt to influence managerial decisions, but rather diversifies
her portfolio and adopts a “vote with one’s feet” attitude. A passive fund manager is subject
to two major restrictions, however. First, she must invest in a pre-determined class of stocks
stated in the statutes of the fund, e.g. geography, industry, firm size. Second, AMFs shares
2See, for instance, the statement issued by Laurence Fink, CEO of BlackRock, Inc., in his January 2018 Letter to
CEOs: “Society is demanding that companies, both public and private, serve a social purpose. [...] We must be
active, engaged agents on behalf of the clients invested with BlackRock, who are the true owners of your company.
This responsibility goes beyond casting proxy votes at annual meetings - it means investing the time and resources
necessary to foster long-term value.”
3For instance BlackRock holding is estimated to ca. $7.4 trillion AUMs. In their latest report, BlackRock displays two-
thirds of AUMs in stock markets, which would represent 5% of the estimated $90 trillion world market capitalization.
Besides, ca. $2 trillion of the BlackRock AUMs are invested in active management funds, ten times as much as the
fair value of stocks held by Berkshire Hathaway - ca. $200 billion as of December 31, 2019 - whose CEO and main
owner Warren Buffet is renowned for his influence on financial markets.
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must remain within the stated asset class, and derivatives instruments and short sales are
typically disallowed. The so called passively managed funds are the index funds, whereby
investments are distributed across companies in the same proportions as the stock index,
whatever the amounts received from customers. On the other hand, managers of so-called
“actively” managed funds may freely select firms within the predetermined class of stocks;
their performance is eventually compared with the stock class’ market benchmarks.4 In par-
ticular, passively managed funds were assumed to be passive shareholders, however this
statement is contradicted by the large passive funds such as BlackRock, Vanguard or States
Street, which claim to be ‘passive investors, but active owners’. For example, Glenn Booraem,
controller of Vanguard, states in 2013: “We believe that our active engagement on all man-
ner of issues demonstrates that passive investors don’t need to be passive owners”.5 Similar
statements about active engagement have been made by other major funds.6
Possible effects of common shareholding
common shareholding may induce anticompetitive effects stemming from a number of mech-
anisms. First, reducing competition may be explicit, through personal engagement with man-
agers. Softened competition allows common shareholders to extract consumers’ utility through
cartels and maximise corporate profits, just as monopolistic firms would do. Through a related,
but non-explicit mechanism, AMFs may systematically vote in favour of less competitive dy-
namics because, as a diversified shareholder, they control votes across firms. José Azar and
Martin Schmalz rather emphasise this latter mechanism (see for instance the chronicle in Azar
et al., 2017).
Both mechanisms assume that the gains a firm may extract from additional market shares
are taken away from another firm, and diversified AMFs would thus be even overall. For
instance, the design and development of a new car model may be less relevant to diversified
AMFs, since the new model would take away market shares from another car producer, rather
than increasing the overall industry sales and enhancing shareholders’ profits. CEOs know
this, and thus expend less efforts in outperforming competitors. Evidence provided in the
4It is important to note that active management fund managers are not shareholder activists. Shareholder activists
typically are unregulated hedge funds that publicly and “actively” demand changes in management decisions and take
action through, e.g., media campaigns and proxy voting. Activists typically ask for short-term decisions including cash-
holdings distribution and tender offer acceptance, even board members change. Activists are hostile to entrenched
managers and enhance shareholder rights. Also, activists target a few companies and are little diversified. Examples
of famous activists are Elliott Associates and Icahn Associates. Studies that looked at the effects of hedge fund attacks
include Brav et al. (2008) and Bebchuk et al. (2015).
5See article “Passive Investors, Not Passive Owners” by Glenn Booraem in April 2013, available
at Vanguard’s corporate site https://global.vanguard.com/portal/site/institutional/ch/en/articles/
research-and-commentary/topical-insights/passive-investors-passive-owners-tlor
6The Financial Times presented similar views by State Street on 6 April 2014 in the article “Passive investment,
active ownership” and by Dimensional Fund on 16 March 2013 in “Challenging Management (but Not the Market)”.
For an overview, see Appel (2016).
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literature, showing that CEOs compensation schemes are indexed to industry rather than firm
performances, supports such a hypothesis.7
Another effect relates to the previously mentioned shareholder activists. By establishing a
compact and stable pool of shareholders, AMFs may create a disincentive for shareholder
activists. Activists are viewed as a major instrument against entrenched managers; AMFs may
deter such attacks and reduce shareholders’ rights, not just competition.
The literature on the effects of common shareholding finds its motivation in the theoretical
papers on partial ownership developed by Bresnahan and Salop (1986) and O’Brien and Salop
(2000) in which they design an economic framework for the analysis of the competitive effects
of partial ownership of common shares. The analysis depends on two separate and distinct
elements, i.e. financial interest and corporate control in determining a firms’ pricing incen-
tives. Compared to a merger analysis, which assumes that the acquiring firm automatically
controls the acquired entity, in partial ownership the corporate control and financial interests
are separable elements and their interplay may harm competition in a greater or lesser way
than the case of a complete merger. As highlighted in O’Brien and Waehrer (2017), the theory
of partial ownership in the above papers encompasses what this line of research calls “com-
mon ownership”, as a case where two or more competing firms have a common shareholder
that partially owns each of them.
The empirical literature usually refers to a set of papers that analyse the level of common
shareholding of US publicly-listed companies in certain selected industries. For instance, the
paper of Azar et al. (2018), henceforth “AST airline paper,” analyses the effects of minority
common shareholdings on airfares. Using fixed-effect panel regressions, they show a correla-
tion between common shareholding concentration and an increase in airfares for some airlines
routes of around 3-7% on average, compared to the case under separate ownership. Alongside
higher prices, reduced incentives to compete due to common shareholding generate a lower
output, with a large decrease in market efficiency and a transfer from consumers to firms.
Recently, Dennis et al. (2019) further tested the empirical evidence on the relationship be-
tween airfares and common shareholding in the airline industry documented in the AST paper.
Adjusting for several aspects, such as (i) cash flow and control rights of equity holders, (ii) the
measure of control rights to apply only to shares for which the institutions have unique voting
rights, and (iii) accounting for the endogeneity of market concentration and prices, they found
no relationship between common shareholding and prices in this industry.
The paper of Azar et al. (2019), henceforth “ARS banking paper”, analyses whether variations
in bank concentration due to common shareholding help to explain the variation of prices
in the banking market. The authors use a dataset containing information on interest rates
and fees on deposit accounts at branch-level in the US credit market from 2003 to 2013,
finding that changes in the HHI do not correlate with changes in either fees, thresholds, or
7See for instance Antón et al. (2018), Gilje et al. (2019).
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deposit spreads. In particular, they also show that monopsony power of depository institutions
generated through common shareholding and cross-ownership links has a strong correlation
with prices in the market for deposits.
In their paper, Antón et al. (2018) (henceforth, “AEGS paper”) examine variation in the extent
to which different shareholders in the US industry have different economic incentives to induce
their firms to compete, and whether managerial incentives reflect these shareholder prefer-
ences. The AEGS paper shows that the sensitivity between a top manager’s wealth and their
firm’s performance is weaker when the firm’s largest shareholders are also large shareholders
of competitors. The wealth-performance relationship for managers is steeper when firms are
owned by shareholders without significant stakes in competitors.
In a related paper, Appel et al. (2016) examined whether passive institutional investors in-
fluenced firms’ governance structures and their performance. The study exploits variations
in the ownership - by passive mutual funds - of US firms associated with stock assignments
to the Russell 1000 and 2000 indexes. The authors show that passive institutional investors
are not active owners in the traditional sense of buying or selling shares with the purpose
of influencing management, but they are not passive owners either. In particular, ownership
by passively-managed mutual funds was associated with more independent directors, fewer
takeover defensive movements, and more equal voting rights. These funds are attentive to
firms’ corporate governance, and they use their large voting blocks to exercise voice and ex-
ert influence. Companies with greater ownership by passive funds exert influence, exhibit
improvements in long-term performance, and are less likely to be targeted for activism by
active hedge funds.
These studies, however, have been subject to harsh criticism from wealth fund managers.
In their ViewPoint document (BlackRock, 2017) BlackRock top management members ex-
plain that the wealth management business model hardly matches the mechanisms described
above. The document highlights the complex mechanisms present in the voting decisions of
AMFs. In particular, AMFs are composed of a variety of funds with various objectives. Bylaws
of index funds constrain the latter to invest in index companies and represent long-term and
stable shareholders. The authors emphasise how they differ from activists who are short-term
investors. The document stresses that “engagement is a way to influence and monitor firms
on best practices in advance of using the ultimate sanctions – voting against particular pro-
posals or directors – and consequently engagement and voting go hand-in-hand in carrying
out an assert manager’s responsibilities.” The authors argue that they promote corporate
governance using engagement techniques rather than public hostility; similar arguments are
found in Larry Fink’s 2018 Letter to CEOs.8
8In Fink (2018): “Where activists do offer valuable ideas [...] we encourage companies to begin discussions early,
to engage with shareholders like BlackRock, and to bring other critical shareholders to the table. But when a company
waits until a proxy proposal to engage or fails to express its long-term strategy in a compelling manner, we believe
the opportunity for meaningful dialogue has often already been missed.”
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The current debate
The debate on common shareholding - and its potential antitrust effects - is currently on the
agenda of all major think tanks and institutions worldwide. In December 2017 Paris hosted an
OECD Competition Policy Roundtable on "Common ownership by institutional investors and its
impact on competition", which built on a previous roundtable held in 2008 entitled "Minority
Shareholdings and Interlocking Directorates". According to the OECD event report,9 in the last
ten years several developments occurred, including a "rapid growth in passively-managed
investment funds, [which] has had a significant impact on the ownership structure of large
firms in several industries". It is also stated that "Recent econometric studies have expressed
differing views of the likely impact on competitive conditions of common ownership by insti-
tutional investors or other large financial firms. However, measuring the impact of common
ownership and using competition policy to address any associated competition problems can
be challenging".
More recently, in May 2018, the European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) dedicated a
focus panel of its Annual Members’ Meeting to "Common Ownership: Antitrust Meets Corpo-
rate Governance". The session was open to the public and comprised interventions by Barbara
Novick, BlackRock’s Vice-Chairman; Greg Medcraft, Director of the OECD Directorate for Finan-
cial and Enterprise Affairs; and Xavier Vives, professor of Economics and Finance, Abertis Chair
of Regulation, Competition and Public Policy, at IESE Business School. According to the ECGI
Event Report,10 "The discussion brought out very clearly the tension between increased stew-
ardship and governance involvement on the one hand, and concerns about potential collusion
between competing firms having the same shareholders."
The last "Viewpoint" of the International Corporate Governance Network issued in October
2018 (see ICGN, 2018) states that "the reality of common ownership is not in dispute, but its
impacts are".
Finally, in the US, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) organised a public hearing on common
shareholding in December 2018. While the representatives of relevant US federal agencies
(the FTC and the Securities and Exchange Commissions) considered that changes in antitrust
and corporate governance regulations would be premature at this stage, they declared nev-
ertheless that the effects of common concentrated ownership on competition across the US
economy deserve close and careful study.11
All discussions point to the increased need of sound studies that allow for the measurement
of such potential impacts. The main existing empirical studies are limited to specific sectors
such as airlines (Azar et al., 2018; Kennedy et al., 2017; Dennis et al., 2019; Schmalz, 2018),
9See http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/common-ownership-and-its-impact-on-competition.htm
10See https://ecgi.global/sites/default/files/events/2018_annual_members_meeting.pdf
11US Federal Trade Commission public hearing on “Common ownership”, 6 December 2018, see https://www.ftc.
gov/news-events/events-calendar/ftc-hearing-8-competition-consumer-protection-21st-century.
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banking (Azar et al., 2019; Schmalz, 2018) or pharmaceuticals (Newham et al., 2018). Some
scholars also began to debate measurement issues in order to improve on the state-of-the-art
Modified Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (MHHI) (see Gilje et al., 2019).
Data on ownership is generally limited to US publicly-listed firms. Nevertheless, European
markets are equally in danger of a steep rise in passive investment. As stated by John Authers
in the Financial Times12 in September 2018: "As passive is a far bigger share of the US mar-
kets than of any counterpart elsewhere in the world, this looks like an invitation for passive
providers to pile into the rest of the world". However, not much empirical evidence is currently
available on institutional investments and common shareholding in Europe. Seldeslacht et al.
(2017) present an overview of ownership of German companies by institutional investors in
selected industries. Pagliari and Graham (2019) propose the analysis of a counter-shock in
ownership, i.e. the case of two commonly held airports whose ownership was separated. Re-
cent reports by the Monopolies Commission (2018) and by the European Parliament (2020)
investigated the extent of common shareholding in Europe, however their investigation is lim-
ited in scope to specific geographic areas or industries.
The Monopolies Commission in Germany, an independent expert advisory body, analysed the
situation of common shareholding at national level and across certain other Member States in
its 2018 report.13 The report indicates that many institutional investors hold several portfo-
lio companies active in a given economic sector. Moreover, several companies can be found
simultaneously in the portfolio of several of the largest institutional investors. The Monopo-
lies Commission concluded that there is considerable potential for competition distortion and
recommended a close monitoring of the situation at the European level.
The study on common shareholding commissioned by the European Parliament’s Committee
on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) is aimed at providing supporting analysis for the
ECON members.14 The ECON study contains a brief case study describing common sharehold-
ings in the banking sector, considering the first 15 largest shareholders for a sample of 25 of
the largest publicly listed banks in Europe (in the time window 2012-2015). Contrary to the
present report, the European Parliament study does not perform an econometric analysis of
links between the levels of common shareholding and firms’ competitive performance. It fo-
cuses, instead, on providing some measures of common shareholdings in the banking sector,
together with a very brief description of voting and engagement policies of the main com-
mon shareholders. The study acknowledges that common shareholding is well present in the
banking sector, with BlackRock being the largest common shareholder. The largest part of the
ECON study is devoted to an overview of the key arguments in the debate about potential
theories of harm relating to common shareholdings (unilateral and coordinated effects). The
12See Opinion "The long view" of 1st September 2018 entitled "Have we seen a peak in passive investing for the
US?", https://www.ft.com/content/99d13606-ad2a-11e8-94bd-cba20d67390c
13Available at https://www.monopolkommission.de/images/HG22/Main_Report_XXII_Common_Ownership.pdf
14See Frazzani et al. (2020), available at https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2020/
652708/IPOL_STU(2020)652708_EN.pdf
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study assesses how these potential effects could be captured by EU competition law (merg-
ers control, but also application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU) and recalls in particular the
debate around possible modification of the EU Merger Regulation to capture non-controlling
shareholdings. However, it is important to note that the study does not support any potential
policy/legislative initiatives. The ECON study concludes that “whether and in which circum-
stances common ownership is beneficial or deleterious for competition, innovation, and, ulti-
mately, citizen welfare is still an open debate” and that more research is needed to understand
this. The authors caution that, “unless there is evidence that common ownership does indeed
negatively impact competition in the EU banking sector, amending the current competition law
toolbox to address any as yet unproven competition law concerns about such a phenomenon
could be premature”.
The present report represents, to the best of our knowledge, the first comprehensive study on
firms’ ownership in the EU, shedding light upon the picture of common shareholding and iden-
tifying the main investors in all listed firms active in the EU15 and in five strategic industries:
Oil&Gas, Electricity, Telecommunications, Trading Platforms and Beverages Manufacturers.
The study of the five selected sectors is not limited to publicly listed companies, but includes
all major players - public and private - active in the EU, i.e. either registered in the EU,
or registered outside but holding participations in European firms. This includes major non-
EU corporations that exert influence on the European markets, which in turn are influenced
by several common minority shareholders. The role of such shareholders, therefore, is not
enacted solely through direct participation in European firms, but also indirectly via foreign
investments.
Additionally, the present report also includes an attempt to measure through an econometric
model the possible effect of common shareholding on firms’ profitability. Specifically, the
study presents an empirical analysis of the effects of the BlackRock-Barclays Global Investors
(BGI) merger on profitability of the manufacturers of beverages (soft drinks, waters, juices and
beers) active in the EU during 2007-2016.
Report overview
The report starts by considering some possible methodological strategies for the measurement
of common shareholding. We first review the current knowledge, together with its growing cri-
tiques. We then present a general framework for the analysis of common shareholding, where
we define the assumptions underlying the market and the players under analysis, identifying
the main measurement issues to be tackled.
15We recall that in this context the term EU comprises the 28 countries of the EU as of 2017, excluding candidate
countries and countries which are simply associates of the European Economic Area (EEA).
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A series of new indices of common shareholding are proposed, based on balance sheet and
ownership firm-level data available for this study. The indicators are linked to two main sets of
statistical methodologies, coming from the literature on sparsity and on networks, respectively.
The new indices cover both the firm and the investor’s perspectives, and are then aggregated
at market level to obtain suitable industry indicators.
The proposed common shareholding measures are then applied to firm-level data to illus-
trate the picture of common shareholding in the EU. The availability and suitability of data to
conduct the analysis is assessed. All firms’ information - regarding their ownership, financial
performance, area of activity, and other characteristics - is extracted from the Orbis commer-
cial database, provided by Bureau van Dijk, covering the period 2007-2016. A first overview of
the phenomenon is obtained considering all listed firms active in Europe in the given period,
i.e. all those registered in the EU territory plus any listed firm that is registered elsewhere but
holds shares in at least one firm registered in the EU. After the general picture, the analysis
focuses on five specific industries: Oil&Gas, Electricity, Mobile Telecommunications, Trading
Platforms and Beverages.
A series of indicators is presented, describing the investment behaviour of shareholders both
at industry-level and at investor-level. The strength of relationships within the networks of
firms and of investors is also studied. Special attention is devoted to the top investors within
the EU overall and within each industry, and a brief overview of cross-investments within
industries is also reported, when relevant. Finally, specific indicators are calculated for the
’Big Three’ - BlackRock, State Street and Vanguard - whose investment behaviour is looked at
in detail.
The sectoral studies continue with the analysis of the intensity of shareholders’ investments
(level of holdings), and its effects on various common shareholding indicators, both at investor
and at market-level. The study considers different thresholds of a firm’s ownership, namely
holdings of minimum 1, 3, 5 and 10 percent of shares. New indicators of common shareholding
based on thresholds are also constructed for individual investors and for the overall network
of shareholders.
Several issues are then considered to test causality between common shareholding and com-
petition, including suitable firms’ competitive outcomes, and the calculation of alternative
indicators. Various econometric strategies are proposed, following alternative choices of com-
petition measures and of specifications of the possible anticompetitive effects. The five sectors
are then compared as possible candidates for the econometric analysis, which aims to assess
a possible causal link between common shareholding and competition.
The final part of the report presents an empirical analysis of the effects of the BlackRock-
Barclays Global Investors (BGI) merger on the profitability of manufacturers of beverages (soft
drinks, waters, juices and beers) active in the EU during 2007-2016. Besides changes in the
ownership of firms as generated by the merger, several other characteristics of firms are taken
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into account, such as the shareholding structure, the interconnectedness with competitors
through shareholders, the detailed industry classification, the size, and the pre- and post-
merger listing status.
The remainder of the report is organised as follows: Chapter 2 discusses the main issues
involved in the measurement of common shareholding, and proposes some new indicators.
Chapter 3 presents the general picture of common shareholding in the EU, while Chapter 4
reports the five sectoral studies dedicated to common shareholding in Oil&Gas, Electricity,
Telecommunications, Trading Platforms and Beverages. Chapter 5 looks at the intensity of
ownership in the five sectors, analysing the presence of block-holdings in investors’ portfolios.
Chapter 6 discusses possible avenues to follow in order to analyse the link between common
shareholding and competition. With the purpose of applying a thorough and solid econometric
model to the EU data, alternative specifications of causal models are proposed; the five sectors
are subsequently re-analysed as possible candidates for the empirical study. Finally, Chapter 7
presents the chosen econometric model, as well as its application to the EU Beverages sector.
Some further technical details are reported in the annexes, concerning, respectively, the
database construction (Appendix A); the proposed framework for the measurement of com-
mon shareholding (Appendix B); the identification of the five industries for the sectoral studies
(Appendix C); and finally some complements to the econometric analysis (Appendix D).
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Chapter 2
Measuring Common shareholding
The most popular tool used in the academic literature to assess the effects of common share-
holding is the so-called Modified Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (MHHI), which captures the dis-
tortion introduced in market competition by the presence of common shareholders. It does so
by correcting the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of competition according to the ownership
and control shares of common shareholders in competing companies. Nevertheless, it fails to
measure directly the extent of common shareholding itself.
As alternatives, the few existing empirical studies have generally limited the measurement of
common shareholding to a small set of descriptive measures. Examples are the proportion
of common shareholders among all the investors present in a market; or the proportion of
firms that are cross-held by a common holder, at a certain level of ownership. However,
several other aspects of investors’ behaviour and of portfolios’ composition can help draw
a more precise picture of the phenomenon. The same applies to the analysis of the firms’
shareholding structures, which can reveal interesting patterns of overlap in a given market.
In the present investigation, a series of statistical techniques are analysed, with the objec-
tive of identifying new indices of the extent of common shareholding that explore the above
dimensions.
The remainder of this Chapter is organised as follows: Section 2.1 reviews the existing mea-
sures of common shareholding used in the empirical analyses, highlighting limitations and
critiques recently raised by scholars. Section 2.2 prepares the framework for the pursuit of a
measure of the extent of common shareholding, defining working assumptions and pointing
out the main measurement issues to be tackled. It also illustrates them through a simple mar-
ket example. Section 2.3 describes briefly the firm-level information available for this study.
A set of new indices of common shareholding, based upon the available firm variables, is pro-
posed in Section 2.4. A full account of the database structure can be found in Appendix A,
while more technical details about the construction of the indices are reported in Appendix B.
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2.1 Existing measures of common shareholding
Studies investigating the effects of common shareholding have presented a series of descrip-
tive measures of the phenomenon, such as the number of competitors linked through a com-
mon shareholder, the proportion of a firm’s shares held by common shareholders, or still the
shares held by common shareholders in a firm’s competitors, and so on (see for instance,
He and Huang, 2017). Such descriptive measures have been used as firm-level explanatory
variables in models trying to capture the effect of common shareholding on markets, together
with other measures capturing the corporate ownership structure, such as the proportion of
atomistic shareholders of a firm.
One index which has become increasingly popular in the empirical studies on common share-
holding is the so-called Modified Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index (MHHI), a modified version of
the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI). The MHHI is a measure of competition that controls
for common shareholding across firms in the same industry. Its difference with respect to
the HHI - called the “delta” MHHI - has often been used as a proxy for the measurement of
common shareholding. As a matter of fact, it is not a direct measure of the level of common
shareholding in an industry, but rather of the distortion that the common shareholding of com-
peting firms may generate on competition in markets. Nevertheless, given its centrality and
its widespread use in the empirical literature on common shareholding, the MHHI will be briefly
presented here, together with its shortcomings.
The HHI assumes that market dispersion is a factor of competition, and equals the sum of
squared market shares (sj) of each firm j in a selected industry, i.e. HH =
∑
j s
2
j
. The HHI
is constructed in a competition setting à la Cournot, where firms compete in the market by
setting quantities. In such an environment, each firm j in the industry maximises the profit
of the shareholder, which does not have any other financial stakes in rival firms, and the
consequent markup - the ratio between the selling prices and cost prices - is proportional to
the firms’ HHI.
Under the assumption of constant marginal costs for competing firms in the industry - i.e., each
firm bears constant additional costs to increment an additional unit of product - the formula
predicts a positive correlation between greater concentration (high HHI) and higher prices in
the market. However, there is mixed evidence of a correlation between higher concentration
and prices. For instance, a firm may gain in production efficiency, while marginal costs de-
crease, yet eventually gain in market power; the HHI thus increases without an increase in
prices. In addition, the correlation between the HHI and prices does not reliably identify the
economic power of each player, leading to a possible bias in the assessment of the effective
competition in the market.
The HHI suffers from many weaknesses, such as (i) a strong sensitivity to the market defi-
nition, (ii) the lack of assigning the appropriate weights to smaller firms in the market, (iii)
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the inability to make product market and quality distinctions among competitors, and more
recently, and especially (iv) the failure to accurately reflect the real level of competition in the
presence of common shareholding, where common shares of institutional investors in multiple
competing firms are not accounted for. The consideration of shares held by a common share-
holder in competing firms is crucial, since it may affect their incentives to compete, lessening
competition in targeted markets and moving their equilibria closer to less competitive and less
efficient models such as oligopoly or monopoly. In particular, the assignment of lower weights
to firms having smaller market power but that are commonly owned by the same stockholder
may underestimate the importance of such firms in potential anticompetitive behaviours.
To overcome the problem of common stockholders, Bresnahan and Salop (1986) proposed a
modification of the HHI controlling for common shareholding across firms in the same industry.
The modified index was named MHHI (Modified HHI), and was first proposed in a theoretical
model to account for the change in competitive incentives of stockholders produced by an hor-
izontal joint venture. When the profits of the joint venture are shared by parent stockholders,
then parent’s incentives to expand output by lowering prices would be reduced, under certain
conditions. Later, O’Brien and Salop (2000) derived a formula to analyse the degree of mar-
ket concentration in a setting where competing firms were partially acquired by competitors
(cross-ownership). The general formula is given by:
MHH =
∑
j
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(2.1)
Following the notation in the AST airline paper, coefficient βj denotes the ownership shares of
firm j held by shareholder , and βk

the analogous quantity for firm k 6= j. On the other hand,
γ
j
 is the control share in firm j held by shareholder .
The MHHI breaks down the total market concentration into two parts (i) the standard industry
concentration, as measured by HHI, capturing the number and the relative dimension of com-
petitors; and (ii) the common shareholding concentration, called ΔMHHI, which captures how
natural competitors are connected by common shareholding. The MHHI represents the level
of concentration after the ownership’ acquisitions by common shareholders, and the change
of concentration “delta” is the difference between the post-ownership’ acquisition MHHI and
the pre-ownership’ acquisition HHI.
The recent empirical literature uses mainly the ΔMHHI as a measure of the lower incentive
of commonly-owned firms to compete. For example, assuming competing firms have distinct
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shareholders, then the ΔMHHI equals zero – the maximization of profits depends on the market
share of each firm and MHH = HH. On the other hand, supposing firms are commonly owned,
the ΔMHHI will then capture the difference in the level of concentration in the market due to
changes in ownership shares (βj) and the control shares of the shareholder  (γ
j
) in each firm
j, taking into account the ownership shares that the shareholder  owns in competitors (βk

).
Just like the HHI, the MHHI assumes that firms maximise the profits of their shareholders. Yet,
firms also maximise their profits taking into account the diversity among their shareholders
and their respective stakes in competing firms. The larger the share of ownership held by
common shareholders, the greater the financial interests of shareholders that a firm has to
maximise.
Shareholders may influence the objective production function of controlled firms to pursue
their financial interests by exerting their control shares and voting rights. Hence, ownership
and voting shares have implications for the mechanisms of corporate governance and conse-
quently for shareholders’ incentives to compete.
One of the main instruments utilised by shareholders to exert influence over corporate gov-
ernance is the so-called “voice.” The investors can communicate their financial, investment
and strategic plans regarding product markets to firms’ management through private or pub-
lic engagement meetings.1 Although it is still not clear if these possible strategies come from
engagement meetings of investors, or directly from members requested to sit on boards to
determine such strategies, the “voice” is proportional to the degree of ownership (βj) that the
shareholder  holds in (partially) owned firms’ j.
The last powerful instrument, or the last resort, utilised by shareholders to exert influence
on corporate strategies is the “vote” against firm’s management - as stated by the Black-
Rock proxy voting guidelines indicating that they vote against when direct engagement fails.2
The higher is the share of shareholders voting rights (γj), the greater will be the influence of
investors over management’s strategies.
The above analysis of the structure of the MHHI highlights two difficulties that can be encoun-
tered in its calculation. First, computing the market shares of the firms is not a straightforward
exercise, given that they can be based on different market variables, and that the definition of
the market itself is sometimes blurred. Moreover, the control weights of shareholders in firms
are also difficult to determine, due to the different possible assumptions on the type of control
exerted by the shareholder, which is not always easy to assess.
1The active engagement approach is openly supported by the main investment funds, as discussed earlier in
Chapter 1. See, for example, article “Passive Investors, Not Passive Owners” by Glenn Booraem in April 2013, avail-
able at Vanguard’s corporate site https://global.vanguard.com/portal/site/institutional/ch/en/articles/
research-and-commentary/topical-insights/passive-investors-passive-owners-tlor. The Financial Times
presented similar views by State Street on 6 April 2014 in the article “Passive investment, active ownership” and by
Dimensional Fund on 16 March 2013 in “Challenging Management (but Not the Market)”. For an overview, see Appel
(2016).
2See, for example, the document “BlackRock Investment Stewardship - Corporate governance and proxy voting
guidelines for U.S. securities”, January 2020, available at https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/
fact-sheet/blk-responsible-investment-guidelines-us.pdf.
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Besides the problems in the calculation of the MHHI, the actual use of the index has also been
subject to some criticism, especially by O’Brien and Waehrer (2017). The first major issue is
the misspecification problem in the equations generally used in the empirical literature, which
may generate a (positive) correlation between price and the adopted measure of common
shareholding, even in the absence of a causal effect of common shareholding on price. Thus,
a possible implication is that these correlations do not establish that common shareholding
through minority shareholdings raises prices. Specifically, the MHHI depends on product mar-
ket shares, which depend in turn on the same factors that drive prices. In that case, both
market shares and the MHHI may be endogenous. If market shares and the MHHI are related
to factors that affect price, but such factors are not included as explanatory variables, the
estimated regressions are likely to cause a positive relationship between the MHHI and prices
for reasons not directly related to common shareholding.
A second critique of the use of MHHI relates to the issue that some of the factors that drive
prices may also affect institutional investors’ stock purchasing decisions, and consequently the
financial shares of investors. In their AST airline paper Azar et al. (2018) accounted for possible
endogeneity of common shareholding, but not of the industry market shares. This is the main
critique formulated by Kennedy et al. (2017) and O’Brien and Waeher (2017). By considering
the industry shares as endogenous, the effect on prices becomes statistically insignificant.
The above authors use instruments for common shareholding similar to the AST airline paper,
namely the merger between BlackRock’s acquisition of Barclays Global Investors in 2009, and
add the number of airlines in the Russell 1000 index for each market quarter. Shares of airline
companies that appear in the Russell 1000 stock market index are more likely to be held
by passive investors. Kennedy et al. (2017) find evidence that instrumentalised common
shareholding results in lower prices. This exercise demonstrates the complexity and high
relevance of identifying the determinants of all components of the MHHI that are unrelated to
the dependent variable, in this case product market prices.
The above considerations revealed several shortcomings in the existing common shareholding
measures: the limitation of the descriptive measures of common shareholding, the difficulties
in the calculation of the MHHI, the inadequacy of the MHHI as a measurement of the extent of
common shareholding, and finally its controversial use in econometric models due to possible
endogeneity and misspecification problems. This analysis suggests that measures of common
shareholding are still incomplete and require further investigation. The next sections suggest
new avenues for measuring common shareholding.
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2.2 Towards new common shareholding indices
2.2.1 General framework
The identification of possible methodologies to be applied in order to construct an index of the
extent of common shareholding is based on the assumptions outlined below, which both define
the structure of common shareholding considered in the present study, as well as identify
characteristics of the agents and markets involved in the analysis.
The assumptions have been inspired in part by the structure of the database that will be
used in real-world applications of this project - the Bureau van Dijk Orbis historical ownership
database. Nevertheless, they constitute a general framework applicable to any set of corpo-
rate ownership data. For more details about the Orbis database see Bureau van Dijk (2018a).
Assumptions underlying the common shareholding analysis
A.1 The index measuring the extent of common shareholding will be based on ownership
shares alone, and will not consider other aspects of market structure of a given industry
or economy.
A.2 We will consider the case of competing firms presenting the same shareholder that is a
third entity, therefore excluding the case of cross-ownership.
A.3 The entities involved in the analysis belong to one and only one of two categories: either
shareholders or firms owned.
A.4 The firms owned must be identified by a common characteristic, such as an industry or
geographic area, which we will denote from now on as “market”. The measurement of
common shareholding will be limited to the specified market.
A.5 The measurement of common shareholding will refer to a specific point in time, i.e. it will
be of cross-sectional nature.
A.6 Independent firms, or firms with no recorded shareholders, will not be considered in the
analysis of ownership structure. The same will apply to potential shareholders with no
recorded shares in any of the market firms’. Their presence and characteristics in a
given market will be considered separately from the common shareholding analysis, and
integrated therein if applicable.
A.7 Possible relationships between shareholders are not considered in the common share-
holding analysis, focussing only on the relationship between each shareholder and the
firms in the given market. Possible links between shareholders will be considered sepa-
rately from the common shareholding analysis, and integrated therein if applicable.
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A.8 The shareholders’ nature will not be limited to a given set of entity types, and can include,
for instance, companies, institutions, states, individuals, and so on.
A.9 The ownership shares may be direct or indirect (total) shares, as applicable.
In this report, the identification and proposal of methodologies for the measurement of com-
mon shareholding will be based on these assumptions, some of which may be relaxed later if
necessary.
The typical information available on ownership relationships between entities should include,
at least, the identification of the firm, the shareholder and the existence of a link between the
two. Ideally, the actual amount of ownership shares owned by the shareholder, either directly
or indirectly, should also be available.
In many real-world databases, the reported shareholder structure is simplified, covering only
the main shareholders. This is especially true for listed companies, where the long list of
atomistic shareholders is often summarised into only one item (named “Public” in the Orbis
database), whose value of shares corresponds to the sum of the shares owned by all atomistic
shareholders together. The simplified ownership structure can also be due to lack of data, or
to an explicit choice of the researcher, deciding to limit the study to shareholders owning at
least a certain amount of shares. Given these possible scenarios, we will add an additional
working assumption:
A.10 If reported direct ownership shares do not sum to 100%, we will assume that the remain-
ing shares are either self-owned or are owned by atomistic shareholders, with a negligible
individual ownership.
From assumptions A1-A10, a simplified representation of the ownership structure of a given
market can be obtained through a table, where each row corresponds to a shareholder and
each column to a firm. The elements of the table can either report the corresponding owner-
ship share, in which case we name it ownership matrix (OM), or simply report a value of
one if a link exists between a firm and a shareholder, zero otherwise (relation matrix - RM).
2.2.2 A simple example
This section presents a simple numerical example to help illustrate the common shareholding
problem and highlight the different facets that might be of interest. This example will be used
throughout the document to help illustrate the different methodologies, by applying them to
the common shareholding context, and test the alternative measurement proposals.
Consider a fictitious “market” with four firms (denoted by F1-F4) and eight shareholders (de-
noted by O1-O8). According to assumption A3, the firms and the shareholders constitute two
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separate groups, i.e. there are twelve distinct players, and relationships are only possible
across the two groups, and not within (assumptions A2 and A7). Table 2.1 reports the own-
ership information of the four firms active in the market, while Tables 2.2-2.3 display the cor-
responding ownership and relation matrices. Italics denote indirect ownership shares; “n.a.”
indicates information about the existence of a link between a shareholder and a firm, without
knowledge of the actual percentage of ownership shares.
Table 2.1: Ownership structure displaying the links between the firms in a given market and their
respective owners. Direct and indirect (total) ownership shares reported.
Firm Owner Direct share (%) Indirect share (%)
F1 O1 13.1 -
F1 O2 8.6 -
F1 O3 - 5.2
F2 O3 - n.a.
F2 O4 27.4 -
F3 O2 10.4 -
F3 O3 4.8 -
F3 O5 66.3 -
F3 O6 18.5 -
F4 O1 - 1.6
F4 O3 - 6.8
F4 O7 54.3 -
F4 O8 12.7 -
The ownership matrix in Table 2.2 shows immediately the presence of three common share-
holders in the market, namely O1-O3, one of them (O3) creating a link between all four firms
in the market. The remaining shareholders (O4-O8) only hold shares in one of the four firms,
therefore are not common shareholders. Each column represents the ownership structure of
the respective firm, with the total shown at the bottom. Notice that direct and indirect owner-
ship shares are not summed, to avoid possible duplications.
The total amount of direct shares is the proportion of the firm directly held by the reported
shareholders; according to assumption A10, the remaining proportion is either self-owned, or
owned by atomistic shareholders with a negligible individual ownership, unlikely to have a
large impact on the firm. Total indirect ownership represents the amount of shares of each
firm owned by shareholders through some intermediate entities. It can be considered, besides
direct ownership, as an index of the influence of a specific shareholder on the firm.
In each column, the sum of shares relative to O1-O3 corresponds to the proportion of the firm’s
shares held by common shareholders. For example, in the case of F3 common shareholders
control 15.2% of the shares. On the other hand, in each line the total amount of shares held
by a common shareholder in a firm’s competitors can be identified. For instance, O2 holds
10.4% of F1’s competitor F3, and holds 8.6% of F3’s competitor F1.
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Table 2.2: Ownership matrix (OM) of the market example from Table 2.1. Indirect ownership shares in
italics.
F1 F2 F3 F4
O1 13.1 1.6
O2 8.6 10.4
O3 5.2 n.a. 4.8 6.8
O4 27.4
O5 66.3
O6 18.5
O7 54.3
O8 12.7
Total 21.7 27.4 100 67
5.2 n.a. 8.4
The relation matrix is shown in Table 2.3, reporting a value of one whenever a link is reported
in the ownership information. Notice that, in the case of F2 and O3, the existence of a link was
detected, although without the specification of the actual ownership share. In this case, the
relation matrix still shows a value of one, even if the reported link had incomplete information.
The row totals of the relation matrix show how many firms in the market are owned by each
shareholder, allowing for the immediate identification of the common shareholders (row total
greater than one). The column total identifies the number of reported shareholders of each
firm. The sum of rows O1-O3 counts the number of common shareholders present in each
firm’s ownership structure, indicating a degree of inter-dependence of each firm on the rest of
the market. For example, F1 shows a strong presence of common shareholders (3/3), while F4
has only two of its four shareholders in common with other firms.
The overall total shows the number of links between shareholders and firms present in the
economy, in this case thirteen. The minimum number of possible links, arising in a case with
no common shareholders, would be eight; in this case, each shareholder only invests in one
firm, so we would have only one link for each shareholder (eight in total). On the other hand,
in the opposite extreme case where all shareholders own shares in all four firms, the total
number of links would reach its maximum of 8 × 4 = 32, that is the number of shareholders
times the number of firms.
2.2.3 Measurement issues
Through the construction of the ownership and relation matrices (OM and RM), it is possible
to identify and compute some of the most common descriptive measures of the extent of
common shareholding, as described above, comprising:
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Table 2.3: Relation matrix (RM) of the market example from Table 2.1.
F1 F2 F3 F4 Total
O1 1 0 0 1 2
O2 1 0 1 0 2
O3 1 1 1 1 4
O4 0 1 0 0 1
O5 0 0 1 0 1
O6 0 0 1 0 1
O7 0 0 0 1 1
O8 0 0 0 1 1
Total 3 2 4 4 13
1. Number of reported shareholders with shares in more than one firm of the given market
(number of reported common shareholders)
2. For each common shareholder, number of competitors held
3. For each firm, number/proportion of common shareholders among its reported sharehold-
ers
4. For each firm, proportion of shares held by common shareholders
5. For each firm, shares of equity holders tail (atomistic shareholders)
6. For each firm, shares held by common shareholders in their competitors
As a matter of fact, these are the main measures used in the empirical studies on common
shareholding outlined previously. They describe firms’ and shareholders’ characteristics with
regard to common shareholding at an individual level, and are therefore helpful in a regression
setting, in order to incorporate the structure of common shareholding when seeking to study
the effects on a certain market measure such as prices.
However, these measures are unable to describe the overall extent of the phenomenon at
market level, unless they are aggregated over agents according to certain criteria, for example
computing sums or averages. Still, it is unclear which measure should be chosen over the
others, and what would be the best aggregation strategy.
The representation of the ownership structure of a market through a matrix, be it ownership or
relation matrix, suggests as a natural starting point the investigation of methods that charac-
terise matrices’ structures. Several different statistical techniques that extract patterns from
given matrices are available, both for the case of numerical and of relational/binary matri-
ces. Such techniques allow for the identification of matrices’ characteristics, as well as for
the calculation of indices quantifying specific aspects of the relationships represented in the
matrix. Given the multiplicity of possible matrix aspects to be considered, we shall analyse in
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this work the measures related to the concept of sparsity (or sparseness) of a matrix, which
is more directly linked to the common shareholding problem. In fact, the concept of sparsity
has to do with the representation of a phenomenon where only a small number of coefficients
contain a large proportion of the total information. The remaining elements of the representa-
tion are negligible, in most cases considered just noise. In matrix language, a sparse matrix
or vector is such that most of its elements are zero, similar to the structure of the ownership
and relation matrices introduced above.
The distance or similarity between matrices will also be analysed. The similarity between
matrices is defined according to a specific metric used to determine the distance between two
given matrices. If one of the two matrices is a benchmark - for example the most sparse matrix
in a specific context - the distance or similarity measure can be used to identify the degree
of a certain phenomenon with respect to the given benchmark. In the study of common
shareholding, a specific benchmark matrix can be easily defined, representing for instance
the absence of common shareholding, rather than total interconnection between shareholders
and firms, or any other market structure of interest.
In the following sections, the aforementioned concepts and statistical methods will be re-
viewed, and their relevance in the context of common shareholding measurement analysed.
Network methods will also be considered, given that many indices used in this context are
derived from matrix methods, applied to the matrix representation of the network links. The
discussion of the various methods will be illustrated based on the previous numerical example.
2.2.4 Assessing the extent of common shareholding
Describing the phenomenon of common shareholding through a unique indicator is somewhat
a reductive exercise, given that the investment behaviour of shareholders in a specific market
touches many different aspects. Of all the shortcomings of the existing common shareholding
measures highlighted in the previous sections, particular attention will be devoted here to a
specific issue, that is the pursuit of a measure of the mere extent of common shareholding in
a market, before considering its possible effects on economic variables.
A first evaluation of the market ownership structure can be obtained through descriptive statis-
tics such as the proportion of common shareholders (relative to the total number of share-
holders), or the fraction of firms that are cross-held3 (possibly defining a threshold of block-
holding). Such statistics are an important quantification of the extent of common shareholding
in a market, and can reveal interesting patterns over time. He and Huang (2017) apply these
two measures to US data in the period 1980-2014, obtaining evidence of a large increase in
3An investor is considered to be a block-holder of a certain level - say, for example, at a 5% level - if she holds at
least 5% of the shares of a company. Two firms are cross-held by the block-holder if the investor holds a block of at
least 5% of shares in both firms.
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the phenomenon since the beginning of the observation period until 2006, where a peak is
reached, followed by a more stable period afterwards.
A general overview of the degree of connectedness of a market due to the presence of com-
mon shareholders is a starting point, but several other issues are of interest, stemming from
the individual behaviour of the investors. First, the investment decisions are driven by a variety
of objectives, which determine not only how many and which firms to include in an investor’s
portfolio, but also the amount to be held in each of the chosen companies. Furthermore, the
distribution of investments within a portfolio can also vary, being more or less concentrated
around few players rather than equally spread across all chosen firms. As a consequence,
the degree of uniformity of a portfolio can reveal different shareholders’ strategies. Another
aspect of interest is the comparison of portfolios of concurrent investors. This allows for the
analysis of possible market-level structures, in particular considering whether a market is split
into segments allotted to different stakeholders or - on the opposite side - total access to any
company is available to all potential investors. Finally, the consideration of the shareholders’
type (such as industrial company, financial company, public authority, individual, etc.) is also
of interest to investigate possible differentiation of investments across certain groups.
2.3 Data availability
Keeping all the above points in mind, the building of new measures should start with the
careful consideration of the available data, in order to propose indicators that are feasible
to be calculated. Orbis, a database compiled by Bureau van Dijk (BvD), was chosen as our
main data source for several reasons. First, it provides standardised company information
for most world countries, also allowing for historical analyses. The worldwide coverage is
key to be able to analyse not only EU firms, but also their shareholders, which are many times
registered outside the EU. Second, it constitutes a very rich source of firm-level data, collecting
many different aspects of companies, such as legal information, industry classification, trade
description, full historical reported ownership, and financial accounts. Third, Orbis is a well
acknowledged database, widely used in the financial economics and corporate finance fields.
Indeed, several empirical studies investigating firms’ financial information are based on Orbis
data.4 Lastly, the representativeness of Orbis is generally considered satisfying both for the
financial panel data and the historical ownership (See Kalemli-Oezcan et al., 2015).
An ad hoc dataset was extracted from Orbis on purpose for this study, including all firms’ fi-
nancial and ownership main variables, needed as building blocks for the common shareholding
indices. Although balance sheet data are available for many years back in time, the owner-
ship structure of companies only became available more recently. Hence, the ad hoc dataset
4See, for instance, Altomonte and Nicolini (2012), Gal (2013), Andrews et al. (2014), Asdrubali and Signore (2015),
and Bravo-Biosca et al. (2016).
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covers firm-level information from 2007 to 2016, all available years at the time of the study.
In order to build the common shareholding indices, two main sets of variables are necessary.
On one side, a full account of the shareholders’ structure of companies, allowing to describe
in detail the relationships between investors and firms operating in the market. For instance,
using this information it is possible to identify firms that are linked through a common share-
holder. Orbis includes information on the percentage held by a shareholder, associated to each
firm in its portfolio, as well as the name and country of registration of both parties. Moreover,
the reported ownership shares come together with the date of validity, the source from which
BvD has received the information, and, above all, the classification of the firm-shareholder
type of relation.5 Finally, Orbis differentiates between direct and total ownership shares, with
the first documenting a direct participation of the shareholder in the firm, while the second
also taking into account participations mediated through a third company.
On the other side, variables proxying firms’ size are needed to adjust common shareholding
measures for firms’ value in the market. For example, we can calculate the value (in monetary
terms) of the firms’ shares in an investor’s portfolio. Orbis historical financial information con-
tains a large amount of variables coming from firms’ accounts. To proxy firms’ market size, we
adopted two measures: Total Assets (TOAS) and Market Capitalisation (MKT CAP). TOAS rep-
resents the total amount of assets owned by a firm expressed at its market value, including
cash, marketable securities, inventory, fixed assets, intangibles and goodwill. Market Capital-
isation is the value of a company that is traded on the stock market, calculated by the total
number of shares times the present share price. While data on Market Capitalization is only
available for listed firms, Total Assets figures are available for most of firms. Nevertheless, in
principle both variables describe the size of the firm from the monetary perspective, hence will
be alternatively used in the common shareholding analysis, also depending on the availability
of data. Further financial variables related to firms’ risk, performance, efficiency, profitability
and growth are also retrieved.
The aforementioned two groups of variables constitute the basis for the construction of a mea-
sure of common shareholding. Nevertheless, the ad hoc dataset is complemented with other
firms’ characteristics, such as the listing status of the enterprise, or its sector of economic ac-
tivity, identified through the NACE (Nomenclature générale des Activités économiques dans les
Communautés Européennes) industry classification.6 The identification of five broad groups
of shareholders of interest is also considered, namely Funds, States, Banks, Insurance Com-
panies and finally Cross-Investors, i.e. shareholders whose main activity falls within the same
market under analysis.
We describe briefly below our main source of data and the characteristics of the final ad
hoc dataset. Further details on the Orbis database and on the extraction of the relevant
5Such as Domestic or Global Ultimate Owner (DUO or GUO) – see detailed definitions in Appendix A.
6Section A.2.2 in Appendix A presents a discussion of different systems of industry classification, and a summary
description of the NACE system. Full details about the NACE codes and classification can be found in Eurostat (2008).
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information into the ad hoc dataset are described in Appendix A. There, we report a description
of the data provider, the identification and selection of the companies of interest, all details
about the variables enclosed in the dataset, the data organisation and cleaning, and some
descriptive statistics of the dataset.
2.3.1 The Orbis database
Presentation of the database
The Orbis database comprises standardised company information compiled by Bureau van
Dijk (BvD). According to the BvD official presentation:7
Orbis has information on more than 365 million companies across the globe. It’s the
resource for company data. And we make it simple to compare companies internation-
ally. Use Orbis to find, analyse and compare companies for better decision making and
increased efficiency.
We go further than just providing information, we carefully capture a wide variety of data,
then we treat, append and standardise it to make it richer, more powerful and easier to
interrogate. In fact, we capture and treat data from more than 160 separate providers,
and hundreds of our own sources, to create Orbis.
Orbis provides data on firms’ financial and production activity from balance sheets and income
statements, together with all known firms’ ownership information, as well as other company
related information (intellectual property, auditors, etc.) A detailed list of all the services BvD
provides can be found in their business presentation. Orbis has been designed as a commer-
cial database focused mainly on business activities (such as the screening of new suppliers),
and was not originally designed for academic research. Therefore, some characteristics of
the database need to be carefully considered, when constructing a database for research pur-
poses.
BvD collects part of the data itself, but mostly combines and harmonises the data provided
by national information providers. An overview of the national information providers can be
found in the BvD Orbis Brochure (Bureau van Dijk, 2018a). Not all of the providers cover
a single country, but rather several (regional) countries. For example, the provider Cortera
provides ownership information for the US and Canada, Creditreform is the provider for Austria,
Germany and Luxembourg, and so on.
The financial and balance sheet information comes from the national Chambers of Commerce,
to which the companies are obliged to file their accounting information (into the respective
7See https://www.bvdinfo.com/en-gb/our-products/data/international/orbis
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business register). The information is then relayed to Orbis via one of its providers. It is BvD’s
declared goal to harmonise the respective information and make it internationally comparable.
Hence, it provides the financial data in a so-called “global format”, which has been derived
from the prevailing formats used for the presentation of business accounts in Europe.
Orbis-based academic research
Several empirical studies use data coming from the Orbis database, mainly on the firms’ fi-
nancial information. Among others, Altomonte and Nicolini (2012), Gal (2013), Andrews et al.
(2014), Asdrubali and Signore (2015), and Bravo-Biosca et al. (2016). Some of these stud-
ies develop a series of weights to correct the Orbis-based estimates for representativeness
according to the objective of the study. Such analyses can be used as a benchmark for the
specification of econometric models in the study of the effects of common shareholding on the
markets. Altomonte et al. (2018) use Orbis to explore the structure of business groups.
Other papers describe and discuss methodological aspects of the use of Orbis data, like the
aforementioned Kalemli-Oezcan et al. (2015), or Ribeiro et al. (2010), where some of the
differences between Orbis administrative data and the methodological framework used by
National Statistical Offices are discussed. Ragoussis and Gonnard (2012) and Schild (2016)
describe methodologies used to extract from Orbis specific datasets for use in subsequent
empirical studies. For example, the Ragoussis and Gonnard dataset is the basis for the study
in Andrews et al. (2014) cited above. Harasztosi (2018) gives a thorough and updated account
of the representativeness of the Orbis database according to employment and value added
variables.
Since Kalemli-Oezcan et al. (2015) is a reference on Orbis included in many empirical studies,
we summarise briefly here their main findings. First, they give a detailed description of the
challenges and shortcomings of the Orbis database and concrete instructions regarding the
download, the methodology and the cleaning process in the construction of panel datasets
from Orbis.
Furthermore, the authors test the representativeness of the financial dataset and the owner-
ship structure represented in Orbis with data from Eurostat and OECD, respectively. The firms
contained in Orbis are set in comparison to the firms presented in the official statistics by
Eurostat/ OECD based on
 the amount of gross output the respective firms represent in a given economy
 the number of firms
 and the size and the sector distribution of firms
The authors conclude that the representativeness of Orbis is satisfying for the financial panel
data as well as the historic ownership file. In terms of gross output, the Orbis data covers
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80-90% of the gross output represented in the Eurostat information. In all other cases the
coverage of the Orbis data is at least higher than 50%. The results are confirmed when looking
at a smaller subsample (the manufacturing sector).
2.3.2 The ad hoc dataset
A historical dataset containing all listed companies active in the EU8 in the period 2007-2016
is constructed: this includes all listed firms registered in the EU, plus all listed companies reg-
istered elsewhere, but holding shares in at least one firm registered in the EU.9 The average
number of firms observed each year is 26,560 - as displayed in Table 2.4 - where about 57%
are registered in the EU countries, the rest being registered outside the EU. The proportion of
EU versus Non-EU registered companies remains roughly constant over time. The total num-
ber of observed firms increases slightly over the years, except for the last, where due to the
reporting lag the number of covered firms is slightly smaller than in the previous year. Overall,
a set of 31,864 different firms are observed.
Table 2.4: Sample composition by country of registration and year.
Country 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
EU 14,434 14,849 15,000 15,122 15,171 15,125 15,479 15,564 15,336 15,086
Non-EU 10,423 10,819 11,169 11,398 11,581 11,710 11,756 11,846 11,877 11,856
Total 24,857 25,668 26,169 26,520 26,752 26,835 27,235 27,410 27,213 26,942
The largest groups of EU companies are registered in the UK and Spain (around 20% in each
country), followed by Romania (9%), Germany (8,5%), France (7,5%), Poland (5,5%) and Swe-
den (5%). Again, the distribution stays roughly constant over time. Most of the companies
registered outside the EU are located in the US (30%), Japan (9.7%), Canada (6.78%) and
Australia (6.6%), while 4,83% of the companies are from India.
Although not all companies are observed in all years, due to the natural life cycle of firms,
generally the sample is rather stable. About 68% of the companies have complete records,
i.e. they are present throughout the whole 10 years of the period under analysis, and 80% are
observed during at least 7 years; a small percentage of firms (15%) were recorded maximum
during half of the period, i.e. at most for 5 years.
The bulk of firms are concentrated in few industries. In Table 2.5 the proportion of firms active
in the main NACE Sections are reported, with “Manufacturing” (Section C) and “Financial and
8In this context the term EU comprises the 28 countries of the EU as of 2017, excluding candidate countries and
countries which are simply associates of the European Economic Area (EEA).
9More details about the selection procedure are reported in Section A.2.
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insurance activities” (Section K) comprising the largest number of firms. Each one of the
remaining unreported Sections represented less than 2.5% of the total sample.
Table 2.5: Proportion of firms active in the main NACE Sections
Section Description No Firms %
C Manufacturing 10,242 32.69
K Financial and insurance activities 7,713 24.62
J Information and communication 3,002 9.58
G Wholesale and retail trade 1,889 6.03
M Professional, scientific and technical activities 1,486 4.74
L Real estate activities 1,151 3.67
B Mining and quarrying 1,119 3.57
The dataset contains 6,070,111 ownership links. On average, each company has about 22
shareholders per year. However, 50% of the companies have at most 7 shareholders in a
given year, while 9,5% of the companies even have only one shareholder. The number of total
links per year rises slightly from 604,385 in 2007 to 617,353 in 2016.
Every year, on average over 87% of the companies report an ultimate owner of some type.10
The percentage rises slightly over the sample period from 83.24% in 2007 to 88.49% in 2016.
About 60% of companies have a domestic GUO50, with non-EU companies showing a larger
share (70%) compared to EU (56%).
Overall, 64% of the firm-shareholder links are recorded between entities registered in the same
country (domestic shareholders), the remaining cases denoting a shareholder located abroad.
The proportion is rather similar in the case of EU or non-EU based companies.
2.4 Some new common shareholding indices
Some descriptive measures of the presence of common shareholding have been used in the
past, as mentioned earlier, but a unifying index evaluating the overall extent of common
shareholding is still to be investigated. Based on the considerations presented in the previous
sections, a series of alternative indices of common shareholding is proposed. The chosen
indicators are constructed on participation shares alone, considered as the main expression of
a shareholder’s influence on a firm.
10Such as Domestic or Global Ultimate Owner (DUO or GUO) – see detailed definitions in Appendix A.
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The indices are derived through applying two different approaches to the common sharehold-
ing framework, coming from the Sparsity and Network literature, respectively. The first set of
methods looks at the shareholder-firm relationships. The second one, instead, analyses only
links between agents of the same type, i.e. firm-firm or investor-investor, looking separately at
the respective networks. The relationships in these last two groups are not direct, but induced
by the presence of an external agent making a connection – a common shareholder linking
two firms, or a firm present in two investors’ portfolios, creating an overlap.
Details about the derivation and properties of the sparsity and network indices are explained in
Appendix B. There, the indices are applied to the appropriate matrices, following the simplified
market example introduced earlier. In one case the matrices represent shareholders-firms
relationships (sparsity methods), in the other case they correspond to the two separate groups
of firms or shareholders (networks methods).
It follows that the set of indices calculated for the sectoral analyses is constituted by two
groups of indices: the first is based on the analysis of each shareholders’ portfolio, then ag-
gregated at market level according to different criteria; the second set looks instead at sim-
ilarities between portfolios of pairs of shareholders, or at overlaps of shareholders structures
for pairs of firms. The market level aggregation of these last indicators gives rise to network
indices, assessing the strength of connectedness of the networks of shareholders or firms,
respectively.
Moreover, following examples in the literature (see for instance Seldeslachts et al., 2017, or
Fichtner et al., 2017), some new indicators based on the number of block-holdings have been
added, for different definitions of blocks (minimum 1%, 3%, 5% and 10% of shares held).
Some previous shareholders’ indicators have also been aggregated at market level in new
ways. For example, the joint market shares of the ’Big Three’ portfolios (BlackRock, State
Street and Vanguard) have been calculated based on Total Assets (TOAS) or Market Capitali-
sation (MKT CAP), aggregating the respective weighted densities.
The construction and meaning of all above indicators are briefly recalled in Tables 2.6 and 2.7.
Their interpretation in the light of the current study is presented in the next Sections. For
further details about their statistical derivation and properties please refer to Appendix B.
2.4.1 Shareholder indices
Assessing the size of an investor’s portfolio is a crucial exercise; this is needed to understand
the potential strength of connections induced by the shareholder in the commonly held firms
present in her portfolio. We present below a series of indices capturing different aspects of
portfolio size and strength, reflecting alternative measurements of the extent and strength of
common shareholding induced in a market by the portfolio. In turn, the behaviour of specific
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shareholders, which dominate in some sense the industry, will characterise at market level
the extent of common shareholding.
The first type of index used to study portfolios of investors is the so-called density of invest-
ments, representing the share of the market in the hands of a specific shareholder, according
to different definitions. This index comes from the literature on sparsity of matrices, and
is based on the shareholder-firm relationships represented through an ownership matrix or
through an incidence/relation matrix.
The density can be calculated based on the headcount of firms in a portfolio, or according
to their value, expressed in terms of some financial indicator of firm size. In this study, the
value-based densities have referred to the total assets (TOAS), available for most firms, or to
the market capitalisation (MKT CAP) - only for listed firms. Moreover, the density can also be
weighted by the actual participation shares held by the shareholder in each firm, giving rise
to a weighted density. All-together, this originates five different indicators as follows:
 Density = Nsubs/Nfirms
No. of firms in a shareholder’s portfolio over total no. of firms in the market
Represents the share of the market to which an investor has access through sharehold-
ing. For example, a density of 12% means that a shareholder holds shares in 12% of the
firms in the market under consideration. This index does not take into account the actual
amount of participation, but only whether the investor is present in a certain firm or not.
 TOAS density = Total TOAS subs/Total market TOAS
Sum of the TOAS of all firms in a shareholder’s portfolio over sum of TOAS of all firms in
the market
Represents the relative weight of the firms chosen by a specific investor over the whole
market. For instance, a value of 65% means that the firms chosen by the investor rep-
resent 65% of the market in terms of TOAS. Even if the density is low (i.e. the portfolio
includes few companies), the TOAS density can still be high, if the chosen companies are
all large enterprises. The opposite can also occur (high density with low TOAS density, in
case the portfolio includes only small firms).
 MKT CAP density = Total MKT CAP subs/Total market MKT CAP
Sum of the MKT CAP of all listed firms in a shareholder’s portfolio over sum of MKT CAP
of all listed firms in the market
Interpretation is the same as above, but refers to market capitalisation. Notice that, since
this variable is only available for listed companies, the index will include only listed firms,
and the market total is computed only on listed firms.
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 TOAS weighted density = Sum weighted TOAS subs/Total market TOAS
Sum of the TOAS of firms in portfolio, each weighted by the actual ownership share of
investor, over sum of TOAS of all firms in the market
Represents the actual share of TOAS of the market in the hand of an investor through
the specific ownership shares held. For example, if a shareholder has a weighted TOAS
density of 2%, this means that the shares held in the various firms of the portfolio amount
to 2% of the total market TOAS.
 MKT CAP weighted density = Sum weighted MKT CAP subs/Total market MKT CAP
Sum of the MKT CAP of listed firms in portfolio, each weighted by the actual ownership
share of investor, over sum of MKT CAP of all listed firms in the market
Same as above, but refers to market capitalisation. Again computed only for listed firms
(see note for MKT CAP density).
Shareholders scoring exceptional values in the above indicators (so-called top investors) are
deemed to dominate the market in some respect, and therefore are subject to further analysis.
Among them, a group of particular interest is that of companies active in the market itself,
which hold shares in concurrent firms, therefore constituting a group. Such shareholders, in
case they present high values of the above indices, are denoted top cross investors.
Another index describing the type of investment strategy is the so-called uniformity index:11
 Uniformity = 1 -
p
∑
shres2
∑
shres
One minus the following ratio: (Square root of the) Sum of the squares of the shares in
portfolio, over sum of all shares in portfolio.
The index is based on the shares held by an investor in each company in the market, and
assesses the relative weight of larger participation shares over the shares total, showing
smaller values for more concentrated distributions. A value of the index closer to one
denotes an even distribution of investments within the portfolio (uniformity).12
In the limit, if the investor only holds shares in one company, and zero shares in all remaining
companies, the uniformity index will have a value of zero. On the other hand, when an investor
holds participation in all firms of the given market, and all with equal shares ("democratic"
investor), the index attains its highest value, equal to one. The smaller the values of the
index, the more concentrated the investment strategy of a shareholder, i.e. the more the
shareholder discriminates between different companies and chooses only some, typically with
large participation shares. A large value of uniformity instead generally corresponds to many
firms, all held with small shares.
11This index is derived from the ℓ2/ ℓ1 norm, as defined in Appendix B.
12For further details see Appendix B, and examples therein.
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2.4.2 Market indices
Once we compute the above indices for each shareholder’s portfolio, we can look at their dis-
tribution across the population of shareholders, identifying for instance the average, median
or maximum density, or some percentiles of interest. Such values, and their evolution
over time, will reveal some characteristics of the market ownership structure, leading to the
subsequent analysis of specific cases of interest.
Further insight into the market structure comes from the analysis of the shareholder-shareholder
relationships, which are explored through the network representation of the market. The pro-
jection of the two-mode links between firms and shareholders into the one-more network of
shareholders allows us to implement network indices revealing the interconnectedness of port-
folios. The main index used for this purpose is the correlation between pairs of portfolios,
which reveals the level of overlap between two shareholders’ investments.
Several market indices can be obtained from the above, such as the proportion of non-zero
correlations, measuring the overall degree of overlap of portfolios; this proportion can only
be calculated for shareholders with high densities, who hold a considerable number of firms
in the market. The proportion of highly correlated high-density portfolios is a signal of
the degree of overlap in the investment behaviour of top shareholders.
A similar analysis can be performed within the network of firms, through the projection of the
ownership links into the firm-firm relationships induced by common shareholders. Here, the
object of study is the shareholders’ structure of a firm, and the assessment of the degree of
overlap with other competitors’ ownership information computed through their correlation.
The higher the correlation between two firms, the greater the similarity of the respective
shareholders’ structures, both in terms of the identity of the shareholders and of the quanti-
ties of participation they hold in each competitor. For example, even though two firms have
several shareholders in common, if they choose to hold rather different amounts of shares
in each company, the correlation between the two firms may not be very high. A value of
100% of correlation denotes total coincidence of the two ownership structures, both in terms
of shareholders and of quantities held. On the opposite side, in a case where two firms are
not cross-held, the correlation between their respective ownership structures is zero, there-
fore the proportion of non-zero correlations is again a useful indicator of the degree of
connectedness of the firms’ network.
In order to consider only relevant participations, the index above can be calculated only taking
into consideration the main shareholders for each firm, i.e. investors that hold at least a certain
percentage of shares - for example the threshold of 5%. In this case, the index is identical to
a common shareholding measure presented in Chapter 6 of Azar (2012), based on the density
of the network of firms, which computes the proportion of firm-firm connections existing
between pairs of competitors in a given market, due to the presence of a common block-holder.
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Notice that all proposed indices can only be computed if the amount of shares held by an
investor is known, so it is thus crucial to have the maximum possible information about partic-
ipation shares. Since there is a non-negligible fraction of recorded shareholder-firm links that
do not specify the actual amount of participation, an imputation strategy has been adopted in
order to fill in the missing information, where possible. Details on the imputation procedure
are reported in Section A.4.
2.4.3 Indices based on block-holdings
A final note regards the intensity of the investments, i.e. specific thresholds for the level
of participation. Recent literature investigated the role of block-holders as effective monitors
of the firms held (see, for example, Kang et al., 2018). An investor is considered to be a
block-holder of a certain level - say, for example, at a 5% level - if she holds at least 5% of
the shares of a company. Particular attention has been given to investors whose portfolios
present multiple block-holdings, suggesting strong links to the common shareholding investi-
gation. It follows that the analysis of the intensity of investments by common shareholders,
as represented by block-holdings, can shed further light on the common shareholding puzzle.
The very few existing empirical studies on common shareholding, all based on non-EU firms,
consider block-holding as defined by thresholds of 5%. This is mostly due to data availability
and not due to a specific economic meaning of the chosen value. In the interest of truly under-
standing the full extent of this phenomenon, particularly in the context of the EU, this study
experiments with new thresholds in the definition of block-holders, namely using minimum
equity investments of 1, 3, 5, and 10 percent. We present some new indicators of common
shareholding based on thresholds of block-holdings.
A first group of indices computes the number and proportion of firms cross-held by
block-holders, for different levels of holdings. Two firms are cross-held by a block-holder if
the investor holds a block of at least x% of shares in both firms. When the threshold of 5% is
used, we match the indicators used in the US-based research of He and Huang (2017). This
threshold is used in the overview of listed firms active in the EU and in the sectoral studies, for
ease of comparison with the cited literature. However, the same indicator is then reproposed
with alternative thresholds.
New threshold-based versions of common shareholding indices
In the first part of the study, several common shareholding indices are developed based on
all holdings in each market. Some of them are re-proposed here with a new definition, where
only holdings above certain thresholds are considered. First, the density of portfolios, i.e.
the proportion of market firms included in a single investor’s portfolio, is computed looking at
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the most intensive holdings only, namely with minimum 1%, 3%, 5% and 10%. These indices
represent the fraction of firms active in an industry which are held with a large participation
by a single shareholder, i.e. measures the extent of cross-holding of competitors in blocks of
certain value. They are also compared to the previous values based on all holdings.
As for the network indices, the interconnection between firms has been assessed looking
only at the largest participations in each firm’s shareholders structure. Looking at one pair
of firms at a time, these indices quantify the degree of similarity between the shareholder
structures of each pair, where the shareholders for the two firms are limited to the investors
with more intensive participation, namely larger than x%. When two firms have no common
block-holder, then they are not connected, and the index for the pair equals zero. According
to this definition, the overall proportion of existing connections in the firms’ network measures
the density of links between firms, links induced by common shareholders that hold consid-
erable participations in pairs of competitors. With a threshold of minimum 5% of shares, the
index coincides with a common shareholding measure presented in Chapter 6 of Azar (2012)
(density of the network of firms). In the present analysis, we compute the same indices for
different levels of block-holding, namely at 1%, 3%, 5% and 10%.
In the case of the investors’ network, the links between pairs of portfolios have been computed
considering all firms held by an investor, regardless of the level of participation. Here we
propose alternative definitions of the same index, where only the largest holdings are retained
in each portfolio, in order to compare structures only of major investments.
Additional descriptive indicators of block-holding
In addition to the previous indicators, some new indices based on thresholds are proposed,
following some recent studies. For example, Fichtner et al. (2017) presents the number of
block-holdings of top global investors for holdings of minimum 3%, 5% and 10% re-
spectively, highlighting specifically results for the ’Big Three’ - BlackRock, State Street and
Vanguard. Similarly, Seldeslachts et al. (2017) present the number of block-holdings at 1% of
selected institutional investors in German listed companies.
In accordance with these studies, we present the calculation of the number of block-holdings
for the ’Big Three’ in each market under analysis for 1%, 3% and 5% levels; we add the
proportion of such block-holdings relative to the total portfolio of the investors in each industry.
Finally, we compute the total number of block-holdings at 1%, 3%, 5% and 10% for all investors
in each market. These indices reveal interesting patterns of industry-specific intensities of
investment by shareholders.
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Table 2.6: common shareholding indicators for shareholders’ portfolios, and market level counterparts.
Indicator Definition Interpretation
Market
level
Density Nsubs/Nfirms
Number of firms in a shareholder’s portfolio over total
number of firms in the market. Represents the share
of the market to which an investor has access through
shareholding.
Average,
median,
maximum,
percentiles
TOAS
density
Total TOAS subs/Total
market TOAS
Sum of the TOAS of all firms in a shareholder’s port-
folio over sum of TOAS of all firms in the market. Rep-
resents the relative weight of the firms chosen by a
specific investor over the whole market.
Average,
median,
maximum,
percentiles
TOAS
weighted
density
Sum weighted TOAS
subs/Total market
TOAS
Sum of the TOAS of firms in portfolio, each weighted
by the actual ownership share of investor, over sum
of TOAS of all firms in the market. Represents the
actual share of TOAS of the market in the hand of an
investor through the specific ownership shares held.
Average,
median,
maximum,
percentiles,
sum for ’Big 3’
MKT
CAP
density
Total MKT CAP
subs/Total market MKT
CAP
Sum of the MKT CAP of all listed firms in a share-
holder’s portfolio over sum of MKT CAP of all listed
firms in the market. Interpretation is same as for
TOAS density, but refers to market capitalisation.
Only listed firms in portfolio.
Average,
median,
maximum,
percentiles
MKT
CAP
weighted
density
Sum weighted MKT
CAP subs/Total market
MKT CAP
Sum of the MKT CAP of listed firms in portfolio, each
weighted by the actual ownership share of investor,
over sum of MKT CAP of all listed firms in the market.
Interpretation is same as for TOAS weighted density,
but refers to market capitalisation. Only listed firms
in portfolio.
Average,
median,
maximum,
percentiles,
sum for ’Big 3’
Uniformity 1 -
p
∑
shres2
∑
shres
One minus the following ratio: (Square root of the)
Sum of the squares of the shares in portfolio, over
sum of all shares in portfolio. Index assesses the rel-
ative weight of larger participation shares over the
shares total, showing smaller values for more concen-
trated distributions.
Average,
median,
maximum,
percentiles
Number
of
Block-
holdings
Number of holdings
> p%
Number of participations in portfolios with share
value above a certain percentage p. Represents the
number of more intensive investments of portfolio.
Computed for p = 3,5,10.
Sum for ’Big
3’, sum for all
SH
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Table 2.7: common shareholding indicators for shareholders’ and firms’ networks.
Shareholders’ network
Indicator Definition Interpretation
Correlation Pearson’s ρ
Pearson’s correlation coefficient ρ between pairs of port-
folios. Reveals the level of overlap between two share-
holders’ investments.
Proportion of
non-zero
correlations
No. non−zero ρ
n(n−1)/2
Number of non-zero correlations over total number of
possible connections between pairs of portfolios. n is the
total number of portfolios. Represents the proportion of
existing links in the shareholders’ network, i.e. the net-
work’s density.
Number of
highly correlated
high-density
portfolios
No. of ρ >80%
Number of correlations higher than 80% between pairs
of large (high density) portfolios (holding more than 10%
of the market’s firms). Counts the number of very strong
links among large shareholders’ portfolios.
Proportion of
highly correlated
high-density
portfolios
No. ρ>80%
k(k−1)/2
Number of correlations higher than 80%, over total num-
ber of possible connections between pairs of large (high
density) portfolios (holding more than 10% of the mar-
ket’s firms). k is the total number of high density port-
folios. Represents the proportion of very strong links
among large shareholders’ portfolios, i.e. the degree of
similarity of their investments.
Firms’ network (only block-holdings at min. 5%)
Indicator Definition Interpretation
Correlation Pearson’s ρ
Pearson’s correlation coefficient ρ between pairs of SH
structures of firms. Reveals the level of overlap between
two firms’ SH structures.
Proportion of
non-zero
correlations
No. non−zero ρ
n(n−1)/2
Number of non-zero correlations over total number of
possible connections between pairs of firms. n is the to-
tal number of firms. Represents the proportion of firms
that are connected through some common shareholder,
i.e. the firms’ network density.
Number of
highly correlated
SH structures
No. of ρ>80%
Number of correlations higher than 80% between pairs
of firms. Counts the number of very strong links among
firms’ SH structures.
Proportion of
highly correlated
SH structures
No. ρ>80%
k(k−1)/2
Number of correlations higher than 80%, over total num-
ber of non-zero connections between pairs of firms. k is
the total number of connected firms. Represents the pro-
portion of very strong links among connected firms, i.e.
the degree of similarity of SH structure.
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Chapter 3
Common Shareholding in the EU
Before proceeding with the identification and analysis of the five industries of interest, we
present here a brief overview of the overall structure of ownership in Europe. The figures are
based on the dataset of all listed firms active in the EU,1 introduced earlier.
Given the very large number of recorded shareholders in the EU (above a hundred thousand
per year), the market indices based on networks – which compare two-by-two all possible pairs
of agents – were not calculated, and will be left for the sectoral analyses. Therefore this first
overview will present the indices based on density and uniformity, as well as some descriptive
statistics of the ownership structure of Europe.2
The Chapter is organised as follows: Section 3.1 presents the overall results of common share-
holding indicators for listed companies active in the EU between 2007 and 2016. Section 3.2
identifies the investors presenting top values of the common shareholding indices in the EU,
while Section 3.3 outlines the summary statistics on the largest EU portfolios.
3.1 Results for listed firms active in the EU in 2007-2016
Table 3.1 presents an overview of the market structure, reporting the number of listed firms
active in the EU in 2007-2016, and the number of their respective recorded shareholders. We
recall that the definition of this set of firms includes two groups of companies: (i) listed firms
registered in one of the EU countries, and (ii) listed firms registered elsewhere, but holding
shares in firms registered in the EU territory. As for the shareholders, some types that are
recorded collectively – and hence cannot be identified – were discarded in this analysis.3
1We recall that in this context the term EU comprises the 28 countries of the EU as of 2017, excluding candidate
countries and countries which are simply associates of the European Economic Area (EEA).
2For the definition of the indicators, see Section 2.4.
3The discarded shareholder types correspond to the following categories, as classified in Bureau van Dijk’s user
guide to the ownership databases (see BvD, 2018b): Public (Shareholder type "Z"), and Aggregated unnamed share-
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Table 3.1 highlights also the number and proportion of common shareholders, as well as of
companies cross-held by block-holders. A common shareholder by definition is an investor
holding participation in at least two firms in a given market, otherwise it is labelled as a
"single" shareholder. As before, an investor is defined as being a block-holder of a firm if
holding at least 5% of the shares of the firm. Two firms are cross-held by a block-holder if the
investor holds at least 5% in both firms. This definition will be maintained also in the sectoral
analyses.
Table 3.1: Summary statistics for listed firms active in the EU between 2007 and 2016: number of
firms; number and percentage of firms cross-held by block-holders (BH) at minimum 5%; total number
of shareholders; number and percentage of common shareholders (i.e. shareholders with more than one
firm in their portfolio); number and percentage of single owners (holding shares only of one firm).
Year Number Number (%) Firms Number Number (%) Number (%)Firms Cross-held by BH of SH Common SH Single SH
2007 23,624 15,454 (65.41) 97,578 14,570 (14.93) 83,008 (85.07)
2008 24,453 15,891 (64.99) 100,856 14,799 (14.67) 86,057 (85.33)
2009 24,910 15,883 (63.76) 101,190 14,959 (14.78) 86,231 (85.22)
2010 25,307 16,001 (63.23) 105,803 15,398 (14.55) 90,405 (85.45)
2011 25,493 16,059 (62.99) 104,798 14,772 (14.10) 90,026 (85.90)
2012 25,515 16,203 (63.50) 105,237 14,733 (14.00) 90,504 (86.00)
2013 26,090 17,800 (68.23) 107,430 14,991 (13.95) 92,439 (86.05)
2014 26,375 18,235 (69.14) 113,071 15,599 (13.80) 97,472 (86.20)
2015 26,282 17,678 (67.26) 120,307 16,196 (13.46) 104,111 (86.54)
2016 25,995 17,460 (67.17) 126,810 16,236 (12.80) 110,574 (87.20)
The figures show a slight increase in the number of listed firms over time (from less than
24,000 to about 26,000). The total number of reported shareholders is also increasing over
the years, reaching a value of almost 127 thousand in 2016. However, the large majority of
shareholders only hold participation in one of the listed firms, being therefore "single" share-
holders (more than 85% of the cases). Although the number of common shareholders has
been increasing in the ten years of observation, their proportion has been declining, from
about 15% in 2007 to less than 13% in 2016.
Another interesting indicator of the extent of common shareholding is given by the quantifica-
tion of the presence of common block-holders. The number of listed firms that are cross-held
by block-holders has been increasing from about 15.5 thousand to about 17.5 thousand, and
their proportion over the whole set of firms has been oscillating, but is now rather stable on
higher values around 67%.
The above results are very close to US-based indicators calculated for the same period in He
and Huang (2017). In their research, the two authors present a calculation of the above indices
from 1980 to 2014, showing a noticeable increase in all indicators, reaching a peak in 2007,
holders (types "L" and "D"). See Appendix A for details.
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and stabilising afterwards with a minor upward trend. The graph summarising their results is
reproduced in Figure 3.1 for easier comparison4.
The definitions used for the calculation of the indices are slightly different. For example,
He and Huang (2017) refer to "Institutional Investors" rather than all shareholders, but do
not give a specific definition of how such a group of investors is chosen; in our analysis all
shareholders are considered. Another difference in the definition of the indicators comes from
the consideration, in He and Huang, of cross-holding only for firms within the same four-digit
SIC industry; in our overall analysis we considered cross-holding for all firms, without splitting
into industries. In the sectoral analysis that will be presented in Chapter 4, instead, we will
calculate the indicators by industry.5 Despite these slight differences, the overall results for
the period 2007-2016 are very much in line with what was encountered in the EU analysis,
both at overall level and in the sectoral analyses presented later.
After this initial overview and characterisation of the shareholders’ structure of listed firms
active in the EU, we now present the results obtained with the new common shareholding in-
dicators as presented in Section 2.4. The uniformity and the five density indices (plain density
and value-based densities) are calculated for each shareholder; their distribution across all
shareholders is studied. For each index, the most significant statistics are reported in Tables
3.2-3.5, namely: average, percentiles 75 and 99, and the maximum value in the population.
Figure 3.1: Figure 1 from He and Huang (2017). Patterns of institutional cross-ownership over time in
the US.
Reproduced under permission, Oxford University Press License Number 4874220513731
4Permission to reproduce Fig. 1 on p. 2675 of He and Huang (2017) was granted by Oxford University Press on Jul
22, 2020 by License Number 4874220513731.
5Notice, however, that sectors will not be identified through a code of Industry Classification, due to several short-
falls encountered in this approach. See Appendix C for further details.
53
The summary statistics for the plain density index are presented in Table 3.2. The average
market share held by investors has declined over time, from about 0.025% in 2007 to 0.018%
in 2016. However, such yearly averages are greatly influenced by some large values corre-
sponding to the top investors, while in fact the majority of shareholders present much lower
values. In fact, recalling that about 85% of the owners hold only one firm in their portfo-
lio, and considering that there are about 26 thousand firms per year in the market, for most
shareholders the density is extremely low (≈ 0.004% = 1/26,000).
The portfolios have non-negligible sizes only for a very small fraction of investors: many of
the portfolios in the top 1% of the distribution still do not even encompass as much as 0.5%
of the firms (the 99th percentiles is around 0.2%), but the maximum density value shows that
there are shareholders holding as many as 25% of the firms in the market, i.e. more than 6000
companies. Due to these very high values, the top shareholders will be briefly analysed later
in Sections 3.2-3.3, looking at the sizes of their portfolios over time, their composition in terms
of country of registration of the firms, and their weight as assessed by the average share value.
Table 3.2: Density of investments: Proportion of firms in a shareholder’s portfolio relative to the total
number of firms in the market. Summary Statistics by year (percentage points): mean, 75th percentile
(p75), 99th percentile (p99), maximum (max).
Year Density
mean p75 p99 max
2007 0.0252 0.0042 0.2751 25.2921
2008 0.0235 0.0041 0.2413 25.7923
2009 0.0225 0.0040 0.2369 25.4195
2010 0.0222 0.0040 0.2331 26.0205
2011 0.0216 0.0039 0.2197 25.8149
2012 0.0210 0.0039 0.2077 25.5928
2013 0.0204 0.0038 0.2108 24.8371
2014 0.0198 0.0038 0.2047 23.9166
2015 0.0189 0.0038 0.1940 23.8452
2016 0.0179 0.0038 0.1770 23.8661
In the case of uniformity, reported in Table 3.3, more than three quarters of the shareholders
present a value of zero, given that they only own shares in one firm. This also justifies the
very low mean value, showing high concentration of the investments of the shareholders.
However, the top values for this index are rather high, with the percentile 99 showing a unifor-
mity above 80%, and the maximum observed value being about 99% throughout the years of
observation. This shows that the shareholders with the larger portfolios tend to invest equally
among the chosen firms, rather than giving priority to specific companies through buying
higher shares. This is usually reflected by a low value for the average share, as will be seen
later in the section dedicated to the top owners.
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Table 3.3: Uniformity of investments: relative weight of larger participation shares over the shares total
in the portfolio. Small values denote concentrated investment. Summary Statistics by year (percentage
points, index values between 0 and 1): mean, 75th percentile (p75), 99th percentile (p99), maximum
(max).
Year Uniformity
mean p75 p99 max
2007 6.8517 0.0000 82.5517 98.6362
2008 6.6227 0.0000 81.7706 98.6313
2009 6.4407 0.0000 81.2290 98.7472
2010 6.3770 0.0000 81.4345 98.7784
2011 6.1674 0.0000 81.0806 98.7048
2012 5.9699 0.0000 80.2010 98.6637
2013 6.0062 0.0000 80.3506 98.7083
2014 6.0396 0.0000 80.4744 98.8071
2015 5.9612 0.0000 80.0559 98.8045
2016 5.7440 0.0000 79.0219 98.7994
For the density indices based on financial variables, the distributions present a large amount
of values very close to zero, as shown in Table 3.4 for values based on Total Assets, and Table
3.5 for indices calculated from Market Capitalisation. This is in line with the presence of a large
number of single shareholders, but adds the information that the single firms in their portfolios
are generally also small in size.
However, looking at the common shareholders, it is striking that the firms included in the
largest portfolios represent a significant proportion of the total value of the market, reaching a
coverage of above 80% of Total Assets and more than 90% of Market Capitalisation in almost
all years. This means that the top investors not only hold shares in a considerable number
of firms (we have seen values around 25% in Table 3.2), but also typically choose the largest
enterprises, leaving out only minor players - which together do not account for more than
10-20% of the market value. Also of note is that both indices have been increasing steadily
over time, showing that the preference for the largest players has become stronger over time.
Looking at the weighted indices, in the right panels of Tables 3.4 and 3.5, again we observe
the majority of portfolios producing negligible values. However, the proportion of market value
held by top investors through their participation shares is rather tangible, showing maximum
values above 3% - and increasing - for Market Capitalisation. For Total Assets even higher
maximum values are observed, with an average of about 4.3% and, also increasing, displaying
a steep rise from 2012 onwards in particular.
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Table 3.4: Density indices based on Total Assets of firms in portfolio. Left: TOAS density - proportion of
total assets of the market represented by the firms in portfolio. Right: Weighted TOAS density - proportion
of total assets of the market held by shareholder through participation shares. Summary Statistics by
year (percentage points): mean, 75th percentile (p75), 99th percentile (p99), maximum (max).
Year TOAS density
mean p75 p99 max
2007 0.0843 0.0017 0.6643 75.8632
2008 0.0850 0.0014 0.6213 79.7778
2009 0.0745 0.0013 0.6136 79.0359
2010 0.0737 0.0012 0.6201 81.7066
2011 0.0784 0.0012 0.9931 83.9119
2012 0.0764 0.0012 1.0032 83.8338
2013 0.0707 0.0012 0.7367 85.0071
2014 0.0673 0.0013 0.7632 86.9724
2015 0.0640 0.0012 0.7076 87.6514
2016 0.0596 0.0012 0.7024 88.3695
Year Weighted TOAS density
mean p75 p99 max
2007 0.0011 0.0000 0.0145 2.2906
2008 0.0011 0.0000 0.0130 3.6192
2009 0.0012 0.0000 0.0130 4.1082
2010 0.0011 0.0000 0.0126 3.2133
2011 0.0012 0.0000 0.0139 2.8798
2012 0.0011 0.0000 0.0134 2.8715
2013 0.0012 0.0000 0.0132 5.5166
2014 0.0011 0.0000 0.0118 5.8217
2015 0.0011 0.0000 0.0116 6.2675
2016 0.0010 0.0000 0.0110 6.3193
Table 3.5: Density indices based on Market Capitalisation of firms in portfolio. Left: MKT CAP density -
proportion of market capitalisation of the market represented by the firms in portfolio. Right: Weighted
MKT CAP density - proportion of market capitalisation of the market held by shareholder through par-
ticipation shares. Summary Statistics by year (percentage points): mean, 75th percentile (p75), 99th
percentile (p99), maximum (max).
Year MKT CAP density
mean p75 p99 max
2007 0.0832 0.0009 0.6613 86.7368
2008 0.0833 0.0008 0.6335 85.9546
2009 0.0857 0.0011 0.6446 89.1957
2010 0.0882 0.0012 0.6664 91.1985
2011 0.0854 0.0012 0.6274 91.8413
2012 0.0841 0.0012 0.6629 90.3237
2013 0.0843 0.0015 0.7311 91.5006
2014 0.0806 0.0017 0.6475 91.1626
2015 0.0795 0.0021 0.6328 91.3758
2016 0.0754 0.0021 0.5716 92.5755
Year Weighted MKT CAP density
mean p75 p99 max
2007 0.0011 0.0000 0.0157 2.3374
2008 0.0010 0.0000 0.0134 2.3823
2009 0.0011 0.0000 0.0150 3.1114
2010 0.0010 0.0000 0.0137 3.3804
2011 0.0010 0.0000 0.0138 3.3270
2012 0.0010 0.0000 0.0135 3.1121
2013 0.0010 0.0000 0.0134 3.4228
2014 0.0010 0.0000 0.0127 3.4310
2015 0.0010 0.0000 0.0120 3.6713
2016 0.0009 0.0000 0.0112 3.8560
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3.2 Top-ranking investors
After the consideration of the general results, it is worth having a closer look at the share-
holders that present maximum values in the density-based indices presented earlier. In fact,
although in many cases the investors scoring higher values in one index also score high in the
remaining ones, there are some exceptions.
In particular, we observe cases of small portfolios that include very large enterprises with
very large participation shares, therefore presenting top values for the weighted indices, even
though their non-weighted indices are negligible. Given the possible strategic relevance of
their investments, we summarise the main findings in Table 3.6.
The table presents, for each top-ranking investor, the country of registration and the number
of listed firms active in the EU included in the respective portfolio; the last five columns report
the number of years in 2007-2016 when the investor presented one of the top 20 values in
the five indices. A blank corresponds to cases where the investor was never in the top 20 for
the specific index.
The top panel summarises the information on the largest portfolios, most of which present top
values for the Density index throughout the 10 years of observation. Given the large number
of firms held and their size, the value-based indices also present very high values in most
cases, both in terms of Total Assets and of Market Capitalisation. As was mentioned earlier,
these large portfolios generally encompass all the largest companies, representing in many
cases more than 80% of the market value.
As for the weighted indices, not all portfolios present high values, given that the average
shares held are rather small in some cases, therefore producing a smaller value for these
indices. Still, a good number of investors score very high also on the weighted indices for
the entire period of 2007-2016, namely Bank of New York Mellon, BlackRock, Fidelity, JP Mor-
gan Chase, Norway6, State Street and Vanguard. From these preliminary figures, these large
groups - mainly US-based (except Norway) - show a clear dominance over the set of listed
firms active in Europe.
The bottom panel of Table 3.6 reports other portfolios, of generally smaller size, but still scor-
ing high in one or more of the value-based indices. In many cases this is still due to the
considerable number of firms held (hundreds or even thousands), but few investors hold a
rather small portfolio (few dozens of firms). These few cases generally correspond to investors
holding very high stakes of some large companies, therefore producing high weighted indices.
The corresponding non-weighted indices are always negligible.
6We recall that the term "Norway" (the state) is used as an abbreviation to indicate the Norwegian Sovereign Fund.
The same is intended for the references to other states, such as France or Sweden, meaning the respective sovereign
funds.
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Table 3.6: Top-ranking investors. Number of years in 2007-2016 an investor appears in the top 20 for
the five density-based indices. Blanks correspond to cases where investor was never in the top 20.
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Largest portfolios No years ranking in top 20
ALLIANZ DE 2651 9 10 8
AXA FR 3261 10 9 10 4 7
BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON US 4289 10 10 10 10
BARCLAYS UK 1841 5 4 5
BLACKROCK US 6052 9 9 9 9 10
BNP PARIBAS FR 2070 4 5 5
CREDIT SUISSE CH 3378 10 7
DEUTSCHE BANK DE 3474 10 10 10
DIMENSIONAL FUND US 6204 10 6
FMR LLC US 3378 10 10 10 10 10
GOLDMAN SACHS US 3447 10 5
INVESCO BM 3335 9 9 9 7
JP MORGAN CHASE US 4208 10 10 10 8 10
MORGAN STANLEY US 2976 10 9
NORTHERN TRUST US 3081 5 7
NORWAY NO 5316 10 10 10 9 10
STATE STREET US 4346 10 10 10 10 10
TEACHERS INSURANCE US 3885 9 10 10
UBS CH n.a. 8 8 8 6
VANGUARD US 6006 10 10 10 10 10
Other portfolios No years ranking in top 20
CAPITAL GROUP US 1451 10 9 10 10
CENTRAL HUIJIN INVESTMENT CN 47 8
CHINA-PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC CN 472 8 8
FRANKLIN RESOURCES US 1748 10
HKSCC NOMINEES LIMITED CN 52 7
HSBC CUSTODY NOMINEES (AUSTRALIA) AU 433 5
ING GROEP NL 380 6
LLOYDS BANKING GROUP UK 25 9
REGERINGSKANSLIET - SWEDEN SE 1872 8 10
SCHRODERS UK 2644 7
STICHTING PENSIOENFONDS NL 1790 9 10
SUN LIFE FINANCIAL CA 1447 5
T ROWE PRICE GROUP US 1831 9
TEMASEK HOLDINGS SG 39 5
WELLINGTON MANAGEMENT US 1929 10
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3.3 Major Portfolios
Following the general overview of the shareholders’ structure in the EU, this section gives
a closer look at portfolios of the major common shareholders present in the area. Twenty
shareholders were considered for this analysis, selected according to the size of their portfolio
over the entire period of observation, and for their presence in the top ranks of all indices
analysed earlier, i.e. they correspond to the largest portfolios presented in the top panel of
Table 3.6.
The chosen shareholders all have in their portfolio more than 3000 listed companies active in
the EU, for at least 5 years in the period 2007-2016.7 The main results are presented in Tables
3.7 and 3.8, in which an outline of the characteristics of portfolios in terms of size and shares
are reported, as well as the geographical area of registration of firms held in each portfolio.
From the top and middle panels of Table 3.7, four large funds stand out with portfolios currently
including more than 20% of the listed firms active in Europe, namely BlackRock, Dimensional
Fund, Norway and Vanguard. In terms of time trend, both BlackRock and Vanguard show an
increase in size over time, while Dimensional has been shrinking a little, and Norway is overall
stable.
Positioned only slightly behind are Axa, Deutsche Bank, Fidelity (FMR LLC) and JP Morgan
Chase, which started out above 20% at the beginning of the period of observation, but have
decreased their number of firms held over time, currently holding between 12.5% and 16.2%.
On a lower but stable level are Bank of New York Mellon, State Street and Teachers Insurance,
with around 17%, while Credit Suisse, Goldman Sachs and Invesco show smaller declining
portfolios, currently standing at around 13%. The remaining investors hold smaller portfolios,
generally having diminished in relative size over the years.
7The only exception is BNP PARIBAS, which has more than 3000 firms in portfolio only in three years.
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Table 3.7: Summary indicators for portfolios of major common shareholders over 2007-2016.
Year A
LL
IA
NZ
AX
A
BA
NK
OF
NY
ME
LL
ON
BA
RC
LA
YS
BL
AC
KR
OC
K
BN
P
PA
RI
BA
S
CR
ED
IT
SU
IS
SE
DE
UT
SC
HE
BA
NK
DI
ME
NS
IO
NA
L
FU
ND
FM
R
LL
C
GO
LD
MA
N
SA
CH
S
IN
VE
SC
O
JP
MO
RG
AN
CH
AS
E
MO
RG
AN
ST
AN
LE
Y
NO
RT
HE
RN
TR
US
T
NO
RW
AY
ST
AT
E
ST
RE
ET
TE
AC
HE
RS
IN
SU
RA
NC
E
UB
S
VA
NG
UA
RD
Size of portfolios (number of listed firms active in the EU owned by each investor)
2007 3746 5431 3637 5975 3055 2242 4198 4841 5962 4913 3920 1804 4942 4107 3120 4095 3937 2990 4749 3852
2008 3809 5376 3837 6142 4038 2316 4141 4658 6307 4952 4092 3445 5173 3985 3133 5206 4232 3183 4586 4022
2009 3686 5484 4144 5512 5547 3359 3808 4464 6332 4880 3875 3663 5092 3660 3005 5242 4253 4017 4138 3993
2010 3679 5411 4329 3187 5927 3453 4044 4553 6585 5009 3897 3962 5191 3636 2966 5310 4502 4420 4162 4043
2011 3390 5001 4268 3042 6049 3159 3943 4246 6581 4915 3687 3948 4980 3352 2871 5252 4572 4682 3956 5947
2012 3231 4672 4208 2714 5910 2856 3747 4036 6530 4728 3524 3800 4682 3226 2767 5077 4657 4639 3656 5968
2013 3135 4201 4292 2278 6016 2637 3614 3924 6480 4576 3545 3705 4604 3108 2856 5305 4643 4688 3466 5820
2014 2897 3969 4384 2240 6187 2357 3581 3799 6308 4321 3663 3620 4582 3330 2943 5484 4772 4635 3331 5884
2015 2786 3630 4429 2044 6217 2254 3496 3693 6267 3592 3626 3491 4402 3180 3025 5469 4612 4495 n.a. 6008
2016 2651 3261 4289 1841 6052 2070 3378 3474 6204 3378 3447 3335 4208 2976 3081 5316 4346 3885 n.a. 6006
Relative size of portfolios (% of listed firms active in the EU owned by each investor)
2007 15.9 23.0 15.4 25.3 12.9 9.5 17.8 20.5 25.2 20.8 16.6 7.6 20.9 17.4 13.2 17.3 16.7 12.7 20.1 16.3
2008 15.6 22.0 15.7 25.1 16.5 9.5 16.9 19.1 25.8 20.3 16.7 14.1 21.2 16.3 12.8 21.3 17.3 13.0 18.8 16.5
2009 14.8 22.0 16.6 22.1 22.3 13.5 15.3 17.9 25.4 19.6 15.6 14.7 20.4 14.7 12.1 21.0 17.1 16.1 16.6 16.0
2010 14.5 21.4 17.1 12.6 23.4 13.6 16.0 18.0 26.0 19.8 15.4 15.7 20.5 14.4 11.7 21.0 17.8 17.5 16.5 16.0
2011 13.3 19.6 16.7 11.9 23.7 12.4 15.5 16.7 25.8 19.3 14.5 15.5 19.5 13.2 11.3 20.6 17.9 18.4 15.5 23.3
2012 12.7 18.3 16.5 10.6 23.2 11.2 14.7 15.8 25.6 18.5 13.8 14.9 18.4 12.6 10.8 19.9 18.3 18.2 14.3 23.4
2013 12.0 16.1 16.5 8.7 23.1 10.1 13.9 15.0 24.8 17.5 13.6 14.2 17.7 11.9 11.0 20.3 17.8 18.0 13.3 22.3
2014 11.0 15.1 16.6 8.5 23.5 8.9 13.6 14.4 23.9 16.4 13.9 13.7 17.4 12.6 11.2 20.8 18.1 17.6 12.6 22.3
2015 10.6 13.8 16.9 7.8 23.7 8.6 13.3 14.1 23.9 13.7 13.8 13.3 16.8 12.1 11.5 20.8 17.6 17.1 n.a. 22.9
2016 10.2 12.5 16.5 7.1 23.3 8.0 13.0 13.4 23.9 13.0 13.3 12.8 16.2 11.5 11.9 20.5 16.7 15.0 n.a. 23.1
Average participation shares
2007 1.01 1.78 1.01 2.53 1.43 0.74 0.95 1.25 1.18 3.31 1.40 1.68 1.37 1.23 0.75 0.46 1.30 0.63 1.17 1.56
2008 1.02 1.56 0.96 2.62 1.28 0.81 0.85 1.10 1.17 2.86 1.29 1.43 1.20 1.23 0.77 0.65 1.28 0.60 1.09 1.71
2009 0.94 1.30 1.02 2.18 3.25 1.22 0.66 0.95 1.14 2.93 0.86 1.30 1.11 1.01 0.95 0.80 1.33 0.52 0.88 1.97
2010 0.89 1.00 0.97 2.08 3.16 0.98 0.56 0.91 1.06 2.88 0.71 1.49 1.00 0.82 0.96 0.90 1.26 0.49 0.88 2.13
2011 0.97 0.94 0.99 1.41 3.04 0.83 0.51 0.82 1.07 2.73 0.67 1.37 1.02 0.72 1.02 1.00 1.26 0.47 0.83 1.68
2012 1.01 0.88 0.95 1.36 2.96 0.77 0.52 0.74 1.12 2.66 0.68 1.36 1.02 0.69 1.11 1.07 1.29 0.46 0.77 1.84
2013 1.00 0.87 0.98 0.92 3.13 0.81 0.49 0.69 1.18 2.70 0.65 1.43 1.08 0.63 1.07 1.19 1.31 0.46 0.80 1.97
2014 1.04 0.88 0.91 0.87 3.04 0.78 0.50 0.72 1.25 2.68 0.67 1.50 1.16 0.69 0.90 1.23 1.28 0.56 0.85 2.17
2015 1.07 0.90 0.90 0.91 3.09 0.76 0.49 0.80 1.36 2.96 0.71 1.58 1.11 0.74 0.88 1.21 1.30 0.56 n.a. 2.52
2016 1.00 0.97 0.83 0.82 3.26 0.75 0.46 0.70 1.40 2.87 0.72 1.56 1.12 0.74 0.83 1.27 1.37 0.60 n.a. 2.84
6
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Considering the average quantities held (bottom panel of Table 3.7), the ranking is slightly
different, with the average share of BlackRock and Fidelity consistently representing around
3%, followed by Vanguard with about 2% (increasing), and Invesco, Dimensional and State
Street with about 1% to 1.5%. They are followed in turn by Allianz, Axa, Bank of New York
Mellon, Norway and JP Morgan Chase, where the average share of annual portfolios is close to
1%, and slightly increasing. The remaining common shareholders currently present portfolios
whose average share is below 1%.
In terms of the geographical composition of portfolios, Table 3.8 reports some overall statistics
for the whole period of observation. Compared to the complete set of listed firms active in the
EU during 2007-2016 - where roughly 43% of companies are registered outside Europe - the
firms included in the portfolios of the top 20 shareholders show a much higher proportion of
cases registered outside the EU (70%).
Looking at the countries of registration of the firms in the portfolios, we find that the most
frequent ones are the US, the UK, Japan, Germany, France and Italy (in decreasing order).
Depending on the investor, though, the proportion of firms in the portfolio coming from each
of the mentioned countries varies largely. For example, Northern Trust invests almost uniquely
in firms from the US (≈ 70% of portfolio) and from the UK (≈ 18%), almost disregarding Japan
and the other EU countries.
On the other hand, Japan attracts large attention from many of the major common sharehold-
ers, covering in many cases more than one-tenth of their portfolio (Axa, Bank of New York
Mellon, BlackRock, Dimensional, Fidelity, Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan Chase, Norway, State
Street, Teachers Insurance and Vanguard).
UK-based firms have in general a large weight in all portfolios, second only to the US, but they
are privileged by Barclays, where they represent about one-third of the chosen companies
over the years.
As for the three remaining European countries, they are present in small proportions in all
portfolios, but they are clearly preferred by home investors: Allianz and Deutsche Bank port-
folios present, respectively, 6% and 5% of companies based in Germany, while 7.67% of firms
held by BNP Paribas are French.
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Table 3.8: Composition of portfolios of major common shareholders, by geographical area and country
of registration. N = Number of links to listed firms active in the EU over 2007-2016; p = proportion of
links (%) in portfolio related to listed firms active in the EU registered in indicated area/country.
Name of Shareholder Area Country of registration
Non-EU EU US UK JP DE FR IT
ALLIANZ N 19,215 13,795 11,488 3,518 1,433 1,965 2,016 865
p (%) 58.21 41.79 34.80 10.66 4.34 5.95 6.11 2.62
AXA N 30,152 16,284 17,140 7,335 4,670 1,352 1,752 993
p (%) 64.93 35.07 36.91 15.80 10.06 2.91 3.77 2.14
BANK OF NY MELLON N 32,553 9,264 19,984 4,376 3,817 801 756 550
p (%) 77.85 22.15 47.79 10.46 9.13 1.92 1.81 1.32
BARCLAYS N 21,563 13,412 14,905 10,331 1,369 469 545 287
p (%) 61.65 38.35 42.62 29.54 3.91 1.34 1.56 0.82
BLACKROCK N 40,342 14,656 20,269 7,043 5,419 1,209 1,174 714
p (%) 73.35 26.65 36.85 12.81 9.85 2.20 2.13 1.30
BNP PARIBAS N 13,364 13,339 7,278 4,949 1,330 840 2,048 712
p (%) 50.05 49.95 27.26 18.53 4.98 3.15 7.67 2.67
CREDIT SUISSE N 26,348 11,602 18,266 6,030 1,940 1,293 756 619
p (%) 69.43 30.57 48.13 15.89 5.11 3.41 1.99 1.63
DEUTSCHE BANK N 27,732 13,956 18,466 6,531 1,458 2,122 880 502
p (%) 66.52 33.48 44.30 15.67 3.50 5.07 2.11 1.20
DIMENSIONAL FUND N 45,848 17,708 18,433 4,661 6,584 2,107 1,957 1,298
p (%) 72.14 27.86 29.00 7.33 10.36 3.32 3.08 2.04
FMR LLC N 33,286 11,978 15,923 5,024 4,433 1,055 1,361 758
p (%) 73.54 26.46 35.18 11.10 9.79 2.33 3.01 1.67
GOLDMAN SACHS N 28,138 9,138 18,934 6,085 3,640 513 448 285
p (%) 75.49 24.51 50.79 16.32 9.76 1.38 1.20 0.76
INVESCO N 25,518 9,255 15,647 4,712 2,086 796 815 315
p (%) 73.38 26.62 45.00 13.55 6.00 2.29 2.34 0.91
JPMORGAN CHASE N 33,364 14,492 17,555 6,305 4,753 1,350 1,340 877
p (%) 69.72 30.28 36.68 13.17 9.93 2.82 2.80 1.83
MORGAN STANLEY N 26,349 8,211 19,188 5,229 1,185 485 464 224
p (%) 76.24 23.76 55.52 15.13 3.43 1.40 1.34 0.65
NORTHERN TRUST N 23,381 6,386 20,808 5,437 188 116 106 45
p (%) 78.55 21.45 69.90 18.27 0.63 0.39 0.36 0.15
NORWAY N 36,986 14,770 13,693 4,210 6,753 1,446 1,709 1,173
p (%) 71.46 28.54 26.46 8.13 13.05 2.79 3.30 2.27
STATE STREET N 33,530 10,996 19,398 4,850 4,976 903 1,002 647
p (%) 75.30 24.70 43.57 10.89 11.18 2.03 2.25 1.45
TEACHERS INSURANCE N 32,723 8,911 18,614 2,939 4,969 939 951 530
p (%) 78.60 21.40 44.71 7.06 11.93 2.26 2.28 1.27
UBS N 20,873 11,474 12,922 6,489 1,342 1,157 1,106 451
p (%) 64.53 35.47 39.95 20.06 4.15 3.58 3.42 1.39
VANGUARD N 40,853 10,690 21,225 3,304 5,401 1,012 1,208 744
p (%) 79.26 20.74 41.18 6.41 10.48 1.96 2.34 1.44
Box 3.1: Main results of EU analysis - Overall evidence
 Baseline analysis is done on a historical dataset containing all listed companies active in
the EU in the period 2007-2016: this includes all listed firms registered in the EU, plus
all listed companies registered elsewhere, but holding participation in at least one firm
registered in the EU. The average number of firms observed each year is 26,560 (from
24,857 in 2007 to 26,942 in 2016) - where about 57% are registered in EU countries,
the rest being registered outside the EU. The proportion of EU versus Non-EU registered
companies remains roughly constant over time.
 In 2016, 87.2% of all shareholders of companies in our dataset held participation in only
one company (85.1% in 2007). Common shareholders therefore make up 12.8% of all
shareholders (14.9% in 2007). The number of listed firms that are cross-held by block-
holders (common shareholders with at least 5% participation in more than one company)
has been increasing, growing from around 15.5 thousand in 2007 to around 17.5 thousand
in 2016. Around 67% of the analysed companies are cross-held by block-holders with at
least 5% participation.
 Looking at portfolios, the top common shareholders hold as many as 25% of the firms
in the market, representing more than 6,000 companies overall. They tend to invest
equally among the chosen firms, rather than prioritising specific companies through buy-
ing higher percentages of shares.
 The firms included in the largest portfolios represent a significant proportion of the total
value of the market, reaching a coverage of above 80% of Total Assets and more than 90%
of Market Capitalisation in almost all years. This means that the top investors not only
hold shares in a considerable number of firms (around 25%), but also typically choose
the largest enterprises, leaving out only minor players - which together do not account
for more than 10-20% of the market value. The preference for the largest market players
has become stronger over time.
 When both the Total Assets and Market Capitalisation are multiplied by the percentage of
shares actually held, we find that in 2016 the top common shareholders holds within its
grasp 3.8% of total Market Capitalisation and 6.6% of the Total Assets in the EU. These
percentages were 2.3 and 3.6 respectively in 2008; An acceleration in the control of Total
Assets or MarketCap can be observed as of 2012.

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Box 3.2: Main results of EU analysis - Focus on big players
 Four large funds stand out with portfolios currently including more than 20% of the listed
firms active in Europe, namely BlackRock, Dimensional Fund, Norway (short for The Nor-
wegian Sovereign Fund) and Vanguard. In terms of time trend, both BlackRock and Van-
guard show an increase in size over time, while Dimensional has been shrinking a little,
and Norway is overall stable.
 Positioned only slightly behind are Axa, Deutsche Bank, Fidelity (FMR LLC) and JP Morgan
Chase, which all started out holding above 20% of the listed firms active in Europe at
the beginning of the period of observation, but have decreased their number of firms
held over time, currently holding between 12.5% and 16.2% of listed firms. On a lower
but stable level are Bank of New York Mellon, State Street and Teachers Insurance, with
holdings in around 17% of listed firms active in Europe, while Credit Suisse, Goldman
Sachs and Invesco show smaller declining portfolios, currently comprising at around 13%
of the firms under analysis.
 Considering the quantities held in portfolio, BlackRock and Fidelity have average shares
which consistently represent around 3%, followed by Vanguard with about 2% (increas-
ing), and Invesco, Dimensional and State Street with about 1% to 1.5% average holdings.
They are followed in turn by Allianz, Axa, Bank of New York Mellon, Norway and JP Morgan
Chase, where the average share of annual portfolios is close to 1%, and slightly increas-
ing. The remaining common shareholders currently present portfolios whose average
share is below 1%.
 The top 20 common shareholders tend to invest in companies registered outside the EU
(70% of the cases), mostly in the US and Japan. The top EU target countries in 2007-
2016 were the UK, Germany, France and Italy. Some common shareholders show a clear
geographical preference: for example, Northern Trust invests almost uniquely in firms
from the US (≈ 70% of portfolio) and from the UK (≈ 18%), almost disregarding Japan and
the other EU countries.

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Chapter 4
Common Shareholding in
Selected Industries
Following the general overview of all firms active in the EU, five industries of interest are
considered, namely Oil&Gas, Electricity, Mobile Telecommunications, Trading Platforms and
Beverages.1 For each industry, the identification of the relevant companies representing the
market followed an ad hoc process.
It should be noted that, similarly to the study on listed firms, the analysis of the five industries
encompasses all firms active in the EU in the specified sectors of economic activity, regardless
of their country of registration. In reality, a large proportion of companies active in these
sectors are subsidiaries of mother companies registered outside the EU, mainly in the US, but
also in countries such as Canada, Russia and China.
Starting from the comprehensive database of all listed companies active in the EU between
2007 and 2016, an initial selection of firms was conducted according to the international codes
of industry classification. The industry classification used to identify the economic activity
of firms followed the NACE system.2 Each firm can present more than one NACE code of
economic activity, classified as either "Core", "Primary" or "Secondary" activity. In many cases
it was necessary to consider all levels of activity, given that many corporations are active in
additional economic fields beyond their core business.
Unfortunately, this procedure did not manage to fully identify the set of relevant players in
each market, calling for further refinements. Several non-listed firms of relevance were also
integrated into each market. The final identification of each industry benefitted from the
crucial input of specialist teams at DG COMP, which we gratefully acknowledge.
1The relative concentration (limited number of firms with large market shares) and the existence of a topical
expertise on market players (due to recent antitrust or merger investigations) motivated the choice.
2NACE stands for Nomenclature générale des Activités économiques dans les Communautés Européennes (Euro-
pean Classification of Economic Activities). For further details see Eurostat (2008).
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The selection procedure of each industry is briefly commented upon in each sectoral analysis.
Full details are reported in Appendix C. Sections 4.1-4.5 report the results for each industry.
The relatively large time span of available observations, covering ten years between 2007 and
2016, enables the identification of a shift in investment behaviour among the top investors in
some industries, both in terms of the size of portfolios and the amount of participation in
individual firms. In particular, the increase in investment coming from Funds and States may
raise some concerns in strategic sectors such as those considered in the present analysis.
All aspects considered above are measured through the application of some of the indices
presented in Chapter 2.
4.1 Energy sector - Oil&Gas
All companies that presented at least one NACE code in Section "D" (Electricity, gas, steam and
air conditioning supply) among Core, Primary or Secondary activities were initially selected as
potential candidates for the Energy sector. We noticed the importance of considering also the
Secondary codes, especially in the Oil&Gas sector to capture relevant companies having their
Core and Primary codes in Mining or Manufacturing.
After this first selection, firms were allocated to the "Electricity" or "Oil&Gas" sectors according
to specific classifications appearing among Core or first three Primary codes (see Table C.1 in
Appendix C for details). As suggested by our colleagues in DG COMP, we removed transmission
system operators (TSOs) from the list, given that transmission is a highly regulated activity.
Nearly a hundred unlisted firms were added to complement the dataset, based on expert
opinion.
The Oil&Gas industry, identified according to the procedure described above, is composed by
153 distinct corporations active in the EU during the period 2007-2016. Of these, 73% are
listed. All-together, in 2016 the Total Assets of the selected firms amount to 3309 Bn Euro,
while the listed firms have a total value of Market Capitalisation of 1811 Bn Euro for the same
year. Although most firms are active throughout the whole period of observation, some are
recorded during a shorter period of time, either due to a later entry into the market or to exit
due to M&A, dissolution or other reasons. Therefore the panel of firms is not constant over
time, oscillating during the ten years of observation between 125 and 139 firms per year (on
average 134).
An overview of the summary statistics is outlined in Table 4.1. The number of recorded share-
holders varies little during 2007-2016, ranging between 1578 and 1884 per year, with the
proportion of common shareholders rather stable around 33%, much higher than the overall
figure of about 14%. On the other hand, the proportion of firms cross-held by block-holders is
in line with the general picture of listed firms in the EU, i.e. rather stable around 63%.
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Table 4.1: Summary statistics for firms active in the EU in the Oil&Gas sector between 2007 and 2016:
number of firms; number and percentage of firms cross-held by block-holders (BH) at minimum 5%; total
number of shareholders; number and percentage of common shareholders (i.e. shareholders with more
than one firm in their portfolio); number and percentage of single owners (holding shares only of one
firm).
Year Number Number (%) Firms Number Number (%) Number (%)Firms Cross-held by BH of SH Common SH Single SH
2007 125 75 (60.00) 1,655 535 (32.33) 1,120 (67.67)
2008 129 84 (65.11) 1,639 535 (32.64) 1,104 (67.36)
2009 132 77 (58.33) 1,578 544 (34.47) 1,034 (65.53)
2010 134 87 (64.93) 1,802 621 (34.46) 1,181 (65.54)
2011 134 87 (64.93) 1,822 605 (33.21) 1,217 (66.79)
2012 137 90 (65.69) 1,659 617 (37.19) 1,042 (62.81)
2013 139 86 (61.87) 1,832 597 (32.59) 1,235 (67.41)
2014 139 86 (61.87) 1,835 606 (33.02) 1,229 (66.98)
2015 136 85 (62.50) 1,884 598 (31.74) 1,286 (68.26)
2016 135 82 (60.74) 1,741 565 (32.45) 1,176 (67.55)
About 46% of the firms are registered outside the EU, almost half of which are in the US,
followed by Canada, Australia and a smaller number from China, Japan, Norway and Russia.
More than half of the firms (52%) report as their core activity the Nace code "3522: Distribu-
tion of gaseous fuels through mains", while 12% have as their principal classification "3513:
Distribution of electricity", and another 12% present "1920: Manufacture of refined petroleum
products". About 9% of firms are active in "610: Extraction of crude petroleum" and 5% in
"3523: Trade of gas through mains". The remaining companies declare their main activities in
Section D (Electricity, Gas and Steam Supply), or other related activities (wholesale of fuels or
transport via pipeline). A summary of the main economic activities is reported in Table 4.2.
Table 4.2: Main areas of economic activity of firms active in the EU in the Oil&Gas sector between 2007
and 2016: Core Nace code, description of area of activity, and percentage of firms presenting such Core
code.
Core Nace Description % firms
3522 Distribution of gaseous fuels through mains 52
1920 Manufacture of refined petroleum products 12
3513 Distribution of electricity 12
0610 Extraction of crude petroleum 9
3523 Trade of gas through mains 5
Other: mainly from Section D (Electricity, Gas and Steam Supply), 10Wholesale of fuels or Transport via pipeline
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Main players
Before looking at the overall results for the whole market, we report here some figures relative
to the largest enterprises active in this sector. Table 4.3 reports the ten largest companies
registered in the EU and the ten largest from outside, reporting their size in terms of Total
Assets for 2016, the country of registration, and the percentage of shares held in 2016 by the
four top institutional investors, namely BlackRock, Vanguard, State Street and Norway3.
The size of the largest companies is comparable across the two groups, although those reg-
istered outside the EU 28 tend to show somewhat larger Total Assets for 2016. In terms
of country of registration, the UK, France, Italy and Spain prevail in Europe, while outside
most companies are based in North America (US or Canada), followed by Russia, Norway and
Venezuela.
The presence of the four funds is widespread in both groups of firms, in some cases presenting
very high participation (above 6%). In terms of shares, BlackRock dominates in the EU-based
companies, with values generally much higher than the remaining three investors. State
Street concentrates mainly on UK firms, while Norway and Vanguard invest more evenly in
all top companies. Outside the EU, Vanguard’s presence is of a similar level to Blackrock,
although slightly higher in this case, followed at some distance by State Street. Norway marks
its presence in almost all top firms, although with rather small shares. The only exception is
Petroleos De Venezuela, where the funds are absent, being wholly owned by the State.
Density and uniformity
The first common shareholding indices to be presented are the shareholders indices derived
from each investor’s ownership information. Their respective distribution will be analysed to
infer market-level indicators. The results for the Oil&Gas industry are displayed in Table 4.4.
The six indices are those based on plain density, on the value-based densities calculated from
Total Assets and Market Capitalisation, with their corresponding share-weighted versions, and
finally the index of uniformity of investments portfolios.
On average, the portfolios of investors in this market hold about 2.5% of the firms, i.e. ap-
proximately 3 firms. However, given the very large number of single shareholders (about two
thirds), the distribution of the size of portfolios is very asymmetric: the majority of investors
(75%) only hold participation in 2 firms or less, that is 1.5% of the market, as we see from
the 75th percentile. Things change dramatically for the largest portfolios, where the top 1%
hold on average more than 38 firms (≈ 28% of the market). All these figures are rather stable
over the ten years of observation. The maximum size of portfolios is very large, with portfolios
3We recall that the term "Norway" (the state) is used as an abbreviation to indicate the Norwegian Sovereign Fund.
The same is intended for the references to other states, such as France or Sweden, meaning the respective sovereign
funds.
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Table 4.3: Largest firms of Oil&Gas sector and selected ownership data on their main common share-
holders. Top 10 largest enterprises in the EU and outside the EU, by country of registration. Size mea-
sured by Total Assets in 2016 (Bn Euros). Direct or indirect participation shares (%) held in 2016.
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Registered in the EU Shares held in 2016 (%)
ROYAL DUTCH SHELL PL UK 390.17 6.92 2.35 3.38 2.73
BP PLC UK 249.80 5.51 1.70 3.33 2.52
TOTAL S.A. FR 128.17 5.07 1.67 0.74 1.92
ENI S.P.A. IT 83.36 2.27 1.51 0.57 1.48
ENGIE FR 80.56 1.74 1.46 0.49 1.28
GAS NATURAL SDG, S.A ES 32.08 1.16 0.79 0.18 0.68
CENTRICA PLC UK 25.55 6.75 1.91 2.52 2.44
REPSOL S.A. ES 23.74 3.04 1.24 0.36 1.61
OMV AG AT 17.35 1.07 1.57 0.51 0.99
HERA SPA IT 6.17 0.42 1.75 0.90 0.97
Registered outside the EU Shares held in 2016 (%)
EXXON MOBIL CORP US 313.36 5.87 0.87 4.63 6.83
CHEVRON CORP US 246.73 6.41 0.98 6.04 6.97
GAZPROM PJSC RU 216.66 1.25 0.47 0.11 1.46
PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA VE 179.93
ROSNEFT OIL COM PJSC RU 155.67 0.27 0.12 0.34
STATOIL ASA NO 85.96 0.80 67.00 0.22 0.70
CONOCOPHILLIPS CO US 85.16 6.55 0.96 4.84 6.91
KINDER MORGAN INC US 76.18 4.78 0.64 3.99 5.80
ENERGY TRANSFER US 66.59 0.19
TRANSCANADA CORP CA 62.21 0.60 0.11 2.06
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encompassing 40% or more of the firms in the market being observed every year. This fig-
ure has been increasing over time, reaching a peak of 45% in 2016, i.e. about 60 competing
companies.
As for the uniformity index, rather low average values are observed in all years (around 14%),
showing that investors tend to distinguish between the firms in their portfolio through an
uneven distribution of shares. However, the top values of the index are always above 85%,
with a maximum above 90% and increasing, revealing that there are shareholders holding an
almost equal amount of shares in all firms held.
The value-based indices are calculated from the Total Assets or the Market Capitalisation of
the firms in a portfolio. Given that the last variable is only available for listed firms, the two
indices present slightly different values, given that they are not calculated using the same
pool of firms. However, the general trend is rather similar in the two cases. Looking first at
the unweighted indices, we find that the firms in the portfolios represent on average about
6% of the market, but again this distribution is very skewed: the 75th percentile shows that
three quarters of portfolios include firms that represent at most a minor share of the market
value (a stable figure of about 3.5% of Market Capitalisation, and an increasing share of Total
Assets, currently reaching 6.5%). This suggests that the majority of portfolios include either
a limited number of medium firms, or a larger number of small firms, in either case not being
very relevant for the overall market. When we move towards the upper end of the distribution,
however, we see that the top portfolios include participation in almost all relevant firms, rep-
resenting more than 70% of the market value in terms of Total Assets, and more than 85% of
Market Capitalisation (on average over the ten years). The largest observed values are close
to 90% for TOAS and almost 100% for MKT CAP, revealing that the largest portfolios hand-pick
all firms with the largest value in the market.
Once we consider actual firm ownership, weighting the value of the firms by the respective
participation shares, we find that 99% of portfolios hold less than 1% of the value of the market
through their participation shares, both in terms of TOAS and of MKT CAP. However, there are
top investors that hold in their hands large amounts of market value, given that the shares
they hold in the firms in their portfolio amount to about 5-6% of the market TOAS or MKT CAP.
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Table 4.4: Oil&Gas sector common shareholding indices. Summary Statistics by year (percentage
points, index values between 0 and 100): mean, 75th percentile (p75), 99th percentile (p99), maxi-
mum (max). Density: Proportion of firms in a shareholder’s portfolio relative to the total number of
firms in the market. Uniformity: Relative weight of larger participation shares over the shares total in
the portfolio. Small values denote concentrated investment. TOAS density: Proportion of total assets
of the market represented by the firms in portfolio. Weighted TOAS density: Proportion of total assets
of the market held by shareholder through participation shares. MKT CAP density: Proportion of market
capitalisation of the market represented by the firms in portfolio. Weighted MKT CAP density: Proportion
of market capitalisation of the market held by shareholder through participation shares.
Year Density
mean p75 p99 max
2007 2.4933 1.6000 28.8000 40.8000
2008 2.5838 1.5504 31.0078 42.6357
2009 2.6256 1.5152 31.0606 41.6667
2010 2.5366 1.4925 28.3582 44.0299
2011 2.4780 1.4925 29.1045 44.0299
2012 2.5444 2.1898 27.7372 40.8759
2013 2.3334 1.4388 26.6187 43.1655
2014 2.4159 1.4388 27.3381 43.1655
2015 2.3409 1.4706 27.2059 44.1176
2016 2.4281 1.4815 25.9259 45.1852
Year Uniformity
mean p75 p99 max
2007 14.2029 28.9559 84.7759 88.65
2008 14.2989 28.7194 85.0252 89.68
2009 15.0344 29.8343 85.2258 90.12
2010 14.9557 30.3018 85.4537 90.50
2011 14.4327 29.1845 84.9744 90.52
2012 15.9969 31.7066 84.9540 90.37
2013 13.9317 28.2429 84.7570 90.97
2014 14.5752 29.9732 85.3394 90.97
2015 13.5395 27.3938 85.1052 90.60
2016 14.1145 28.4073 86.0875 91.01
Year TOAS density
mean p75 p99 max
2007 5.5368 3.0749 72.1366 84.9300
2008 5.8669 3.6807 74.1782 86.3755
2009 5.9431 3.7569 77.2302 86.2309
2010 5.8955 3.4620 78.6741 86.9212
2011 5.5879 2.7858 77.5357 87.9454
2012 5.7378 3.3057 72.9714 84.7497
2013 5.7177 4.6072 68.7842 85.1007
2014 5.7448 5.8130 69.8872 87.6938
2015 5.6280 5.2626 70.2692 88.7788
2016 5.9754 6.5469 68.6473 89.2991
Year Weighted TOAS density
mean p75 p99 max
2007 0.0536 0.0161 0.8886 4.1202
2008 0.0518 0.0160 0.8091 3.9701
2009 0.0576 0.0179 1.0858 5.1398
2010 0.0500 0.0148 0.8719 5.3173
2011 0.0467 0.0130 0.8057 5.5801
2012 0.0511 0.0148 0.8601 5.8139
2013 0.0524 0.0134 0.8213 6.3651
2014 0.0517 0.0149 0.7790 4.8745
2015 0.0543 0.0160 0.8331 4.7199
2016 0.0538 0.0163 0.9077 5.7510
Year MKT CAP density
mean p75 p99 max
2007 5.9102 3.0433 80.0996 97.8927
2008 6.4627 3.7682 89.2018 99.0173
2009 6.4209 4.2629 86.2573 99.3972
2010 6.3556 4.7061 91.0768 99.4750
2011 5.9074 3.7030 87.0212 99.4429
2012 6.0933 4.1428 84.1377 97.6022
2013 6.1213 4.6127 82.8554 97.4576
2014 6.3079 3.4487 84.0280 98.8587
2015 6.0392 3.3678 83.6435 98.7671
2016 6.3439 3.6858 82.1542 97.5925
Year Weighted MKT CAP density
mean p75 p99 max
2007 0.0542 0.0102 1.1636 5.5174
2008 0.0468 0.0086 1.0094 2.9745
2009 0.0597 0.0118 1.1059 6.2290
2010 0.0500 0.0095 0.9359 6.0684
2011 0.0445 0.0090 0.7262 5.1673
2012 0.0483 0.0117 0.8850 5.3693
2013 0.0463 0.0112 0.8567 4.4287
2014 0.0463 0.0133 0.8548 4.6792
2015 0.0474 0.0137 0.8731 4.7452
2016 0.0476 0.0136 0.8101 4.9134
Common shareholding indices for top investors
Given the asymmetries of the density indices observed above, it is worth investigating what
happens at the top levels. For this reason, a group of investors has been selected according
to the values scored in the various indices in 2007-2016, and their behaviour has been looked
at in detail. The "Top Investors" are defined as being the shareholders that present, over the
ten years of observation, at least five times a value of density, Weighted TOAS density or
Weighted MKT CAP density in the top 20. This selection makes it possible to distinguish the
largest portfolios, i.e. those holding the largest number of firms, or the most valuable ones,
such as those portfolios with a limited number of large firms but each one held with a large
participation share, thus securing a large overall share of market value into the hand of the
investor.
In fact, the top investors tend to be the same over the entire period, therefore scoring the
largest values in the indices across all years. Given that the MKT CAP variable is not available
for all firms, Table 4.5 summarises, for the sake of the example, some figures concerning the
shareholders with the top Weighted TOAS density. The Table reports the size of portfolios
(number of firms in portfolio and density) in 2016, and the two TOAS-based indices, together
with the largest firms held and respective participation shares reported in 2016.
In the first position we find the Russian Government, which holds almost 6% of the Total Assets
of the market, given that it is the majority owner of two of the largest companies in Oil&Gas
(Gazprom and Rosneft). The usual top three funds follow, respectively BlackRock, Vanguard
and Norway, each having invested in more than 40% of the firms in the market; even with
small participation, they hold approximately between 3% and 4% of the market value. State
Street and Capital Group follow closely behind, again with numerous firms held, including most
larger players. Last, Jupiter Dividend, with participations in only 3 firms, manages to control
1.56% of the market value, due to large shares in the largest firms.
The evolution of the indices over 2007-2016 is reported for top investors in Figure 4.1, by in-
vestor type (Funds, States, Banks, Insurance). In general, over the years Banks and Insurance
companies have maintained or decreased the number of firms held in the Oil&Gas industry.
Yet, the proportion of firms in portfolio is rather high, constituting between 15% and 40% of
companies active in the industry. The share of market value, both in terms of TOAS and of
MKT CAP, is almost always below 1% throughout the period of observation for both types of
investors.
States present more stable values, with Norway and Sweden holding the largest number of
firms (about 42% and 28% on average respectively), but in terms of market value are beaten
by Russia, as reported earlier. As for the funds, BlackRock, Vanguard and State Street dominate
over all remaining investors of this type, showing increasing trends in all indicators during
2007-2016, and scoring the top three values in each index in 2016.
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Table 4.5: Top Investors in Oil&Gas sector: Investors whose portfolios present the top values of the
Weighted TOAS density index in 2016. Country of shareholder (SH); number of firms held in Oil&Gas
industry; Density (share of firms held); TOAS density (share of market TOAS represented by firms held);
Weighted TOAS density (share of market TOAS held through participation shares); firms with largest
TOAS in portfolio and respective quantity of shares held, ordered by decreasing TOAS. All figures refer to
the year 2016. MO = Majority Owner.
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Largest firms and shares held (%)
GOVERNMENT OF
THE RUSSIAN FED-
ERATION
RU 7 5.19 11.51 5.75 GAZPROM (MO); ROSNEFT (MO)
BLACKROCK US 61 45.19 89.21 4.19
ROYAL DUTCH SHELL (6.92); EXXON
(5.87); BP PLC (5.51); CHEVRON
(6.41); GAZPROM (1.25); ROSNEFT
(0.27); TOTAL (5.07)
VANGUARD US 57 42.22 87.51 3.42
ROYAL DUTCH SHELL (2.73); EXXON
(6.83); BP (2.52); CHEVRON (6.97);
GAZPROM (1.46); ROSNEFT (0.34);
TOTAL (1.92)
NORWAY NO 54 40.00 85.68 2.72
ROYAL DUTCH SHELL (2.35); EXXON
(0.87); BP (1.7); CHEVRON (0.98);
GAZPROM (0.47); ROSNEFT (0.12);
TOTAL (1.67); STATOIL (67.00)
STATE STREET US 45 33.33 80.21 2.55
ROYAL DUTCH SHELL (3.38); EXXON
(4.63); BP (3.33); CHEVRON (6.04);
GAZPROM (0.11); TOTAL (0.74)
CAPITAL GROUP US 27 20.00 65.78 1.91
ROYAL DUTCH SHELL (5.45); EXXON
(1.47); BP PLC (2.17); CHEVRON
(3.79); TOTAL (2.49)
JUPITER DIVIDEND UK 3 2.22 20.11 1.56 ROYAL DUTCH SHELL (7.1); BP PLC(9.2); CENTRICA(3.4)
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Figure 4.1: Common shareholding indices for Top Investors in Oil Gas sector. Top panel: Density -
Proportion of firms in a shareholder’s portfolio relative to the total number of firms in the market. Bottom
panel: Weighted TOAS density - Proportion of total assets of the market held by shareholder through
participation shares.
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Network indices
This Section presents common shareholding indices calculated inside the two separate net-
works of Shareholders and Firms, measuring the strength of the relationships induced between
actors of the same type due to a link with an actor of the other type. Namely, two firms can
be linked by a common shareholder, while two shareholders are connected through ownership
of shares in the same firm.
The higher the number of firms that two investors have in common, and the closer the amount
of shares held in each of them, the stronger the link between the two investors. On the other
hand, the higher the number of shareholders that appear in two firms’ ownership structures,
and the more similar the values of the shares held, the closer the firms will be considered
to be. In both networks, the strength of the link is measured through the calculation of the
coefficients of correlation between either portfolios (for shareholders) or ownership structures
(in the case of firms).
In the shareholders’ network, however, high correlations can be observed between two port-
folios that comprise the same firms with similar shares, but with a very small number of firms.
Given that in general the portfolios tend to be rather small,4 it makes sense to select the most
significant portfolios before looking at the strength of their link. For this industry, a threshold
of at least 10% of density has been chosen, defining the so-called "high density portfolios".
In the case of the firms’ network, no selection was necessary based on the number of share-
holders, since the average ownership structure includes about 12 owners, giving rise to a
reasonable number of links to analyse between any pair of firms. On the other hand, to avoid
possible spurious links generated by very small participations, only block-holdings have been
considered, i.e. links generated by ownership of at least 5% of shares. If the participation is
below 5%, it is ignored for the calculation of these indices.
Tables 4.6 and 4.7 report the yearly results for the two networks. Only about 4% of all possible
owner-owner connections are detected, i.e. the vast majority of shareholders have no firms in
common. Such proportion is rather constant over time, slightly decreasing in the last years.
Considering all existing links between large "high density" portfolios, less than 2% of con-
nected high density shareholders have a strong correlation of investment behaviour (above
80%). Still, it is striking that some large portfolios show an almost coinciding behaviour; even
though they are few, they cannot be ignored and should be further analysed.
In the firms’ network, we observe an increasing proportion of connections of pairs of firms
through block-holders present in their ownership structures. This fraction was below 2% in
2007, but has currently more than doubled to above 5%, witnessing an increase in extensive
block-holding by large investors. Among the connected firms, above 10% show strong links,
with correlations of more than 80% between their respective block-holding structures, con-
4We recall that 75% of portfolios hold at most 2 firms, and the average portfolio size is of 3 firms, as seen in earlier.
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firming there is a large overlap of investment preferences among top investors. However, this
indicator has not shown a particular pattern over time.
Table 4.6: Network indices for Oil&Gas sector. Shareholders’ network. Total number of common share-
holders; proportion of non-zero correlations between pairs of portfolios, i.e. proportion of connections
between two shareholders induced by common shareholding of a same firm; number of high correlations
(>80%) between pairs of high-density portfolios (both densities >10%); proportion of high correlations
between pairs of high-density portfolios.
Tot No. Prop Non-Zero No. High Corr. Prop. High Corr.
Year Comm SH Correlations High Dens. High Dens.
2007 535 3.87 69 1.78
2008 535 4.02 87 2.08
2009 544 4.35 97 2.23
2010 621 4.03 94 1.66
2011 605 3.96 96 1.90
2012 617 4.72 73 1.47
2013 597 3.59 73 1.50
2014 606 3.93 96 1.86
2015 598 3.45 63 1.30
2016 565 3.63 70 1.57
Table 4.7: Network indices for Oil&Gas sector. Firms’ network. Total number of firms cross-held by block-
holders (holding at least 5%); proportion of non-zero correlations between shareholders’ structures of
pairs of firms (only shares >5%); number of high correlations between shareholders’ structures of pairs
of firms (only shares >5%); proportion of high correlations (>80%) among the non-zero correlations.
Tot. No. Firms Prop Non-Zero No. of High Prop. of High
Year Cross-Held by BH Correlations Correlations Correlations
2007 75 1.70 18 13.64
2008 84 2.24 28 15.14
2009 77 4.98 63 14.62
2010 87 4.65 59 14.25
2011 87 4.23 44 11.67
2012 90 3.57 50 15.02
2013 86 3.60 30 8.70
2014 86 4.09 39 9.95
2015 85 4.52 41 9.88
2016 82 5.40 69 14.14
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4.2 Energy sector - Electricity
The Electricity sector has been selected according to the general procedure for the Energy
sectors (see Section 4.1). This industry includes 396 firms active in the EU area, of which
39% are registered outside, mainly in the US, Canada, Switzerland and Russia. The number
of active firms per year has been increasing steadily from 275 in 2007 to 353 in 2016, with
an average of 325 firms per year. The large majority (89%) of the selected firms is listed.
In 2016, the sector totaled 3330 Bn Euro of Total Assets, while the listed firms had a Market
Capitalisation of 864 Bn Euro.
The number of shareholders has also been increasing over time, totalling 3596 investors in
2016 against the 2429 present in 2007. Although the number of common shareholders has
been rather stable over time (on average about 690 per year), their proportion has been
drastically diminishing, having observed a steep rise in single shareholders, which currently
amount to 80% of the investors. In 2007, this proportion was as low as 71%. Table 4.8 presents
some yearly statistics.
Although the number of firms cross-held by block investors has been increasing since 2007,
their proportion had decreased around 7 percentage points (from 62.5 to 55.5) by the end of
2016, given the rapid growth of the size of this industry.
Table 4.8: Summary statistics for firms active in the EU in the Electricity sector between 2007 and 2016:
number of firms; number and percentage of firms cross-held by block-holders (BH) at minimum 5%; total
number of shareholders; number and percentage of common shareholders (i.e. shareholders with more
than one firm in their portfolio); number and percentage of single owners (holding shares only of one
firm).
Year Number Number (%) Firms Number Number (%) Number (%)Firms Cross-held by BH of SH Common SH Single SH
2007 275 172 (62.55) 2,429 704 (28.98) 1,725 (71.02)
2008 285 177 (62.11) 2,545 722 (28.37) 1,823 (71.63)
2009 303 171 (56.44) 2,566 697 (27.16) 1,869 (72.84)
2010 321 188 (58.57) 2,925 759 (25.95) 2,166 (74.05)
2011 325 186 (57.23) 2,842 677 (23.82) 2,165 (76.18)
2012 333 191 (57.36) 2,732 644 (23.57) 2,088 (76.43)
2013 340 184 (54.12) 2,815 663 (23.55) 2,152 (76.45)
2014 346 194 (56.07) 2,975 645 (21.68) 2,330 (78.32)
2015 350 204 (58.29) 3,028 693 (22.89) 2,335 (77.11)
2016 353 196 (55.52) 3,596 712 (19.80) 2,884 (80.20)
All of the firms’ economic activity falls within Group 35.1 of the Nace classification (Electric
power generation, transmission and distribution), as shown in Table 4.9. The large majority
of firms (73%) have as their main activity "Production of electricity" (Nace Core code 3511),
followed by "3512: Transmission of electricity" (16%), "3513: Distribution of electricity" (7%)
and "3514: Trade of electricity" (4%).
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Table 4.9: Main areas of economic activity of firms active in the EU in the Electricity sector between
2007 and 2016: Core Nace code, description of area of activity, and percentage of firms presenting such
Core code.
Core Nace Description % firms
3511 Production of electricity 73
3512 Transmission of electricity 16
3513 Distribution of electricity 7
3514 Trade of electricity 4
Main players
The picture of the main players as shown in Table 4.10 again indicates a strong presence of
the four main funds. Additionally, France plays a major role in this market, holding very large
stakes in three of the top ten EU-based corporations, together with a minor presence in some
additional firms. Of the remaining four investors, BlackRock holds the highest shares, followed
by Norway and Vanguard on similar levels, and finally by State Street. As for companies based
outside the EU, all three American investors show very large participation, while Norway is
present in most companies, but with low shares, and France is completely absent, having
focused only on EU top players.
In this sector there are more companies which are totally State-owned: EnBW (Energie Baden-
Württemberg), whose majority shareholders are the state of Baden-WÜrttemberg and the
Oberschwäbischen Elektrizitätswerken - a municipal association of regional and local authori-
ties; Vattenfall AB, wholly owned by Sweden; and China Huadian, wholly owned by China.
Density and uniformity
The shareholders’ indices based on densities and uniformity present a picture of investors’
portfolios which is rather different from the other Energy industry analysed in Section 4.1,
namely the Oil&Gas market. In fact, the larger (and increasing) number of firms active in
Electricity implies that even sizeable portfolios represent a smaller share of the market in
terms of headcount. Besides the very large fraction of single shareholders (above 80% in
2016), we can see from Table 4.11 that only 1% of investors hold more than 9% of the firms
active in the market in 2016, i.e. about 30 firms. This figure has been diminishing over
time, as has the maximum density, which currently stands at around 28%; however, given the
large number of firms in this industry, this apparently small fraction - when compared to the
maximum density of 45% in Oil&Gas - amounts to about one hundred Electricity companies.
Compared to Oil&Gas, the lower average value of the uniformity index shows a more con-
centrated behaviour in terms of amount of shares held, that is to say that investors tend to
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Table 4.10: Largest firms of Electricity sector and selected ownership data on their main common
shareholders. Top 10 largest enterprises in the EU and outside the EU, by country of registration. Size
measured by Total Assets in 2016 (Bn Euros). Direct or indirect participation shares (%) held in 2016.
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Registered in the EU Shares held in 2016 (%)
ELECTRICITE DE FRANCE FR 198.93 0.25 84.50 0.57 0.14 0.30
ENEL SPA IT 155.60 5.04 1.57 0.59 1.63
ENGIE FR 80.56 1.74 36.10 1.46 0.49 1.28
E.ON SE DE 63.70 6.03 0.15 2.03 1.84 2.05
ELECTRABEL BE 52.08 25.01
IBERDROLA SA ES 48.31 3.00 0.11 3.21 0.75 1.92
RWE AG DE 45.97 4.72 0.12 1.93 1.03 1.73
ENBW DE 30.90
SSE PLC UK 27.86 2.93 2.95 2.62 2.56
VATTENFALL AB SE 27.42
Registered outside the EU Shares held in 2016 (%)
DUKE ENERGY CORP US 125.95 5.97 0.60 4.93 6.74
EXELON CORP US 109.01 7.68 0.90 5.92 6.25
CHINA HUADIAN CN 106.36
TOKYO ELECTRIC POWER JP 92.03 0.76 0.52 0.13 0.90
KOREA ELECTRIC POWER KR 82.73 1.18 0.84
AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER US 60.21 6.83 5.19 6.22
CENTRAIS ELETRICAS BRASILEIRAS BR 49.64 0.98 1.01 0.52
THE KANSAI ELECTRIC POWER JP 48.71 1.46 1.06 0.18 1.61
EDISON INTERNATIONAL US 48.69 7.16 1.40 7.98 7.91
ENTERGY CORP US 43.55 8.74 1.40 5.60 10.90
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privilege a few companies in their portfolios, buying larger shares, while the remaining chosen
firms are only held with minor participations. Even at the upper end of the distribution, we
find values much lower than in the other Energy market, except for the maximum, which is
rather similar around 90%. Notably, that the 75th percentile drops to zero in 2011, which is not
surprising since the fraction of single owners exceeds three quarters from that year onwards
(a single owner by definition has the maximum concentration of investments, i.e. a value of
0% uniformity).
If we look at the representativeness of the portfolios in terms of TOAS and MKT CAP, we see that
even in the largest portfolios the chosen firms tend to cover smaller fractions of the market
value: for example, looking at the TOAS density, we see that currently only 1% of portfolios
hold firms whose value represents more than 30% of the market, the largest portfolios reaching
a maximum just above 66%. The equivalent figures in Oil&Gas were of about 70% and 90%
respectively in 2016, having increased over time, while in Electricity a drop in this indicator is
evident. Again, this difference can be attributed to the fact that the number of firms active in
Electricity has been increasing steadily over time, while in Oil&Gas it is rather constant.
As for the density based on market capital, we observe that on average portfolios hold listed
firms that represent between 2% and 3% of the market value. Still, the top portfolios comprise
as much as 90% of the market value, having clearly hand-picked the most relevant companies.
Compared to the TOAS density, the index based on MKT CAP shows larger shares; this can
partly depend on the reduced number of firms for which this last variable is available, but it
could also be due to a mismatch between Assets and Market value in this industry. In fact,
the same was not observed in the Oil&Gas, where the indicators based on both variables were
almost identical.
Looking now at the weighted densities, we find portfolios holding large amount of participation
in very large firms, therefore controlling a remarkable fraction of the market’s Total Assets
or Market Capitalisation. Although this is true only for the very largest portfolios (the 99th
percentile is still very low, around 0.5%), in 2016 we observe investors holding about 7%
of the market’s Total Assets through their participation shares, and about 3.5% of Market
Capitalisation. While for TOAS the values are rather stable over time, for MKT CAP we observe
a decline, especially in recent years, but this could be due not only to changes in ownership,
but also to possible changes in the listing status of large companies.
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Table 4.11: Electricity sector common shareholding indices. Summary Statistics by year (percentage
points, index values between 0 and 100): mean, 75th percentile (p75), 99th percentile (p99), maximum
(max). Density: Proportion of firms in a shareholder’s portfolio relative to the total number of firms in the
market. Uniformity: Relative weight of larger participation shares over the shares total in the portfolio.
Small values denote concentrated investment. TOAS density: Proportion of total assets of the market
represented by the firms in portfolio. Weighted TOAS density: Proportion of total assets of the market
held by shareholder through participation shares. MKT CAP density: Proportion of market capitalisation
of the market represented by the firms in portfolio. Weighted MKT CAP density: Proportion of market
capitalisation of the market held by shareholder through participation shares.
Year Density
mean p75 p99 max
2007 1.0635 0.7273 14.5455 28.3636
2008 1.0495 0.7018 14.3860 32.9825
2009 0.9703 0.6601 14.8515 33.3333
2010 0.8840 0.6231 12.1495 33.6449
2011 0.8269 0.3077 11.0769 31.0769
2012 0.7699 0.3003 10.2102 27.9279
2013 0.7379 0.2941 9.1176 29.7059
2014 0.7189 0.2890 8.9595 29.1908
2015 0.7258 0.2857 9.7143 28.0000
2016 0.6520 0.2833 8.7819 28.6119
Year Uniformity
mean p75 p99 max
2007 11.4758 18.0206 79.7464 91.03
2008 11.3280 17.0530 79.9821 91.15
2009 10.9425 9.4204 79.7225 90.26
2010 10.3508 2.5943 78.3367 89.84
2011 9.6477 0.0000 77.3420 89.96
2012 9.3177 0.0000 77.7962 89.04
2013 9.1434 0.0000 76.4534 89.39
2014 8.5811 0.0000 76.1050 90.13
2015 8.8894 0.0000 76.9485 90.43
2016 7.6547 0.0000 75.4472 90.35
Year TOAS density
mean p75 p99 max
2007 2.1784 1.4514 38.8681 64.2994
2008 2.2075 1.5575 37.6497 73.7039
2009 1.9902 1.2598 35.7006 69.5548
2010 1.9819 1.7400 33.5341 75.1448
2011 1.8313 0.9804 32.9652 75.5721
2012 1.7416 0.9607 30.7829 69.8389
2013 1.4364 0.7711 25.1298 61.3229
2014 1.4196 0.6757 25.2061 60.8484
2015 1.4816 0.7645 27.9182 61.1137
2016 1.3715 0.5439 29.2677 66.8575
Year Weighted TOAS density
mean p75 p99 max
2007 0.0361 0.0091 0.6896 6.4523
2008 0.0340 0.0094 0.6419 5.4920
2009 0.0358 0.0087 0.5736 8.1448
2010 0.0332 0.0071 0.5625 8.0028
2011 0.0323 0.0073 0.5335 5.7006
2012 0.0336 0.0090 0.6108 7.8643
2013 0.0302 0.0077 0.5185 7.1067
2014 0.0283 0.0064 0.4660 6.5553
2015 0.0276 0.0066 0.4522 6.6746
2016 0.0259 0.0045 0.4230 6.6986
Year MKT CAP density
mean p75 p99 max
2007 2.8789 2.3382 52.7401 86.6605
2008 2.8798 1.8094 53.2521 93.7594
2009 2.7628 2.1126 53.4902 92.6958
2010 2.6516 2.4864 46.6519 93.8992
2011 2.5396 2.2393 45.7196 91.6545
2012 2.5180 1.5586 47.2062 88.3341
2013 2.3336 1.2352 40.1832 90.5733
2014 2.3432 0.9714 43.4761 90.8546
2015 2.3770 1.0705 45.4337 90.2871
2016 2.0593 0.7743 42.3846 92.9233
Year Weighted MKT CAP density
mean p75 p99 max
2007 0.0376 0.0074 0.5643 14.6561
2008 0.0348 0.0062 0.6301 8.9390
2009 0.0377 0.0077 0.6842 11.5364
2010 0.0368 0.0057 0.6988 8.7482
2011 0.0330 0.0062 0.7082 4.4305
2012 0.0350 0.0081 0.6466 5.5326
2013 0.0340 0.0079 0.6214 7.7576
2014 0.0301 0.0071 0.5407 6.4315
2015 0.0312 0.0080 0.5583 4.3989
2016 0.0279 0.0048 0.5063 3.4891
Common shareholding indices for top investors
Table 4.12 reports the major owners of this industry in 2016, in terms of share of market Total
Assets held through participation shares (weighted TOAS density). The Electricity sector is
characterised by a strong presence of state-owned companies, with States holding very large
shares or in many cases even being the majority owners of their national providers, as in the
case of France, Sweden, China and Korea. The usual US-based funds are still present as top
investors, but rather for the large number of firms in their portfolios, each held with minority
shares. The graphs in Figure 4.2 highlight the contrast between the large size of the portfolios
of Funds and their relatively small fraction of market TOAS held. The opposite is true for States,
especially France, presenting a small but very valuable portfolio.
The Banks are no longer important players in this market, having observed over time a shrink-
age of the size of their portfolios, both in terms of number of firms and of TOAS held, as is
evident from Figure 4.2. Similar findings, even at lower levels, are evident for the Insurance
companies investing in this industry, currently playing a minor role.
Network indices
The indices of connectedness calculated on the two networks of shareholders and firms are
shown in Tables 4.13 and 4.14 respectively. In both cases, we observe a much lower number
of links between actors in each network compared to Oil&Gas, and with diminishing trends in
time.
While in 2007 about 1.7% of possible connections between pairs of investors were active, in
2016 we observe only 0.65%, showing that the market has moved towards a structure with
more independent investors. In Oil&Gas the degree of connectedness among shareholders
was always above 3.5% throughout the whole period of observation. As for the strength of
those links, the fraction of high correlations (above 80%) between large portfolios (at least
10% of firms held) is small, but increasing: starting at about 0.35%, it is currently at 2.15%,
suggesting that the largest portfolios have experienced a convergence of investment strate-
gies.
As for the firms’ network, we observe few links derived from cross-ownership by block-holders,
almost always below 1%, but a large proportion of them are strong: about 21% of the links
existing in 2106 had a correlation larger than 80%.
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Table 4.12: Top Investors in Electricity sector: Investors whose portfolios present the top values of the
Weighted TOAS density index in 2016. Country of shareholder (SH); number of firms held in Electricity
industry; Density (share of firms held); TOAS density (share of market TOAS represented by firms held);
Weighted TOAS density (share of market TOAS held through participation shares); firms with largest
TOAS in portfolio and respective quantity of shares held, ordered by decreasing TOAS. All figures refer to
the year 2016.
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Largest firms and shares held (%)
FRANCE FR 20 5.67 16.84 6.70 EDF (84.5); ENGIE (36.1); E.ON (0.15); ELEC-TRABEL (25.01); IBERDROLA (0.11); RWE (0.12)
CHINA-
PEOPLE’S
REPUBLIC
CN 6 1.70 6.54 3.23
CHINA HUADIAN CORP (100); SSE (0.84); SDIC
POWER HOLDINGS (0.12); CENTRICA (0.83);
EDP (3.02); SHANGHAI ELECT. POWER (1.62)
BLACKROCK US 99 28.05 66.04 2.41
EDF (0.25); ENEL (5.04); DUKE ENERGY (5.97);
EXELON (7.68); TOKYO ELECT. POWER (0.76);
KOREA ELECT. POWER (1.18); ENGIE (1.74)
VANGUARD
GROUP US 101 28.61 66.86 1.98
EDF (0.3); ENEL (1.63); DUKE ENERGY (6.74);
EXELON (6.25); TOKYO ELECT. POWER (0.9);
KOREA ELECT. POWER (0.84); ENGIE (1.28)
REPUBLIC
KOREA KR 14 3.97 21.01 1.22
DUKE ENERGY (0.11); EXELON (0.23); KOREA
ELECT. POWER (18.2); AMERICAN ELECTRIC
(0.16); EDISON (0.15); ENTERGY (0.12); KOREA
HYDRO & NUCLEAR POWER (50.01)
STATE
STREET US 69 19.55 58.22 1.18
EDF (0.14); ENEL (0.59); DUKE ENERGY (4.93);
EXELON (5.92); TOKYO ELECT. POWER (0.13);
ENGIE (0.49); E.ON (1.84)
NORWAY NO 90 25.50 56.66 1.13
EDF (0.57); ENEL (1.57); DUKE ENERGY (0.6);
EXELON (0.9); TOKYO ELECT. POWER (0.52);
ENGIE (1.46); E.ON (2.03)
SWEDEN SE 48 13.60 41.93 1.06
ENEL (0.18); DUKE ENERGY (0.17); EXELON
(0.12); E.ON (0.11); AMERICAN ELECTRIC
(0.14); KANSAI ELECTRIC (0.14); EDISON
(0.19); VATTENFALL (100)
CAPITAL
GROUP US 23 6.52 32.19 0.82
EDF (0.2); ENEL (1.34); DUKE ENERGY (3.12);
EXELON (3.9); ENGIE (1.82); AMERICAN ELEC-
TRIC (0.29); IBERDROLA (2.39)
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Figure 4.2: Common shareholding indices for Top Investors in Electricity sector. Top panel: Density -
Proportion of firms in a shareholder’s portfolio relative to the total number of firms in the market. Bottom
panel: Weighted TOAS density - Proportion of total assets of the market held by shareholder through
participation shares.
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Table 4.13: Network indices for Electricity sector. Shareholders’ network. Total number of common
shareholders; proportion of non-zero correlations between pairs of portfolios, i.e. proportion of con-
nections between two shareholders induced by common shareholding of a same firm; number of high
correlations (>80%) between pairs of high-density portfolios (both densities >10%); proportion of high
correlations between pairs of high-density portfolios.
Tot No. Prop Non-Zero No. High Corr. Prop. High Corr.
Year Comm SH Correlations High Dens. High Dens.
2007 704 1.73 3 0.35
2008 722 1.66 2 0.27
2009 697 1.47 1 0.17
2010 759 1.26 2 0.32
2011 677 1.08 2 0.40
2012 644 1.03 5 1.42
2013 663 1.00 3 1.43
2014 645 0.94 4 1.45
2015 693 0.96 3 0.85
2016 712 0.65 7 2.15
Table 4.14: Network indices for Electricity sector. Firms’ network. Total number of firms cross-held by
block-holders (holding at least 5%); proportion of non-zero correlations between shareholders’ structures
of pairs of firms (only shares >5%); number of high correlations between shareholders’ structures of pairs
of firms (only shares >5%); proportion of high correlations (>80%) among the non-zero correlations.
Tot. No. Firms Prop Non-Zero No. of High Prop. of High
Year Cross-Held Correlations Correlations Correlations
2007 172 1.31 93 18.79
2008 177 0.95 75 19.58
2009 171 1.27 86 14.75
2010 188 1.11 85 14.96
2011 186 0.91 96 20.13
2012 191 0.77 91 21.36
2013 184 0.72 81 19.61
2014 194 0.68 96 23.82
2015 204 0.81 96 19.47
2016 196 0.77 102 21.29
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4.3 Trading Platforms for Financial Instruments sector -
Trading Platforms operators
The initial attempt of capturing through NACE codes the industry of Trading Platforms for Finan-
cial Instruments (Trading Platforms for short) failed to identify the relevant companies. Given
that a specific NACE code for Trading Platforms does not actually exist, possible codes have
been selected based on what was reported by the main players of this sector. Unfortunately,
such categories were either too broad ("Other credit granting"; "Other financial service activi-
ties, except insurance and pension funding n.e.c.") or too narrow ("Administration of financial
markets"; "Security and commodity contracts brokerage"), and therefore were of no help for
the identification of the other players in the industry.
As a consequence, the list of trading venues and systematic internalisers operating in the EU
has been constructed manually using the list of markets maintained by the European Secu-
rities Market Authorities (ESMA). First, four separate lists for different categories of trading
venues were compiled: regulated markets, multilateral trading facilities, organised trading fa-
cilities, and systematic internalisers. Then, together with colleagues in DG COMP, we identified
a single list of 176 companies operating such platforms in EU. The Trading Platforms operators
reflect the actual players active in this industry, and are hence considered the relevant com-
panies for this sector. Only 27% of the selected operators are listed. The sector’s Total Assets
in 2016 amounted to 11729 Bn Euro, while the 2016 total Market Capitalisation for listed firms
was 590 Bn Euro. The large majority (89%) of the operators are registered in one of the EU
countries. Of the few operators registered outside, ten come from the US, six from Norway,
two from Canada and two from Switzerland.
Table 4.15: Summary statistics for firms active in the EU in the Trading Platforms sector between 2007
and 2016: number of firms; number and percentage of firms cross-held by block-holders (BH) at minimum
5%; total number of shareholders; number and percentage of common shareholders (i.e. shareholders
with more than one firm in their portfolio); number and percentage of single owners (holding shares only
of one firm).
Year Number Number (%) Firms Number Number (%) Number (%)Firms Cross-held by BH of SH Common SH Single SH
2007 124 80 (64.52) 1,584 425 (26.83) 1,159 (73.17)
2008 130 88 (67.69) 1,600 464 (29.00) 1,136 (71.00)
2009 136 86 (63.24) 1,630 403 (24.72) 1,227 (75.28)
2010 137 90 (65.69) 1,655 386 (23.32) 1,269 (76.68)
2011 138 90 (65.22) 1,594 373 (23.40) 1,221 (76.60)
2012 143 89 (62.24) 1,503 352 (23.42) 1,151 (76.58)
2013 148 103 (69.59) 1,433 366 (25.54) 1,067 (74.46)
2014 152 102 (67.11) 1,474 394 (26.73) 1,080 (73.27)
2015 156 104 (66.67) 1,607 401 (24.95) 1,206 (75.05)
2016 159 105 (66.04) 1,662 384 (23.10) 1,278 (76.90)
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As shown in Table 4.15, on average there are 142 firms per year, constantly increasing from
124 in 2007 to 159 in 2016. The total number of shareholders, on the other hand, has been
rather stable, with an average just below 1600 investors per year. The proportion of common
shareholders has also shown a constant value of about 25%, again higher than the overall EU
figure. In this sector, we observe a growth in both the number and the proportion of com-
petitors commonly block-held by investors: currently about two thirds of the Trading Platforms
operators have some shareholder in common with another operator, both with participations
higher than 5%.
The classification of economic activity of the trading platform operators is summarised in Table
4.16. The largest group of firms (39%) present the Core Nace code "6419: Other monetary in-
termediation", followed by "6612: Security and commodity contracts brokerage" (19%), "6611:
Administration of financial markets" (15%) and "6499: Other financial service activities, except
insurance and pension funding n.e.c." (9%). Smaller groups are classified as "6420: Activities
of holding companies" (5%) and "6619: Other activities auxiliary to financial services, except
insurance and pension funding" (4%), the remaining companies having registered activities
either in the Financial area, or as Head offices/Business support services (less than 2% each).
Only three firms are classified in the field of Information and Communication.
Table 4.16: Main areas of economic activity of firms active in the EU in the Trading Platforms sec-
tor between 2007 and 2016: Core Nace code, description of area of activity, and percentage of firms
presenting such Core code.
Core Nace Description % firms
6419 Other monetary intermediation 39
6612 Security and commodity contracts brokerage 19
6611 Administration of financial markets 15
6499 Other financial service activities n.e.c. 9
6420 Activities of holding companies 5
6619 Other activities auxiliary to financial services 4
Other: mainly from Section K (Financial and Insurance Activities), 9Business support services or Information and communication
Main players
Of the set of 176 firms that operate Trading Platforms in the EU, the largest are banks or
financial intermediaries devoted to auxiliary financial activities (Core Nace codes 6611 and
6612, see Table 4.16), whose names are reported in the first column of Table 4.17.
In many cases, even the operators that are registered in the EU are actually foreign compa-
nies wholly owned by homonymic firms based outside the EU area. In other cases, they are
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controlled subsidiaries of very large corporations, again mainly based outside Europe. If that
is the case, looking at the shareholder structure of the firm in the first column is of no help,
necessitating the investigation of the parent or controlling companies. As a consequence, Ta-
ble 4.17 reports an additional column with the name of the parent, in case the operator is a
controlled subsidiary or foreign company. For such cases, the reported shares held by the four
funds are the participation shares of the controlling corporation, not of the original firm.
In general, a very strong participation of BlackRock and Vanguard is evident, followed closely
by State Street and to a lesser extent Norway.
Density and uniformity
The Trading Platforms industry has some peculiarities that should be pointed out before pro-
ceeding to the analysis of the common shareholding indicators. The set of firms operating the
Trading Platforms is rather heterogeneous, not only in terms of area of activity, as seen ear-
lier, but also in terms of Total Assets and Market Capitalisation. For example, the Total Assets
of a bank are incomparably higher than those of a stock exchange, and even more so than
those of a digital platform or technology firm. On the other hand, even companies with little
assets can have a large Market Cap, but overall the amount of listed firms in the identified set
of operators is minor. This will cause a certain discrepancy between the TOAS and MKT CAP
indicators, as will be highlighted later.
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Table 4.17: Largest firms of Trading Platforms sector and selected ownership data on their main common shareholders. Top 10 largest
enterprises in the EU and outside the EU, by country of registration. Size measured by Total Assets in 2016 (Bn Euros). Direct or indirect
participation shares (%) held in 2016. In case a firm is controlled or is a foreign company, reported shares are those of the parent.
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Operators registered in the EU Foreign company of/Controlled by Shares held in 2016 (%)
BANK OF AMERICA NA UK 2069.37 BANK of AMERICA CORPORATION (US) 6.01 0.86 4.04 6.26
BARCLAYS BANK PLC UK 1416.76 BARCLAYS PLC 5.45 3.00 2.40 2.47
CITYBANK N.A. UK 1276.58 CITIGROUP INC (US) 6.34 0.86 4.10 5.82
LLOYDS BANK PLC UK 969.74 LLOYDS BANKING GROUP PLC 5.14 3.01 2.04 2.29
GOLDMAN SACHS INTERNATIONAL UK 883.78 GOLDMAN SACHS GROUP, INC (US) 5.79 0.63 4.78 5.41
LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE GROUP PLC UK 659.15 8.66 1.49 3.05 2.59
AUSTRALIA AND NZ BANKING GROUP UK 625.91 AUSTRALIA AND NZ BANKING GROUP (AU) 1.78 1.34 0.46 2.64
STANDARD CHARTERED BANK UK 612.85 STANDARD CHARTERED PLC 5.04 1.81 1.93 1.98
BANCO SANTANDER SA ES 461.24 5.03 0.94 0.45 1.09
BANCO BILBAO VIZCAYA ES 418.45 5.00 1.52 0.93 2.16
Operators registered outside the EU Foreign company of/Controlled by Shares held in 2016 (%)
JPMORGAN CHASE BANK US 1975.91 JPMORGAN CHASE & CO 6.34 0.90 4.28 6.50
UBS AG CH 873.37 UBS GROUP AG 4.89 3.17 0.82 2.00
TORONTO DOMINION BANK CA 802.24 0.13 0.87 0.11 1.90
DNB BANK ASA NO 258.44 25.01
INTERCONTINENTAL EXCHANGE, INC. US 77.79 6.06 0.71 3.87 5.74
RBC INVESTOR SERVICES TRUST CA 17.26 ROYAL BANK of CANADA 0.34 0.82 0.11 1.88
NASDAQ, INC. US 13.42 5.58 1.12 2.90 6.59
BGC PARTNERS INC US 4.79 2.38 0.61 1.53 5.48
INVESTMENT TECHNOLOGY GROUP INC US 0.74 9.68 1.78 2.23 8.06
MARKETAXESS HOLDINGS INC. US 0.50 7.58 1.10 2.47 7.09
8
9
Another characteristic of this industry is that many of the companies active in this sector are
controlled by large groups, presenting therefore a very concentrated ownership structure with
large participation shares in the hands of few - or even only one - investor. This implies that in
some cases the weighted indices show values very close to the unweighted ones, given that
the shares can get very close to 100%.
Table 4.18 displays the results of the density and uniformity indices. The relative size of
portfolios has been decreasing over time, not only in terms of mean but also at any other
level of the distribution. The maximum firms’ share declined from 26.6% in 2007 to 21.38%
in 2016, corresponding to about 34 firms in the largest portfolio. The average investor holds
about 1.5% of the firms in the industry, i.e. about two companies.
The average uniformity presents a small, stable value of about 8%, with the maximum uni-
formity reaching about 83% in the later years. This shows a rather "democratic" investment
behaviour of top investors, holding in general similar minor shares in most companies in their
portfolio.
As for the TOAS based densities, there are no investors whose portfolio represents a very large
share of the market value, as in the other markets under analysis, given that some of the firms
present extremely high values of TOAS as shown earlier in Table 4.17, thus the market total
is extremely high. Overall, firms cross-held by the largest common shareholders represent at
most about 30% of the market value; however, given that these companies are held with large
participations, the weighted TOAS index is rather high, witnessing in some cases investors who
hold as much as 20% of the market Total Assets through their shares. This is particularly true
of some major investors, which will be analysed in more detail below.
Alternatively, in the case of Market Capitalisation, we observe a behaviour similar to the other
industries, with the largest portfolios including all relevant players covering almost all the
market value, however once we weight according to the shares held, we encounter at most
about 3% of the market value in the hands of a single investor. The large difference, compared
to the TOAS based indices, is principally due to the fact that the fraction of quoted firms is
rather small in this industry (about 27%), so that the indices based on MKT CAP are calculated
on a rather restricted set of operators. In particular, many large banks - whose Total Assets
are huge - are not listed, since they are part of larger groups, wholly owned by listed parent
companies. Therefore, many large players end up being excluded from the calculation of the
MKT CAP indicators.
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Table 4.18: Trading Platforms sector common shareholding indices. Summary Statistics by year (per-
centage points, index values between 0 and 100): mean, 75th percentile (p75), 99th percentile (p99),
maximum (max). Density: Proportion of firms in a shareholder’s portfolio relative to the total number
of firms in the market. Uniformity: Relative weight of larger participation shares over the shares total
in the portfolio. Small values denote concentrated investment. TOAS density: Proportion of total assets
of the market represented by the firms in portfolio. Weighted TOAS density: Proportion of total assets
of the market held by shareholder through participation shares. MKT CAP density: Proportion of market
capitalisation of the market represented by the firms in portfolio. Weighted MKT CAP density: Proportion
of market capitalisation of the market held by shareholder through participation shares.
Year Density
mean p75 p99 max
2007 1.8136 1.6129 18.5484 26.6129
2008 1.7125 1.5385 17.6923 24.6154
2009 1.5327 0.7353 15.4412 22.7941
2010 1.5140 0.7299 15.3285 22.6277
2011 1.5009 0.7246 15.2174 23.1884
2012 1.4370 0.6993 14.6853 23.0769
2013 1.4970 1.3514 14.1892 23.6486
2014 1.4630 1.3158 15.7895 23.0263
2015 1.3786 0.6410 14.1026 21.7949
2016 1.3358 0.6289 13.8365 21.3836
Year Uniformity
mean p75 p99 max
2007 9.5876 6.2989 73.6539 83.68
2008 10.1073 11.3614 74.2729 82.81
2009 8.8353 0.0000 72.2638 81.78
2010 8.4081 0.0000 70.3008 82.89
2011 8.1140 0.0000 69.8677 80.79
2012 8.0586 0.0000 71.6145 80.98
2013 8.9990 0.0000 69.8792 83.25
2014 9.3877 0.9769 72.9298 81.71
2015 9.1083 0.0000 73.7728 84.14
2016 8.5076 0.0000 70.6782 83.85
Year TOAS density
mean p75 p99 max
2007 0.4389 0.0466 6.3910 29.6057
2008 0.4611 0.0994 6.2391 32.1952
2009 0.5860 0.0656 8.0627 37.5420
2010 0.7589 0.0916 10.1345 32.9129
2011 4.5037 6.7067 28.2688 39.1659
2012 3.4188 5.8499 24.6123 27.4766
2013 2.5138 4.9271 22.2890 25.8939
2014 1.9307 3.3851 18.2272 21.7242
2015 2.0172 3.3320 18.3522 22.8370
2016 1.7800 3.5675 17.1748 27.7510
Year Weighted TOAS density
mean p75 p99 max
2007 0.0750 0.0002 2.5414 22.4576
2008 0.0800 0.0002 2.3012 23.8047
2009 0.0916 0.0002 2.6735 23.8654
2010 0.1008 0.0004 2.9524 28.2308
2011 0.0942 0.0017 2.5829 21.8007
2012 0.0801 0.0018 1.9380 16.7944
2013 0.0933 0.0030 2.7622 17.6959
2014 0.0696 0.0024 1.5450 15.3982
2015 0.0949 0.0018 2.7502 16.8588
2016 0.0970 0.0012 2.3591 17.9481
Year MKT CAP density
mean p75 p99 max
2007 5.1203 6.4321 71.5485 84.8913
2008 5.1975 1.3291 88.6810 91.9205
2009 4.8121 1.0343 86.8470 90.1022
2010 4.8709 0.7086 88.0968 90.8747
2011 7.6239 12.5216 75.1979 97.4071
2012 7.1208 9.0928 74.4122 97.8364
2013 7.2721 11.4601 78.8032 99.6870
2014 7.0214 10.7205 74.9539 93.1160
2015 6.6428 8.7194 81.5364 99.5894
2016 6.3330 7.1437 76.3403 99.6206
Year Weighted MKT CAP density
mean p75 p99 max
2007 0.0522 0.0078 1.1656 6.4321
2008 0.0451 0.0023 1.1934 4.2842
2009 0.0409 0.0007 0.7801 5.3194
2010 0.0411 0.0016 0.7514 5.6036
2011 0.0486 0.0078 0.9468 4.2831
2012 0.0488 0.0079 0.9800 2.1674
2013 0.0547 0.0138 0.9872 2.8838
2014 0.0527 0.0163 0.9790 2.7234
2015 0.0515 0.0163 0.9384 3.2663
2016 0.0489 0.0109 0.9614 3.3583
Common shareholding indices for top investors
The picture of top investors in the Trading Platforms industry is largely dominated by banks,
while funds tend to drop to lower positions in the ranking of shareholders. All top investors in
2016 (except Barclays) are registered outside the EU, but hold in turn foreign companies (FC)
or controlled subsidiaries registered in Europe, as reported in Table 4.19.
To give a few examples, US-based Goldman Sachs Group Inc majority owns Goldman Sachs
International and wholly owns Goldman Sachs International Bank, both registered in the UK;
the Japanese Nomura Holdings Inc wholly owns UK-based Nomura International; finally, Morgan
Stanley is registered in the US but is the majority owner of Morgan Stanley & Co. International
PLC, which is based in the UK. The list could continue with several similar examples.
In 2016, the big funds tended to hold very similar portfolios in terms of firms held, but the
level of participation varies. For example, BlackRock holds a large share (8.66%) of the London
Stock Exchange, while State Street and Vanguard have about 3% each. On the other hand,
State Street has a strong presence in the Spanish banks Santander (8.34%) and Banco Bilbao
Vizcaya (10.87), while BlackRock holds about half of that and Vanguard even less (about 1%
and 2% respectively).
It is worth commenting briefly on the results presented in Tables 4.17 and 4.19, since they
seem to show - at first sight - some inconsistencies. Compared to the picture of the main play-
ers in Table 4.17, we see that some main operators based in the EU, such as Bank of America,
Citibank or Lloyds, are not reported here among the largest firms held by top investors in Table
4.19. This is because, as previously reported, they are not held directly by such top investors,
but are instead controlled by groups which are in turn held by top investors, according to
the ownership displayed information; however, they do not in general have such large Total
Assets, and therefore do not appear among the largest firms in portfolio in Table 4.19.
In terms of time trends of the indicators, Figure 4.3 reports the density and the weighted TOAS
density indices. The decreasing trend of density for all types of investors shows an overall
tendency to invest in a smaller proportion of firms over time. However, the shrinkage of such
a proportion can be due to the increase in the number of firms active in this industry in 2007-
2016, while the actual number of firms in each portfolio has remained stable. Overall, the
size of the portfolios does not differ much across the four types of investors presented in the
graphs, with Sweden, Funds, Banks and Insurance companies all fluctuating within the range
of 15%-20%, while Norway highlights a consistently higher value of above 20%, holding the
largest portfolio in 2016 (34 firms).
As for the Total Assets, the portfolios of Banks present values way above any other type of
investor, due to both the large amount of Assets of the firms participated in, and to the
high shares held. Still, we observe a certain decreasing trend over time, again potentially
attributable to the enlargement of the market in recent years.
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Table 4.19: Top Investors in Trading Platforms sector: Investors whose portfolios present the top values
of the Weighted TOAS density index in 2016. Country of shareholder (SH); number of firms held in Trading
Platforms industry; Density (share of firms held); TOAS density (share of market TOAS represented by
firms held); Weighted TOAS density (share of market TOAS held through participation shares); firms with
largest TOAS in portfolio and respective quantity of shares held, ordered by decreasing TOAS. All figures
refer to the year 2016.
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Largest firms and shares held (%)
BARCLAYS
PLC UK 9 5.66 19.50 12.46
BARCLAYS BANK PLC (98); LSE (0.32); INTERCONT. EXCH.
(0.15); BARCLAYS CAPITAL SEC (100); TP ICAP (0.13); IN-
VESTEC (0.15); DEUTSCHE BOERSE (0.52)
GOLDMAN
SACHS US 22 13.84 22.88 4.20
GOLDMAN SACHS INTERN. (50.01); LSE (1.09); SAN-
TANDER (0.14); BANCO BILBAO VIZCAYA (0.11); IN-
TERCONT. EXCH. (1.91); JYSKE BANK (0.11); GOLDMAN
SACHS INTERN. BANK (100)
CREDIT
SUISSE CH 23 14.47 17.38 2.89
LSE (0.57); SANTANDER (2.87); BANCO BILBAO VIZCAYA
(1.75); CREDIT SUISSE INTERN. (100); INTERCONT. EXCH.
(0.23); TP ICAP (0.22); INVESTEC (0.27)
NOMURA
HOLD. JP 11 6.92 8.78 2.36
LSE (0.74); NOMURA INTERN. (100); INTERCONT. EXCH.
(1.03); NASDAQ INC (0.11); DEUTSCHE BOERSE (0.13);
INVESTM. TECHN. (0.12); MARKETAXESS HOLD. (1.32)
DNB ASA NO 9 5.66 4.37 1.88
DANSKE BANK (0.13); DNB BANK (100); OSLO BORS
(19.81); ABG SUNDAL COLLIER (0.21); SOCIETE GEN-
ERALE (0.12); SWEDBANK (0.19)
MORGAN
STANLEY US 14 8.81 17.39 1.76
LSE (0.78); SANTANDER (0.14); BANCO BILBAO VIZCAYA
(0.11); MORGAN STANLEY INTERN. (50.01); INTERCONT.
EXCH. (0.22); NASDAQ INC (0.44); DEUTSCHE BOERSE
(0.17)
STATE
STREET US 33 20.75 19.49 1.23
LSE (3.05); SANTANDER (8.34); BANCO BILBAO VIZCAYA
(10.87); DANSKE BANK (0.29); STATE STREET BANK FC -
UK (100); INTERCONT. EXCH. (3.87); JYSKE BANK (0.11);
OSLO BORS (4.16)
BLACKROCK US 30 18.87 17.56 0.98
LSE (8.66); SANTANDER (5.03); BANCO BILBAO VIZCAYA
(5.00); DANSKE BANK (2.02); INTERCONT. EXCH. (6.06);
JYSKE BANK (0.54); TP ICAP (1.72)
NORWAY NO 34 21.38 19.44 0.73
LSE (1.49); SANTANDER (0.94); BANCO BILBAO VIZCAYA
(1.52); DANSKE BANK (2.13); DNB BANK (25.01); INTER-
CONT. EXCH. (0.71); JYSKE BANK (1.6)
BANK NY
MELLON US 23 14.47 14.78 0.44
LSE (0.27); SANTANDER (4.8); BANCO BILBAO VIZCAYA
(4.19); INTERCONT. EXCH. (1.85); TP ICAP (0.18); IN-
VESTEC (0.13); SYDBANK (0.18)
VANGUARD
GROUP US 31 19.50 17.56 0.37
LSE (2.59); SANTANDER (1.09); BANCO BILBAO VIZCAYA
(2.16); DANSKE BANK (1.6); INTERCONT. EXCH. (5.74);
JYSKE BANK (1.5); TP ICAP (0.97)
INVESCO BM 25 15.72 13.35 0.31
LSE (4.84); BANCO BILBAO VIZCAYA (0.19); DANSKE
BANK (0.68); INTERCONT. EXCH. (0.24); JYSKE BANK
(0.38); TP ICAP (2.26); SYDBANK (0.11)
Figure 4.3: Common shareholding indices for Top Investors in Trading Platforms sector. Top panel:
Density - Proportion of firms in a shareholder’s portfolio relative to the total number of firms in the market.
Bottom panel: Weighted TOAS density - Proportion of total assets of the market held by shareholder
through participation shares.
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Network indices
The network indices show a weak connection among shareholders, where only about 2% of
possible links are active, and among the connected large portfolios (density>10%), less than
1% show strong links with correlations above 80%. These results point toward a more frag-
mented market (compared for instance to the Energy cases), where shareholders tend to take
hold of different parts of the industry, with little overlap in terms of investment strategies.
In the firms’ network, the active links due to block-holdings are few (less than 1% all over
2008-2016), but the firms that are linked show in general a strong similarity of ownership
structures, with more than 30% of cases recording a very high correlation (above 80%).
Table 4.20: Network indices for Trading Platforms sector. Shareholders’ network. Total number of
common shareholders; proportion of non-zero correlations between pairs of portfolios, i.e. proportion of
connections between two shareholders induced by common shareholding of a same firm; number of high
correlations (>80%) between pairs of high-density portfolios (both densities >10%); proportion of high
correlations between pairs of high-density portfolios.
Tot No. Prop Non-Zero No. High Corr. Prop. High Corr.
Year Comm SH Correlations High Dens. High Dens.
2007 425 2.48 7 0.55
2008 464 2.50 7 0.68
2009 403 1.99 5 0.64
2010 386 1.93 5 0.75
2011 373 1.91 2 0.36
2012 352 1.89 2 0.40
2013 366 2.22 2 0.49
2014 394 2.30 4 0.86
2015 401 2.02 3 0.60
2016 384 1.86 3 0.69
Table 4.21: Network indices for Trading Platforms. Firms’ network. Total number of firms cross-held by
block-holders (holding at least 5%); proportion of non-zero correlations between shareholders’ structures
of pairs of firms (only shares >5%); number of high correlations between shareholders’ structures of pairs
of firms (only shares >5%); proportion of high correlations (>80%) among the non-zero correlations.
Tot. No. Firms Prop Non-Zero No. of High Prop. of High
Year Cross-Held Correlations Correlations Correlations
2007 80 1.19 20 21.98
2008 88 0.73 28 45.90
2009 86 0.87 24 30.00
2010 90 0.94 29 32.95
2011 90 0.84 34 43.04
2012 89 0.76 27 35.06
2013 103 0.84 30 32.97
2014 102 0.71 22 26.83
2015 104 0.79 28 29.47
2016 105 0.93 33 28.21
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4.4 Telecommunication sector - Mobile Network Opera-
tors and their parents
The NACE industry classification does not supply a specific code for mobile telecommunica-
tions. The NACE codes "60: programming and broadcasting activities" and "61: telecom-
munications" have been used as base to select, in each EU country, the initial list of Mobile
Network Operators (MNOs). Colleagues in DG COMP supplied an additional list of Mobile Vir-
tual Network Operators (MVNOs) for each EU country. After some preliminary analyses,5 the
MVNOs were eventually left out given their small size. The parent companies of the MNOs
were added to the list of firms defining the Mobile Telecoms market. This was considered ad-
visable for at least two reasons. First, large telecoms companies often operate in the mobile
sector through specialised subsidiaries dedicated to this segment of their activity. Therefore,
they would not be included in the industry if merely looking at Mobile Operators.6 Second, the
large investors (and likely common shareholders) tend to show more interest in the parents of
corporate groups, rather than in their controlled subsidiaries. Therefore, the ownership struc-
ture of Mobile Operators alone is likely to underestimate the actual influence of large investors
in this industry, exerted indirectly through the parents.
Altogether, we identified 105 Mobile Network Operators (MNOs) active in the EU in the pe-
riod 2007-2016, and additional 72 controlling parents. The parents are identified with the
Orbis definition of "GUO50", i.e. the Global Ultimate Owner characterised by a minimum of
50% ownership shares in the path from the subsidiary to the ultimate owner.7 These parents
are partly companies active in the telecoms industry, partly holding or financial companies.
Adding the parents to the list of MNOs, we obtain a final list of 177 companies that represent
all firms active in or influencing mobile telecoms in the EU over 2007-2016. This set of firms
in 2016 totaled 1236 Bn Euro in Total Assets and 521 Bn Euro in Market Capitalisation.
The large majority of the firms are registered in Europe (93%), with the largest share in Lux-
embourg (10%), followed by the Netherlands with about 8%. As shown in Table 4.22, most
of the companies (70%) classify their core activity in the Nace Division "61: Telecommunica-
tions", mainly with codes "6190: Other telecommunications activities" (33%), "6120: Wireless
telecommunications activities" (28%) and "6110: Wired telecommunications activities" (6%),
the remaining 3% being classified generically as "6100: Telecommunications". Holding com-
panies represent 11% of the sample. The remaining 19% of firms are scattered across a series
of different activities, mainly in business support services or management consulting activities.
5Results available upon request. The identification process of the relevant MVNOs is described in Appendix C.
6For example, DEUTSCHE TELEKOM AG is not an MNO, but controls several mobile operators, such as T-MOBILE
AUSTRIA GMB, T-MOBILE NETHERLANDS and TELEKOM DEUTSCHLAND. DEUTSCHE TELEKOM AG would be excluded
from the list of firms active in the mobile sector, if merely selecting MNOs.
7For details about the GUO definition, see Appendix A.
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Table 4.22: Main areas of economic activity of firms active in the EU in the Mobile Telecoms sector be-
tween 2007 and 2016: Core Nace code, description of area of activity, and percentage of firms presenting
such Core code.
Core Nace Description % firms
6190 Other telecommunications activities 33
6120 Wireless telecommunications activities 28
6110 Wired telecommunications activities 6
6100 Telecommunications 3
6420 Activities of Holding Companies 11
Other 19
(mainly: Business support service activities,
Business and other management consultancy activities,
Other IT and computer service activities)
Brief figures on the shareholder structure of the industry are reported in Table 4.23. The num-
ber of firms in this industry has been increasing slightly, going from 122 in 2007 to 149 in
2016 (on average 134 firms per year). The number of shareholders has been rather stable,
at an average of around 1160. The proportion of common vs single owners, however, has
changed throughout the period of observation, with the initial proportion of roughly 25% vs
75% becoming around 30% vs 70%. The proportion of companies that share block-holders with
competitors is slightly increasing - growing from about 75% to 82% throughout the decade of
observation. These figures are much higher for this market, compared to the overall values
observed for the listed firms active in the EU across all industries (always below 70%).
Table 4.23: Summary statistics for firms active in the EU in the Mobile Telecoms sector in 2007-2016:
number of firms; number and percentage of firms cross-held by block-holders (BH) at minimum 5%; total
number of shareholders; number and percentage of common shareholders (i.e. shareholders with more
than one firm in their portfolio); number and percentage of single owners (holding shares only of one
firm).
Year Number Number (%) Firms Number Number (%) Number (%)Firms Cross-held by BH of SH Common SH Single SH
2007 122 92 (75.41) 1,220 307 (25.16) 913 (74.84)
2008 127 96 (75.59) 1,197 324 (27.07) 873 (72.93)
2009 129 98 (75.97) 1,235 343 (27.77) 892 (72.23)
2010 130 99 (76.15) 1,259 342 (27.16) 917 (72.84)
2011 132 99 (75.00) 1,113 334 (30.01) 779 (69.99)
2012 139 103 (74.10) 1,073 325 (30.29) 748 (69.71)
2013 137 108 (78.83) 1,120 339 (30.27) 781 (69.73)
2014 137 105 (76.64) 1,107 321 (29.00) 786 (71.00)
2015 144 112 (77.78) 1,120 337 (30.09) 783 (69.91)
2016 149 122 (81.88) 1,126 341 (30.28) 785 (69.72)
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Main players
Most of the firms are registered in the EU, with only a few large players from outside. Therefore,
in the analysis of the main firms active in this industry fourteen EU-based companies vs only
four non-EU corporations will be considered. Summary information is displayed in Table 4.24.
BlackRock dominates this industry, with rather large shares in some of the top players; Van-
guard and Norway lag behind, with relatively small participations, while State Street plays only
a minor role. France is also present, with a large participation in the French company Orange,
but also some smaller shares in other top competitors.
Table 4.24: Largest firms of Mobile Telecoms sector and selected ownership data on their main common
shareholders. Top 14 largest enterprises in the EU and top 4 outside the EU, by country of registration.
Size measured by Total Assets in 2016 (Bn Euros). Direct or indirect participation shares (%) held in 2016.
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Registered in the EU Shares held in 2016 (%)
VODAFONE GROUP PLC UK 180.17 8.14 0.17 2.26 2.83 2.42
DEUTSCHE TELEKOM AG DE 103.18 4.65 0.13 1.52 1.28 1.49
ORANGE FR 92.59 1.98 21.00 1.51 0.53 1.57
TELEFONICA SA ES 83.26 5.22 0.10 1.48 0.65 1.84
LIBERTY GLOBAL PLC UK 65.16 3.06 0.75 1.98 1.53
TELECOM ITALIA S.P.A IT 61.70 2.10 1.46 0.22 1.19
BT GROUP PLC UK 49.35 6.72 1.38 1.80 2.1
VIVENDI FR 27.01 3.94 3.12 1.62 2.12 1.83
TELIA COMPANY AB SE 22.53 1.27 0.88 0.24 1.28
PROXIMUS SA BE 16.49 2.60 0.21 0.79 0.31 0.92
KONINKLIJKE KPN NV NL 14.74 6.53 0.19 2.01 0.29 1.59
BOUYGUES SA FR 13.77 1.32 0.14 1.10 0.20 1.19
TELEFONICA DEUTSCHLAND DE 10.88 0.84 0.43 0.70 0.11 0.50
TDC A/S DK 8.64 2.05 2.76 0.44 2.10
Registered outside the EU Shares held in 2016 (%)
CK HUTCHISON HOLDING KY 123.99 1.39 1.11 0.95 1.51
AMERICA MOVIL MX 69.33 1.98 0.26 0.12 1.35
MTN GROUP LIMITED ZA 18.63 1.78 0.30 0.36 2.88
TELENOR ASA NO 13.62 0.82 5.55 0.58 0.99
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Density and uniformity
The summary statistics on the density-based and uniformity indicators for Mobile Network
Operators are reported in Table 4.25. The distribution of investors portfolios is heavily skewed,
with the top 1% of portfolios having an equity interest in above 13% of the firms on the market
in 2016, albeit in a declining trend with respect to previous years. Maximum values are also
significantly high, around 24% on average for the period. This is again due to the presence,
in this industry, of large groups mothered by Telecom giants such as Vodafone, Orange or
Deutsche Telecom, which have little if no overlap in their portfolios, and have more or less
partitioned the set of firms active in this industry into independent groups.
The presence of large global investors lowers the uniformity indices, where the maximum
reaches 87% in 2016. This is because these investors have very widespread interests both in
subsidiaries as well as in the mother groups themselves.
In terms of value-based indices, there are some differences in level between TOAS and MKT
CAP results, given that the set of listed firms in this industry is rather reduced, and therefore
the second set of indices is calculated on a very restricted part of the market. We see that the
top 1% of investors hold firms that represent roughly 70% or more of the Total Assets of the
industry, showing that such top investors tend to privilege the largest enterprises. The TOAS
market shares, represented by the weighted TOAS, reach values of about 3% of the market
Total Assets through their participation shares. As we will see further down in the analysis
dedicated to top investors, it is mostly certain individual shareholders - alongside funds such as
BlackRock - that control the largest amounts of assets weighted by their participation shares,
while the telecom groups and other shareholders control smaller and smaller portions.
A similar picture holds for listed firms, where the largest portfolios (mainly the Funds) hold
firms representing almost the entire market Market Capitalisation, and through their participa-
tions control about 3% of the market value.
Common shareholding indices for top investors
The final ownership in the Mobile Network Operators industry in 2016 is concentrated in the
hands of select individuals and associated holding groups, alongside large investment man-
agement firms such as Blackrock or Vanguard Group. These global shareholders hold signifi-
cant investments in large pan-European telecom groups such as Vodafone and Orange, as well
as national providers. Together, these groups and providers compose almost the entirety of
the European mobile telecommunication market. For example, Table 4.26 shows the reach of
individuals such as Mr. Carlos Slim Helú in Mexico or Mr. Victor Li Tzar Kuoi on Hong Kong, with
controlling interests in European national telecom providers, both directly and through their
controlled holdings.
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Table 4.25: Telecoms sector common shareholding indices. Summary Statistics by year (percentage
points, index values between 0 and 100): mean, 75th percentile (p75), 99th percentile (p99), maximum
(max). Density: Proportion of firms in a shareholder’s portfolio relative to the total number of firms in the
market. Uniformity: Relative weight of larger participation shares over the shares total in the portfolio.
Small values denote concentrated investment. TOAS density: Proportion of total assets of the market
represented by the firms in portfolio. Weighted TOAS density: Proportion of total assets of the market
held by shareholder through participation shares. MKT CAP density: Proportion of market capitalisation
of the market represented by the firms in portfolio. Weighted MKT CAP density: Proportion of market
capitalisation of the market held by shareholder through participation shares.
Year Density
mean p75 p99 max
2007 1.9793 1.6393 19.6721 22.1311
2008 2.0221 1.5748 19.6850 22.8346
2009 1.9521 1.5504 20.1550 23.2558
2010 1.9423 1.5385 19.2308 23.8462
2011 1.9392 1.5152 18.9394 23.4848
2012 1.7969 1.4388 17.2662 22.3022
2013 1.7596 1.4599 16.7883 24.0876
2014 1.7401 1.4599 16.7883 24.8175
2015 1.6778 1.3889 15.9722 24.3056
2016 1.5896 1.3423 13.4228 24.1611
Year Uniformity
mean p75 p99 max
2007 11.3223 0.0000 79.9896 83.35
2008 12.0384 15.3604 80.0174 85.50
2009 12.3053 20.5333 79.8603 84.99
2010 11.9752 16.3526 80.1282 83.88
2011 12.7353 25.9924 79.2355 85.53
2012 12.6269 26.2247 79.7097 85.14
2013 12.3826 26.2024 77.5718 86.93
2014 12.0850 23.2642 77.7652 87.12
2015 12.0788 24.5015 78.9143 87.51
2016 12.0780 23.6421 76.5931 87.34
Year TOAS density
mean p75 p99 max
2007 7.4309 7.4203 69.8989 78.4716
2008 8.3073 7.8860 74.8037 79.1696
2009 7.8094 7.5798 74.3395 78.9711
2010 7.9720 7.8477 71.1840 78.1884
2011 7.6715 7.7347 70.0327 75.6523
2012 7.8307 11.6326 67.1252 75.9208
2013 7.4921 7.9090 67.7414 77.8850
2014 7.7871 8.3077 68.4811 79.3806
2015 8.7723 9.5516 73.6521 81.9915
2016 8.1432 10.0338 69.7344 82.4209
Year Weighted TOAS density
mean p75 p99 max
2007 0.0860 0.0359 1.5411 4.5559
2008 0.0925 0.0426 1.6098 3.9637
2009 0.0879 0.0385 1.4706 3.0256
2010 0.0930 0.0406 1.4843 3.3877
2011 0.0926 0.0435 1.3986 3.1649
2012 0.1016 0.0474 1.7398 3.6171
2013 0.0952 0.0486 1.3742 3.5939
2014 0.1014 0.0497 1.4447 4.0498
2015 0.1042 0.0479 1.4203 4.0009
2016 0.1058 0.0490 1.5877 3.2686
Year MKT CAP density
mean p75 p99 max
2007 7.7725 6.2385 85.8200 96.7953
2008 10.4532 16.4621 92.7547 98.4306
2009 9.8064 17.0676 91.4586 98.1987
2010 9.7489 14.0196 91.2640 97.9573
2011 10.4767 12.4617 90.9646 98.2289
2012 10.6983 10.9133 87.2116 96.1643
2013 9.2160 11.3131 85.0667 99.3275
2014 9.4158 11.0683 85.5496 96.7283
2015 9.2643 11.8521 85.8330 99.3324
2016 8.7866 8.5342 83.3435 99.1699
Year Weighted MKT CAP density
mean p75 p99 max
2007 0.0750 0.0276 1.2486 4.1236
2008 0.0800 0.0291 1.3366 3.8236
2009 0.0788 0.0282 1.4514 3.3880
2010 0.0753 0.0313 1.2841 3.6704
2011 0.0853 0.0415 1.3257 4.3855
2012 0.0909 0.0433 1.3286 4.5546
2013 0.0811 0.0403 1.0815 4.2521
2014 0.0898 0.0452 1.4224 3.8289
2015 0.0916 0.0412 1.5243 3.5703
2016 0.0925 0.0377 1.7629 3.7309
Investment management groups such as Blackrock Inc are also major shareholders in Euro-
pean telecom groups such as Vodafone, where Blackrock holds 8.14%. Vodafone Group PLC
is a major player in the market, holding more than 8% of undertakings active in the sector
through its full ownership of subsidiaries in Spain, Italy, Romania, Check Republic, Hungary,
Netherlands, Germany, and so on. Similarly, Orange controls subsidiaries in Spain, Poland,
Belgium, Romania and Slovakia. Note that not all subsidiaries of these groups are shown for
conciseness. As Table 4.26 shows, the top global shareholders in the sector often hold signifi-
cant portions of Total Assets. In particular, the aforementioned Carlos Slim Helú, Victor Li Tzar
Kuoi, and Blackrock each hold 3.26%, 3.09%, and 3.18% of weighted Total assets respectively.
Also rather important are the States, with France and Norway ranking amongst the top in-
vestors. While Total Assets are less significant in comparison to other shareholders (about 1%
weighted Total Assets for the two), the number of undertakings invested in is significant, reach-
ing 24.16% for Norway. Table 4.26 presents all these top shareholders, based on weighted
Total Assets, reporting first the individuals and their associated holdings, and then the funds,
telecom groups, and states.
The time trends of the common shareholding indices are reported for the usual four groups
of shareholders’ types (Funds, States, Banks and Insurance companies) as well as for the top
cross investors, that is, the most important telecom groups with significant assets or sub-
sidiaries active in the EU. Figures 4.4 and 4.5 report the results for density and weighted TOAS
density for the top investors and top cross-investors, respectively.
We observe rather constant density for Funds and States, while Banks and Insurance com-
panies seem to be divesting in this sector. The largest portfolios in terms of undertakings
invested in remain those of Norway and Sweden. However, as Table 4.26 previously demon-
strated, the biggest shareholders in terms of weighted Total Assets density remain the funds,
in particular Blackrock with more than 3%, followed by the individuals mentioned in Table 4.26
but not shown here. In terms of Total Assets, Banks and Insurance confirm a decline in quanti-
ties held. The remaining Funds, such as Vanguard Group are located at much lower levels for
the entire period, finishing just above 1% but steadily increasing.
Looking at cross-owners in Figure 4.5, we see that the relative size of the portfolios of the
Telecom groups has been stable throughout the period (between 4% and 10%). Vodafone and
Deutsche Telekom remain important players from this perspective, because of the number
of national subsidiaries that are wholly or significantly owned. Looking at the share of total
assets weighted by participation, however, the values have been converging to between 1%
and 2% for all the groups. The shares of total assets are not very high, due to the fact that
parent companies and large global shareholders are included, diluting the share of controlled
total assets.
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Table 4.26: Top Investors in Mobile Telecoms sector: Investors whose portfolios present the top values
of the Weighted TOAS density index in 2016. Country of shareholder (SH); number of firms held in MNO
industry; Density (share of firms held); TOAS density (share of market TOAS represented by firms held);
Weighted TOAS density (share of market TOAS held through participation shares); firms with largest
TOAS in portfolio and respective quantity of shares held, ordered by decreasing TOAS. All figures refer to
the year 2016.
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Largest firms and shares held (%)
Individuals
CARLOS SLIM1 MX 5 3.35 6.53 3.26
AMERICA MOVIL (50.01); TELEKOM AUSTRIA
(50.01); A1 TELEKOM AUSTRIA (50.01); A1
SLOVENIJA (50.01)
VICTOR LI2 HK 11 7.38 12.36 3.09
CK HUTCHISON HOLDING (25.01); WIND TRE S.P.A
(25.01); HI3G HOLDINGS AB (25.01)
JOHN MALONE US 4 2.68 7.53 2.01
LIBERTY GLOBAL PLC (27.5); CABLE AND WIRELESS
LIMITED (25.01); TELENET GROUP (25.01); LIBERTY
GLOBAL INC (35.3)
Corporate
BLACKROCK US 30 20.13 81.97 3.18
VODAFONE GROUP PLC (8.14); CK HUTCHINSON
HOLDING (1.39); DEUTSCHE TELEKOM (4.65); OR-
ANGE (1.98); TELEFONICA (5.22); AMERICA MOVIL
(1.98); LIBERTY GLOBAL PLC (3.06)
CK-HUTCHISON
HOLDING3 KY 6 2.83 3.90 2.23
WIND TRE (50.01); HI3G HOLDINGS (50.01);
HUTCHISON DREI AUSTRIA (100); HI3G ACCESS
(50.01); THREE IRELAND (100); HI3G DENMARK
(50.01); VIP-CKH LUXEMBOURG (50)
FRANCE FR 12 8.05 44.56 1.69 VIVENDI (3.12); VODAFONE GROUP PUBLIC (.17);ORANGE (21); DEUTSCHE TELEKOM (.13)
VODAFONE UK 12 8.05 1.52 1.45
VODAFONE ESPANA (100); VODAFONE ITALIA
(100); VODAFONE ENTERPR. (100); VODAFONE
CZECH REP. (100); VODAFONE PORTUGAL (38.26)
VANGUARD US 30 20.13 81.97 1.38
VODAFONE GROUP PLC (2.42); DEUTSCHE
TELEKOM (1.49); ORANGE (1.57); TELEFONICA
(1.84); LIBERTY GLOBAL PLC (1.53); AMERICA
MOVIL (1.35); CK HUTCHISON HOLDING (1.51)
NORWAY NO 36 24.16 82.42 1.34
VODAFONE GROUP PLC (2.26); ORANGE (1.51);
DEUTSCHE TELEKOM (1.52); TELEFONICA (1.48);
CK HUTCHISON HOLDING (1.11)
ORANGE FR 8 5.36 5.51 1.31
ORANGE ESPAGNE (100); ORANGE POLSKA
(50.67); ORANGE BELGIUM (50.01); ORANGE
ROMANIA (97.75); ORANGE SLOVENSKO (100);
HUTCHISON DREI AUSTRIA (35)
TELEFONICA ES 4 2.68 2.2 1.23
02 HOLDINGS LIMITED (100); TELEFONICA
DEUTSCHLAND (0.5); TELEFONICA MOVILES
(100); O2 CZECH REPUBLIC (4.9)
1 Includes CARLOS SLIM HELU Y FAMILIA, FIDEICOMISO FAMILIAR and INVERSORA CARSO SA. 2 Includes VICTOR LI TZAR-KUOI, LI
KA-SHING UNITY HOLDING and LI KA-SHING UNITY TRUST. 3 Held at > 25% by VICTOR LI TZAR-KUOI.
Figure 4.4: Common shareholding indices for Top Investors in Mobile Telecoms sector. Top panel: Density
- Proportion of firms in a shareholder’s portfolio relative to the total number of firms in the market.
Bottom panel: Weighted TOAS density - Proportion of total assets of the market held by shareholder
through participation shares.
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Figure 4.5: Common shareholding indices for Top Cross Investors in Mobile Telecoms sector. Top panel:
Density - Proportion of firms in a shareholder’s portfolio relative to the total number of firms in the market.
Bottom panel: Weighted TOAS density - Proportion of total assets of the market held by shareholder
through participation shares.
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Network indices
The Mobile Telecoms industry shows stronger interconnections between actors of the same
type, comparable to the values observed in the Oil&Gas sector, evidently higher than the
cases of Electricity or Trading Platforms. The results on shareholders’ and firms’ networks are
reported in Tables 4.27 and 4.28, respectively.
The proportion of portfolios that are linked through commonly held firms has been increasing
over time, from about 2.82% to 3.15%. On the other hand, among the large connected port-
folios (density>10%) the links are weaker with respect to the previous definition of the sector,
with about 1.99% of these owners showing a correlation of 80% or higher in 2106.
The firms’ network is also highly interconnected through block-holders, with about 2.75% of
active links in 2016, and of which about half present a high correlation of more than 80%. This
very high fraction of highly-correlated ownership structures is likely the result of the presence
of clusters of firms belonging to the large Telecoms groups, which are almost all wholly owned
or at least controlled by the parent, showing therefore very similar shareholders’ structures.
Table 4.27: Network indices for Mobile Telecoms sector. Shareholders’ network. Total number of com-
mon shareholders; proportion of non-zero correlations between pairs of portfolios, i.e. proportion of
connections between two shareholders induced by common shareholding of a same firm; number of
high correlations (>80%) between pairs of high-density portfolios (both densities >10%); proportion of
high correlations between pairs of high-density portfolios.
Tot No. Prop Non-Zero No. High Corr. Prop. High Corr.
Year Comm SH Correlations High Dens. High Dens.
2007 324 2.82 16 1.25
2008 347 3.41 12 0.78
2009 367 3.29 12 0.98
2010 363 3.22 3 0.33
2011 360 3.83 6 0.70
2012 352 3.69 8 1.72
2013 365 3.41 2 0.53
2014 347 3.34 6 1.85
2015 358 3.27 11 3.13
2016 363 3.15 7 1.99
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Table 4.28: Network indices for Mobile Telecoms sector. Firms’ network. Total number of firms cross-
held by block-holders (holding at least 5%); proportion of non-zero correlations between shareholders’
structures of pairs of firms (only shares >5%); number of high correlations between shareholders’ struc-
tures of pairs of firms (only shares >5%); proportion of high correlations (>80%) among the non-zero
correlations.
Tot. No. Firms Prop Non-Zero No. of High Prop. of High
Year Cross-Held Correlations Correlations Correlations
2007 92 2.76 99 48.53
2008 96 2.99 124 51.88
2009 98 3.19 129 49.05
2010 99 3.05 124 48.44
2011 99 2.96 117 45.70
2012 103 3.04 142 48.63
2013 108 2.82 134 50.95
2014 105 2.79 111 42.69
2015 112 2.82 118 40.69
2016 122 2.75 142 46.86
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4.5 Beverages sector - Manufacturers
The focus is on the manufacture of beverages, rather than their wholesale, although some
of the companies considered perform both types of activities. Only certain types of products
were included, namely Soft Drinks, Waters, Juices and Beers.
The set of firms active in the sector was delineated according to two steps. First, a selection
was made based on specific NACE codes of industry classification for beverages manufac-
turing: "Manufacture of beer", "Manufacture of soft drinks; production of mineral waters and
other bottled waters", and "Manufacture of fruit and vegetable juice". All listed firms active
in the EU which presented at least one of the above classifications as primary or secondary
activity were included in the sample.
Following this initial selection, a number of unlisted relevant players was added based on the
expert opinion of colleagues from DG COMP, representing unlisted companies with significant
market share or presence in European countries. All-together, we obtain a list of 290 firms, of
which 214 are listed manufacturers of Soft Drinks and/or Waters, Beer or Juices. The remaining
76 firms are the relevant unlisted players. The sector’s Total Assets in 2016 were worth 1309
Bn Euro, while the Market Capitalisation totaled 1352 Bn Euro.
Roughly two-thirds of the firms are registered in the EU (69.15%), with Germany accounting
for about 20%, then followed by France and United Kingdom at around 5%. Outside, the US is
the largest country represented, with 8.81% of firms in the sample registered there.
As shown in Table 4.29, the majority of companies (69%) classify their core activity in the Nace
Division "11: Manufacture of Beverages", divided evenly between codes "1105: Manufacture
of beer" (33%) and "1107: Manufacture of soft drinks; production of mineral waters" (32%); a
smaller percentage (4%) are occupied in "1102: Manufacture of wine from grape".
Table 4.29: Main areas of activity of firms active in the EU in the Beverages sector in 2007-2016: Core
Nace code, description of area of activity, and percentage of firms presenting such Core code.
Core Nace Description % firms
1105 Manufacture of beer 33
1107 Manufacture of soft drinks; production of mineral waters 32
1102 Manufacture of wine from grape 4
1089 Manufacture of other food products n.e.c. 3
1032 Manufacture of fruit and vegetable juice 2
4634 Wholesale of beverages 3
Other 23
(mainly: Distilling, rectifying and blending of spirits,
Other processing and preserving of fruit and vegetables,
Activities of head offices)
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Products such as fruit juices were also included in the sample, but they comprise a significantly
smaller portion of the sector, just 5% between codes 1089 and 1032. Instead 26% of firms
are scattered across a series of different but related activities under their core Nace, such as
wholesale or distillation.
In terms of shareholder structure of the industry, some summary data is reported in Table
4.30. The number of firms in this industry has been increasing slightly, from 241 in 2007 to
261 in 2016. Similarly, the number of shareholders has been steadily increasing, albeit not
drastically, over the same period. The initial proportion of common vs single shareholders,
although slightly declining, has not changed much throughout the period (28% and 72% vs
26% and 74% roughly). A similar pattern can be observed when considering block-holdings
of 5%, where the number (and proportion) of firms cross-held by a block-holder has remained
rather stable, just below 45% throughout most of the period. These levels are slightly below
the EU average observed for other sectors.
Table 4.30: Summary statistics for firms active in the EU in the Beverages sector between 2007 and
2016: number of firms; number and percentage of firms cross-held by block-holders (BH) at minimum
5%; total number of shareholders; number and percentage of common shareholders (i.e. shareholders
with more than one firm in their portfolio); number and percentage of single owners (holding shares only
of one firm).
Year Number Number (%) Firms Number Number (%) Number (%)Firms Cross-held by BH of SH Common SH Single SH
2007 241 104 (43.15) 1,902 533 (28.02) 1,369 (71.98)
2008 245 113 (46.12) 1,874 563 (30.04) 1,311 (69.96)
2009 250 113 (45.20) 1,987 607 (30.55) 1,380 (69.45)
2010 257 113 (43.97) 2,058 610 (29.64) 1,448 (70.36)
2011 259 111 (42.86) 2,073 572 (27.59) 1,501 (72.41)
2012 259 111 (42.86) 2,035 574 (28.21) 1,461 (71.79)
2013 263 116 (44.11) 2,096 580 (27.67) 1,516 (72.33)
2014 264 115 (43.56) 2,079 567 (27.27) 1,512 (72.73)
2015 264 118 (44.70) 2,152 567 (26.35) 1,585 (73.65)
2016 261 118 (45.21) 2,152 561 (26.07) 1,591 (73.93)
Main players
Table 4.31 shows the main players in this sector, selected on the basis of their declared total
assets (in billions of euros) in 2016, alongside some of the more relevant shareholders for the
purpose of this exercise. As previously stated, about two-thirds of the firms in the sample
are registered in the EU. Among these, the biggest of these firms, Anheuser-Busch InBev, is
almost four times as big as its next largest competitor. The top ’international’ competitors on
the other hand, are far more similar in size and typically also larger than their EU counterparts.
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Table 4.31: Largest firms active in the EU in the Beverages sector, and selected ownership data on
their main common shareholders. Top 15 largest enterprises registered in the EU and top 15 registered
outside the EU, by country of registration. Size measured by Total Assets in 2016 (Bn Euros). Direct or
indirect participation shares (%) held in 2016.
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Registered in the EU Shares held in 2016 (%)
ANHEUSER-BUSCH INBEV BE 192.99 0.76 0.95 1.05 0.85
GRAND METROPOLITAN LTD (DIAGEO PLC) UK 55.41 7.09 1.58 2.59 2.49
DANONE FR 40.96 5.40 1.50 0.69 1.88
HEINEKEN NV NL 39.32 0.89 0.80 0.20 0.81
UNILEVER NV NL 38.14 2.98 1.72 0.66 1.98
COCA-COLA EUROPEAN PARTNERS PLC UK 18.57 0.15 0.48 0.44 0.28
CADBURY LIMITED (MONDELEZ) UK 12.05 5.76 0.99 4.23 5.94
GREENE KING PLC UK 7.19 2.87 1.98 0.86 2.39
CARLSBERG A/S DK 6.27 4.99 1.24 0.20 1.48
MARSTON’S PLC UK 3.25 2.25 1.45 0.76 2.31
DAVIDE CAMPARI IT 3.18 0.71 1.08 0.13 0.99
NESTLE WATERS (NESTLE S.A.) FR 2.41 3.70 2.56 0.50 2.12
REFRESCO GROUP N.V. NL 1.96 0.46 5.67 1.25
BRITVIC PLC UK 1.90 5.01 2.66 1.02 2.20
JERONIMO MARTINS SGP PT 1.43 2.41 1.02 0.14 0.85
Registered outside the EU Shares held in 2016 (%)
NESTLE S.A. CH 122.94 3.70 2.56 0.50 2.12
THE COCA-COLA COMPANY US 82.79 5.42 0.87 3.93 6.37
PEPSICO INC US 69.72 5.53 0.94 4.36 1.43
MONDELEZ INTERNATIONATIONAL US 58.38 5.76 0.99 4.23 5.94
QUINENCO S.A. CL 52.32 0.18
SWIRE PACIFIC LIMITED HK 45.70 0.98 0.82 0.49 0.75
MOLSON COORS BREWING US 27.84 4.96 0.50 3.47 7.24
FOMENTO ECONOMICO MEXICANO MX 24.97 0.83 0.16 0.32
SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION PH 24.89
AMBEV SA (ANHEUSER-BUSCH INBEV) BR 24.41 1.28 0.30 0.13 0.98
GENERAL MILLS INC US 19.47 6.69 0.92 5.96 5.80
BEIJING ENTERPRISES HK 17.70 2.22 0.31 0.15 1.31
KIRIN HOLDINGS JP 13.71 4.90 1.13 0.54 1.87
DR PEPPER SNAPPLE GROUP INC US 9.29 8.82 1.01 4.57 9.35
ASAHI GROUP HOLDINGS JP 9.01 2.19 1.07 0.59 1.62
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The last four columns show the participation of the shareholders considered most relevant in
terms of common shareholding positions. BlackRock dominates this industry, with rather large
shares in most of the top players, reaching up to 8.82%. The others lag behind, with relatively
small participations. State Street in particular is a minor player for the observed year.
Density and uniformity
The summary statistics on the density-based and uniformity indicators are reported in Table
4.32. Across all reported quantiles, the share of firms held by investors is declining. Even
though the top investor holds almost 25% of all firms in the sector, the remaining investors
are trimming their portfolio density. This pattern is evident when looking at the top 1% of
investors, which in 2007 held above 14% of firms in the sector; in 2016 this declined to 11.2%.
While the distribution of investors portfolios is still skewed, this is less so when compared to
other sectors analysed earlier, showing at first a more diversified shareholder network.
On the other hand, the uniformity index remains more or less stable throughout the period,
with the average (around 10%) indicating that most shareholders are concentrated on few
firms in their investment decisions. The years 2015 and 2016 show a slightly larger number
of investors with non-reported shares (about 1.3% compared to less than 1% in the previous
years), yielding a slightly larger proportion of single owners (with zero uniformity index). For
this reason the values of the 75th percentile drop in these two years.
In terms of value-based indices, there are some differences in level between TOAS and MKT
CAP results due to the fact that some firms in the sample are not listed. The table shows that
the top 1% of investors hold firms that represent at least between 53% and 60% of the Total
Assets of the industry depending on the year (declining trend), while the top investor per year
has held an increasing share of the Total Assets of the sector, up to 82% in 2016. Such values
are in line with expectations on investor behaviour, since top investors tend to privilege the
largest enterprises. However, when this index is weighted according to the participation share
of investors, the trend inverts, and it can be seen how the largest investor holds a slightly
decreasing share of weighted Total Assets. Given the results from the unweighted Total Assets
density, it would seem that top investors, and other investors in general, are diluting their
investment concentration among more firms.
A similar picture holds for listed firms, where the largest portfolios hold firms representing
almost the industry’s entire Market Capitalisation, and through their participations control
about 4% of the market value. In 2016, the top value for the Total Asset index corresponds
to Stichting Anheuser-Busch InBev, which holds a large direct participation in only one firm,
Anheuser-Busch InBev, the largest player in the market; this single participation amounts to
5% of the market total assets.8
8This investor did not appear in Table 4.33, since it is not a common shareholder.
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Table 4.32: Beverages sector common shareholding indices. Summary Statistics by year (percentage
points, index values between 0 and 100): mean, 75th percentile (p75), 99th percentile (p99), maximum
(max). Density: Proportion of firms in a shareholder’s portfolio relative to the total number of firms in the
market. Uniformity: Relative weight of larger participation shares over the shares total in the portfolio.
Small values denote concentrated investment. TOAS density: Proportion of total assets of the market
represented by the firms in portfolio. Weighted TOAS density: Proportion of total assets of the market
held by shareholder through participation shares. MKT CAP density: Proportion of market capitalisation
of the market represented by the firms in portfolio. Weighted MKT CAP density: Proportion of market
capitalisation of the market held by shareholder through participation shares.
Year Density
mean p75 p99 max
2007 1.1737 0.8299 13.6929 23.2365
2008 1.2223 0.8163 14.6939 24.4898
2009 1.1539 0.8000 14.0000 23.2000
2010 1.0830 0.7782 13.6187 23.3463
2011 1.0464 0.7722 12.3552 23.9382
2012 1.0538 0.7722 12.7413 24.3243
2013 1.0148 0.7605 12.1673 25.8555
2014 1.0014 0.7576 11.3636 24.2424
2015 0.9827 0.7576 11.7424 23.4848
2016 0.9673 0.7663 11.1111 23.7548
Year Uniformity
mean p75 p99 max
2007 11.6126 18.0240 80.08 87.47
2008 12.6035 23.8995 80.39 88.87
2009 12.3630 23.2265 80.05 88.79
2010 11.9174 21.4334 78.82 88.87
2011 11.1801 13.8747 78.27 87.38
2012 11.3974 15.7820 78.49 88.69
2013 11.2386 15.1230 77.83 89.63
2014 11.1712 14.9939 78.38 89.18
2015 10.6359 4.7023 77.66 89.71
2016 10.3846 0.0000 77.26 88.44
Year TOAS density
mean p75 p99 max
2007 3.3957 1.8235 54.2706 68.7580
2008 3.6018 1.6250 59.4013 76.0763
2009 3.3997 1.7581 59.6992 75.3183
2010 3.4720 1.4321 59.4506 77.1518
2011 3.5727 2.1656 57.6684 77.6810
2012 3.4596 2.0395 55.4596 81.4382
2013 3.4603 3.1643 55.0004 81.9081
2014 3.3045 1.2180 54.8999 81.8191
2015 3.2564 1.7686 53.0278 79.7791
2016 3.4460 1.9012 55.0029 81.7071
Year Weighted TOAS density
mean p75 p99 max
2007 0.0526 0.0123 0.9355 9.7332
2008 0.0472 0.0115 0.9804 7.5868
2009 0.0453 0.0104 1.0497 6.8132
2010 0.0426 0.0094 0.8014 5.9034
2011 0.0451 0.0121 1.1049 5.1856
2012 0.0469 0.0121 0.9054 5.4738
2013 0.0522 0.0130 1.0894 5.4275
2014 0.0464 0.0100 1.0640 5.2338
2015 0.0481 0.0112 1.0125 4.9468
2016 0.0448 0.0090 0.9203 5.0550
Year MKT CAP density
mean p75 p99 max
2007 4.5776 0.6308 79.1511 91.6880
2008 4.7761 0.6713 80.9224 92.8885
2009 4.5231 0.9838 84.2562 92.5605
2010 4.3595 0.8348 81.4195 93.1819
2011 4.5801 1.0658 81.8512 94.3082
2012 4.0444 0.9599 69.3285 87.0125
2013 4.2028 1.3411 73.1618 94.3178
2014 4.0458 0.8432 72.3251 92.3230
2015 4.3344 1.0635 69.9960 94.7139
2016 4.5102 1.2788 69.6414 96.1065
Year Weighted MKT CAP density
mean p75 p99 max
2007 0.0404 0.0040 0.6531 5.7154
2008 0.0366 0.0049 0.6580 4.4177
2009 0.0380 0.0057 0.6928 4.2223
2010 0.0365 0.0049 0.6492 3.3666
2011 0.0393 0.0085 0.6704 3.7131
2012 0.0410 0.0089 0.5933 7.4080
2013 0.0489 0.0099 0.8511 7.4582
2014 0.0392 0.0056 0.7480 4.4457
2015 0.0423 0.0079 0.7056 4.7110
2016 0.0401 0.0077 0.6559 4.3167
Common shareholding indices for top investors
The list of top common investors9 presented in Table 4.33 ranks these shareholders based on
their weighted Total Assets density for 2016, i.e. the share of total market TOAS held through
the stakes of firms in their portfolios. It is immediately evident that the main investors are
the sector-specific corporate groups with many controlled subsidiaries. Diageo Plc, L’Arche
Green, and Anheuser-Busch InBev are just three of those large corporate groups responsible
for well-known brands, such as the case of L’Arche Green and Heineken. In fact, the table
hints at the heterogeneity within the Beverage sector, where those groups or firms involved in
the production and/or distribution of alcoholic products are structured in a similar manner to
what was seen in Telecoms, with large corporate groups and many cross-holdings. The other
beverage producers instead tend to be defined as smaller enterprises with local markets and
a limited shareholder structure.
Alongside these corporate groups, the large investment management funds are also present
as main investors. As will be highlighted in greater detail in the following sections, Black-
Rock leads among these funds under every observed metric. In terms of weighted total asset
density, BlackRock in 2016 accounted for 2.33% of the market’s total assets, not far off from
one of the leading corporate groups, Anheuser-Busch InBev with 2.92%. Vanguard and State
Street enter into the ranks of top investors, but fall short of these values. Observing the port-
folio composition of these investment management funds, there is evidence of an appetite for
investment in larger corporate groups or holdings as opposed to individual or smaller produc-
ers: some of the biggest corporate groups such as Anheuser-Busch InBev appear alongside
some of the bigger producers of beverages such as The Coca-Cola Company.
Finally, it should be noted that other financial institutions are missing from the ranks of top
investors. Large banks or insurance companies do not appear, a trend which is repeated over
different sectors and can be confirmed when looking at the time series for ownership indices
across different investor classes. State participation is also missing, excluding the Norwegian
sovereign fund which presents a portfolio similar in composition to that of the other large
funds mentioned earlier, with investments in corporate groups such as Anheuser-Busch InBev
or Nestle SA.
As a final comment, there are several comparisons that can be drawn between the top in-
vestors of this sector and that of Mobile Telecoms, when defined as Mobile Network Operators
and Parents (see Section 4.4). In particular, cross-investing is prevalent in both these sectors.
The time trends of the common shareholding indices are reported for the usual four groups of
shareholders’ types (Funds, States, Banks and Insurance companies). Figure 4.6 reports the
results for density and weighted TOAS density for the top investors.
9Only investors with more than one firm in portfolio are reported.
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Table 4.33: Top Common Investors in Beverages sector: Investors with more than one firm in portfolio,
whose portfolios present the top values of the Weighted TOAS density index in 2016. Country of share-
holder (SH); number of firms held in MNO industry; Density (share of firms held); TOAS density (share
of market TOAS represented by firms held); Weighted TOAS density (share of market TOAS held through
participation shares); firms with largest TOAS in portfolio and respective quantity of shares held, ordered
by decreasing TOAS. All figures refer to the year 2016.
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Largest firms and shares held (%)
DIAGEO PLC UK 3 1.15 4.28 4.25 GRAND METROPOLITAN LTD (100); EASTAFRICAN BREWERIES LTD (50.03)
L’ARCHE
GREEN NL 6 2.30 6.71 3.40
HEINEKEN HOLDING NV (51.71); HEINEKEN
NV (50.01); SCOTTISH & NEWCASTLE (50.01);
HEINEKEN ASIA PACIFIC (50.01)
ANHEUSER-
BUSCH INBEV BE 10 3.83 3.89 2.92
AMBEV SA (61.95); ABI SAB GROUP HOLDING
(100); ANADOLU EFES BIRACIL (24); SUN IN-
TERBREW PLC (99.95); BANKS HOLDINGS LTD
(34.09); FOSTER’S GROUP (100); LÖWENBRÄU
AG (100)
BLACKROCK US 62 23.75 78.29 2.33
ANHEUSER-BUSCH INBEV (0.76); NESTLE S.A.
(3.70); THE COCA-COLA COMPANY (5.42); PEP-
SICO INC (5.53); MONDELEZ INTERNATIONAL
(5.76); SWIRE PACIFIC LTD (0.98); DANONE (5.4)
VANGUARD US 59 22.61 78.06 1.86
ANHEUSER-BUSCH INBEV (0.85); NESTLE S.A.
(2.12); THE COCA-COLA COMPANY (6.73); PEP-
SICO INC (1.43); MONDELEZ INTERNATIONAL
(5.94); SWIRE PACIFIC LTD (0.75); DANONE
(1.88)
FOMENTO
ECONOMICO MX 3 1.15 6.98 1.44
HEINEKEN HOLDING NV (14.94); HEINEKEN NV
(12.53); COCA-COLA FEMSA SAB (63)
STATE STREET US 44 16.86 72.04 1.21
ANHEUSER-BUSCH INBEV (1.05); NESTLE S.A.
(0.50); THE COCA-COLA COMPANY (3.93); PEP-
SICO INC (4.36); MONDELEZ INTERNATIONAL
(4.23); SWIRE PACIFIC LTD (0.49); DANONE
(0.69)
CAPITAL
GROUP US 22 8.43 42.86 0.95
NESTLE S.A. (1.98); THE COCA-COLA COMPANY
(5.51); PEPSICO INC (0.65); MONDELEZ INTER-
NATIONAL (1.65); DANONE (0.30); UNILEVER
NV (0.61); AMBEV SA (0.12)
NORWAY NO 58 22.22 81.71 0.89
ANHEUSER-BUSCH INBEV (0.95); NESTLE S.A.
(2.56); THE COCA-COLA COMPANY (0.87); PEP-
SICO INC (0.94); MONDELEZ INTERNATIONAL
(0.99); QUINENCO S.A. (0.18); SWIRE PACIFIC
LTD (0.82)
FMR LLC US 38 14.56 65.81 0.69
ANHEUSER-BUSCH INBEV (0.77); NESTLE S.A.
(0.64); THE COCA-COLA COMPANY (1.57); PEP-
SICO INC (0.59); MONDELEZ INTERNATIONAL
(1.38); QUINENCO S.A. (0.15); DANONE (0.15)
As previously noted in other sectors, Funds and States (only Norway in this case) remain
relatively stable in the share of total firms held in their portfolios, while Banks and Insurance
companies seem to be divesting in this sector. The largest portfolios in terms of undertakings
invested in remains that of BlackRock, which peaked above 25%. Indeed, BlackRock has
consistently appeared among the funds as the investor with the greatest reach. Even when
considering the weighted Total Assets density, BlackRock is still considerably ahead of its
competitors, holding more than 2.5% of weighted total assets from 2009 to 2016. Table 4.33
also confirms these findings. In terms of Total Assets, Banks and Insurance confirm a decline
to levels well below BlackRock. The remaining Funds, such as Vanguard Group, are located at
much lower levels for the entire period, finishing just above 2% but steadily increasing.
As mentioned previously, cross-investment - that is the participation of corporate groups or
ultimate owners among each other - defines investment behaviour in this sector. Figure 4.7
therefore looks at the top cross-investors for this sector. When considering the proportion of
firms that a top investor holds in its portfolio for the observed year, corporate groups such
as Anheuser-Busch InBev (also known as AB InBev) and L’Arche Green - which control brands
such as Becks and Heineken respectively - dominate the market with respect to competitors.
In 2016, AB InBev boasts participations in almost 4% of total firms.
However, when considering a weighted measure of total assets controlled, there are new play-
ers in the market to consider, such as Diageo Plc, responsible for the production of alcoholic
beverages, especially liquors and spirits (with Guinness, Baileys and Johnnie Walker among
the main brands). While the Diageo group boasted almost 10% of weighted total assets at the
beginning of the period, this value has been declining and converging towards values more
in line with other top cross-investors. When considering weighted total assets density, these
top cross-investors account for a greater share of the market with respect to funds or other
financial institutions. For example, both AB InBev and Diageo Plc account for roughly 4% of
weighted total assets in 2016, while BlackRock (the biggest of the funds) peaks at 2.5%. This
is the result of a sector, as stated before, characterised on one end by large corporate groups
with many subsidiaries.
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Figure 4.6: Common shareholding indices for Top Investors in Beverages sector. Top panel: Density -
Proportion of firms in a shareholder’s portfolio relative to the total number of firms in the market. Bottom
panel: Weighted TOAS density - Proportion of total assets of the market held by shareholder through
participation shares.
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Figure 4.7: Common shareholding indices for Top Cross Investors in Beverages sector. Left panel:
Density - Proportion of firms in a shareholder’s portfolio relative to the total number of firms in the market.
Right panel: Weighted TOAS density - Proportion of total assets of the market held by shareholder through
participation shares.
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Network indices
The summary statistics regarding shareholders’ and firms’ networks are presented in Tables
4.34 and 4.35, respectively. Several key details should be pointed out regarding these tables.
In the shareholders’ network, only the largest portfolios are considered for the calculation
of correlations, to avoid obtaining very high irrelevant values. For example, if we consider
two coincident small portfolios, both holding the same amount of shares in two very small
firms, their correlation would be maximum, but the two investors are not interesting players.
Therefore, we look at correlations only for investors whose portfolios hold at least 10% of the
firms active in the market.
Applying a similar reasoning, in the case of the firms’ network a minimum value of 5% invest-
ment by the shareholder is used in calculating the correlations among shareholding structures
of firms. Fundamentally, the attention is restricted only to those investors with more intensive
presence in the firm, with block-holdings of minimum 5%. An analysis of alternative levels of
block-holding is reported later in Chapter 5.
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Due to the heterogeneity of firms, with large corporate groups mixed among smaller regional
producers, the strength of the shareholders’ network is less evident. For this reason as well,
the proportion of portfolios that are linked through commonly held firms has been decreas-
ing over time, from about 2.34% to 1.83%. On the other hand, among those high-density
portfolios (density>10%), the number of high correlations between said portfolios is small and
decreasing over time. This could be due to those corporate groups such as AB InBev with large
portfolios consisting of fully controlled subsidiaries.
At the given level of block-holdings (5%), the firms’ network is less interconnected in compari-
son to other sectors, with less than 1% of possible connections between shareholder structures
presenting some correlation. In turn, the proportion of these correlations that could be con-
sidered high (>80%) was only 23.53% in 2016. The presence of many regional firms with
niche markets in this sample helps explain some of these lower correlations in the networks,
but equally the presence of corporate groups with large vertical investments results in weaker
correlations across the shareholder structures.
Table 4.34: Network indices for Beverages sector. Shareholders’ network. Total number of common
shareholders; proportion of non-zero correlations between pairs of portfolios, i.e. proportion of con-
nections between two shareholders induced by common shareholding of a same firm; number of high
correlations (>80%) between pairs of high-density portfolios (both densities >10%); proportion of high
correlations between pairs of high-density portfolios.
Tot No. Prop Non-Zero No. High Corr. Prop. High Corr.
Year Comm SH Correlations High Dens. High Dens.
2007 552 2.34 4 0.63
2008 587 2.69 6 0.63
2009 627 2.57 5 0.58
2010 629 2.53 4 0.67
2011 590 2.48 4 0.92
2012 594 2.52 2 0.49
2013 599 2.38 1 0.26
2014 588 2.20 3 0.79
2015 590 1.95 2 0.36
2016 582 1.83 2 0.49
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Table 4.35: Network indices for Beverages sector. Firms’ network. Total number of firms cross-held by
block-holders (holding at least 5%); proportion of non-zero correlations between shareholders’ structures
of pairs of firms (only shares >5%); number of high correlations between shareholders’ structures of pairs
of firms (only shares >5%); proportion of high correlations (>80%) among the non-zero correlations.
Tot. No. Firms Prop Non-Zero No. of High Prop. of High
Year Cross-Held Correlations Correlations Correlations
2007 115 0.77 59 26.58
2008 124 0.69 74 35.75
2009 123 0.88 87 31.75
2010 123 0.86 78 27.56
2011 126 0.74 76 30.77
2012 128 0.85 72 25.35
2013 130 0.79 65 23.99
2014 125 0.71 68 27.53
2015 128 0.72 75 30.00
2016 129 0.80 64 23.53
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Box 4.1: Focus on markets - Oil&Gas
 The Oil&Gas industry is composed of 153 distinct corporations active in the EU during the
period 2007-2016, of which 73% are listed. Although most firms are active throughout
the whole period of observation, some are active for a shorter period of time, either due
to a later entry into the market or to an exit resulting from M&A, dissolution or other
reasons. Therefore, the set of firms is not constant over time, oscillating between 125
and 139 firms per year (on average 134) during the ten years of observation. About 46%
of the firms are registered outside the EU, almost half of which are in the US, followed by
Canada and Australia, with yet a smaller proportion coming from China, Japan, Norway
and Russia.
 The proportion of firms cross-held by block-holders is in line with the general picture of
listed firms in the EU, i.e. rather stable at around 63%.
 The majority of investors (75%) in companies in the Oil&Gas sector only hold participation
in 2 firms or less. This changes dramatically when looking at the largest portfolios, where
the top 1% of common shareholders hold more than 38 firms on average (≈ 28% of the
market). All these figures remain rather stable over the ten years of observation. The
maximum size of portfolios is very large, with portfolios encompassing 40% or more of
the firms in the market being observed in every year. This figure has been increasing
over time, reaching a peak of 45% in 2016, i.e. about 60 competing companies (out of
the 135 composing the market).
 The largest (top 1%) common shareholders include participation in almost all relevant
firms, representing more than 70% of the market value in terms of Total Assets (TOAS
is roughly 3309 Bn Euro in 2016), and more than 85% of Market Capitalisation (roughly
1811 Bn Euro in 2016), on average over the ten years. The most comprehensive portfolio
holds participations in firms which represent close to 90% of TOAS and almost 100% of
MKT CAP, revealing that the largest investors hand-pick all the firms with the largest value
in the market.
 Once we consider the percentage of shares actually owned by common shareholders, we
find that 99% of portfolios hold less than 1% of the value of the market through their
participation shares, both in terms of TOAS and of MKT CAP.
 However, top common shareholders BlackRock, Vanguard, State Street and Norway (short
for the Norwegian Sovereign Fund) hold large amounts of market value within their grasp:
in 2016 their shares in companies in portfolio amounted to about 12.88% of the TOAS
(approximately 426 Bn Euro).
Cont. next page
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Box 4.1 (cont.): Focus on markets - Oil&Gas
 In terms of shares, BlackRock dominates with investments in the largest EU-registered
companies, with participated values up to 6.9% in 2016, generally much higher than
the remaining three investors (Vanguard, State Street and Norway). In 2016, the firms
participated in by BlackRock constituted roughly 90% of Total Assets of the Oil&Gas mar-
ket (about 3309 Bn), with about 4.2% of TOAS also controlled by BlackRock through its
participations.
 Among firms registered in the EU, State Street principally concentrates its investments in
UK companies, with participations between 0.18% and 3.38% in 2016. However, it holds
larger stakes in top US-based companies, such as Exxon and Chevron, with approximately
5-6% holdings. The companies in its portfolio represent 80.2% of the TOAS in the market,
and State Street controls approximately 2.55% of the market TOAS.
 In the last year of observation (2016), Norway only holds minority stakes in EU-based
firms (between 0.79% and 2.35%), but controls national Statoil with a participation of
67%, whilst also holding stakes in several US giants. Overall, this amounts to controlling
about 2.72% of the TOAS, with firms in the portfolio representing 86% of the market
value. Vanguard has small participations in EU firms (between 0.68% and 2.73%), and
holds several larger stakes (around 7%) in top US-based Oil companies; it controls 3.42%
of the TOAS of the Oil&Gas market.
 A peculiar case is the Russian Government, which holds almost 6% of the Total Assets of
the market in 2016 via its subsidiaries Gazprom and Rosneft, but has little if no participa-
tions in other companies.

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Box 4.2: Focus on markets - Electricity
 The Electricity sector includes 396 firms active in the EU, of which 39% are registered
outside, mainly in the US, Canada, Switzerland and Russia. Most firms are listed (89%).
In 2016, the selected firms totaled 3330 Bn Euro of Total Assets, while the listed firms
had a Market Capitalisation of 864 Bn Euro.
 The number of active firms per year has been increasing steadily, going from 275 in
2007 to 353 in 2016, with an average of 325 firms per year. The Electricity sector is
characterised by the strong presence of state-owned companies, with Sovereign Funds
holding very large shares in their national providers - in many cases even being the
majority owners - as in the case of France, China, Korea and Sweden.
 Although the absolute number of firms cross-held by block investors has been increasing
since 2007, their proportion had decreased about 7 percentage points (from 62.5 in 2007
to 55.5 in 2016), given the rapid growth of the size of this industry. In 2016, the largest
shareholders (top 1%) held more than 30 firms active in the market (corresponding to
9% of the total number of firms). The top portfolio had participations in 29% of the firms,
approximately 100 companies.
 The top 1% of portfolios hold shares in firms whose value represents more than 30% of
the market (in terms of Total Assets) and more than 42% in terms of Market Capitali-
sation. This is a much lower percentage than in the Oil&Gas sector, and is due to the
larger number of firms active in the Electricity sector, and their steady increase over time
(comparatively, in Oil&Gas the number of companies is less than half that observed in
Electricity, and rather constant across time). The largest portfolio encompasses firms
covering more than 66% of TOAS and roughly 93% of MKT CAP. The top portfolio holds
about 7% of the market’s Total Assets through its participation shares, and about 3.5% of
Market Capitalisation.
 France plays a major role in this market, holding very large stakes in three of the top ten
EU-based companies, and minor participations in some additional firms. Overall in 2016
the French Sovereign Fund controlled about 6.7% of the Total Assets of this market.
 China, mainly via its subsidiary CHINA HUADIAN, controls 3.23% of market TOAS in 2016.
 The usual US-based funds (BlackRock, State Street and Vanguard) are still present as top
investors, but rather for the large number of firms in their portfolios (around one hundred
for BlackRock and Vanguard), each held with minority shares. Altogether, they control
5.57% of market TOAS in 2016.
 In 2016, Norway held minority stakes in 90 firms active in the market, controlling 1.13%
of the market TOAS.

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Box 4.3: Focus on markets - Trading Platforms for Financial Instruments
 This sector is defined by the companies that operate Trading Platforms. The selection
of such operators led to the identification of 176 distinct firms active in the EU between
2007 and 2016 (increasing from 124 in 2007 to 159 in 2016), 89% of which are registered
in one of the EU countries. Of the few operators registered outside, ten come from the
US, six from Norway, two from Canada and two from Switzerland. Of the set of 176 firms
that operate Trading Platforms in the EU, the largest are banks or financial intermediaries
devoted to auxiliary financial activities. Only 27% of the operators are listed.
 The Trading Platforms sector has some peculiarities that should be highlighted. The set
of firms operating the Trading Platforms is rather heterogeneous, both in terms of area
of activity, but equally in terms of Total Assets and Market Capitalisation. For example,
the Total Assets of a bank are incomparably higher than those of a stock exchange, and
even more so than those of a digital platform or technology firm. On the other hand,
even companies with few assets can have a large Market Cap, even if the amount of
listed firms in the identified set of operators is minor. Many of the companies active in
this sector are controlled by large groups, thus presenting a very concentrated ownership
structure with large participation shares in the hands of few - or even only one - investor.
 In 2016, about two thirds of the Trading Platforms operators have some shareholder in
common with another operator, both with participations higher than 5%.
 The largest portfolio invests in 26.6% of the companies in the market in 2007; due to
the increase in operators over time, the share of the largest portfolio declines to 21.38%
by 2016, corresponding to about 34 firms. The average investor holds about 1.5% of
the firms in the industry, i.e. about two companies. The top investors show a rather
"democratic" investment behaviour, generally holding similar minority shares in most
companies in their portfolio.
 Taking into account the Total Assets, there are no investors whose portfolio represents a
very large share of the market value (11729 Bn Euro in 2016), in contrast to the other
markets under analysis. In fact, firms cross-held by the largest common shareholders
represent altogether at most around 30% of the market value.
 This market is characterised by the presence of highly intensive portfolios, for example
large banking groups, which can control through their shares as much as 20% of the
market value.
Cont. next page
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Box 4.3 (cont.): Focus on markets - Trading Platforms for Financial Instruments
 The picture of top investors in the Trading Platforms industry is largely dominated by
banks, while funds tend to drop to lower positions in the ranking of common sharehold-
ers. In 2016, the top common shareholder in terms of TOAS control is Barclays: through
participations in only nine firms it controls 12.5% of the market TOAS. All other top in-
vestors in 2016 (except Barclays) are registered outside the EU.
 In 2016, the big funds tended to hold very similar portfolios in terms of firms held, but the
level of participation varies. For example, BlackRock holds a large share (8.66%) in the
London Stock Exchange, while State Street and Vanguard have about 3% each. On the
other hand, State Street has a strong presence in the Spanish banks Santander (8.34%)
and Banco Bilbao Vizcaya (10.87), while BlackRock holds about half of that and Vanguard
even less (about 1% and 2% respectively).
 Overall, the size of the portfolios - in terms of number of firms held - does not differ much
across top investors. Portfolios held by Sweden, Funds, Banks and Insurance companies
include approximately 15% to 20% of the firms active in this market, while Norway dis-
plays a consistently higher value, of above 20%, holding the largest portfolio in 2016 (34
firms).

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Box 4.4: Focus on markets - Mobile Telecoms: MNOs and their parents
 Overall, in 2007-2016 we identified 105 Mobile Network Operators (MNOs) active in the
EU, and an additional 72 controlling parent companies. The parents are either companies
active in the telecoms industry, or holding/financial companies. They have been included
in the set of firms defining this industry because: (i) they have a strong influence on the
mobile market through their controlled subsidiaries and (ii) large investors often reach
the subsidiaries active in this market indirectly through their parents. In adding the
parents to the initial list of MNOs, we obtain a final list of 177 companies that represent
all firms active in or influencing mobile telecoms in the EU during 2007-2016.
 The number of firms in this industry has been increasing slightly, going from 122 in
2007 to 149 in 2016. The large majority of the firms are registered in Europe (93%),
mostly in Luxembourg (10%), followed by the Netherlands with about 8%. The sector is
characterised by large groups mothered by telecom giants such as Vodafone, Orange or
Deutsche Telecom, which have little if no overlap in their portfolios, and have more or
less partitioned the set of firms active in this industry into independent domains.
 The proportion of common vs single owners has changed throughout the period of
observation, with the initial proportion of roughly 25% vs 75% becoming roughly 30%
vs 70%. The proportion of companies that share block-holders with competitors is
increasing, growing from about 75% to 82% through the decade of observation.
 The ownership in the Mobile Telecoms industry at the end of the observation period in
2016 is concentrated in the hands of select individuals and associated holding groups,
alongside large investment management firms such as Blackrock or Vanguard. These
global shareholders hold significant investments in large pan-European telecom groups
such as Vodafone and Orange, as well as in national providers. Together, these groups
and providers compose almost the entirety of the European mobile telecoms market.
 In 2016, individuals such as Carlos Slim Helú (Mexico), Victor Li Tzar Kuoi (Hong
Kong/China), and J. Malone (US) controlled - directly or indirectly - 3.26%, 3.09% and
2.01% of the Total Assets in the market, respectively (1236 Bn Euro).
 Besides individuals, BlackRock dominates this industry, with rather large shares in some
of the top players (over 8% in Vodafone, almost 7% in BT GROUP PLC and about 6% in
KONINKLIJKE KPN NV). Overall BlackRock controlled about 3.18% of Total Assets in 2016.
 Vanguard and Norway lag behind, with relatively small participations, while State Street
plays only a minor role. France is also present, with a large participation in the French
company Orange, but also some smaller shares in other top competitors. This industry
is also characterised by cross-ownership of the companies in the market, with Vodafone,
Orange and Telefonica appearing among the top common shareholders.

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Box 4.5: Focus on markets - Beverages Manufacturers
 The focus is on the manufacture of beverages, rather than their wholesale, although
some of the companies considered conduct both types of activity. Only some types of
products were included, namely Soft Drinks, Waters, Juices and Beers.
 Altogether, we identified 290 distinct firms active in the EU in the manufacturing of Soft
Drinks and/or Waters, Beer or Juices, over the period 2007-2016. Of these, 214 are listed
and the remaining are the relevant unlisted players (76 firms ).
 In this industry, the number of firms has been increasing slightly, going from 241 in
2007 to 261 in 2016. Roughly two-thirds of the firms are registered in the EU (69.15%),
with Germany accounting for about 20%, followed by France and the United Kingdom at
around 5%. Outside, the US is the largest country represented, with 8.81% of firms in the
sample registered there.
 The Beverages market is rather heterogeneous, with a set of large firms are involved in
the production and/or distribution of alcoholic products structured in a similar manner
to what was seen in Telecoms, with large corporate groups and many cross-holdings.
Comparatively, the other beverage producers tend to be smaller enterprises with local
markets and a limited shareholder structure.
 The initial proportion of common vs single shareholders, although slightly declining, has
not changed much throughout the period (28% and 72% in 2007 vs 26% and 74% roughly
in 2016). A similar pattern can be observed when considering block-holdings of 5%, where
the number (and proportion) of firms cross-held by a block-holder has remained rather
stable, just below 45% throughout most of the period. These levels are slightly below the
EU average observed for other sectors.
 The top 1% of investors in 2007 held more than 14% of firms in the sector; by 2016 this
number declined to 11.2%. These investors hold firms that represent between 53% and
60% of the Total Assets of the industry, depending on the year (declining trend). The top
common shareholder has invested in companies representing up to 82% of the TOAS of
the sector in 2016 (1309 Bn Euro). Such values are in line with expectations, since the top
investors tend to privilege the largest enterprises. However, when this index is weighted
according to the participation share of investors, the trend inverts, demonstrating that
the largest investor holds a slightly decreasing share of weighted Total Assets. It would
seem that top investors (but this holds for other investors in general) are diluting their
investment concentration among more firms.
Cont. next page
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Box 4.5 (cont.): Focus on markets - Beverages Manufacturers
 Cross-investment - that is, the participation of corporate groups or ultimate owners
among each other - defines investment behavior in this sector. The first three common
shareholders in terms of weighted total assets in the beverages are also part of the mar-
ket: DIAGEO PLC (UK) with 4.25% of the market TOAS, L’ARCHE GREEN (NL) with 3.40%
and ANHEUSER-BUSCH INBEV (BE) with 2.92%.
 BlackRock is the first common shareholder external to the market, with rather large
shares in most of the top players, reaching up to 8.82% shares in a single firm. Overall
BlackRock’s portfolio accounted for 2.33% of the market’s total assets in 2016. Vanguard
and State Street lag behind, with relatively small participations. State Street in particular
is a minor player for the observed year. The portfolio composition of these investment
management funds would indicate evidence of an appetite for investment in larger cor-
porate groups or holdings, as opposed to individual or smaller producers: some of the
biggest corporate groups such as Anheuser-Busch InBev appear alongside some of the
bigger producers of beverages such as The Coca-Cola Company.
 Other financial institutions, such as large banks or insurance companies, are missing from
the ranks of top common shareholders. State participation is also missing, with the ex-
ception of the Norwegian sovereign fund which presents a portfolio similar in composition
to that of the other large funds.

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Chapter 5
Block-holdings in Investors’
Portfolios in the EU
An investor is defined as a block-holder of a firm if holding at least a certain percentage of the
shares of the firm (block). The threshold defining the block is an indicator of the “intensity”1 of
the investment of the shareholder in a given firm. Kang et al. (2018) study the relationship be-
tween holding blocks in investors’ portfolios and their monitoring effectiveness on firms held.
Their results, based on US data, suggest that "information advantages and governance experi-
ence obtained from multiple block-holdings are important channels through which institutions
perform effective monitoring". The authors also state that "these results are particularly evi-
dent when institutions have multiple block-holdings in the same industry". Using a threshold
for ownership blocks at minimum 5%, they find that in 1993-2010 an institutional investor on
average holds blocks in five competing firms.2
Such evidence is closely linked to the common shareholding debate; hence a careful consid-
eration of block-holdings in investors’ portfolios in the EU provides a more detailed picture of
the phenomenon of common shareholding in Europe.
The EU-level analyses and the sectoral studies reported in the previous chapters presented
some common shareholding indices with a threshold of block-holding of minimum 5%, to al-
low for comparison with existing literature. The same common shareholding indicators are
re-calculated here, utilizing different levels of block-holdings, namely thresholds of 1, 3, 5,
and 10 percent equity holdings by the investors. Moreover, some common shareholding in-
dicators that were previously calculated over all holdings are proposed here in new versions,
where only larger block-holdings are considered. Finally, new threshold-based measures of
1Throughout this report, we have often referred to the magnitude of an investment using the term “intensity”,
namely the level of shares held by an investor in a specific firm.
2Based on Thomson Reuters Institutional Holdings (13F) data.
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common shareholding are presented, following some recent academic studies. The main fea-
tures of the threshold-based common shareholding indices used for the sectoral analyses are
briefly summarised in Chapter 2, Section 2.4.3, where the link with existing literature is also
highlighted. More details on their interpretation and implications for the measurement of com-
mon shareholding will be provided during the presentation of the empirical results on the five
industries.
The remainder of this Chapter is organised as follows: Section 5.1 presents the summary
statistics on average holdings and block-holdings during 2007-2016 in the five industries under
analysis. Section 5.2 presents the empirical results on the common shareholding threshold-
based indices for firm-investor market relations, while Section 5.3 analyses links between
agents in the two separate networks of firms and of shareholders. Section 5.4 looks at the
dynamics of the portfolios of the ’Big three’ (BlackRock, State Street and Vanguard) over the
period of observation, looking at average holdings and at the trends in block-holdings for
different threshold levels. Not only is the total number of firms block-held in each industry
analysed, but equally the proportion that they represent in terms of the overall portfolio of
firms held in each market by such investors.
5.1 Outline of holdings in the five sectors
The identification of the Oil&Gas, Electricity, Trading Platforms, Telecoms and Beverages sec-
tors has been discussed earlier.3 However, one aspect should be underlined here: the Electric-
ity sector is much larger than the remaining industries, both in terms of number of firms and
number of investors. This difference should be taken into account when interpreting some of
the empirical results, and will be recalled later, where appropriate.
Table 5.1 reports the summary statistics on the average participation shares per portfolio, by
market, where the statistics are calculated on the portfolios of all investors present in each
market. Such average holdings reflect the level of intensity of each portfolio in the markets.4
In all industries the median intensity is below 1% throughout 2007-2016, showing that more
than half of investors hold portfolios of very little intensity, with average holdings of less than
1%. The mean portfolio holds about 5-6% shares on average in its firms; only Oil&Gas shows
lower levels, while Telecoms stands on slightly higher values, given the strong presence of
high-participation corporate groups.
3An overview can be found in the sectoral analyses of Chapter 4. Full details in Appendix C, where the main features
of the five markets are recalled in Table C.1.
4We recall that a portfolio is defined by the set of firms where an investor holds shares in a specific market. The
size of a portfolio reflects the number of included firms, while the intensity is determined by the amount of shares
held in each firm.
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Table 5.1: Average participation shares in investors’ portfolios. All investors, by market and year.
Oil&Gas
Year mean median p90 p99
2007 2.66 0.52 2.57 62.05
2008 2.56 0.51 2.56 60.00
2009 2.66 0.51 2.56 63.05
2010 2.50 0.49 2.36 59.45
2011 2.46 0.47 2.34 59.45
2012 2.60 0.50 2.56 62.05
2013 2.66 0.51 2.56 67.49
2014 2.57 0.51 2.56 66.13
2015 2.68 0.52 3.01 69.70
2016 2.67 0.51 2.89 70.01
Electricity
Year mean median p90 p99
2007 3.97 0.70 5.67 78.85
2008 3.97 0.70 5.65 77.95
2009 4.26 0.70 5.98 77.95
2010 4.43 0.70 6.29 78.65
2011 4.70 0.70 7.23 80.52
2012 5.29 0.76 10.90 82.57
2013 5.41 0.74 10.47 87.91
2014 5.15 0.76 9.89 87.91
2015 5.17 0.76 9.89 89.38
2016 5.20 0.74 9.18 89.94
Trading Platforms
Year mean median p90 p99
2007 5.30 0.95 11.45 89.20
2008 5.47 0.84 11.59 91.00
2009 5.46 0.77 10.08 98.00
2010 5.63 0.81 10.49 98.00
2011 5.87 0.87 11.59 98.00
2012 6.16 0.90 11.59 98.25
2013 6.18 0.83 11.59 98.80
2014 6.51 0.89 11.59 99.43
2015 6.38 0.85 11.59 99.43
2016 6.57 0.89 11.74 99.43
Telecoms
Year mean median p90 p99
2007 6.21 0.51 4.99 100.00
2008 6.37 0.48 5.24 100.00
2009 6.44 0.50 5.32 100.00
2010 6.35 0.49 5.28 100.00
2011 7.16 0.52 7.79 100.00
2012 8.19 0.55 15.60 100.00
2013 8.09 0.54 14.72 100.00
2014 8.35 0.55 17.11 100.00
2015 8.85 0.54 24.81 100.00
2016 9.73 0.54 36.46 100.00
Beverages
Year mean median p90 p99
2007 4.67 0.64 5.01 96.14
2008 4.61 0.63 4.70 95.53
2009 4.85 0.65 5.01 96.95
2010 4.93 0.64 5.75 96.95
2011 5.09 0.65 5.99 97.21
2012 5.14 0.66 6.39 98.54
2013 5.41 0.67 7.05 99.53
2014 5.41 0.67 7.00 99.23
2015 5.51 0.67 7.23 99.33
2016 5.60 0.67 7.05 98.99
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Looking at the 90th percentile, we still find that in most industries 90% of investors barely reach
an investment intensity of 10% of average holdings (in Oil&Gas it is actually remarkably lower,
with values around 3% average shareholdings). Overall this pattern is rather stable, except for
the Telecoms sector, where we observe a sudden rise after 2012; the increase in investment
intensity may be due to the upsurge in large corporate groups with large participations in
their subsidiaries. Moreover, with the partial exception of the Oil&Gas sector, a clear trend
emerges among shareholders to increase the intensity of investments in their portfolios. The
distribution of average shares in this table reflects the usual composition of the shareholder
structure: many small investors and few investors with larger participation.
All the distributions of (average) shareholdings are very skewed, and we observe at the top
end some very intensive portfolios. Such top investors are normally linked to corporate groups,
where the parent company controls or even wholly owns the respective subsidiaries. This
pattern is consistent across sectors and throughout the period of observation. In some cases,
such as the Telecoms sector, the presence of large corporate groups with many fully owned
subsidiaries amplifies this. It is likely that other large average participations are investors with
small but ’intensive’ portfolios. This initial portrait demonstrates how, in reality, the majority
of investors favour small shareholdings.
Figure 5.1 shows the block-holdings of all investors active in each market. The total number of
block-holdings for all investors in an industry is an index of the intensity of investments among
the sector’s active firms. Given that the total number of firms is rather stable in all sectors,
an increase in the number of block-holdings reveals either more intensive investment in each
company, or an increase in the number of investors holding blocks of shares in the market.
The levels in the Electricity sector are higher due to the greater (and increasing) number of
firms in the sample. Here the large differences in the indicators for the chosen thresholds
suggest that the investments in this industry vary in intensity. For example, the number of
block-holdings at 1% level are around double those for a 3% threshold, and about four times
more than those at 10%.
In the Oil&Gas and Trading Platforms industries, although the number of active firms has been
slightly increasing throughout 2007-2016, the overall number of block-holdings has remained
rather stable over the years, for all levels of shares considered. Again, the intensity of in-
vestments varies, with about a 4:1 ratio of block-holdings at 1% vs. those at 10%, in both
sectors.
Overall, the Telecoms sector shows lower numbers of block-holdings for small values of par-
ticipation; there is also little variation across thresholds, indicating that in general the invest-
ments in this sector are rather intensive. The block-holdings at 1% are around double those
of the 10% counterpart, confirming a much lower dispersion than in the other industries. Still,
the 10% blocks are as numerous as in the other industries (except Electricity, for the reasons
explained above).
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Figure 5.1: Number of block-holdings for all investors at different thresholds.
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Lastly, in the Beverages Manufacturers sector, the levels remain stable throughout the period
in two respects: on the one hand, the number of firms remains relatively stable, and on the
other hand, the intensity of the investment does not change significantly. In fact, the ratio
between block-holdings at 1% and 10% remains almost the same from 2007 to 2016.
5.2 Effects of thresholds on firms-investors relations
The application of thresholds to the indices based on firm-investor relations limits the ob-
servation only to stronger links between the two groups of agents, therefore considering all
low-intensity connections negligible.
The identification of the firms that are cross-held by a block-holder, i.e. where the investor has
a high intensity of holding in both companies, was performed in previous analyses at a level
of 5%. Here we extend it to lower levels of holdings, namely 1 and 3 percent.
Besides this indicator, we propose here an additional new index, measuring the weight of
intensive investments of each shareholder’s portfolio. This new index is a threshold-based
version of the density of investments presented in the previous sectoral analyses, and repre-
sents the proportion of firms in a shareholder’s portfolio that are block-held with a minimum
amount of shares, relative to the total number of firms in the market. The index is presented
for several block-holding thresholds, as well as for all the holdings, i.e. the original density
index, for the sake of comparison.
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5.2.1 Firms cross-held by block-holders
Figure 5.2 presents the results on the number and proportion of cross-held firms (CHF), for
different levels of block-holding. In all sectors, the number of CHF remains very stable and
similar across the different levels, over the whole period of observation. The slight exception
is the Telecoms sector, where the presence of a few, large corporate groups with many sub-
sidiaries drives up the proportion of CHF in the market. This can be seen both in the bottom
(proportion of CHF) and in the top (number of CHF) panels, where the differential between the
number of cross-held firms for different thresholds of block-holdings is minimal in Telecoms.
The number of cross-held firms in this sector where the block-holder held minimum 1%, 3%,
or 5% of equity in both firms was almost as high as the number of total CHF, indicating that
cross-holders in this sector have much larger equity interests spread out among firms with
respect to other sectors.
On the opposite side stands the case of the Electricity sector, where the ratio of the total num-
ber of firms to the number of CHF where the equity held is 5% or above is roughly 2:1. For
example, in 2009 there were about 300 CHF in the sector, of which about 150 have common
shareholders with shares of at least 5% in both firms. The large number of firms in this sector
also helps to explain the greater number of CHF, but in terms of proportion the values are
dropping over the period to levels closer to those seen in the other sectors. Similar results
emerge for the Beverages Manufacturers sector. Indeed, considering all active firms - com-
pared to those cross-held with shares greater than or equal to 5% - the ratio stands at about
2.5 times on average throughout the period. Compared to the results of threshold analysis
for the other sectors, this difference is significantly larger than in sectors such as Oil&Gas or
Telecoms, showing that in beverages there is a smaller proportion of cross-holdings at a high
intensity of investment.
When looking at the proportion of firms cross-held by block-holders, the values are significant
across the sectors. On average, more than 50% of firms in each sector are cross-held by one
or more investor with shares greater than 5%. The proportion of cross-held firms reaches up to
80% when considering lower thresholds of equity investments. Nevertheless, the Beverages
Manufacturers sector shows a slightly different performance from the average. In fact, for
block-holdings of 5%, the proportion of CHF as a share of total active firms peaks at 45% in
2016, while for all other sectors this figure was steadily above 50% throughout the period
of observation. Moreover, for block-holdings of 1%, the proportion is in decline, going from a
high of 61% in 2008 to about 55% in 2016. This is an indication that the links existing between
shareholder structures are likely constituted through smaller block-holdings than those used
in the reference literature, and in general this is in line with the presence of clusters of firms
represented by corporate groups with little or no interconnections.
Despite these slightly different levels, the overall trends are very similar in all sectors, showing
a flat pattern over time, with a rather stable level throughout the period of observation.
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Figure 5.2: Firms cross-held at different thresholds of block-holdings. Top panel: Total number of cross-
held firms per year. Bottom panel: Proportion of firms cross-held by one or more investors, relative to
total number of firms in each market.
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5.2.2 Densities of block-holdings
The densities of block-holdings represent the proportion of companies in a shareholder’s port-
folio corresponding to a certain threshold of holding (no threshold, 1, 3, 5, 10 percent), relative
to the total number of firms in the market, thus evaluating the market share of firms held with
a certain intensity by a given shareholder. Figure 5.3 shows the results on the top 1% of more
"intensive" portfolios (top panel), as well as the maximum value attained by the most intensive
investor for the various thresholds (bottom panel).
Looking at the top 1% of portfolios holdings, across all sectors the proportion of block-holdings
per portfolio is declining or stable over the period, irrespective of the threshold of equity in-
vestment considered. In general, portfolio densities are below 20% for all levels of investment,
but the differential between non-threshold (all holdings) and threshold densities is large, sug-
gesting that this cohort of investors concentrate their investments in a limited number of firms
where they block-hold at larger values, the remainder of the portfolio presenting smaller partic-
ipations. The exception is the Oil&Gas sector where, considering all equity investments held,
portfolio densities reach noticeably higher levels, illustrating that investors with the largest
portfolios spread out their investments across more firms, even with large intensities.
Observing instead the investors with the maximum values for portfolio density, the trends
are slightly different. Here the maximum value refers to the portfolio holding the largest
proportion of block-holdings in the market, relative to the total number of firms. This top
portfolio represents the most ’intensive’ investor in the market; for example, if we look at the
5% threshold (yellow line), we see in Oil&Gas that the top investor holds a minimum of 5% of
shares in almost 20% of the market firms. The levels of density are clearly higher than in the
top panel of Figure 5.3, but are also slightly increasing, particularly in Oil&Gas. In the other
sectors values are not as high, with the top portfolio including between 5 and 10% of firms at a
block-holding level of 5% shares. Across sectors the distribution of investors measured by the
size of their portfolios is highly skewed, with a very small share of investors increasing their
presence in the market. The same is applicable even when considering different thresholds for
block-holdings. A case in point is the Telecoms sector, where the investor with the maximum
(largest) portfolio density holds at least a 10% equity investment in close to 10% of the firms
in the sample over the period. Still, what is common to all sectors is the flat pattern across the
ten years, where the values for 2007 remain almost unchanged until 2016.
It should be noted that this ’top investor’ described above is not necessarily the same across
years or for different thresholds of block-holdings. Observing for example the Oil&Gas sector,
the top - most "intensive" - investor holds shares equal to or above 10% for roughly 5% of the
firms in the market (light blue line); this is likely to be a corporate group or a holding company
with very sector-specific interests. Instead, the top investor who holds shares of 3% or above
for about 20% of the firms in the market (green line) is likely to be a fund or investment group
with a more diversified portfolio across the sector. For example, looking at the Beverages Man-
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ufacturers sector - as reported in Table 4.33 - funds such as BlackRock have a specific interest
in larger corporate groups, but the top-scoring investor may vary across years. Other larger
investors, such as Morgan Stanley or certain insurance groups, have smaller participations but
have a greater presence across corporate groups as well as in smaller firms in the market,
and thus might in turn overtake the top funds in specific periods in terms of block-holdings.
Among those investors that have significant block-holdings (>10%) for a share of the firms in
the sample, such as those represented by the light blue line, corporate groups with fully-owned
subsidiaries are likely to fall below them.
In conclusion, taking into consideration the different levels of block-holdings, the density of
portfolios has remained relatively stable throughout the period and across the sectors, follow-
ing a decline with respect to initial values. Nevertheless, these figures confirm the presence
of investors with large shares across a wide section of firms in the sectors.
5.3 Thresholds in networks relations
The following sections revisit the shareholder and firms’ network common shareholding indices
used in the previous chapters, allowing for different thresholds of equity investments. The
application of a threshold for block-holding has different effects in the two networks. In the
firms’ case, it limits the shareholding structure of each company only to the most intensive
investments, i.e. only to the most "present" shareholders. On the other hand, in the investors’
network the companies in each portfolio are restricted according to the respective holding
intensity. This exercise substantially resizes the larger portfolios, which usually have a more
dispersed holding structure, while smaller intensive portfolios become more relevant. This
difference in the two networks’ nature must be kept in mind throughout the analysis, in order
to correctly interpret the results.
For each network, four indicators are presented: the number and proportion of links between
each pair of agents in a network, assessing the extent of connectedness of each group; the
total number of strong links, i.e. those presenting a correlation above 80%; and finally the
proportion of strong links over the total number of existing connections, assessing the strength
of the network’s cohesion.
In the case of the firms, the four indicators replicate those used in previous sectoral analyses
with a 5% threshold, adding two further block-holding levels; this allows for different selec-
tions of investors to be considered for the analysis of similarities between firms’ shareholder
structures. In the case of the shareholders’ network, all indices are new, in the sense that they
have never previously been calculated using a threshold, but rather considering all holdings
in each portfolio. Here only the largest holdings of an investor are retained for each threshold
instead.
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Figure 5.3: Summary statistics of portfolio density; proportion of block-held firms in a shareholder’s
portfolio relative to the total number of firms in the market, considering different thresholds for block-
holdings. Top panel: 99th percentile (top 1% of investors). Bottom panel: maximum value (top investor).
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Another important difference with respect to previous sectoral studies is that the analysis of
high correlations between portfolios is now extended to all pairs of portfolios, and not only to
larger ones. Previous analyses only considered portfolios encompassing at least 10% of the
firms in each market, to avoid picking cases of non-relevant high correlations. For example,
two very small portfolios with very low participations in a limited number of coinciding firms
would present a very high correlation, given their strong similarity, but in reality do not rep-
resent relevant investors in the market. Once we apply minimum thresholds for the holdings,
this is no longer a concern, because low-intensity investments are automatically dropped and
there is no need to restrict them further. Therefore, in the present analysis for the sharehold-
ers’ network we keep all portfolios for all levels of block-holdings, so that the reference pool of
portfolios is constant throughout the calculations.
In order to allow for a clear interpretation of the effects of a change in thresholds, four refer-
ence values are initially calculated on all holdings and held fixed as the thresholds are moved:
the total number of firms per sector/year, representing the size of the firms’ network; the total
number of investors per sector/year, representing the size of the shareholders’ network; the
number of firms in a shareholders’ portfolio, representing the shareholder-firm connections
that generate overlaps between investors; and finally the number of shareholders in a firm’s
ownership structure, generating connections with other firms in the market.
5.3.1 Network indices for firms
The firms’ network reveals the correlations between the ownership structures of the firms in
a sector. Figures 5.4 and 5.5 display these correlations across the period for all five sectors,
looking both at non-zero and only high correlations. Non-zero total correlations represents the
overall degree of connectedness of the firms by their shareholders in the given market. High
correlations instead represent correlations of 80% or above between the ownership structures
of firms, only considering shareholders with shares above 1, 3, or 5 percent. This sheds light
upon the most connected firms in each sector. Since in previous calculations of the firms’
network only shareholders with block-holdings of 5% minimum were used, this study expands
on this by considering values of 1% and 3% as alternative thresholds.
Observing the number of non-zero correlations in the top panel of Figure 5.4, the results show
that the total overlaps between firms’ shareholder structures remain relatively stable over the
period across sectors (except Electricity at 1%), with only slightly increasing trends. In the
case of the Oil&Gas sector, the overall degree of connectedness among firms remains gen-
erally higher than other sectors; in this industry, the share of non-zero correlations over total
correlations stays consistently above 12% (see bottom panel of Figure 5.4), highlighting that
there are numerous links between firms induced by common shareholders.
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For the remaining sectors, correlations between shareholder structures remain close to or be-
low 5%, depending on the threshold for minimum investment used. Within the Beverages
Manufacturers sector the values are slightly lower than in the others. Even at the minimum
investment of 1%, the share of non-zero correlations never rises above 5% of total possible
connections. For more significant investments, such as 5%, the share is never above 1%.
Figure 5.4: Non-zero correlations between shareholder structures of pairs of firms, considering only
investments with shares above certain minimums. Top panel: Number of non-zero correlations for differ-
ent thresholds. Bottom panel: Proportion of non-zero correlations relative to the total number of possible
connections between pairs of firms for different thresholds.
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This limited linkage between the shareholder structures is likely due, as previously mentioned,
to the type of firms in the sample - a mixture of large corporate groups with fully-owned sub-
sidiaries and small local enterprises with few owners. The overall result is that of a sector with
many ’vertical’ investments and few horizontal investors.
Figure 5.5: High correlations between shareholders structures of pairs of firms, considering only in-
vestments with shares above certain minimums. Top panel: Number of high correlations for different
thresholds. Bottom panel: Proportion of high correlations relative to the total number of non-zero corre-
lations between pairs of firms for different thresholds.
0
50
100
150
2007 2010 2013 2016
OilGas
0
50
100
150
2007 2010 2013 2016
Electricity
0
50
100
150
2007 2010 2013 2016
Trading Platf.
0
50
100
150
2007 2010 2013 2016
Telecoms
0
50
100
150
2007 2010 2013 2016
Beverages
(only shares above a certain minimum %)
Number of high correlations (>80%) - Firms' network
shares > 1% shares > 3% shares > 5%
0
10
20
30
40
50
%
2007201020132016
OilGas
0
10
20
30
40
50
2007 2010 2013 2016
Electricity
0
10
20
30
40
50
2007 2010 2013 2016
Trading Platf.
0
10
20
30
40
50
2007 2010 2013 2016
Telecoms
0
10
20
30
40
50
2007 2010 2013 2016
Beverages
(only shares above a certain minimum %)
Proportion of high correlations (>80%) - Firms' network
shares > 1% shares > 3% shares > 5%
139
Concerning the proportion of high correlations among the shareholder structures (see bottom
panel of Figure 5.5), Telecoms is again the outlier because of the presence of large corporate
groups with fully owned subsidiaries. The time series for Trading Platforms, although more
volatile, also shows that the proportion of high correlations over total correlations reaches
peaks comparable to Telecoms. This suggests that the top shareholders in this sector are also
further concentrating their investments. As the considered intensity of investment increases,
the proportion of high correlations between connected firms rises substantially, meaning that
those firms that are connected at higher investment intensity more frequently show a stronger
overlap of shareholding structures. In terms of total number of strong links (top panel), Elec-
tricity also present some higher figures, but mainly due to the larger size of its network.
5.3.2 Network indices for investors
Figure 5.6 and Figure 5.7 present indices related to the shareholders’ network, which demon-
strates the correlations between the portfolio structure of investors. The interpretation is
analogous to that of the firms’ network, and in general confirms a strong connectedness in all
markets.
When considering very low thresholds such as 1%, the number of non-zero correlations indi-
cates a high overall degree of overlap between investor portfolios (top panel of Figure 5.6),
but with a tendency to decline over the period of observation.
As the threshold becomes more stringent, the number of connections becomes more stable
over the period, but exhibits a dramatic drop; about ten-fold if comparing the 1% to the 5%
figures. This may again be due, as in the Telecoms sector, to large corporate groups that
fully own many subsidiaries and do not cross invest as much. Therefore, the likelihood of
correlations between portfolios decreases, and depends mostly on the cross-investments of
institutional investors such as funds, which in general hold smaller shares.
As for the proportion of connections existing in the shareholders’ network, the trends are very
similar to those of the absolute figures, the only difference being in the 1% threshold, where a
more evident decline is observed. It is important to note that the proportion of connections is
calculated over the total number of potential shareholder-shareholder links; considering that
each market has thousands of investors per year, the possible two-by-two links are in the
order of several millions, which yields very small proportions even when the number of non-
zero correlations is high. This was not the case in the firms network, of much smaller size,
where the possible links were a few thousand, even in the largest market (Electricity).
Alternatively, Figure 5.7 shows the high correlations between investor portfolios, where the
proportion of high correlations is now calculated over the total number of existing investor-
investor connections. The index therefore highlights on the most strongly connected investors
per sector. As the threshold for block-holdings increases, this proportion increases, because
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these top investors with significant equity investments have interests in many of the same
firms, therefore displaying an increasingly strong overlap of portfolios. Overall, across sectors
we observe as many as 30% of the connected investors having almost coincident portfolios
when looking at the most intensive investments, the only exception being Electricity on slightly
lower levels.
Figure 5.6: Non-zero correlations between pairs of investors’ portfolios, considering only investments
above certain minimums. Top panel: Number of non-zero correlations for different thresholds. Bottom
panel: Proportion of non-zero correlations relative to the total number of possible connections between
pairs of portfolios for different thresholds.
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Looking only at the sheer number, high correlations occur less often when the thresholds for
block-holding become more stringent. Even at 1%, the number of high correlations is usually
between 200 and 400, only a fraction of all the non-zero correlations. This suggests that many
of the existing links between shareholder portfolios are driven by small equity holdings by
investors.
Figure 5.7: High correlations between pairs of investors’ portfolios, considering only investments with
shares above certain minimums. Top panel: Number of high correlations for different thresholds. Bottom
panel: Proportion of high correlations relative to the total number of non-zero correlations between pairs
of portfolios for different thresholds.
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5.4 The ’Big Three’
In the interest of understanding how certain big investors, that is those with wide portfolios,
have increased their common shareholding across the sectors of interest over the years, Table
5.2 presents statistics on average participation shares for BlackRock Inc., The Vanguard Group,
and State Street Corporation, referred to as the ’Big Three’. BlackRock in particular stands
out since, following the 2009 merger with Barclays Global Investors, its average ownership
increased dramatically across sectors. This stylised fact can also be seen in the time series
showing the evolution of block-holdings for the ’Big Three’ in Figures 5.8 and 5.9.
In the Oil&Gas industry, all these funds hold average participation shares that are close to or
above a 3% level of block-holding, making them very relevant actors in the market. BlackRock
and Vanguard have a similar behaviour in Trading Platforms, but State Street is left behind
in this sector, with average holdings just above 1% throughout the period. The investment
intensity in Electricity is rather uniform for the three funds, at around 1.5%, with only Black-
Rock at slightly higher levels, around 2%. The Telecoms sector presents the lowest intensity in
investments of all considered industries, with both State Street and Vanguard well below 1%
average holdings. BlackRock stands at a higher level, with around 2% average. In the Bev-
erages Manufacturers sector, BlackRock experiences a significant jump after its acquisition
of Barclays Global Investors in 2009. Vanguard similarly increases its average participation,
but not due to capital operations. State Street remains the laggard again with respect to its
competitors. This trend is comparable to the other sectors of interest, with BlackRock and
Vanguard always edging out State Street in terms of average participation size.
Figures 5.8 and 5.9 show the number of firms block-held by each fund and the proportion
of their portfolios composed by block-holdings. These are reported as usual for block-holding
levels of 1, 3, and 5 percent. Of these ’Big Three’ investors, BlackRock is the most active across
sectors and over the period. A large part of this is again due to the 2009 acquisition of Barclays
Global Investors, which created a money management juggernaut and vastly increased the
portfolio holdings of BlackRock.
The levels of block-holdings are comparable across the sectors for these top investors, with
BlackRock and Vanguard increasing their block-holdings over the period while State Street
remains steady but well below. In certain sectors, such as Telecoms, the presence of large
corporate groups (for example Vodafone) with many fully owned subsidiaries pushes down the
number of block-holdings for other investors, while in Electricity the large number of firms in
the sample with respect to the other sectors results in an increased number of block-holdings.
Due to these circumstances, the ’Big Three’ lean towards a block-holding style of investment
in the energy sectors (Oil&Gas, and Electricity), while maintaining smaller equity holdings in
Trading Platforms or Telecoms.
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Table 5.2: Average participation shares in investors’ portfolios. Results for ’Big three’: BlackRock, State
Street and Vanguard, by market and year.
Oil&Gas
Year BlackRock State Street Vanguard
2007 0.96 2.24 1.86
2008 0.82 1.98 1.90
2009 3.97 2.00 2.01
2010 3.85 2.12 2.23
2011 3.52 1.96 2.05
2012 3.32 2.17 2.20
2013 3.43 2.34 2.58
2014 3.51 2.32 2.81
2015 3.54 2.64 3.44
2016 3.91 2.98 3.87
Electricity
Year BlackRock State Street Vanguard
2007 1.05 1.48 1.08
2008 1.03 1.28 1.03
2009 2.55 1.38 1.20
2010 2.24 1.28 1.26
2011 2.10 1.36 1.18
2012 1.90 1.25 1.18
2013 2.06 1.20 1.34
2014 2.31 1.20 1.52
2015 2.32 1.24 1.77
2016 2.40 1.30 2.00
Trading Platforms
Year BlackRock State Street Vanguard
2007 0.61 1.04 0.76
2008 0.73 0.71 0.89
2009 2.44 0.64 0.96
2010 2.95 0.81 1.11
2011 2.69 0.71 1.19
2012 2.46 0.71 1.41
2013 3.54 0.92 1.74
2014 2.76 1.00 1.94
2015 3.17 1.13 2.26
2016 3.46 1.03 2.43
Telecoms
Year BlackRock State Street Vanguard
2007 0.29 0.50 0.40
2008 0.45 0.51 0.43
2009 2.65 0.54 0.54
2010 2.84 0.54 0.72
2011 2.49 0.51 0.80
2012 1.99 0.58 0.86
2013 2.57 0.57 0.92
2014 1.90 0.54 0.98
2015 1.99 0.60 1.23
2016 2.29 0.63 1.38
Beverages
Year BlackRock State Street Vanguard
2007 1.07 1.38 1.14
2008 0.65 1.33 1.31
2009 2.64 1.36 1.37
2010 2.78 1.29 1.48
2011 2.41 1.51 1.36
2012 2.48 1.68 1.63
2013 2.52 1.46 1.79
2014 2.72 1.46 1.90
2015 2.73 1.38 2.21
2016 2.59 1.26 2.38
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The proportion of block-holdings in the total investments (overall investor’s portfolio) per sec-
tor by each of the ’Big Three’ is presented in Figure 5.9. These stylised facts show the prefer-
ence for intensity of investment by these top funds. Indeed, in certain sectors such as Oil&Gas,
over 40% of BlackRock’s equity holdings are of 5% or greater during the entire period anal-
ysed. This preference for intensity of investment is very sector specific; in other markets such
as Telecoms, the majority of shares held in the portfolios of each of the ’Big Three’ is smaller.
BlackRock for example, has between 60% and 80% of its equity investments in Telecoms
greater than or equal to 1%, while its remaining shares held in Telecom firms are therefore
smaller than 1%. State Street is in a reverse situation, with only just below 20% of shares in
its Telecoms portfolio being greater than or equal to 1%, and the vast majority of its share
holdings in the sector being below 1%. In this specific sector, only BlackRock holds shares
above the other thresholds. Lastly, in the Beverages Manufacturers sector, when considering
conventional levels of 5%, almost 20% of BlackRock and Vanguard’s portfolios in 2016 are
composed by block-holdings, values higher than in the others sectors with the exception of
Oil&Gas.
145
Figure 5.8: Number of block-holdings for the ’Big Three’ at different thresholds.
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Figure 5.9: Proportion of block-holdings in portfolios of ’Big Three’ at different thresholds.
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Chapter 6
Linking Common Shareholding
and Competition
The link between common shareholding and competition is related to a firm’s objective func-
tion. As noticed by Azar et al. (2018), if a firm acts in the interest of its main shareholder,
then what should be maximised is not the firm’s own value but the shareholder’s utility. With
institutional investors, this corresponds to the maximization of their portfolio value. Clearly,
firms’ profit maximization and portfolio maximization do not always coincide; in particular, an
aggressive price behaviour could benefit a firm’s own profit but reduce the value of common
shareholders’ portfolios.
To what extent common shareholders possessing small fractions of shares in many firms of the
same market are able to actually influence market outcome is still an open question. O’Brien
and Salop (2000) show that if a firm maximises its shareholders’ portfolio profits (and not its
own profit), industry markup1 is proportional to a modified Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI),
where the markup depends on the density of the network of ownership and control of the firms
in the considered market. When this is the case, higher markup should be observed in markets
with higher common shareholding (Azar et al., 2018).
Previous chapters have discussed in detail the various measures of common shareholding that
were developed for the purpose of this exercise.2 The different firm and market level indices,
aside from offering viable alternatives to the standard literature indices such as the HHI or the
modified HHI, also gave valuable insight into the structure of the five sectors considered for
the analysis, namely Oil&Gas, Electricity, Mobile Telecoms, Trading Platforms and Beverages.3
1Markup is given by (price - marginal costs)/price.
2See Chapter 2 for a general overview and Appendix B for more technical details.
3See sectoral results in Chapters 4 and 5.
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This chapter deals with the measurement, data and econometric issues arising when assess-
ing the link between common shareholding and competition. In what follows, rather than
reviewing thoroughly the research on this topic, we will briefly detail the requirements and
possible way forward for an empirical measurement of such possible effect. It is worth recall-
ing, though, that the econometric modelling still has several challenges ahead, principally the
lack of an established theory showing how common shareholding affects managers, and from
there competitive outcomes.
Section 6.1 recalls the main modelling challenges. Section 6.2 discusses measurement and
data issues related to market identification, the measurement of common shareholding and of
competitive outcomes. Section 6.3 presents and discusses different market power indicators
of competition, while Section 6.4 proposes an econometric strategy for the test of causality
between common shareholding and competition. Finally, Section 6.5 recalls the main sectoral
results, to help choose a suitable candidate industry for the econometric analysis.
6.1 Modelling the link
The first ingredient of the recipe linking competition to common shareholding is how the rela-
tionship is actually modelled.
One could look at markets where common shareholders are not present and compare them
with markets where common shareholding is observed (He and Huang, 2017). Azar (2012)
uses a panel of 210 industries to regress average industry markup on the density of common
shareholders (plus controls, including industry fixed effects). He finds a significant and pos-
itive relation between markup and within-industry density. Cross-industry comparison, while
appealing in theory, has limited utility as very different aspects - e.g. the different cost-
structures, different nature of activity, and so on - might play a crucial role in shaping causal
effects (Schmalz, 2018).
An additional difficulty in industry comparisons is the amount of data and effort needed to de-
fine market boundaries and proximity. On the other hand, the analysis of common sharehold-
ing in vertically linked markets could be worth exploring, since there common shareholding
could have a beneficial effects on markups (Azar’s results go in this direction).
Given the theoretical and empirical problems in working with many markets, the analysis of a
single market has been the choice mostly followed by the literature (Schmalz, 2018). Ideally,
to measure the effect of common shareholding within the same market one would need a
change in market conditions with the emergence of a set of common shareholders either
previously not there, or present but with different percentages of shares. One could then
analyse the pre and post margins for the whole industry - or for the affected firms - and see if
common shareholding has indeed influenced markups.
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Our data span from 2007 to 2016, and in that period we never observe the switch between
the absence and the presence of common shareholders in the EU overall and in any of the five
analysed markets.4 We observe, instead, changes in the identity of common shareholders (for
example, evidence suggests that large funds substitute banks as common shareholders of the
electricity market from 2009-2010), or in the proportion of the market assets held.
Within markets, the literature usually looks at variables such as market share or profitability of
companies with common shareholders (He and Huang, 2017, among others). Changes in prof-
its or margins are associated to common shareholding also by Azar (2012), once confounding
factors are accounted for. Notice that sharp empirical evidence for efficiency gains arising
from common shareholding is still lacking (Schmalz, 2017).
Finally, the effects of common shareholding on variables other than competition, such as in-
novation, have been also analysed (López and Vives, 2017; Antón et al., 2018; Shelegia and
Spiegel, 2017), showing that common shareholding can also be welfare improving. The link
between common shareholding and investments is explored by Gutierrez and Philippon (2017).
6.2 Measurement and data issues
No matter the model chosen, the empirical testing of the relation between common share-
holding and competition is not straightforward, due to several measurement and data issues.
Here we discuss the main points, including concerns related to the market identification and
the measurement of common shareholding. The choice of possible measures of competition
is also discussed, looking at both market power and market concentration indicators.
6.2.1 Market identification
First the definition of market boundaries. The literature has used official codes of economic
activity (NACE for Europe, NAICS, SIC for the US5) to define market boundaries. The main
issue is that this classification is not precise for all firms and markets. In Europe, NACE codes
are assigned according to the value added produced by the company and this classification is
generally quite stable in time, reflecting changes in company’s activity only with delay. This
is crucial for firms and sectors where technological progress is rapidly changing production
and products. An additional complication is the presence of large conglomerates with multiple
and very different activities (thus uncertain industrial classification) which operate in different
markets. Finally, for certain types of activities there is no correspondence to a specific code,
4See overall picture of common shareholding in the EU in Chapter 3 and sectoral results in Chapters 4 and 5.
5The codes of economic activity are referred to, respectively, as the NACE (Nomenclature générale des Activités
économiques dans les Communautés Européennes - European Classification of Economic Activities), the NAICS (North
American Industry Classification System), and the SIC (Standard Industrial Classification).
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and even looking at the main players they tend to be classified according to a variety of dif-
ferent activities. For example, in the definition of the Trading Platforms industry presented in
Chapter 4, the companies that operate the trading platforms are classified not only as devel-
oping financial services activities or administration of financial markets, but also as banking
(monetary intermediation), holding activities, business support services or even IT services.
An underestimated complication resides in the fact that the availability of NACE classifica-
tion for firms depends on national legislation. In some countries, like Denmark, firms are
given the option to indicate ’no sectoral code’ when producing their accounts and this in-
flated the number of firms for which the NACE code is not available. Other countries foresee
simplified accounting rules (without the indication of NACE) for certain categories of firms.
Non-exhaustive examples are, in France, Société en nom collectif (SNC), Affaires Personnelles,
Coopératives, Administration, Associations, GIE (groupement d’intérêt économique); in Lux-
embourg, enterprise individual, SECS (Société en commandite simple), SNC, Etablissement
public, foundation, GIE; in the Netherlands Sole Traders, Federations, Foundations and partici-
pations, which are consolidated in holdings. Two countries - UK and Cyprus - explicitly mention
exceptions to NACE declaration related to foreign controlled firms. UK grants exceptions for
NACE declaration to Unlimited, LP, Royal Charter, European Economic Interest Grouping, and
foreign companies. Cyprus grants exceptions to partnerships and business names, and to
overseas companies (branches of foreign companies) if not taxed in Cyprus.
A further issue, when dealing with data coming from different classifications (typically NACE
for Europe and NAICS or SIC for US) is that the correspondence of sectors at 4 (or even 3) digit
level is not assured. For example, in the Electricity sector the US-SIC classification presents
a rather comprehensive category of "Electric Services" (code 4911), while the NACE distin-
guishes between Production (code 3511), Transmission (3512), Distribution (3513) and Trade
(3514) of Electricity. Similar, but not identical detailed classification can be encountered in the
NAICS system, where different codes identify Electric Power Generation (22111), Electric Bulk
Power Transmission and Control (221121) and Electric Power Distribution (221122), but none
refers to trade.
6.2.2 Measures of common shareholding
An empirical testing of the link between common shareholding and competition requires us-
able variables for the measurement of both phenomena.
The literature has so far mainly recurred to the modified HHI delta as a measure of common
shareholding (HHI delta is the additional variation in concentration arising because of common
shareholding). This implies several challenges. Firstly, data challenges, with the need to have
firm-level and market-level data. Secondly, endogeneity problems (see discussion in O’Brien
and Waehrer, 2017). Finally, a logical issue also exists: common shareholding is measured with
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the MHHI, an endogenous measure of concentration that depends on common shareholding
and market share.
To solve the endogeneity problem, Azar et al. (2018) use changes in route-level prices and
the purchase of Barclays Global Investors in 2009 by BlackRock as an instrument to estimate
the impact of enhanced concentration on specific airfares. The use of prices, while extremely
appealing to measure competitive pressure, is rather challenging in practice. It requires the
identification of a homogeneous good supplied by all (most of) the companies in the market,
for which the price-company data is actually observed and collected for a sufficiently long
period to allow meaningful quantitative analysis. While standard surveys on product-market-
price data and quantities typically take years to be conducted and validated, the use of web-
scrapers to record on-line prices could constitute a possible alternative.6
Azar (2012) offers an alternative to the modified HHI, constructing a measure of density of
common shareholders in a market. Azar’s defines density as
Densty =
∑n
=1
∑
j< yj
n(n − 1)/2
where yj is equal to 1 if firms  and j are connected by a block-holder (i.e. if they have a
common shareholder holding at least 5% shares in each firm), zero otherwise. He and Huang
(2017) also offer measures of intensity of common shareholding based on the number of firms,
within a market, that are cross-held. These indicators are firm-centred in the sense that they
look at the ownership structure of firms, identifying possible shareholders’ overlaps with their
competitors. On the other hand, additional owner-oriented common shareholding indicators
have been developed in Chapter 2 (and applied to the EU in Chapters 3-5), adding a new
dimension to the measurement of the phenomenon. The new indices analyse the portfolio
structure of investors, and the overlap between investment strategies of different owners
active in a given market, highlighting whether the common shareholders tend to target the
same companies or rather split the market into selected ownership subsets.
Another (unavoidable) limitation of all the analyses of common shareholding resides in the use
of shares to infer control. The percentage of the shares held is only an imperfect substitute for
the control exercised, when e.g. dual-class share or golden shares are present. Data issues
complicate this point. To the best of our knowledge, no firm-level data (not Orbis, nor Dun &
Bradstreet7 or Compustat8 for listed firms) distinguish explicitly shareholders in terms of the
type of shares they hold. Therefore, we are obliged to assume a 1:1 correspondence between
control rights and percentage of shares.9
6An example of web scrapers to infer prices is The billion prices project (http://www.thebillionpricesproject.
com/our-research/). Notice that the Commission developed a tool, the European media monitor (EMM - https://ec.
europa.eu/jrc/en/scientific-tool/europe-media-monitor-newsbrief), that could be adapted to the purpose.
EMM scrapes the web in 70 languages according to given keywords and runs sentiment analysis in 14 languages.
7See https://www.dnb.com/
8See https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/campaigns/i-need-data-to-make-informed-decisions
9An additional issue with papers using US data (e.g. all the papers by Azar and Schmalz) is that they rely on data
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Schmalz (2018) suggests associating also the number of board seats to the percentage of
shareholding. Orbis contains information on board members obtained from balance sheet
data, hence with a delay of about 2 years, but does not contain information on which com-
pany/shareholder each board member represents. The dataset BoardEx10 contains updated
biographical information on board members and senior executives for about 1.7 million com-
panies around the world, but it requires manual matching of companies when it is used in
tandem with financial statements from Orbis (or from other datasets).
6.2.3 Measures of competition
A third challenge is the measurement of competition. Structural forces at play in the global
economy, including the ICT revolution, globalization, and delocalisation of supply chains, are
uprooting industrial organization in many countries. Policymakers, and for this purpose those
worried about consumer welfare, need to adjust their policy objectives to capture the new
possible anticompetitive effects resulting from these changes. For these reasons, it is crucial
to choose an appropriate measure of competition. In order to establish a causal relationship
between common shareholding and competition, the options explored include measures of
market power or market concentration, as well as considering directly the effect on prices.
Prices remain the preferred indicator for changes in competitive forces on the market, however
obtaining data on prices at the required level of specificity is still a challenge.
The literature on common shareholding offers two possibilities, either a measure of market
power or a measure of market concentration. Market power refers to the ability of a company
to raise and maintain the price above the level that would prevail under perfect competition
(see OECD, 1993). The indicator mostly used in practical measures is the Lerner index based
on industry markup, i.e. the wedge between prices and marginal costs. As neither prices nor
marginal costs are actually observed in firm-level data, the Lerner index is approximated by a
profitability index either based on the difference between sales and variable costs or the differ-
ence between operating profits and financial costs, to account for fixed costs (for a summary
of the measures see Santos et al., 2018). Still, this approach has pros and cons. The major
limitation is that it is based on average costs rather than on costs at the margin. The advan-
tage is that they can be calculated using standard accounting data. Although not perfect, the
Orbis dataset remains the best possible option for an empirical analysis when accompanied by
a correct definition of the reference market and its main players. Orbis variables from balance
sheet and profit-loss accounts are widely used in the literature to approximate markups and
are good candidates for empirical testing.11
coming from the 13F filings (a quarterly report filed by institutional managers to the Security Exchange Commission),
thus limited to equity assets under management of at least 100 million US$ in value. Azar et al. (2018) complement
these data with hand-collected non-institutional ownership data for owners with a stake above 5% of outstanding
shares.
10See http://corp.boardex.com/data/
11See Appendix A, and specifically definitions of available balance sheet and profit&loss account variables in Tables
154
Market concentration relates to the idea that a limited number of players may implicitly
control the market, while a larger number of players is likely to increase the competitive pres-
sure on competitors. The HHI is the common measure of concentration used in the literature
(Hallak and Rosati, 2018), as it computes the relative size of a firm in an industry in terms of
the proportion of total output (see OECD, 1993, and OECD, 2012). Sales are generally used as
a proxy of firms’ economic activity, as they are a standard measure in product market strength
literature and are less subject to manipulation than reported earnings (He and Huang, 2017).
A major empirical shortcoming of both approaches is related to the use of accounting data from
consolidated (versus unconsolidated) accounts. Consolidated sales refer to the entire activity
of the company, regardless of the sector in which it is undertaken. Apportioning sales/value
added to sectors is not an easy task and is subject to ad hoc assumptions. An additional short-
coming of using consolidated accounts is that even if one assumed that a company is active
in a single sector, multinational firms will report all international sales within a single consol-
idated account; this is likely to artificially inflate the share of multinational firms if compared
to the shares of domestic ones.
As the typology of balance sheet produced (unconsolidated vs consolidated) depends on legal
requirements (hence also on national legislation), in some cases consolidated balance sheet
is the only available option within firm-level datasets. To the best of our knowledge, only
Euromonitor12 apportions consolidated balance sheets among markets/sectors. They calcu-
late for each firm ad hoc sectoral and country specific weights, which allow redistribution of
the consolidated figures to specific industries and local (national) markets where the firm is
active. We run some consistency checks with Orbis for markets/countries where both consol-
idated and unconsolidated accounts were available; however, we found that the Euromonitor
market/country apportioning based on imputed weights applied to consolidated account fig-
ures did not match in general the "true" values given by unconsolidated accounts. In all cases
analysed the Euromonitor estimation was conservative, and produced imputed values well
above actual unconsolidated values. We could not dig further into the reasons of this differ-
ence. Euromonitor imputation procedure is not replicable, as it is based on non-disclosed,
purpose-built, firm-specific weights.
Orbis database allows differentiating between consolidated and unconsolidated accounts, and
accounting for ownership. By using as much as possible unconsolidated country-level firms’
accounts, we are able to be more precise in sector and geographic area.13 Furthermore, we
avoid inflating the data with international sales or sales of the group in other markets. When-
ever unconsolidated accounts are not available, we consider consolidated accounts without
apportioning sales or assets to single markets to avoid ad hoc assumptions.14
A.8 and A.9.
12See https://www.euromonitor.com
13See Hallak and Rosati (2018) and discussion therein.
14Notice that in the case of the listed firms included in the initial database, most of the accounts (70%) are con-
solidated (see Section A.5 in Appendix A for further details). In the case of the unlisted firms - added manually to
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6.3 Markup
Through a survey of the relevant literature and a recap of the main terminology, we discuss
more in detail the potential indicators for competition, in particular linking them to the im-
portance of new policy objectives. We focus mainly on the firm markup, and present the
methodology for how it is calculated.15
Over the past 20 years, economies in the Western world have seen major structural shifts
driven by the rapid diffusion of ICT, the globalization of supply chains, or the delocalization
of production, for example. These forces are responsible for market outcomes that now com-
mand attention from academics and policymakers alike. No market trend, however, has gar-
nered as much attention in recent years as the apparent increase in industry concentration
and the corresponding decline in competition. Both U.S and European antitrust authorities -
arguably the two most influential entities of their kind in the world - have brought (or begun)
in recent years antitrust actions against major market players such as Google, Facebook, or
Amazon.
The evidence seems to back up the claims of the authorities. Reports by the OECD (2018)
find that markups and profits, especially in the U.S, have increased globally. Others such as
Gutiérrez and Philippon (2017), Baqaee and Farh (2020), and Diez et al. (2019) have found
similar results. This last work calculates that global markups have increased by 6% between
2000 and 2015, driven by high-markup firms in advanced countries. Again, De Loecker et
al. (2020) report similar findings, where the upper tail of the distribution drives increasing
markups in the U.S. There is therefore consensus in the literature on the evolution of industry
concentration, but less so when it comes to concentration and its effects on competition for
a specific market within an industry. The authors mentioned above, alongside others such as
Gutiérrez and Philippon (2018), conclude that, while competition has declined in the U.S, the
trend in Europe is less evident. Because of the structural changes mentioned above, observed
changes such as increasing industry concentration do not necessarily lead to greater market
concentration, and hence lower competition. Properly assessing the economic outcomes due
to changes in common shareholding requires that the policymaker focuses instead on more
specific indicators such as prices, profits, or markups (OECD, 2018).
In Europe, Weche and Wambach (2018) have also observed increasing markups in the years
after the financial crisis of 2007. The distinguishing factor is that the authors observed increas-
ing markups along the entire distribution - as opposed to the U.S, where the large firms with
higher markups gained more market share. The results also showed heterogeneity among
European countries, with some experiencing this increase in markups more than others.
These stylised facts could be indicators of anticompetitive behaviour going on in the market.
integrate the definition of the five industries - the large majority of accounts are unconsolidated.
15Concentration measures are not explored further for being at market rather than at firm level.
156
Several authors, such as Kwoka (2013) and Blonigen and Pierce (2016), have shown that ar-
rangements like mergers, which result in increased market concentration, are correlated to
increasing markups or declining competition. It is therefore possible that through these merg-
ers or other similar agreements, firms are extending their market power with anticompetitive
behavior or conduct. This includes not only price setting, but also rent-seeking behaviour
through intense lobbying for regulatory protection or favoritism. Even where anticompetitive
mergers are not observed, increasing markups should still be of concern to policymakers. As
outlined before, structural changes are weakening the link between concentration and higher
profits. For example, superstar firms such as Google or Facebook operate in sectors with ex-
ceptionally low marginal costs with respect to their revenue, something seen among all new
emerging digital firms. Based on this, evidence suggests that regulatory agencies should be
less focused on market shares or concentrations in their decisions, but should instead pay
attention to how markups are evolving, and whether they increase the incentive or ability to
exclude rivals.
6.3.1 Calculation of markup
The theoretical and applied literature has developed different methodologies for computing
markup both at microeconomic, and at sectoral/macroeconomic level. Estimating markups is
generally not straightforward, as some of the variables entering theoretical formulas are not
directly observable.
The literature presents four main methods that can be applied in the empirical analysis to
compute markups. The first is the basic approach that starts from the assumption of constant
short-run marginal cost (Tybout, 2003). An alternative method by Hall (1988) is also largely
used in the literature, even though its implementation is not always feasible with standard
datasets, as it requires the availability of appropriate instrumental variables. Some of the
difficulties associated to this method are solved by Roeger (1995), who develops a methodol-
ogy that allows the computation of markups with a minimal set of variables. More recently, a
robust methodology for computing firm-level markups has been proposed by De Loecker and
Warzynski (2012), the main advantage being that it does not require the estimation of the
user cost of capital.
As a first step of the analysis, we use a rather standard approach to compute markups of
individual firms, following Tybout (2003). We define markup as the ratio between output price
(p) and marginal cost (c), that is:
μ =
p
c
=
η
η − 1
(6.1)
where η is the elasticity of demand faced by the firm.
From equation (6.1), it follows that computing markups requires the knowledge of prices and
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marginal costs, which generally are not observable. Therefore, many methodologies have
been developed to infer markups indirectly. The most common approach is based on the
price-cost margin (PCM), and it assumes that marginal unitary costs do not depend on the
level of output. Under this assumption, we have:
μ − 1
μ
= PCM =
pq − cq
pq
(6.2)
where q is the physical output. In order to estimate markups, it suffices to dispose of data
on sales (pq), and costs (cq) both at current prices, where all the economic costs have to be
included in the computation, including the user cost of capital.
In detail, once the costs associated to capital are taken into account, the price-cost margin of
firm  at date t - and thus the markup - can be estimated as follows:
PCMt =
πt
pt qt
+
(rt + δ) kt
pt qt
(6.3)
where πt is the profit of firm  at date t, rt is the interest rate at date t, δ is the depreciation
rate of capital, and kt is the stock of capital of firm  at time t. This computation is relatively
straightforward within the ORBIS dataset. Indeed, the database includes firm-level data on
the revenues ptqt, and on the costs associated to labour and intermediate inputs, which
determine the level of current profit πt. Moreover, ORBIS reports the stock of tangible assets
kt. The only elements missing in the computation are the interest rate and the depreciation
rate of capital, which can be obtained from other statistical sources.
The interest rate can be computed as the difference between the nominal interest rate and
the inflation rate, to get a proxy of the real ex-ante interest rate. The series are available, for
example, from the Statistical Data Warehouse of the European Central Bank. With regards to
the depreciation rate, Konigs and Vandenbussche (2005) assume a fixed parameter, and find
that their results are not significantly affected by its value.
Applying equation (6.3), it is possible thus to estimate the markup level of each firm included
in the ORBIS dataset year by year, provided data on the four key variables are available: sales
(TURN), cost of labour (STAF), cost of intermediate inputs (MATE) and stock of assets (TFAS).
Tables A.8 and A.9 in Appendix A report the detailed definition of these variables, as well as of
other main financial variables present in the Orbis dataset.
6.3.2 Lerner index
An alternative measure of markets’ competition, largely used in the literature (see, among
others, Aghion et al., 2005; Grullon et al., 2019; and Gutiérrez and Philippon, 2017) is given
by the Lerner index. This index is in practice a monotone transformation of the markup, the
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main difference being the expression of their respective formulas, which allow their calculation
starting from different items of the balance sheet and profit & loss account. The Lerner Index
was formalised by Abba Lerner in 1934, and is defined as follows:
L =
P − MC
P
(6.4)
where P are prices and MC are marginal costs for a given firm. The indicator varies from zero to
one, with zero being the situation of perfect competition in which prices are equal to marginal
costs.
The interpretation of the two alternative measures is the following: while the markup gives the
percentage amount for which prices exceed marginal costs (and should be equal to one under
perfect competition), the Lerner Index is a normalised measure that varies between zero and
one. The value zero - as mentioned above - represents the case of perfect competition, while
the index takes value one in the extreme situation where the monopolist faces zero marginal
costs and it is able to charge a positive price. In this sense, the Lerner index is a measure of
how much the discretion in firm’s price setting is far away from the social optimum.16
Nevertheless, as for the markup, prices and marginal costs are not observable. Hence, to
overcome this problem, it is possible to compute the index at firm level as the ratio between
the earnings before interests and taxes (EBT) and the amount of sales (TURN).17 While this
indicator can be considered as a good proxy of the firms’ market power, it does not contain the
cost of capital,18 which can be subtracted from the EBT to obtain a more realistic measure of
markets’ competition.
6.4 Econometric approach
Building on the previous discussion, the purpose of this Section is to propose a model at
the sector level that shows the causal relationship of common shareholding on competitive
outcomes. The most straightforward way is by leveraging exogenous events that occur in
the market that affect the degree of common shareholding. However, as commented earlier,
there are no clear occurrences where the market passes from an absence to a presence of
common shareholding in the period under observation (2007-2016). In fact, the phenomenon
of common shareholding in this period is already quite widespread across the EU, and its
intensity is rather stable throughout the period.19 On the other hand, as mentioned earlier,
we observe substitutions among the classes of common shareholders, as funds tend to replace
16See Lerner (1934).
17For detailed definition of these and other variables, see Tables A.8 and A.9 in Appendix A.
18A comprehensive review of the main strengths and weaknesses in using the Lerner Index as a measure of com-
petitiveness is provided by Elzinga et al. (2011).
19See overall picture of common shareholding in the EU in Chapter 3.
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banks along the observation period, especially driven by the merger between BlackRock and
BGI.
We recall also that, with the data at hand, cross-industry regressions are not suitable for es-
tablishing a causal link between common shareholding and competitive outcomes, since there
are too many sectoral differentiating factors that are difficult to control for. The analyses of the
previous Chapters will help choose one of such sectors for the application of the econometric
analysis.
Keeping these issues in mind, a possible sectoral model can be built on the large literature
that uses the Difference-in-Differences (DiD) method to investigate the net impact of a pol-
icy/programme on given outcomes. The standard case for applying the DiD is when a change
in regulation/law (treatment) affects only a group of units (the treated units) and there is an-
other group (the control) which is similar in all respects but is not affected by the policy. Both
groups are observed over a period of time which includes the year of the adoption of the policy.
Then, it is natural to measure the policy effect by comparing the change in the mean outcome
of the treated cases with the change in the mean outcome for the untreated. This approach
can, under some conditions, identify the causal effect of the policy on the outcome of interest.
In this specific case, there is no clear shock affecting common shareholding, namely neither
a regulation, nor an intervention that has affected common shareholding at the European
level in the period of observation. As a consequence, it is also not straightforward to identify
possible treated and control units.
Hence, to overcome these issues, and in order to induce a sort of "exogenous" variation in
the common shareholding, we exploit the decision of BlackRock to acquire Barclays Global
Investors (BGI) in 2009. The presence of this merger event not only allows a pre and a post
period to be defined, but also permits the identification of treated and control groups. That is,
we can create a measure of a firm’s exposure to the merger event based on their dependency
on BlackRock and BGI before the merger. The intuition being that the more a firm was held by
BlackRock and/or BGI, the more a firm is expected to be "exposed" to the merger and, hence,
the higher the impact. Of course, firms that did not have any relations with BlackRock and/or
BGI would not be directly affected by the merger, and hence would act as control units.
The simplest exposure indicator can be a dummy variable assessing whether a firm was part
of BlackRock or BGI portfolios before the merger. A more sophisticated indicator, measuring
different degrees of exposure, is given by the relative share held by BlackRock and BGI in
each firm. It follows that the impact of common shareholding is estimated, under the two
alternative exposure indicators, by comparing changes in the markup of firms (more) exposed
to the merger to those that are not (less) affected, before and after the merger.
Markup can be influenced by country-specific macroeconomic shocks, such as changes in
institutional setting and/or consumer tastes. However, financial variables are in general not
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country-specific,20 so they do not allow to account for country effects. Similarly, heterogeneity
of the products in a given sector cannot be captured by a firm’s aggregate balance sheet,
hence product-specific unobserved effects cannot be factored in.
An alternative solution would be relying on product-level data on consumption (prices and
quantities) in each country. This data can then be linked to firms, providing information on the
average quantities and prices of the products sold by each firm in each country. In this case,
the analysis would be based on the measure of exposure and its interaction with the average
quantities sold, so as to capture the relative weight of each firm in the market. Moreover, this
type of data would allow to add other combinations of fixed effects to eliminate any remaining
source of bias due to correlation between unobserved factors that are constant over time
(firms, products, country and year fixed effects) and our exposure variable.
Several options for price data for the five sectors were investigated, unfortunately with no
success. In some cases there was an additional challenge related to the identification of a
“product” itself (e.g. in the Trading Platforms case), and hence the definition of a possible
price. In other cases, wholesale prices could have been retrieved (e.g. in Electricity markets),
but not retail prices, which are those more likely to be affected in case of harmed market com-
petition. For the Beverages sector, where a product was more easily identified, unfortunately
product-level data covering the pre- and post-merger periods were not available, at the time
of the study.21 For these reasons, the empirical analysis is kept at the firm level.
6.5 Candidate sectors for the econometric analysis
Five sectoral studies have been reported in Chapter 4, analysing respectively the Oil&Gas,
Electricity, Mobile Telecoms, Trading Platforms and Beverages industries. Specifically, results
on market definition and shareholding structure were presented, with a detailed identification
of main corporations and top investors, with respective portfolio information. Special attention
has been devoted to minority shareholders and their role as block-holders, in particular to the
so-called ’Big Three’, the largest US-based funds BlackRock, State Street and Vanguard; the
analyses looked at their portfolios, at trends of investment ’intensity’ (amount of shares held
in firms in portfolio), as well as changes in portfolio size and number of block-holdings. Evi-
dence on the interconnections within each market has been investigated looking at a series of
common shareholding indices based on firm-shareholder relations; moreover, the networks of
firms and shareholders have been studied separately, identifying the presence and strength of
links between firms (induced by common shareholders), and connections across shareholders
(due to partially overlapping portfolios). Lastly, a comparative analysis of some of the indices
20See discussion about consolidated vs unconsolidated financial accounts in Section 6.2.3.
21Two major provider of product-level data have been consulted, namely Euromonitor and EuroPanel, but neither
had data available as back as 2007 for EU markets.
161
above has been presented for all the sectors in Chapter 5, with the assessment of the effect
of holding thresholds on the chosen indices.
The objective of this section is to analyse various ownership patterns in the five sectors, in or-
der to identify suitable variation in the common shareholding indicators that can help capture
the possible effects on competition. Besides the relevant earlier findings on the five sectors,
here we discuss two new types of variations of ownership that can be of particular value in the
development of the econometric analysis. First, evidence is presented on the BlackRock-BGI
merger in 2009, accompanied by the contemporaneous analysis of the investment behaviour
of close players, namely State Street, Vanguard and Barclays PLC. Second, additional sig-
nificant ownership changes between investors in the period of observation are considered,
looking at both increase and decrease in participation of top investors in ’secondary’ investors
- which can be likely targets of M&As strategy from the large institutional investors.
6.5.1 The ’Big Three’ and the BlackRock-BGI merger
The overall results from the sectoral analyses do not show a very specific trend over the pe-
riod of observation. As already commented earlier, at first sight this seems to signal a lack
of dynamics in the ownership structure of the sectors. However, looking at a selection of top
investors, the sectoral studies revealed that, while the top values of common shareholding in-
dicators were stable in the last decade, a change in the identity of the main players took place.
In particular, it was witnessed the rising of the large investment funds and a contemporaneous
drop in the participation of banks and insurance companies.22
In Chapter 5 additional indices have been computed for the ’Big Three’ (BlackRock, State
Street and Vanguard), looking at both their market shares (in terms of Total Assets and Market
Capitalisation) and the intensity of their investments (number of block-holdings). Here such
indices are recalled for all five sectors, while analogous figures are shown also for Barclays
Global Investors (BGI) and Barclays PLC. The reason why these two investors are added is to
monitor the effect of the 2009 merger of BlackRock with BGI, which is the largest ’substitution’
event between funds and banks. This event had unprecedented proportions in the history of
mergers between asset management funds, and has therefore played a crucial role in shaping
the various studies on common shareholding.
The BlackRock acquisition of Barclays Global Investors was announced 10 years ago to date,
propelling the asset management fund to the top of global rankings, ahead of its competitors
such as State Street and Fidelity Investments. It created what was at the time a behemoth of
almost $3 trillion in assets, in what was just the latest in a series of acquisitions beginning with
Merrill Lynch Investment Management. The sheer magnitude and speed at which BlackRock
22See in Chapter 4 the specific sections analysing the common shareholding indices for top investors, where evi-
dence of this substitution effects between funds and banks is reported.
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expanded has made it an interesting case study as well as instrument in impact evaluation
models. Often these acquisitions do not occur independently of other events. In fact, the
sale of BGI to BlackRock by Barclays was used to finance the acquisition of Lehman Brother’s
assets. In the meanwhile, BlackRock has grown to be the largest asset management fund in
the world, and has gone from being a primarily fixed income business to a diversified business
with interests in exchange traded funds, government consulting, and even a provider of risk
and operations platforms for others in the industry.
The effects of the BlackRock-BGI merger are clearly visible in the databases of the five sectors.
For the sake of comparison, Figure 6.1 presents the number of block-holdings at minimum 1%
of participation in the portfolio of the ’Big Three’ and of both BGI and Barclays PLC. The reason
why Barclays PLC is also object of this investigation is because BGI has few links to the firms
in each sector, while most of the participation of the group appears through Barclays PLC.
Table 6.1 compares the average participation shares in the portfolios of BlackRock and Bar-
clays PLC,23 while Figure 6.2 reports the total market shares held jointly by BlackRock, State
Street and Vanguard against the Barclays/BGI joint market shares. Market shares are based
on the Total Assets or Market Capitalisation24 of the firms in each portfolio, weighted by the
respective participation shares. At the time of the merger, all dimensions - the number of firms
in portfolio, the intensity of the participation and the market shares - dropped dramatically for
BGI/Barclays PLC.
Table 6.1: Average participation shares in investors’ portfolios. Results for Barclays PLC (BARC) and
BlackRock (BR), by market and year.
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Oil&Gas BARC 3.02 2.96 1.79 1.38 0.85 0.80 0.52 0.48 0.55 0.65
BR 0.96 0.82 3.97 3.85 3.52 3.32 3.43 3.51 3.54 3.91
Electricity BARC 1.75 1.63 1.39 1.14 0.82 0.81 0.85 0.75 1.08 1.07
BR 1.05 1.03 2.55 2.24 2.10 1.90 2.06 2.31 2.32 2.40
Stock Mkts BARC 2.16 1.89 1.37 1.59 1.37 1.41 0.26 0.28 0.77 0.23
BR 0.61 0.73 2.44 2.95 2.69 2.46 3.54 2.76 3.17 3.46
Telecoms BARC 1.51 1.54 1.08 1.50 0.47 0.43 1.29 1.25 1.19 1.39
BR 0.29 0.45 2.65 2.84 2.49 1.99 2.57 1.90 1.99 2.29
Beverages BARC 2.68 2.10 1.70 1.44 0.85 0.62 0.66 0.71 0.63 0.67
BR 1.07 0.65 2.64 2.78 2.41 2.48 2.52 2.72 2.73 2.59
23Analogous figures for State Street and Vanguard have already been presented in Table 5.2 in the previous Chapter.
As for BGI, the ownership of this fund is often reported under Barclays PLC, hence its specific information is rather
limited.
24For listed firms only.
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Figure 6.1: Number of block-holdings for the ’Big Three’ (top) and Barclays/BGI (bottom) at 1% level.
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Figure 6.2: Total market shares held jointly by BlackRock, State Street and Vanguard vs Barclays/BGI
joint market shares.
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6.5.2 Ownership changes between primary and secondary investors
Given that the BlackRock-BGI merger represented a once-in-a-lifetime event, we investigated
the possible existence of other minor changes in ownership at the investors’ level, which in
turn may have provoked a relevant change in the degree of common shareholding of the firms
active in each sector.
In each of the five markets, besides the usual set of top global investors,25 a second group
of relevant shareholders holding slightly smaller portfolios has been identified; this second
group of investors represents a possible target of M&A from the largest investors, therefore
being likely candidates of changes in ownership events. Overall, the patterns of ownership
changes are similar to those already seen in the discussion specific to the ’Big Three’ and the
BlackRock-BGI merger. In almost every sector there is a sharp increase in ownership jumps of
BlackRock in the sector, driven by its acquisition of BGI, and in turn a sharp sell-off on behalf
of Barclays as they sell their division. By far these ownership jumps are the most significant in
each sector.
25See Chapter 3.
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This evidence is in line with the results of a similar investigation presented in Massa et al.
(2018), where a series of asset management mergers is considered besides the BlackRock-
BGI case. The authors comment that “While these other mergers are considerably smaller in
magnitude and scale, the analysis is helpful for at least two reasons. First, it clarifies to what
extent the results from the BlackRock-BGI merger generalise to a broader setting. Second, it
addresses any residual concern that the results we document are impacted by the financial
crisis of 2008, the subsequent market recovery that took place during the BlackRock-BGI
merger period, or any long-term trends around that time.” Their empirical analysis finds that
the statistical and economic significance of the effects of these minor mergers is “an order of
magnitude smaller” than that of the BlackRock-BGI event. The authors argue that “this was to
be expected, as no other merger led to the same increase in ownership concentration.”
For these reasons, no other ownership changes between investors are pursued further, con-
centrating our econometric analysis on the BlackRock-BGI merger. The selection procedure of
the ’secondary top investors’ is reported in Appendix D, together with an investigation of own-
ership changes between primary and secondary investors during the period of observation.
6.5.3 Towards an application
This Chapter analysed several features of a possible causal model linking common sharehold-
ing and competition, and considered specific aspects of the five sectors, with the purpose of
assessing their suitability as candidates for the econometric analysis.
The overall picture of ownership and common shareholding indicators is rather similar across
sectors. The evidence of the BlackRock-BGI merger is also strongly present in all considered
industries, which were all equally affected. Hence, the choice of the sector for the application
of the econometric model is based rather on an overall interest, than on empirical grounds.
The food sector has been the object of much competition concern in the past decade, having
seen many Commission initiatives investigating the food supply chain. Therefore, it seemed
interesting to investigate further the Beverages sector. The next Chapter presents the applica-
tion of the causal model to the industry of Beverages manufacturers. Section 7.1 describes in
detail this market, and the various aspects which led to its choice for the econometric analysis.
The empirical results are then reported, together with a series of robustness checks.
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Chapter 7
Effects of the BlackRock-BGI
Merger on Beverages
Manufacturers
The merger between BlackRock and Barclays Global Investors (BGI) in 2009 generated an
unprecedented shock in ownership of large corporations worldwide, having exogenously in-
creased common shareholding of competitors across several industries. The effect of the
merger on airlines has been analysed in the reference study of Azar et al. (2018), which
generated a lively discussion and a number of additional studies in response.1 This series
of research, based on US data, has raised several antitrust concerns related to the potential
distortion introduced by common shareholding. The present analysis falls within the above
framework, providing one of the first attempts at assessing the possible anticompetitive ef-
fects of common shareholding in the EU.
To date, there are very few studies looking at common shareholding in Europe. Seldeslacht
et al. (2017) present an overview of ownership of German companies, in particular looking
at the presence of institutional investors and of their growing role in selected industries, both
in terms of value held and of number of block-holdings. Recent reports by the Monopolies
Commission (2018) and by the European Parliament (2020) investigate the extent of common
shareholding in Europe, however their investigation is limited in scope to specific geographic
areas or industries, and is kept at a descriptive level.2 Pagliari and Graham (2019) propose the
analysis of a counter-shock in ownership, i.e. the case of two commonly held airports whose
ownership was separated; the authors provide evidence on how this change in ownership
has affected the competition between the two airports, in terms of traffic, charges, prices,
1See, for example, the literature cited in the Introduction to the report.
2See more details in Chapter 1.
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strategy, and other performance indicators. However, no market-level impact of the split in
ownership can be gauged from this analysis.
Furthermore, all above studies remain at a descriptive level, and do not propose an econo-
metric model for the measurement of potential causality between common shareholding and
competition. Therefore, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first investigation of such
potential antitrust effect based on firm-level data in the EU. The chosen industry for the anal-
ysis is the Beverages sector, constituted by the manufacturers of soft drinks, mineral waters,
juices and beers active in the EU between 2007 and 2016.
Section 7.1 describes in detail the Beverages market, and the reasons behind its choice for the
econometric analysis. Section 7.2 presents the main econometric model chosen to investigate
causality between common shareholding and competition. Section 7.3 illustrates the main
variables (outcomes and treatments), and the firm-level controls used in the analysis. Section
7.4 discusses the availability of the required variables in the observed sample, highlighting
some structural limitations. Section 7.5 presents and discusses the main empirical results,
while Section 7.6 reports alternative specifications used to test the robustness of the main
model. The presence of heterogeneous effects is investigated in Section 7.7, and Section
7.8 reports some final remarks. Appendix D includes some complements to the econometric
analysis.
7.1 The Beverages manufacturing industry
The monitoring of the food sector has raised several competition concerns in the past decade,
with a number of actions taken towards antitrust enforcement in this area. The European
Commission launched several initiatives to investigate the food supply chain. Some of the
main points are summarised below; for further details please refer to Schmidt (2013), Cassels
and Whiddingtion (2012), Collinson and Woodward-Carlton (2012) and European Commission
press release (2018).
Starting as back as 2008, we witness the publication of the communication "Tackling the Chal-
lenge of Rising Food Prices" in May,3 followed in December by the interim report "Food Prices
in Europe".4 In the same year the High Level Group on the Agro-Food Industry was formed,
whose first findings gave basis for the Communication "A Better Functioning Food Supply Chain
in Europe" in October 2009,5 accompanied by the "Staff Working Document on Competition in
the Food Supply Chain" issued by DG COMP.6
3Commission Communication on "Tackling the challenge of rising food prices - Directions for EU action", COM (2008)
321, May 20, 2008.
4Commission Communication on "Food Prices in Europe", COM (2008) 821, December 9, 2008.
5Commission Communication "A better functioning food supply chain in Europe", COM(2009) 591, October 28, 2009
6Commission Staff Working Document, "Competition in the food supply chain", accompanying document to the
Communication "A better functioning food supply chain in Europe", October 28, 2009
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In 2010 the High Level Forum for a Better Functioning Food Supply Chain was set up; within
the Forum, the "Business to Business (B2B) Platform" proposed in 2011 and 2013 principles of
good practice in B2B relationships in the whole food supply chain.7,8 In January 2012 a Task
Force was established within DG COMP to oversee competition within the food sector.
In May 2012 the European Competition Network publishes the "Report on competition law en-
forcement and market monitoring activities by European competition authorities in the food
sector", a compilation of contributions from national competition authorities of the EU and
DG COMP, describing antitrust investigations for the period 2004-2011. The following years
(2012-2017) are covered in the recently released report "The application of the Union compe-
tition rules to the agricultural sector" (October 2018), accompanied by the Commission Staff
Working Document with additional information on the investigations.
In 2012 DG COMP commissioned a study on the economic impact of modern retail on choice
and innovation in the EU food sector. The study was conducted between May 2013 and
September 2014 by EY, together with Arcadia International and Cambridge Econometrics. The
results were published by the Commission in the "modern retail study" in 2014 (see EC, 2104),
highlighting the presence and power of large retailers, with growing concentration. Their role
in the food supply chain, and their interplay with the other parts of the chain, are discussed in
Chauve et al. (2014) and Chauve and Renkens (2015), where several competition issues are
analysed. In particular, the authors suggest that "innovation is more likely to be hampered by
highly concentrated food manufacturers than by powerful retailers" , and that "the spotlight
of competition enforcement is on retailers but the processing and manufacturing part of the
chain is the largest source of antitrust cases", pointing to the need of more attention on the
manufacturing part of the food supply chain.
The present analysis focuses precisely on manufacturers and their ownership structure, look-
ing at both common and cross-ownership. Within the broader food sector, the study inves-
tigates the Beverages industry, more specifically looking at manufacturers of Soft Drinks,
Bottled Waters, Juices and Beers, active in the EU territory. In the soft drinks category all
carbonated (cola and non-cola) drinks are included, as well as sports drinks and energy drinks.
The brewery industry has been included given its role as potential entry point in the soft drinks
market. Manufacturers of other alcoholic drinks such as wine or spirits are not object of the
present investigation. The wholesalers of Beverages have also been excluded, being active at
a different level of the supply chain.
The choice of the Beverages industry within the food sector has been based on the consider-
ation of several aspects, in cooperation with DG COMP. On the one hand the market is very
dynamic - the entry into the segment is technically rather straightforward (although strong
7Core Members of B2B Platform: “Vertical relationships in the Food Supply Chain: Principles of Good Practice”,
November 29, 2011.
8B2B Platform (industry and retailers without farmers): “Framework for the implementation and enforcement of the
principles of good practice in vertical relations in the food supply chain”, January 25, 2013.
169
brands are present) - and has experienced several changes during 2007-2016: the share of
bottled waters has been increasing over total consumption, with a gradual uptake of flavoured
and sweetened waters; changes in consumers’ preferences are visible in growth of consump-
tion of smoothies and juices, with a clear consumers’ trend toward healthier food/drinks; the
popularity of energy drinks largely increased;9 changes in regulation about beverages (e.g.
"sugar tax") or related issues such as packaging materials and food information took place
during the period of observation.10
On the other hand, looking at concentration and common shareholding structures,11 several
points are of interest in this industry, among which the following: there is very high market
concentration, with the top three soft drinks champions (CocaCola, Pepsico and Mondelez)
covering the main part of world market in soda; the top players present major common share-
holding by institutional investors; there are quite significant changes, both in relative and in
absolute terms, in the shares owned by key institutional shareholders, such as BlackRock and
Vanguard, in the period of observation; cross-ownership is also widely present, due to several
large corporate groups; there are many companies active in the EU, but registered outside,
with a strong foreign ownership structure; and, finally, common shareholding is also present
where manufacturing of soft drinks is a secondary activity (e.g. Danone).
The "intensity" of investments is also quite high in this industry, with the average participation
shares in all investors’ portfolios growing over time during the decade of observation. In 2016,
the top 10% of investors held on average stakes of about 7% or more in the firms in their
portfolios. This is in line with the presence of large corporate group, where the participation
level in the subsidiaries is very high. Even the investments of the ’Big Three’ (BlackRock, State
Street and Vanguard) reach high and increasing levels, with BlackRock and Vanguard holding
in 2016 stakes of 5% or more in about one fifth of firms in their EU Beverages portfolio. The
joint market share of the ’Big Three’ also increases steadily over time, in 2016 amounting to
more than 5% of the industry’s Total Assets.
Overall, the proximity of portfolios among institutional investors is very high, giving rise to
strong interconnections between shareholders. At the same time, most of the firms are linked
through common shareholders that invest intensely in them, about 45% of firms being cross-
held by block-holders with minimum 5% stakes, steadily through the whole period of observa-
tion.
9"Globally, the energy drink industry has gone from a $3.8-billion business in 1999, to a $27.5-billion business" in
2013. Source: Euromonitor as cited in Ferdman (2014).
10For example: Commission Regulation (EC) No 282/2008 on recycled plastic materials and articles intended to come
into contact with foodstuffs; Directive 2009/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 June 2009 on
the exploitation and marketing of natural mineral waters; Commission Regulation (EU) No 115/2010 laying down the
conditions for use of activated alumina for the removal of fluoride from natural mineral waters and spring waters;
Regulation (EU) No 1169/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on the provision of
food information to consumers (e.g. the mandatory nutrition declaration).
11See dedicated sectoral analysis in Chapter 4.
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7.1.1 Data description
The set of firms investigated in the present study has been identified following an ad-hoc pro-
cess that benefitted from crucial input from DG COMP.12 The selected period of analysis is
dictated by data availability: all firms’ information - regarding their ownership, financial per-
formance, area of activity, and other characteristics - is extracted from the Orbis commercial
database provided by Bureau van Dijk, covering the period 2007-2016. The main features of
the dataset are recalled below.
The set of manufacturers in the Beverages market relevant for the present analysis is com-
posed by all listed firms active13 in the EU between 2007 and 2016, classified with the following
NACE codes14 of industrial activity: manufacture of beer (1105); manufacture of soft drinks,
production of mineral waters and other bottled waters (1107); manufacture of fruit and veg-
etable juice (1032). Few dozens of extra unlisted firms were added based on expert opinion.
All-together, we obtain a list of 290 firms, of which 214 are listed (or delisted15) manufactur-
ers. The remaining 76 firms are the relevant unlisted players. Of the selected firms, 33% are
classified as manufacturers of beer (as core activity), 32% of soft drinks and mineral waters,
and 2% of juices. The remaining firms present a core activity of other nature, including whole-
sale of beverages, distilling, rectifying and blending of spirits, other processing and preserving
of fruit and vegetables, activities of head offices, and so on.16
Roughly two-thirds of the firms are registered in the EU (69.15%), with Germany accounting for
about 20% of the sample, followed by France and the United Kingdom at around 5%. Outside
EU, the US are the largest country represented, with 8.81% of firms in the sample registered
there.
The selected firms present different types of shareholding structures. Along the ten years of
observation, there are 5498 different reported shareholders, on average around two thousand
per year. Among these, roughly 30% are common shareholders steadily throughout the pe-
riod. Looking at investors’ portfolios, the average participation shares increased continuously
from 4.67% in 2007 to 5.60% in 2016, and the number of block-holdings also increases in
the decade of observation for all considered levels of participation (minimum 1, 3, 5 and 10
percent).
12For further details see Appendix C.
13Firm active in the EU: either registered in the EU, or registered outside the EU but holding shares in at least one
firm registered in the EU.
14Among Core, or first four Primary codes, or first twenty Secondary codes.
15The term "delisted" indicates firms that were listed at some point during the period of observation, but were later
delisted.
16In these cases the beverages manufacturing activity will appear not as a core, but as primary or secondary activity.
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7.2 The main causal model
Looking for an appropriate model to establish causal effects of market structure on competi-
tion, the choice was ultimately narrowed down to a Difference-in-Differences (DiD) approach
(see full discussion in Section 6.4).
Despite being the most suitable model for the purpose of this exercise, there are certain
considerations to be taken into account if a DiD approach is to be used. First, there is no
clear policy shock or regulation that would directly affect common shareholding; second -
as a consequence - the splitting of the sample between treated and control units is not as
straightforward in the present context as in a standard DiD policy exercise.
The event of a merger, and in particular the 2009 BlackRock-BGI merger, has been used
before in a similar setting by Azar et al. (2018), as recalled earlier. In a similar fashion, in
our application the treatment group will consist of the firms exposed to (i.e. held by) BGI
or BlackRock before 2009. Therefore, we can leverage the 2009 merger between the two
investors as the exogenous policy event that introduces variation to the indices of common
shareholding in the market.17 The control group will include all firms which were held neither
by BlackRock nor by BGI prior to the merger.
In terms of econometric strategy, this merger allows both to define a “pre” and a “post” period,
as well as to identify a treated and a control group, therefore establishing the essential items
for a DiD approach. The main DiD model estimated in this study is specified as follows:
yƒ t = α + γ tretedƒ2007 × postt + δ ƒ t + ƒt + ƒƒ + ƒ t (7.1)
where yƒ t is the markup of firm ƒ in year t; tretedƒ2007 is a dummy variable that equals
one if a firm ƒ , in year 2007, was held by BlackRock and/or Barclays BGI, and zero otherwise;
since the merger was announced on June 11, 2009 we define postt as a binary variable that is
equal to one from 2009 onwards and zero otherwise; ƒ t is a vector of firm-level explanatory
variables; ƒt are time fixed effects that capture macroeconomic shocks common to all firms in
year t, and ƒƒ are firms fixed effects that control for unobserved heterogeneity between firms.
Finally, ƒ t is the error term, clustered at the firm level to control for the impact of residual
unobservable shocks.
The model presented above represents the baseline econometric approach for studying the
causal effects of common shareholding. In particular, the impact of the change in common
shareholding induced by the merger is estimated by comparing the markup - before and after
the event - of firms exposed to the merger to that of firms that did not have any relations with
BlackRock and/or BGI. In terms of Eq. (7.1), such an effect is measured by the coefficient γ: a
positive sign of this parameter would indicate that the merger led to a higher markup in firms
17See Massa et al., (2018) for a discussion of the exogeneity of the BlackRock/BGI merger event.
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dependent on BlackRock and/or BGI as compared to those not dependent on either investor.
Furthermore, it is worth noting that we measure the treatment indicator in 2007, and keep
the value fixed for all periods in the sample. The use of a pre-determined treatment variable
assures that such an indicator does not vary with common and unobservable shocks which
could simultaneously impact the firms’ markup, generating reverse-causality type of issues.
Finally, notwithstanding that the BlackRock-BGI merger can be considered as a quasi-natural
experiment, a remaining concern is that the treatment status is not randomly allocated across
firms. In other words, the status could be correlated with other firm’s characteristics that in
turn are influenced by the merger event. If this were the case, the exogeneity conditions of
the included control variables would be violated after the merger, leading to biased estimates
(Lechner, 2011). Hence, to overcome this concern, besides the inclusion of time-varying firm
characteristics (ƒ t), we allow for interactions between the variables in ƒ t and the postt event
indicator. This helps ruling out that results are driven by changes in observable firm charac-
teristics and not by the merger event itself (see a similar approach in Massa et al., 2018).
7.3 Model variables
Measures to assess common shareholding and the level of competition in our sample were
extensively discussed in previous Chapters. Different firm and market level indices were con-
structed, offering viable alternatives to the indices commonly used in the literature, such as
the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. In our empirical model, some of these new indices are used
to pursue the econometric strategy.
Regarding the dependent variable, prices were the first choice for an indicator of changes in
the competitive forces on the market. However, due to the difficulty in gathering the data
on prices at the required level of specificity, other suitable measures of competition were
developed. The discussion of the various measures was outlined in Chapter 6, and the Lerner
Index was established as the best alternative. The model specification uses a series of firm-
level control variables and fixed effects, as well as other ownership-based indices; some of
these have been employed previously in the literature as relevant factors to discern potential
causal effects of the ’policy’ experiment under consideration.
Both outcome and control variables related to firms’ financial statements refer to end-of-year
accounts; for example, data points labelled “2010” correspond to 31.12.2010. Furthermore,
the financial database reports one account per firm, reflecting global operations. In fact, each
firm corresponds to one legal entity, whose balancesheet is presented to local authorities
without geographical or activity break-down, regardless of its corporate organizational struc-
ture. In some cases, we could wish more disaggregated information, such as in the case of
multinationals or large multi-activity corporations, but also for smaller enterprises producing a
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series of different products. However, this level of detail is not available, since the global for-
mat reflects the actual reporting of financial statements in the official records of the Business
Registers. Notice also that the accounts are harmonised according to international standards,
hence providing a good term of comparison across firms.
7.3.1 Competitive outcomes
In order to gauge variations in competitiveness, and as a way to calculate the markup of firms,
we adopt the Lerner Index. In the literature, this index is frequently considered as replacement
of the markup, because it bypasses many of the impracticalities associated to calculating the
markup directly (see IMF, 2019).
Estimating markups from a theoretical point of view would require variables that are often
not directly observable, such as prices or marginal costs. The Lerner Index is in practice a
monotone transformation of the markup, and can be constructed using different items of the
balance sheet and profit & loss account. Specifically:
Lerner ndex =
Operting profits nd losses
Operting revenes
where: “operating revenues” (Orbis variable18 OPRE) include net sales, other operating rev-
enues and stock variations; while “operating profits and losses” are given by variable EBT.
This definition of the index is consistent with that of IMF (2019), also based on Orbis firm-level
financial variables. The advantage is that a viable index is obtained using available data.
As a robustness check, an adjusted Lerner Index is also constructed, defined as:
Adjsted Lerner ndex =
Operting profits nd losses − Cost of cpitl
Operting revenes
which accounts for the cost of capital. The latter has been computed by multiplying all tangible
assets (Orbis TFAS) with the nominal interest rate, and subtracting the average expected
inflation of 2% (following Konigs and Vandenbussche, 2005).
7.3.2 Treatment variables
The treatment is defined in different ways according to the various specifications of the DiD
model, and can be summarised as follows:
 Treted: dummy variable that equals one if a firm was held by BlackRock and/or Bar-
clays BGI in 2007, zero otherwise;
18For this and other Orbis variables, see definition in Appendix A.
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 BG&BR: dummy variable that equals one if a firm was jointly held in 2007 by both
BlackRock and Barclays BGI, zero otherwise;
 Shres owned: the amount of shares of a firm held by BlackRock or Barclays BGI in
2007 (or their sum if the firm was jointly held); the purpose is to capture the degree of
exposure to BlackRock and/or Barclays BGI before the merger.
7.3.3 Firm-level controls
Several controls have been used to explicitly account for heterogeneity of firm-level charac-
teristics, besides what captured by the fixed effects. Their definition is as follows:
 Totl ssets: total assets (fixed assets + current assets);
 Shreholders′ HH: index of concentration of the shareholders’ structure of a firm; it is
obtained as an Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) computed on the set of shares held by
recorded shareholders with direct participation;
 Shres top 4 owners: total shares held by the four recorded shareholders with largest
direct participation (excluding aggregated shareholders);
 Shres owned by Big2: total shares held jointly by State Street and Vanguard (Big2);
 Firm′s integrtion: degree of integration of firm with remaining firms in the market
through owners (average correlation between shareholding structures of given firm with
competitors).
While the Total Assets are the usual proxy for firm size, the remaining controls are worth a
short note. The link between shareholding structure and corporate performance has been
investigated in the past, for example in Demsetz and Villalonga (2001); in such work, based
on 511 US firms from all sectors of economy observed in 1976-1980, no significant relation is
found, mainly due to the presence of diffuse ownership. Nevertheless the period of observation
is rather back in time, and is based on different geographical and industry references, hence
we believe that the issue is still worth investigating in our current dataset. For the effect,
we choose three indicators, namely two indices of concentration of ownership (Shareholders’
HHI and Shares top 4 owners, as defined above), and an index of presence of other main
institutional investors among the shareholders (total shares held jointly by State Street and
Vanguard). Similar indices have been investigated in Seldeslacht et al. (2017) and in Fichtner
et al. (2017), among others.
The last control variable accounts for the cross-links in shareholding structures between a firm
and its competitors, a measure of the firm’s integration in the market through its owners.
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Although the measure is computed in a different manner, the logic behind this indicator is
similar to that of Backus et al. (2018), where "profit weights" are computed for each pair of
firms, starting from their shareholding structures. Such weights give rise to some "cooperation
matrices" reflecting the interactions of pairs of firms generated by their ownership overlaps.
7.4 Sample description
The ownership information is complete for almost all the sample and over the entire period of
the analysis. However, the requirements on balance sheet reporting vary according to differ-
ing country legal frameworks and firms’ listing status. In some cases this leads to absence of
financial information for given corporations. For this reason, part of the selected sample can-
not be included in the econometric analysis due to missing data. The issue of missing financial
data and how this may influence the econometric strategy is discussed in further detail below.
Table 7.1 reports the number of cases excluded from the analysis, out of the total number of
available firms per year.19 The second column shows that there are 664 observations for which
financial data are missing, either on the dependent or on control variables. This amounts to
66 firms per year, on average.
Table 7.1: Summary of dropped observations due to non-reported financial variables (Missing financials)
or Lerner Index outside the [-1, 1] interval (Trimmed Lerner Ind.), by year.
Number Missing Trimmed Final
Year of obs. financials Lerner Ind. sample
2007 241 63 7 171
2008 245 63 12 170
2009 250 64 13 173
2010 257 66 8 183
2011 259 66 6 187
2012 259 59 5 195
2013 263 62 8 193
2014 264 66 8 190
2015 264 70 7 187
2016 261 85 4 172
Total 2563 664 78 1821
19Notice that in general not all 290 firms in the overall sample are available each year, due to their natural life-cycle.
Moreover, given that the individual firm we refer to is a unique legal entity, a company may appear as "absent" from
the sample after a change its legal identity - for example due to a restructuring (e.g. takeover) - even if not ceasing
to exist in practice.
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Moreover, sometimes there are outlying values among those companies that have complete
information. In particular, in the case of the main outcome variable a limited number of
abnormal values were observed (Lerner Index outside the [−1,1] interval); such values were
excluded following the IMF procedure.20 As a result of the trimming procedure, an additional
78 observations are excluded over the period 2007-2016. This implies that a company drops
out of the sample in a year when it presents an abnormal value, but is kept in the remaining
years of observation. The reason why extraordinary values of the Lerner Index are recorded
can vary from a simple reporting error to more extreme cases where firms experience severe
shocks. In any case, it is impossible to determine what is the cause of the non-plausible values;
given that a correction is not feasible, outliers are dropped.
The distribution of the trimmed Lerner Index is depicted in Figure 7.1. While the distribution
before the trimming is not very informative, after removing the few observations above 1 and
below -1, the variable seems normally distributed.
Figure 7.1: Distribution of the Lerner Index After Trimming
Finally, we have excluded eight observations from treated firms for which no before-after com-
parison was possible - data were available only before (or during) the year of the merger.21
Overall, we have 1,813 observations between 2007 and 2016, related to 233 distinct firms.
Around 85% of the observations present non negative values of the Lerner Index, while the
remaining ones display negative values due to operating expenses exceeding operating rev-
enues. Summary statistics are shown in Table 7.2.
For a correct interpretation of the results, however, it is crucial to identify and characterise the
20In the IMF procedure only values between −1 and 1 are kept. See International Monetary Fund (2019).
21The eight dropped observations refer to the following cases: CHRIST WATER TECHNOL, 2007; ANHEUSER-BUSCH
COMPANY, 2007; PEPSI BOTTLING GROUP, 2007-2008-2009; PEPSIAMERICAS INC 2007-2008-2009. None of these
companies are observed after 2009. Results do not change if these observations are included in the sample.
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companies that are excluded or that drop out occasionally due to outliers. Appendix D presents
and discusses summary statistics on the excluded firms, and characterises them in terms of
country of registration and listing status, in order to capture possible distortions introduced
by these specificities. As shown in Appendix D, it can be observed that a large proportion of
companies with missing financial information belong in general to countries with less stringent
reporting requirements (such as Germany). On the other hand, the presence of outliers in the
outcome variables seems to be more randomly spread in terms of country and NACE codes,
even if most of the companies trimmed on the basis of outliers are non-listed.
Table 7.2: Summary statistics over the entire period of observation
No. obs. mean sd min max
Lerner Index 1813 0.10 0.24 -0.97 1.00
Treated 1813 0.27 0.44 0.00 1.00
Post 1813 0.82 0.39 0.00 1.00
(log) Total assets 1813 19.28 2.74 9.20 25.99
Shareholders’ HHI 1813 3807.55 3580.25 0.00 10000
Shares top 4 owners 1813 62.66 34.27 0.00 100
Firm’s Integration 1813 0.26 0.36 0.00 1.00
Shares owned by Big2 1813 0.76 2.13 0.00 15.68
Finally, Table 7.3 reports the composition of the treated firms in the final sample. Of the firms
observed in 2007, 53 are treated; among these, three firms are held only by BlackRock (the
average share owned is equal to 0.37), 27 are held only by BGI (with average shares of 1.99%)
and 23 are held by both BlackRock and BGI (the average total share is 4.15%).
Table 7.3: Average shares owned by BGI and/or BlackRock (BR) in 2007 in different sets of firms
Obs. Held by BR Held by BGI Held by BR & BGI
Treated firms 53
of which: 3 27 23
Shares held by BR/BGI 0.37 1.99 4.15
To complement the above baseline information, the evolution of ownership of the treated and
control groups over the following years is inspected. Figures 7.2 and 7.3 report the average
shares owned by Barclays/BGI and BlackRock, respectively, in three sub-groups over the time
frame under analysis: firms jointly owned by the two investors, firms owned only by either
of them, and firms owned by neither. While in the first figure the importance of BGI in the
shareholders’ composition decreases, BlackRock appears to gain a larger share, especially
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among the firms that in 2007 where jointly held by both investors. It is also noteworthy that
companies that were not owned by neither BGI nor BlackRock in 2007 do not experience large
acquisitions by the two in the following 9 years. Detailed results on ownership of key players
of the market can be found in Appendix D.
Figure 7.2: Average shares owned by Barclays/BGI
Figure 7.3: Average shares owned by BlackRock
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7.5 Empirical results
7.5.1 Preliminary evidence
As already mentioned, the main dependent variable used as a proxy for the market power is
the Lerner Index. As a preliminary piece of evidence, Table 7.4 compares the average value of
the Lerner Index observed for treated firms with the average value in non-treated firms, over
the period 2007-2008 (before the merger) and for the years 2009-2016 (after the merger).
In particular, it is worth noting that before the merger, the average Lerner Index is higher in
the group of treated firms (0.14) than in that of control firms (0.06), and such a difference
(0.08) is statistically significant at 1%. The same comparison for the years after the merger
gives, instead, a difference of 0.12, statistically significant at 1%, that is treated firms show,
on average, an higher Lerner Index compared to non-treated units. Finally, it emerges that the
difference in the differences (0.04 = 0.12 – 0.08) is positive and very close to be statistically
significant at the conventional level (p-value = 0.130). While descriptive, this evidence seems
to suggest that the merger has allowed firms already exposed to BlackRock and BGI to increase
their market power. However, before moving to a more rigorous analysis, there are two key
issues that must be carefully considered.
Table 7.4: Preliminary DiD evidence
Lerner Index Treated Controls
Difference
(Treated − controls)
Before
0.14 0.06 0.08***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.04)
After
0.20 0.08 0.12***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Difference 0.06** 0.02 0.04
(After − Before) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03)
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
On the one hand, one of the main assumption for the validity of the DiD method is the presence
of pre-treatment common trends for treated and control firms, that is treated firms would have
experienced the same trend in their potential outcomes as the control firms in the absence
of the merger. Figure 7.4 depicts the evolution22 of the average Lerner Index for treated and
22Notice that the series of the Lerner Index are shown also for 2005 and 2006, given that financial reports are
available in those years. However, the definition of treated and control groups remains the same as before, i.e. is still
based on ownership data for 2007, which is the first available year.
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non-treated firms. Although purely suggestive, it can be noticed that trends look similar before
the merger, since the confidence intervals overlap, while differ after the merger was in place,
with the value of Lerner Index being particularly pronounced for treated firms in the years
2013 and 2014.
Figure 7.4: Naive evidence of the common trend: average Lerner Index (±2SD) in treated (eposed)
and control (not eposed) groups.
On the other hand, since the assignment to the treatment group is not random, there might
be firms’ observable characteristics that determine the probability of being treated. In other
words, the treated firms, namely those held by BGI and/or BlackRock in 2007, could be very
different in terms of observable characteristics, such as size, turnover, etc., from those in the
control group, thus any observed effects on the Lerner Index might be simply due to these
different characteristics rather than the merger event. Were it the case, the exclusion of these
characteristics from the regression would lead to biased estimates.
To account for this, a mean comparison test between treated and control firms is carried out
on pre-treatment data23 for the observable characteristics described in the previous section.
Results are shown in Table 7.5, showing that the level of total assets and total share owned
23For most firms, the ownership and financial values used for the tests are those from the year 2007. However, for
four treated firms and 10 control firms, financial data are only present from 2008. It follows that they are included
in the empirical analyses only from 2008, and that for these cases the tests presented in Table 7.5 are run on 2007
ownership data but on 2008 financial data.
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by the "big two" (State Street and Vanguard) are significantly larger on average for treated
firms as compared to control units. On the contrary, control units show a higher HHI index
and share of top 4 owners with respect to treated firms. It seems that there is no difference
in terms of integration between treated and control firms. Finally, while the initial level of the
Lerner Index for treated firms appears to be larger than that observed for control firms, such
a difference is weakly statistically significant (p-value = 0.071).
Table 7.5: Pre-treatment comparison between treated and control units
Difference
Variable Treated Controls (Treated−controls)
Lerner Index 0.14 0.06 0.08 *
(0.04) (0.02) (0.04)
(log) Total assets 21.73 18.24 3.49 ***
(0.23) (0.19) (0.30)
Shareholders’ HHI 1021.98 4542.58 -3520.60 ***
(178.94) (315.10) (362.37)
Shares top 4 owners 35.59 69.04 -33.45 ***
(3.75) (2.86) (4.71)
Firm’s Integration 0.26 0.27 -0.01
(0.04) (0.03) (0.05)
Shares owned by Big2 1.67 0.02 1.65 ***
(0.33) (0.02) (0.33)
Number of firms 53 128
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
7.5.2 Results from Difference-in-Differences model
The first round of DiD results is reported in Table 7.6. Here, the results of the estimation of
Eq. (7.1) are displayed under different specifications: column (1) reports the model without
control variables; in columns (2) and (3) the analysis is replicated by including controls and
their interaction with the post indicator, respectively. Central to the issues at hand is the
coefficient of treted × post, which is positive (0.069) and statistically significant at 5% level
in the specification in col. (1), and it is very similar (0.072) when controls are included. When
we interact controls with post (col. 3), the coefficient of interest is larger than those in the
previous specifications24 (0.113), and it statistically different form zero at a 5% level.
24Such an increase in the size of the coefficient might indicate that estimations in col. (2) are affected by a negative
correlation between treted × post and the control variables observed after the merger. Furthermore, it is worth
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While for column (2) the implicit assumption is that the dummy for post years has a different
effect only for the treated, in column (3) we postulate that all covariates might have different
effects after the merger, compared to their effect before, which remains the reference point.
In other words, the coefficient for each non-interacted firm characteristic has to be interpreted
as the marginal effect for that variable only for the reference years before the merger.
Table 7.6: Main results
Dep. var.: Lerner Index (1) (2) (3)
Treated*post 0.069** 0.072** 0.113**
(0.034) (0.035) (0.049)
(log) Total assets -0.007 -0.007
(0.009) (0.011)
Shareholders’ HHI 0.004 -0.006
(0.007) (0.008)
Shares top 4 owners 0.010 0.049
(0.049) (0.079)
Firm’s Integration 0.007 -0.003
(0.035) (0.044)
Shares owned by Big2 -0.501 0.631
(0.664) (1.105)
(log) Total assets*post 0.001
(0.007)
Shareholders’ HHI*post 0.012**
(0.005)
Shares top 4 owners*post -0.042
(0.077)
Firm’s Integration*post 0.015
(0.036)
Shares owned by Big2*post -0.952
(0.777)
Observations 1,813 1,813 1,813
Treated 483 483 483
Controls 1,330 1,330 1,330
Year fixed effects yes yes yes
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes
R-squared within 0.015 0.019 0.026
R-squared overall 0.614 0.615 0.618
Robust standard errors, clustered at the firm levels, in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
noting that, although the estimated coefficient of treted × post in col. (3) is larger than the one estimated in col.
(2), its 95% confidence interval ranges from 0.02 to 0.21 which includes 0.72, the point estimate of the specification
reported in col. (2).
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As usual, the interaction term between post and each predictor represents the difference in
the coefficients between the reference period and the post period.25
None of the control variables is statistically significant in the specification of col. (2). When the
controls are interacted with post, only Shrehoders′ HH is statistically significant, indicating
that firms with more concentrated shareholders’ structures experience a positive impact on
the Lerner Index after the merger.
The results indicate that firms held by BlackRock and/or BGI in 2007 show a Lerner Index on
average 0.07 points higher than control firms after the merger, suggesting that the merger
triggered an increase in profitability of firms already exposed to BlackRock and/or BGI.
Analogous results are obtained using as outcome the alternative competition measure de-
scribed earlier, i.e. the Lerner Index adjusted for cost of capital. Results are presented in
Appendix D. Notice that in this case the sample is slightly more reduced, given that not all
firms report the necessary financial variables for the calculation of this adjusted outcome.
While the results indicate an increase of the Lerner Index associated with the merger, nothing
is said on whether such an effect is driven by changes in revenues and/or costs.26 To closely
inspect which component of the Lerner Index pushes more the effect, we plot the (average)
evolution of revenues and costs for treated (Figure 7.5a) and control (Figure 7.5b) firms, before
and after the merger. In the case of treated firms, both revenues and costs move along
the same path before the merger, and immediately after we observe a sharper increase in
revenues as compared to costs, while moving again along a similar trend from 2010 onwards.
Regarding control firms, both revenues and costs follow a similar – almost identical – path,
before and after the merger. What emerges is that the increase in the Lerner Index seems to
be driven more by a marked increase in revenues rather than a decrease in costs.
While this exercise represents a first attempt to link common shareholding with a measure of
firm’s competitive outcome, other ex-post studies evaluated the impact of merger decisions on
prices. Kwoka (2013) collects 46 merger cases in the US and presents the average price effects
estimated by this sample of studies. It turns out that in 38 cases the merger led to a price
increase of approximately 9.85%, while in only 8 cases a decrease in prices was found (around
4.83%). Turning to Europe, a recent report commissioned by the European Commission to a
team of academics at the Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, reviews ex-
post evaluations of the impact of merger decisions by EU competition authorities.27 According
to the report, it emerged that post-merger prices increased in 14 studies, with such an effect
being estimated at around 8.24%, while, on the contrary, in 7 studies a decrease in the level
25Note that estimating a fully interacted model is very similar to estimating two separate models - the so-called
split sample - one before and one after the treatment, and it would be perfectly equivalent if we did not include
fixed effects. However, we prefer to run the interacted estimation rather than the split sample estimator because the
p-value for each interaction term provides a significance test for the difference in those coefficients.
26The revenues variable corresponds to the OPRE variable from Orbis, while the costs are obtained by subtracting
revenues (OPRE) from the EBT variable.
27See Ormosi et al. (2015).
184
of prices was detected (-4.20%). It is worth noting that all these studies have investigated
the impact of several merger events occurring in different industries, but none of them has
looked at the specific BlackRock-BGI merger. The latter has been exploited in a quasi-natural
experimental setting only by Azar et al. (2018), who find that airline ticket prices, after the
merger, are 10% to 12% higher due to the common shareholding.28
In any case, the large majority of studies surveyed in the above-mentioned literature uses the
level of prices as a proxy of market competition, so our results can reconcile with such findings
only to a certain extent, given that prices are not observed in our data.29
Figure 7.5: Revenues and costs
(a) Treated firms
(b) Control firms
28A recent paper, Massa et al., 2018, exploits the merger between BlackRock and Barclays BGI to understand how
the change in common shareholding affects the investment behaviour of funds.
29Being very cautions against any comparison beyond the descriptive evidence, one could provide a rough and
indirect estimate of the price increase by looking at the change in revenues induced by the merger. Yet, in order to
do this, further hypotheses should be made about the trends in costs, which can invalidate the whole exercise.
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7.5.3 Who drives the effect?
In the figures below, a visual overview of the relevance of each treated firm in the baseline
estimation is provided. In Figure 7.6, firms held in 2007 either by BlackRock (the first three
data points from the left) or by Barclays/BGI (the remaining from the fourth onwards) are
dropped from the sample one at a time. The same exercise is conducted in Figure 7.7 focusing
on firms held in 2007 by both BGI and BlackRock.
In case a deviation from the main trend is observed, this signals that the specific dropped
firm played a pivotal role in driving the estimates of our original baseline specification. For
instance, this might be due to an exceptionally high or low Lerner Index. Overall, the value of
the impact is rather constant and does not suffer from notable changes when single firms are
dropped from the sample.
Figure 7.6: Effect of treatment excluding, one at a time, firms owned by either BGI or BlackRock. First
three firms on the left are held by BlackRock; firms on the right, are held by BGI.
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Figure 7.7: Effect of treatment excluding, one at a time, firms jointly owned by BGI and BlackRock
7.6 Robustness checks
In this section, the validity of the previous results is confirmed by a battery of robustness
checks, intended to address possible issues related to the research design, which could bias
the baseline estimates. First, the traditional event-study analysis on the Lerner Index is car-
ried out. Then, several sensitivity checks are performed on alternative specifications of the
sample and on a different definition of the groups of treated and control firms. Finally, some
falsification tests are conducted.
7.6.1 Event study analysis
The existence of a common trend is the key identifying assumption for DiD estimates to be
unbiased. In the framework of this analysis, the assumption implies that - in the absence
of the treatment - firms held by BGI and/or BlackRock in 2007 would have experienced the
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same trends in their potential Lerner Index as the control firms. While this is not testable, an
event-study analysis can shed some light on the validity of the research design. Specifically,
following Autor (2003), the interactions of the time dummies and the treatment indicator for
pre-treatment periods are added to the baseline specification of Eq. (7.1). If the trends in the
Lerner Index in treatment and control groups are the same, then the interactions should be not
statistically significant, i.e. the DiD coefficient should not be significantly different between the
two groups in the pre-treatment period. An attractive feature of this test is that the interactions
of the time dummies after the treatment (up to several years) with the treatment indicator are
informative, and can show whether the treatment effect changes over time. In detail, the
following specification is estimated:
yƒ t = α +
2007
∑
π=2007
γπ(tretedƒ × yerπ)+
2016
∑
τ=2009
γτ(tretedƒ × yerτ) + δƒ t + ƒƒ + ƒt + ƒ t (7.2)
where the year 2008 is omitted, coinciding with the period immediately preceding the merger.
This specification allows to test for the presence of parallel trends in the pre-treatment period,
namely, if the coefficient associated to the lead (γπ, for 2007) is not statistically different from
zero. As already anticipated, this approach is convenient to understand whether the treatment
effect fades, increases or stays constant over time, depending on the estimated coefficients
of the lags γτ , with τ going from 2009 to 2016.
Table 7.7 reports the estimates of Eq. (7.2), with and without control variables. According to
the point estimates in col. (1), where controls are not included, there is no difference in the
Lerner Index between treated and control units in the pre-treatment period. On the contrary,
coefficients associated to lags turn out to be positive and statistically significant from 2 up
to 5 years after the merger, indicating that the Lerner Index is growing over time for treated
firms if compared to control ones. Results remain qualitatively the same in columns (2) and
(3), where controls and controls interacted with post are included.
The estimates from column (3) and their 95% confidence intervals are plotted in Figure 7.8.
Taken together, these results seem to validate the research design, as there is no evidence
against the presence of a common trend between treated and control units.
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Table 7.7: Autor test. Reference year 2008, one year before the merger.
Dep. var.: Lerner Index (1) (2) (3)
2 yrs prior -0.027 -0.027 -0.024
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
merger -0.019 -0.019 0.023
(0.027) (0.027) (0.041)
1 yr after 0.042 0.045 0.089
(0.038) (0.039) (0.057)
2 yrs after 0.080** 0.082** 0.124**
(0.037) (0.038) (0.052)
3 yrs after 0.095** 0.102** 0.144**
(0.047) (0.049) (0.063)
4 yrs after 0.103** 0.104** 0.145**
(0.047) (0.048) (0.062)
5 yrs after 0.097* 0.100* 0.141**
(0.050) (0.052) (0.064)
6 yrs after 0.037 0.043 0.083
(0.052) (0.055) (0.067)
7 yrs after 0.018 0.024 0.063
(0.053) (0.056) (0.065)
(log) Total assets -0.006 -0.006
(0.009) (0.011)
Shareholders’ HHI 0.003 -0.007
(0.006) (0.008)
Shares top 4 owners 0.018 0.056
(0.049) (0.079)
Firm’s Integration 0.004 -0.005
(0.034) (0.044)
Shares owned by Big2 -0.607 0.507
(0.746) (1.079)
(log) Total assets*post 0.001
(0.007)
Shareholders’ HHI*post 0.012**
(0.005)
Shares top 4 owners*post -0.041
(0.076)
Firm’s Integration*post 0.013
(0.036)
Shares owned by Big2*post -0.924
(0.763)
Observations 1,813 1,813 1,813
Treated 483 483 483
Controls 1,330 1,330 1,330
Year fixed effects yes yes yes
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes
R-squared within 0.028 0.032 0.038
R-squared overall 0.619 0.621 0.623
Robust standard errors, clustered at the firm level, in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Figure 7.8: Event study
7.6.2 Alternative sample selection
In Table 7.8, other methods for sample selection have been tested. In the first three columns,
companies that were not present in the 2007 sample are not considered in the estimation,
resulting in a smaller sample size. This means that the control units are constant over time, not
introducing any newly created company in the sample. As a result, the sample is composed
by 1,513 observations, including all 483 observations from treated firms. The coefficient of
interest remains positive and significant at the conventional level.
Yet, another source of concern might derive from the use of an unbalanced sample, which
could lead to biased results.30 Therefore, we replicate our main results by relying on a bal-
anced sample of firms, keeping only those with recorded observations along the entire time-
span of the analysis. We have full 10-year information on 105 firms (1,050 observations), of
which 36 are treated.31 Results of this analysis are reported in Table 7.8, col. (4)−(6) and,
30The concern about unbalanced panels lies in the possible reason behind missing information. If the data are
non-randomly missing, findings are likely to be biased. In our setting, the reasons for the missing data are quite well
known, such as firms exiting the market due to their natural life-cycle, or non-reporting of balance sheet information
due to lack of legal obligation. Therefore, a good robustness check can come from the comparison of the results
obtained with the full unbalanced sample with those obtained using a balanced one. If estimates yield similar results,
this suggests that findings are not biased (Baltagi, 2008; Cameron and Trivedi, 2005).
31As a reference, note that 82% of the firms of the full sample present data for at least 5 years, which is a quite long
time span to capture the effects under study. More in detail, 25% of the companies present between 5 and 8 years of
observation, 12% of the firms are observed for 9 years, and 45% have full information for the whole 10 years.
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reassuringly, indicate that the coefficient of treted × post is statistically significant across
models and pretty similar to that obtained in the baseline specification.
A final alternative sample definition is used in the last three columns. Here, instead of trim-
ming Lerner Index observations outside the [−1,1] interval, these are kept in the sample, but
their values are set equal to the thresholds of −1 and +1. In this case, the sample counts
1,884 observations, of which 489 are related to treated firms. Columns (7)−(9) show the re-
sults with this specification, which are consistent with the main model and slightly larger in
magnitude.
Table 7.8: Alternative sample definitions
Existing in 2007 Balanced Sample Replacing if > 1 or < −1
Dep. var.: Lerner Index (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Treated*post 0.071** 0.073** 0.120** 0.072** 0.080** 0.101*** 0.080** 0.085** 0.126**
(0.034) (0.035) (0.048) (0.033) (0.034) (0.038) (0.037) (0.038) (0.056)
(log) Total assets 0.002 0.003 -0.011 -0.014 0.005 0.006
(0.005) (0.008) (0.014) (0.016) (0.011) (0.013)
Shareholders’ HHI 0.002 -0.007 0.002 -0.003 -0.021 -0.136
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.076) (0.089)
Shares top 4 owners -0.017 0.024 0.009 0.047 0.027 0.100
(0.052) (0.081) (0.064) (0.082) (0.069) (0.100)
Firm’s Integration -0.002 -0.007 -0.039 -0.044 0.007 -0.009
(0.039) (0.046) (0.044) (0.046) (0.036) (0.050)
Shares owned by Big2 -0.336 1.157 -0.439 1.426 -0.010 0.001
(0.567) (0.944) (0.835) (1.206) (0.007) (0.011)
(log) Total assets*post -0.001 0.003 -0.002
(0.007) (0.006) (0.008)
Shareholders’ HHI*post 0.012** 0.007 0.139**
(0.006) (0.005) (0.062)
Shares top 4 owners*post -0.043 -0.046 -0.088
(0.078) (0.061) (0.090)
Firm’s Integration*post 0.008 0.004 0.021
(0.038) (0.027) (0.046)
Shares owned by Big2*post -1.209 -1.515* -0.010
(0.758) (0.814) (0.008)
Observations 1,513 1,513 1,513 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,884 1,884 1,884
Treated 483 483 483 360 360 360 489 489 489
Controls 1,030 1,030 1,030 690 690 690 1,395 1,395 1,395
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
R-squared within 0.018 0.019 0.026 0.037 0.045 0.051 0.095 0.015 0.014
R-squared overall 0.605 0.605 0.608 0.667 0.670 0.617 0.617 0.626 0.627
Robust standard errors, clustered a the firm level, are shown in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
In col. (1), (2) and (3) we exclude firms which were not in the sample in 2007
In col. (4), (5) and (6) we keep only firms with 10 years of observation
In col. (7), (8) and (9) values of Lerner Index below -1 or above 1 are replaced with such thresholds.
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7.6.3 Different definitions of the treatment and control groups
So far, the definition of the treated group included three types of "exposed" firms, according
to the 2007 ownership structure: i) firms held only by BlackRock; ii) firms held only by BGI and
iii) firms held by both BlackRock and BGI. The assumption was that all the above three groups
of firms were equally exposed to the merger, and could therefore be considered as "treated".
However, the interpretation of the role of these three groups might vary, and lead eventually
to alternative definitions of the treatment and control groups.
A possible argument could be the following: while the first two groups of firms are fully entitled
to be considered treated, the latter may be shifted into the control group. In fact, it might be
reasonable to assume that for this set of firms the merger did not produce any effects, given
that it is composed by companies already held by both BlackRock and BGI before the merger.
In order to understand potential differences of roles of these three groups of firms, and whether
this is reflected in any differential effect on profitability after the merger, an alternative specifi-
cation of treated and control groups has been experimented. In particular, we split the original
group of treated firms into two, separating the 23 companies jointly held by BlackRock and BGI
from the rest. A dummy variable, BG&BR, measured in 2007, is built to account for this issue,
equal to one if a firm was held by both BlackRock and BGI, and zero otherwise. Then, this new
variable is interacted with the treted variable in a model taking the following form:
yƒ t = α+γtretedƒ2007× postt+ λtretedƒ2007× postt×BG&BRƒ2007+ δƒ t+ ƒƒ + ƒt+ ƒ t (7.3)
where the variable treted includes all firms held in 2007 by BlackRock and/or BGI, i.e. all
three groups i), ii) and iii) defined above. It follows that coefficient γ accounts for the effect of
the merger for all treated firms, while λ captures the differential effect of the merger for the
firms jointly held by BGI and BlackRock in 2007.
If λ in Eq. (7.3) turns out to be statistically significant, then the impact of the merger on firms
held by both BlackRock and BGI is different from that on firms held by BlackRock or BGI only. In
this case, the treatment variable would need to be redefined, including only firms held either
by BlackRock or by BGI. Instead, if λ is not statistically significant, the impact of the merger
for firms held by both BlackRock and BGI is not different from the rest of treated firms. Hence,
in this case, there would be no need to change the definition of treated and control groups.
According to estimates shown in the first three columns of Table 7.9, the coefficient λ is nega-
tive (−0.030) but not statistically significant in the specification that does not include controls
(col. 1). Similarly, it is negative and indistinguishable from zero both in the model where con-
trols are included (−0.026; col. 2), and in the last case where we account for the interaction
between controls and post (−0.003; col. 3). Therefore, in light of these results, there is no
evidence against the inclusion of these firms, namely those held in 2007 by both BlackRock
and BGI, in the definition of treated firms.
192
7.6.4 Falsification and other tests
Placebo test
A common way to conduct a placebo tests in the context of DiD analysis is that of focusing
on the span prior to the merger, that is to simulate what would have happened to the Lerner
Index if a fake year of the merger were used. More in detail, we assume that the merger
between BlackRock and BGI occurred in 2008, and the main analysis is replicated on the period
2007-2008. If the coefficient associated to tretedƒ2007 × (ƒke)post2008 turns out positive
and significant, it would suggest that before the true year of the merger, treated firms were
already experiencing an increase in the Lerner Index compared to control ones, thus casting
doubts on the validity of previous results.
Reassuringly, the effect of placebo exercise does not lead to any effect on the Lerner Index
as the γ coefficient turns out to be indistinguishable from zero in the specification without
controls (Table 7.9, col. 4), and in both the specifications where controls are included (Table
7.9; col. 5), and interacted with (ƒke)post (Table 7.9; col. 6).
Different definition of the treatment year
The results discussed so far have been based on the indicator of dependence from BlackRock
and/or BGI using figures from 2007, a period coinciding with the beginning of the financial
crisis. This could raise the concern that BGI and BlackRock could have targeted companies
in 2007, which would perform particularly well after the crisis. In other words, it might be
the case that BGI and BlackRock – in light of the financial crisis – have decided to invest
in "healthier" and more performing firms in 2007, thus questioning the definition of treated
and control group, and therefore of the results. In principle, the best solution to tackle this
issue would be building our treatment indicator on earlier ownership data, long before the
financial crisis. By doing so, we would have a proxy for exposure to BGI and BlackRock which
is less subject to possible selection bias. In fact, it would be unrelated to the shareholding
strategies of the two financial institutions preparing for the merger and/or the financial crisis.
Unfortunately, data on ownership is not available before 2007.
However, there are some ways to mitigate this concern. To begin with, recall that in all esti-
mations we control for year fixed effects that are meant to capture macroeconomic shocks,
such as the financial crisis, common to all firms. In this regard, one could claim that treated
and control firms could have responded differently to the crisis even in the absence of the
merger event. Were it the case, the inclusion of years fixed effect would not be sufficient for
obtaining unbiased estimates. Nevertheless, as pointed out by Lewellen and Lowry (2020), it
is a major concern only if firms in the control group belong to different sectors than treatment
firms, which does not apply in our context as we restricted the analysis to firms operating in
the Beverages market.
193
Second, as discussed in Section 7.2, the possibly non-random allocation of treated and control
units can be correlated with other firms’ characteristics and/or with the financial crisis, but the
introduction of the interaction between controls variables and post in the estimates should
attenuate the potential bias. In fact, if more performing firms were acquired by BGI and
BlackRock in 2007 in light of the crisis, the control variables - which are meant to capture
firms’ characteristics - interacted with post should have picked up this effect, leading to a
coefficient of treted × post indistinguishable from zero. However, as shown in Table 7.6, col.
3, the coefficient of treted × post is positive and statistically significant at 1%.
Finally, one could argue that the financial crisis produced its effect in Europe starting from
2008.32 It follows that, in the spirit of a further robustness test, an alternative treatment has
been computed according to 2008 ownership data. If the definition of treated and control
groups were undermined by the strategic behavior of BGI/BlackRock reacting to the financial
crisis, we would observe very different results with respect to those obtained with the treat-
ment indicator based on 2007.
The last three columns of Table 7.9 display the results of this analysis and indicate that the
coefficient of interest is positive (0.071) and statistically significant at 5% level when controls
are excluded (col. 7), and it is slightly larger, 0.77 and 0.125 respectively, when controls and
controls interacted with post are included (col. 8 and 9).
The fact that the coefficient of interest remains stable indicates that the two financial insti-
tutions did not substantially alter their portfolio in anticipation of the financial and economic
turmoil caused by the Great Recession. Taken together, these results are stable across speci-
fications and do not seem to be much affected by the choice of the year used for determining
the treated status of firms, thus lessening the concerns that BGI and BlackRock could have
targeted only the more performing companies in 2007.
32In late 2008 the crisis developed into a number of European bank failures, declines in various stock indexes, large
reductions in the market value of equities, a decrease in international trade. The currency crisis spread at the end of
October 2008.
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Table 7.9: Robustness tests
Dep. var.: Lerner Index (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Treated*post 0.082* 0.075 0.120**
(0.050) (0.048) (0.056)
Treated*post*(BGI&BR) -0.030 -0.026 -0.003
(0.060) (0.058) (0.069)
Treated*(fake)post 0.019 0.019 0.011
(0.029) (0.028) (0.041)
(2008)Treated*post 0.071** 0.077** 0.125**
(0.035) (0.037) (0.054)
(log) Total assets -0.005 -0.003 0.025 0.028 -0.009 -0.007
(0.009) (0.009) (0.025) (0.026) (0.009) (0.011)
Shareholders’ HHI 0.004 -0.007 -0.012 -0.007 0.009 0.000
(0.007) (0.007) (0.012) (0.013) (0.007) (0.010)
Shares top 4 owners 0.018 0.064 -0.036 -0.035 -0.026 -0.021
(0.047) (0.071) (0.109) (0.128) (0.055) (0.115)
Firm’s integration 0.010 -0.003 0.019 0.035 0.032 0.032
(0.035) (0.043) (0.031) (0.041) (0.038) (0.051)
Shares owned by Big2 -0.151 0.919 -4.797*** -4.137*** -0.918 -0.365
(0.548) (1.374) (1.406) (1.407) (0.805) (1.289)
(log) Total assets*post -0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.007)
Shareholders’ HH*Ipost 0.013** 0.009
(0.005) (0.008)
Shares top 4 owners*post -0.049 0.001
(0.069) (0.109)
Firm’s Integration*post 0.017 0.001
(0.035) (0.040)
Shares owned by Big2*post -0.916 -0.401
(1.018) (0.862)
(log) Total assets*(fake)post -0.002
(0.006)
Shareholders’ HHI*(fake)post -0.003
(0.008)
Shares top 4 owners*(fake)post -0.019
(0.107)
Integration*(fake)post -0.034
(0.033)
Shares owned by Big2*(fake)post -0.300
(0.900)
Observations 1,813 1,813 1,813 335 335 335 1,646 1,646 1,646
Treated 483 483 483 101 101 101 434 434 434
Controls 1,330 1,330 1,330 234 234 234 1,212 1,212 1,212
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
R-squared within 0.016 0.014 0.020 0.005 0.041 0.058 0.014 0.024 0.028
R-squared overall 0.614 0.616 0.618 0.613 0.615 0.616 0.629 0.633 0.634
Robust standard errors, clustered at the firm level, are shown in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
We include, in column (1), (2) and (3), the differential effect of firms that are held by both shareholders; in column (4), (5) and (6), a placebo
year of the merger; in column (7), (8) and (9) a different definition of year of treatment.
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7.7 Hetereogeneous effects
The baseline results have shown a positive relationship between the Lerner Index after the
merger and the exposure to the merger itself. However, these results can be explained in light
of two additional aspects not yet considered in the analysis. On the one hand, the merger
may take time to materialise its effect on the Lerner Index. On the other hand, the degree of
exposure to the merger may influence the actual extent of the effect.
7.7.1 Long-term effects
A significant role could be played by the time elapsed since the merger, as its effects may
take some time to materialise. To account for this possibility, a new variable, duration, has
been included in the model, measuring the time since the merger took place (1 to 8 years).
Its quadratic term (drton2) is also included, allowing the effect to be a non-linear function
of time. Therefore, the following model is estimated:
yƒ t = α + tretedƒ2007 × postt × (γ + λ drtont + π drton2t ) + δƒ t + ƒƒ + ƒt + ƒ t (7.4)
Results of this analysis are reported in Table 7.10. Columns (1)-(3) show the estimates of the
linear specification, where the coefficient π in Eq. (7.4) is set equal to zero. Columns (4)-(6),
instead, present the estimates of the full quadratic specification. As usual, the three columns
for each specification correspond to estimation of models without controls, with controls, and
with controls interacted with post.
To better understand its dynamics, the aggregate effect has been computed for the years after
the merger. The estimated coefficients of Table 7.10 have been used to compute the following
combinations: γ+λ×yer in the case of the linear specification, and γ+λ×yer+π×yer2 for
the quadratic specification, for each post-merger year (duration from 1 to 8). The estimated
values of the effects are reported in Table 7.11, for the plain model (cols. 1 and 4), and for
the models with controls (cols. 2 and 5) and controls interacted with the post dummy (cols. 3
and 6). To ease the interpretation of the results, the combinations described above have been
plotted against the number of years in Figure 7.9, for the specifications with controls.
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Table 7.10: Long-term effects
Dep. var.: Lerner Index (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treated*post 0.050* 0.049* 0.091** -0.043 -0.046 -0.005
(0.030) (0.030) (0.045) (0.031) (0.032) (0.041)
Treated*duration 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.064*** 0.066*** 0.066***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Treated*duration2 -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
(log) Total assets -0.007 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008
(0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011)
Shareholders’ HHI 0.003 -0.007 0.003 -0.007
(0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008)
Shares top 4 owners 0.009 0.049 0.012 0.051
(0.049) (0.079) (0.049) (0.079)
Firm’s Integration 0.007 -0.003 0.005 -0.004
(0.035) (0.044) (0.034) (0.044)
Shares owned by Big2 -0.675 0.424 -0.659 0.427
(0.738) (1.039) (0.746) (1.067)
(log) Total assets*post 0.001 0.001
(0.007) (0.007)
Shareholders’ HHI*post 0.012** 0.012**
(0.005) (0.005)
Shares top 4 owners*post -0.044 -0.043
(0.077) (0.077)
Firm’s Integration*post 0.015 0.014
(0.036) (0.037)
Shares owned by Big2*post -0.916 -0.905
(0.752) (0.755)
Observations 1,813 1,813 1,813 1,813 1,813 1,813
Treated 483 483 483 483 483 483
Controls 1,330 1,330 1,330 1,330 1,330 1,330
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
R-squared within 0.016 0.021 0.027 0.024 0.028 0.035
R-squared overall 0.614 0.616 0.619 0.617 0.619 0.622
Robust standard errors, clustered at the firm level, are shown in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
In columns (1)-(3) and (4)-(6) we control for the duration after the merger and its square, respectively.
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In the linear specification, the impact of the merger seems to be positively related to time,
as the Lerner Index significantly increases with the number of years, and after 6 years the
effect vanishes. Looking at the point estimates reported in Table 7.11, col. (1), it emerges
that after 2 and 3 years of the merger treated firms show a Lerner Index approximately 0.06
points larger than that of control firms (an estimate statistically significant at 5%), reaching
the maximum value of 0.08 difference after 7 years (coefficients are statistically significant at
10%) while disappearing in the 8th year. Results do not change if controls and their interaction
with post are included, as displayed in col. (2) and (3) of the same table.
Figure 7.9: Long term effects
(a) Linear specification
(b) Quadratic specification
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However, a more reliable picture emerges when a quadratic term is introduced, which has a
concave effect. In fact, as shown in Figure 7.9b, one additional year after the merger is asso-
ciated to a larger effect on the Lerner Index. According to estimates of Table 7.11, col. (4), the
effect is statistically significant after 2 years and increases up to 5 years from the merger. It
slowly decreases and then, after 6 years disappears. Similar results are observed if controls
and its interaction with post are included (Table 7.11, col. 5 and 6). The main intuition behind
these findings is that the merger event prompted a sizable increase of the Lerner Index in
treated firms during the first years after which the market self-correction took place.
Table 7.11: Effects in models including linear or quadratic time trends
Linear Quadratic
Years (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1 year 0.06** 0.06** 0.010** 0.01 0.01 0.06
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04)
2 years 0.06** 0.06** 0.010** 0.06** 0.06** 0.10**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
3 years 0.06** 0.07** 0.011** 0.09** 0.09** 0.13***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
4 years 0.07** 0.07** 0.011** 0.10** 0.11** 0.15***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06)
5 years 0.07* 0.08* 0.012** 0.11** 0.11** 0.15**
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
6 years 0.08* 0.08* 0.012** 0.09** 0.10** 0.14**
(0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
7 years 0.08* 0.08* 0.013** 0.07 0.07 0.11*
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
8 years 0.08 0.09 0.013** 0.03 0.04 0.08
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Plain model (cols. 1 and 4), with controls (cols. 2 and 5), controls
interacted with post (cols. 3 and 6)
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7.7.2 Intensity of the exposure
In the main analysis all treated firms receive the same weights. However, it might be that the
impact of the merger on profitability depends on the extent of a firm’s exposure to BlackRock
and/or BGI in 2007. For example, the impact of the merger for a firm held at 1% by BG and/or
BlackRock in 2007 could be different from that experienced by a firm held, say, at 3%.
To investigate whether there has been a heterogeneous response according to the intensity
of exposure, we build a continuous variable, shareowned, corresponding to the value of par-
ticipation of BGI and/or BlackRock in 2007 (sum of the respective shares). This indicator is
interacted with tretedƒ2007 × post2007, and a quadratic specification is also considered. The
estimated model is a generalised version of Eq. (7.1), taking the following form:
yƒ t = α+ tretedƒ2007 × postt × (γ+ λ shreonedƒ07 + π shreoned2ƒ07) + δƒ t + ƒƒ + ƒt + ƒ t
(7.5)
Results of estimation for this model are reported in Table 7.12. Columns (1)-(3) show the
estimates of the linear specification, where coefficient π in Eq. (7.5) is set equal to zero.
Columns (4)-(6) present instead the estimates of the quadratic specification. Like before, each
set of three columns corresponds to model without controls, with controls, and with controls
interacted with post.
The quadratic effect is given by the full combination γ+λ×shreonedƒ2007+π shreoned2ƒ07,
while in the linear specification the impact corresponds to γ + λ × shreonedƒ2007; in both
cases the effect depends on the specific value of the variable shareowned. In practice, it
is possible to compute the impact for any value of exposure. For the sake of the example,
the linear and quadratic combined effects are computed using the estimated coefficients for
some chosen levels of exposure (see Table 7.13). The same results are also plotted in Figure
7.10. Apparently, in the linear specification reported in Figure 7.10a, larger shares owned by
BGI and/or BlackRock in 2007 seem to be associated with a reduction on the Lerner Index,
however the significance fades for very large values of exposure, rarely observed in practice.
More in detail, the impact of the merger for a firm held at 1% by BGI and/or BlackRock leads
to an increase of the Lerner Index of 0.10, an estimation statistically significant at 5%. Such
an impact significantly reduces to 0.05 if the held quota increases to 4% (Table 7.13 col. 1).
After 5%, there seems to be no significant impact on the Lerner Index.
Regarding the quadratic specification, although in the visual depiction (Figure 7.10b) and in
the opposite sign of the polynomial coefficients (see Table 7.12, col. 4 to 6) there seems to be
a U-shape pattern, this has no sufficient statistical power.
Further complements to the present exposure analysis are reported in Appendix D.
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Table 7.12: Alternative specifications accounting for exposure level
Dep. var.: Lerner Index (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treated*post 0.119** 0.118** 0.144** 0.146* 0.145* 0.172*
(0.058) (0.059) (0.064) (0.083) (0.084) (0.089)
Treated*post*Shareowned -0.018 -0.017 -0.016 -0.049 -0.048 -0.051
(0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.052) (0.052) (0.058)
Treated*post*Shareowned2 0.004 0.004 0.005
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
(log) Total assets -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.007
(0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011)
Shareholders’ HHI 0.004 -0.006 0.004 -0.007
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
Shares top 4 owners 0.005 0.050 0.005 0.058
(0.050) (0.079) (0.050) (0.079)
Firm’s Integration 0.008 -0.002 0.008 -0.002
(0.035) (0.044) (0.035) (0.044)
Shares owned by Big2 -0.336 -0.141 -0.310 -0.328
(0.619) (1.312) (0.612) (1.379)
(log) Total assets*post 0.000 0.001
(0.007) (0.007)
Shareholders’ HHI*post 0.012** 0.013**
(0.005) (0.006)
Shares top 4 owners*post -0.048 -0.059
(0.076) (0.076)
Firm’s Integration*post 0.015 0.015
(0.036) (0.036)
Shares owned by Big2*post -0.159 0.022
(0.985) (1.043)
Observations 1,813 1,813 1,813 1,813 1,813 1,813
Treated 483 483 483 483 483 483
Controls 1,330 1,330 1,330 1,330 1,330 1,330
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
R-squared within 0.019 0.023 0.028 0.020 0.024 0.029
R-squared overall 0.616 0.617 0.619 0.616 0.617 0.619
Robust standard errors, clustered at the firm level, are shown in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 7.13: Heterogeneous effects on the Lerner Index, according to different levels of exposure to
BlackRock and/or BGI. The effects are calculated, for the sake of the example, at some chosen levels of
exposure (shares owned).
Exposure Linear Quadratic
(Shares owned) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1% 0.10** 0.10** 0.13** 0.10** 0.10** 0.13**
(0.05) (0.05) (0.053) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
2% 0.08** 0.08** 0.11** 0.07* 0.07* 0.09*
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
3% 0.07** 0.07** 0.10** 0.04 0.04 0.06
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06)
4% 0.05* 0.05* 0.08* 0.02 0.02 0.04
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07)
5% 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.04
(0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.07)
6% 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.04
(0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06)
7% 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.05
(0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07)
8% -0.01 -0.00 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.07
(0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10)
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Plain model (cols. 1 and 4), with controls (cols. 2 and 5), controls
interacted with post (cols. 3 and 6)
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Figure 7.10: Marginal effects of the exposure to BlackRock and/or BGI. The effects are calculated, for
the sake of the example, at some chosen levels of exposure (shares owned).
(a) Linear specification
(b) Quadratic specification
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7.8 Final remarks
This analysis presents a first attempt to measure the possible effects of common shareholding
on competition in the Beverages industry. The study considers the exogenous shock in own-
ership given by the BlackRock-BGI merger of 2009. The merger is exploited in a difference-in-
differences setting so as to determine a possible causal effect on market competition.
The specific market under investigation is defined by the set of beverages manufacturers
active in the EU territory between 2007 and 2016, namely either registered in the EU, or
holding participation in at least one firm registered in Europe. The range of manufactured
products considered in the study includes soft drinks, mineral waters, juices and beers.
The first evidence collected in this study points to the direction of enhanced market power
for the manufacturers that experienced increased common shareholding due to the merger.
Moreover, it should be noted that an increase in the Lerner Index - the competitive outcome
used in the analysis - appears to be driven more by a marked increase in revenues, rather
than a decrease in costs. The effect is larger for those companies which were only marginally
participated in by BlackRock or BGI before the merger, having benefitted most from the event.
On the other hand, those manufacturers which were more strongly held by either fund pre-
merger show a positive but smaller improvement in profitability. The effect is present soon
after the merger, but reaches its peak between four and five years after the event, becoming
negligible later on. The empirical evidence found in this study is robust to a certain number of
checks, including alternative specifications of the outcome and treatment variables. Overall,
the findings presented in this chapter seem to confirm similar results obtained by scholars
using US data for other industries. This constitutes, to the best of our knowledge, the first
investigation using EU data, and the first on the Beverages industry.
These results would appear to suggest a positive association between common shareholding
and the market power of firms. However, the findings of this study should be treated with
caution; in particular, the following caveats should be considered:
i) The small sample size and the short period of observation are potentially responsible
for the limited power of some statistical results, which will require further investigation.
In this respect, earlier data on the common shareholding structure of firms would help
confirm that BlackRock and BGI in 2007 did not specifically target companies that would
have performed well after the crisis. In a similar vein, multiple observations prior to the
merger would strengthen the evidence of a common trend between treated and control
firms - a key identifying assumption of the difference-in-differences design underlying the
analysis.
ii) The study focuses only on the Beverages sector, but while carefully accounting for other
industries’ specificities as well as possible data shortcomings, the present methodology
could be applied to possible future investigations in other markets.
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iii) The Lerner Index is used - following the literature - as a proxy of market competition;
however, data on prices would help reinforce the evidence on common shareholding and
competitive outcomes, as it would facilitate controlling for the heterogeneity of products
sold by firms. Moreover, any country/product specific changes in the market could have
been factored-in.
A final observation is due, concerning possible unobservable factors that may have affected
profitability, other than the merger under consideration. There are a series of possible mech-
anisms of influence through which asset managers may affect a firm’s competitive outcome.
Typically, such mechanisms include network effects, general policy consensus between asset
managers, or even a specific threshold in ownership that allows for effective leverage, under
which a shareholder in practice does not have a strong impact. These factors were not directly
observable in the present study and potentially could be further investigated, depending on
the availability of additional specific data. In reality, the phenomenon of common sharehold-
ing proved to be particularly complex, and disentangling its various effects continues to be
challenging. Given that the literature in this area has not yet investigated in depth the chan-
nels through which influence is exerted, this certainly constitutes a good candidate for future
research.
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Box 7.1: Econometrics - Strategy
 We excluded a multi-industry econometric analysis, due to the product and structural
heterogeneity of different sectors, and opted instead for a single sector analysis.
 In the definition of the most appropriate econometric strategy, we observed that results
from the sectoral analyses did not show a very specific trend. The extent of common
shareholding at overall industry level was already high when our observation started in
2007, and remained roughly unchanged until 2016.
 However, looking at a selection of top investors, the sectoral reports revealed that a
change in the identity of the main players took place. In particular, we saw the rise of the
large investment funds and a contemporaneous drop in the participation of banks and
insurance companies.
 In particular, the 2009 merger of BlackRock with BGI, is the largest ’substitution’ event
between funds and banks. This event was of unprecedented proportions in the history
of mergers between asset management funds, and has therefore played a crucial role in
shaping the various studies on common shareholding.
 Given that the BlackRock-BGI merger represented a once-in-a-lifetime event, we also
investigated the possible existence of other minor changes in ownership at the investors’
level, which in turn may have provoked a relevant change in the degree of common
shareholding of the firms active in each sector.
 Others have encountered the same finding, that the statistical and economic significance
of the effects of these minor mergers is there but “an order of magnitude smaller” than
that of the BlackRock-BGI event. We therefore privileged this latter event, in order to
analyse possible links between common shareholding and competitive outcomes.

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Box 7.2: Econometrics - Modelling
 Challenges. The econometric modelling has several challenges ahead, principally the
lack of an established theory showing how common shareholding affects managers, and
from there competitive outcomes. Additional challenges are:
– Defining market boundaries and proximity. The NACE classification is suited to
identify well established sectors, but is unable to capture markets in rapid change
where new technologies and products emerge. Instead, we used expert knowledge
to define exactly the players in each of the analysed markets.
– Using a common shareholding measure that overcomes the drawbacks of the
MHHI. We develop new measures taken from the literature on sparse matrices and
networks.
– Using a relevant measure of competition. Prices remain the preferred indicator for
changes in competitive forces on the market, however obtaining data on prices
at the required level of specificity is still a challenge. Instead, we used measures
of market power and market concentration. Market power is approximated by the
Lerner index, calculated either on the difference between sales and variable costs or
on the difference between operating profits and financial costs, to account for fixed
costs. Market concentration: the HHI is the typical measure of concentration used in
the literature, as it computes the relative size of a firm in an industry in terms of the
proportion of total output.
– A major empirical shortcoming relates to the use of accounting data from consoli-
dated vs unconsolidated accounts. We use unconsolidated accounts whenever avail-
able to be more precise in targeting the sector and the geographic area of activity.
 The sample. The Beverage sector was chosen for the empirical analysis: the set of
beverages manufacturers active in the EU territory between 2007 and 2016, namely
either registered in the EU, or holding participations in at least one firm registered in
Europe. The range of manufactured products considered in the study includes soft
drinks, mineral waters, juices and beers.
 The model. The impact of the change in common shareholding - induced by the
BlackRock-BGI merger - is estimated using a difference-in-differences approach. The
change in markup, before and after the event, for firms exposed to the merger (“treated”
group) is compared to that of firms that did not have any pre-merger relations with Black-
Rock and/or BGI (“control” group). We refine the estimated model through accounting
for several confounding factors, which could distort the measured link between common
shareholding and profitability. In particular, we account for the heterogeneity of relevant
firm-level characteristics, such as the dimension of the company, the shareholding struc-
ture, and the integration of the firm with competitors through common shareholders.

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Box 7.3: Econometrics - Results
 Estimation indicates that, after the merger, firms that were already held by BlackRock
and/or BGI show a Lerner Index on average 0.07 points higher than control firms. This
suggests that the merger triggered an increase in profitability of firms already exposed
to BlackRock and/or BGI before the event.
 Analogous results are obtained using the alternative competition measure as an outcome,
i.e. the Lerner Index adjusted for cost of capital.
 The increase in the Lerner Index seems to be driven more by a marked increase in rev-
enues, than by a decrease in costs.
 We explore the possibility that the effect of the merger on the Lerner Index may take
time to materialise. We find that the impact of the merger seems to be positively related
to time, as the Lerner Index significantly increases with the number of years; 2 and 3
years on from the merger, treated firms show a Lerner Index approximately 0.06 points
larger than that of control firms (an estimate statistically significant at 5%), reaching the
maximum value of 0.08 difference after 7 years (although only statistically significant at
10%), while disappearing in the 8th year. The main intuition behind these findings is that
the merger event prompted a sizable increase in the Lerner Index in treated firms during
the first years, after which the market self-correction took place.
 We explore the possibility that the degree of exposure to the merger may influence the
actual extent of the effect. For example, the impact of the merger for a firm held at 1% by
BG and/or BlackRock in 2007 could be different from that experienced by a firm held, say,
at 3%. We find the effect is larger for those companies which were only marginally part of
the BlackRock or BGI portfolios before the merger, having benefitted most from the event.
In particular, the impact of the merger for a firm held at 1% by BGI and/or BlackRock leads
to an increase in the Lerner Index of 0.10 points, an estimation statistically significant at
5%. Such an impact significantly reduces to 0.05 if the quota held increases to 4%. For
firms participated in at 5% or more, there seems to be no significant impact on the Lerner
Index. This effect is not driven by efficiency considerations as we find that increased
revenues rather than decreased costs drive the result.

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Box 7.4: Econometrics - Robustness checks
Several sensitivity checks are performed on alternative specifications of the sample, and on
a different definition of the groups of treated and control firms (firms directly affected by the
merger, and firms whose shareholding structure is not touched by the merger, respectively).
 Is an outlier driving the result? No, the value of the impact does not suffer from notable
changes when single firms are dropped from the sample.
 Without the merger, would firms held by BGI and/or BlackRock in 2007 have experienced
the same growth in their potential Lerner Index? No, our statistical tests suggest that
this would not have happened; i.e. the firms would not have experienced a higher Lerner
index, if the merger had not taken place.
 Is the result robust to changes of the sample? Yes, we replicate our main results by relying
on a balanced sample of firms, keeping only those with recorded observations along the
entire time-span of the analysis. Results are confirmed and the estimated coefficient is
even higher.
 In our analysis we had: i) firms held only by BlackRock; ii) firms held only by BGI and
iii) firms held by both BlackRock and BGI. The assumption was that all the above three
groups of firms were equally exposed to the merger, and could therefore be considered
as "treated". However, the interpretation of the role of these three groups might vary,
and lead eventually to alternative definitions of the treatment and control groups. Is the
result robust to these changes? Yes, estimations are not sensitive to the definition of the
treated group.
 We also ran a series of falsification tests to validate our model, all with negative results. In
particular, we looked into the possibility that BlackRock/BGI, anticipating the 2008 crisis,
could have targeted only the better performing companies in 2007. We find that the
two financial institutions did not substantially alter their portfolio in anticipation of the
financial and economic turmoil.

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Box 7.5: Econometrics - Additional comments and limitations of the analysis
 The short period of observation before the merger is probably responsible for the limited
power of some statistical results, which will need further investigation. In this respect,
earlier data on the common shareholding structure of firms would help confirm that Black-
Rock and BGI in 2007 did not specifically target companies that would have performed
well after the crisis. In a similar vein, multiple observations prior to the merger would
strengthen the evidence of a common trend between treated and control firms - a key
identifying assumption of the difference-in-differences design underlying the analysis.
 The study focuses only on the Beverages sectors, but while carefully accounting for other
industries’ specificities, as well as possible data shortcomings, the present methodology
could be applied to possible future investigations in other markets.
 The Lerner Index is used - following the literature - as a proxy of market competition;
however, data on prices would help reinforce the evidence on common shareholding and
competitive outcomes, as it facilitates controlling for the heterogeneity of products sold
by firms. Moreover, any country/product specific changes in the market could have been
factored-in.
 Additional unobservable factors, other than the merger under consideration, may have
affected profitability. There are a series of possible mechanisms of influence through
which asset managers may affect a firm’s competitive outcome. Typically, such mech-
anisms include network effects, general policy consensus between asset managers, or
even a specific threshold in ownership that allows for effective leverage, under which a
shareholder in practice does not have a strong impact. These factors were not directly
observable in the present study and potentially could be further investigated, depending
on the availability of additional specific data.
The phenomenon of common shareholding proved to be particularly complex, and disentan-
gling its various effects continues to be challenging. Given that the literature in this area has
not yet investigated in depth the channels through which influence is exerted, this certainly
constitutes a good candidate for future research.

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Chapter 8
Conclusions
The debate on common shareholding - and its potential antitrust effects - is currently on the
agenda of all major think tanks and institutions worldwide. Common shareholders are typi-
cally institutional investors - e.g. pension funds and asset managers - holding concomitant
shareholdings in a given market. In the last two decades, these investment funds have grown
substantially in total size and concentration, both in Europe and worldwide, especially those
channeling savings towards investment strategies that replicate the performance of stock
market indices, such as the S&P500 or the FTSE100. Despite claiming a so-called passive
engagement strategy (not intervening directly in firm’s decisions), institutional investors col-
lect, together with the shares, the associated voting rights of their customers. This has led
economists (and policy makers) to analyse the effects of this concentration of power, as well as
the influence exerted on the management decisions of the firms which common shareholders
are mandated to invest in.
This report provides a comprehensive analysis of common shareholding in Europe with a spe-
cific focus on five industries/markets, namely Oil&Gas, Electricity, Trading Platforms, Telecom-
munications and Beverages. Based on firm-level balance sheet and ownership data, a set of
new indices of common shareholding is used to describe the investment behavior of share-
holders at both industry and investor level. The strength of relationships within the networks
of firms and of investors is also studied. Special attention is devoted to the top investors in
the EU overall as well as in each industry, and a brief overview of cross-investments within
industries is also reported, when relevant. Our baseline analysis is conducted on a historical
dataset containing all listed companies active in the EU in the period 2007-2016: this includes
all listed firms registered in the EU, plus all listed companies registered elsewhere, but holding
shares in at least one firm registered in the EU. The average number of firms observed each
year is 26,560 (24,857 in 2017 to 26,942 in 2016) - where on average about 57% are regis-
tered in the EU countries, the rest being registered outside the EU.
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We find that in 2016, 87.2% of all shareholders of companies in our dataset hold participation
in only one company (85.7% in 2007). Common shareholders therefore constitute 12.8% of all
shareholders (14.9% in 2007). The number of listed firms that are cross-held by block-holders
(common shareholders with at least 5% participation in more than one company) has been
increasing, rising from about 15.5 thousand in 2007 to about 17.5 thousand in 2016. Around
67% of the analysed companies are cross-held by block-holders with at least 5% participation.
Looking at portfolios, top common shareholders hold shares in as many as 25% of the firms
in the market, i.e. more than 6,000 companies overall. They tend to invest equally among
the chosen firms, rather than giving priority to certain specific companies by buying higher
percentages of shares. The firms included in the largest portfolios represent a significant
proportion of the total value of the market, reaching a coverage of above 80% of Total Assets
(TOAS) and more than 90% of Market Capitalisation in almost all years. This means that the
top investors not only hold shares in a considerable number of firms (around 25%), but also
typically choose the largest enterprises, leaving out only minor players - which together do
not account for more than 10-20% of the market value. The preference for the largest market
players has become stronger over time. When both Total Assets and Market Capitalisation are
multiplied by the percentage of shares actually held, we find that in 2016 the top common
shareholder holds within its grasp 3.8% of total weighted Market Capitalisation and 6.6% of
the weighted TOAS in the EU. These percentages were 2.3 and 3.6 respectively in 2008; an
acceleration in the control of Total Assets or MarketCap can be observed as of 2012.
As to specific industries, we find that more than half of investors hold portfolios of very little
intensity, with average holdings of less than 1%. The mean portfolio holds shares of about
5-6% on average in the held firms; only Oil&Gas shows lower levels, while Telecoms stands on
slightly higher values, given the strong presence of high-participation corporate groups. Top
common shareholders are the usual suspects in all sectors (top banks and large asset man-
agement funds), except in Telecoms where individuals and large corporate groups dominate
via their cross-shareholdings in other companies in the same sector.
In the Oil&Gas sector BlackRock, Vanguard, State Street and Norway hold large amounts of
market value in their grasp: their shares in the held companies amount to about 12.88% of
the TOAS in 2016. A peculiar case is the Russian Government, which holds almost 6% of the
Total Assets of the market in 2016 via its subsidiaries Gazprom and Rosneft, but has little or
no participations in other companies.
In the Electricity market top common shareholders hold about 7% of the market’s Total As-
sets through their participation shares, and about 3.5% of Market Capitalisation. France plays
a major role in this market, holding very large stakes in three of the top ten EU-based cor-
porations, together with a minor presence in some additional firms. Overall in 2016 France
controlled about 6.7% of the Total Assets of this market. China is also a major player, mainly
via its subsidiary CHINA HUADIAN CORP, controlling about 3.23% of market TOAS. The usual
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US-based funds (BlackRock, State Street and Vanguard) are still present as top investors, but
rather for the large number of firms in their portfolios, each held with minority shares. Overall,
together they control 5.57% of market TOAS.
The Trading Platforms sector presents some peculiarities. The set of firms operating the trad-
ing platforms (stock exchanges, banks, tech companies) is rather heterogeneous, not only in
terms of area of activity but also in terms of Total Assets and Market Capitalisation. Banks usu-
ally have a value of Total Assets which is incomparably higher than that of a traditional stock
exchange, and even more so than a digital platform or technology firm. On the other hand,
even companies with few assets can have a large Market Cap (even if the amount of listed
firms in the identified set of operators is minor). Many of the companies active in this sector
are controlled by large groups, thus presenting a very concentrated ownership structure with
large participation shares in the hands of few - or even only one - investors. The picture of
top investors in this industry is largely dominated by banks, while funds tend to drop to lower
positions in the ranking of common shareholders. In 2016, the big funds appeared to hold
very similar portfolios in terms of firms held, but the level of participation varies. For example,
BlackRock holds a large share (8.66%) of the London Stock Exchange, while State Street and
Vanguard have about 3% each. On the other hand, State Street has a strong presence in the
Spanish banks Santander (8.34%) and Banco Bilbao Vizcaya (10.87%), while BlackRock holds
about half of that and Vanguard even less (about 1% and 2% respectively). Overall, the size
of the portfolios - in terms of the number of firms - does not differ much across investors, with
Sweden, Funds, Banks and Insurance companies each fluctuating within the range 15%-20%,
while Norway displays a consistently higher value, of above 20%, holding the largest portfolio
in 2016 (34 firms).
In 2016, ownership in the Mobile Telecoms industry is concentrated in the hands of select indi-
viduals and associated holding groups, alongside large investment management firms such as
Blackrock or Vanguard Group. These global shareholders hold significant investments in large
pan-European telecom groups such as Vodafone and Orange, as well as national providers.
Together, these groups and providers compose almost the entirety of the European mobile
telecommunication market. The Telecoms sector exhibits some distinctiveness with respect to
the other sectors, notably cross-ownership (the telecoms companies themselves are common
shareholders). Another peculiarity of the Telecoms sector is the presence of individuals as com-
mon shareholders. Mr. Carlos Slim Helú (Mexico), Mr. Victor Li Tzar Kuoi (Hong Kong/China),
and J. Malone (US) control, directly or indirectly, 3.26%, 3.09% and 2.01% of the Total Assets
in the market, respectively. Among the funds, BlackRock dominates this industry, with rather
large shares in some of the top players (over 8% in Vodafone, almost 7% in BT GROUP PLC and
about 6% in KONINKLIJKE KPN NV); overall BlackRock controlled about 3.18% of Total Assets
in 2016. Vanguard and Norway lag behind, with relatively small participations, while State
Street plays only a minor role. France is also present, with a large participation in the French
company Orange, but also with some smaller stakes in other top competitors.
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The Beverages market is rather heterogeneous. Relatively small enterprises with local markets
and a limited shareholder structure coexist with a set of large firms producing and/or distribut-
ing alcoholic products, structured in complex corporate groups with many cross-holdings (as
in the Telecoms sector). The top 1% of investors in 2007 held above 14% of the firms in the
sector, and in 2016 this declined to 11.2%. These investors hold firms that represent at least
between 53% and 60% of the Total Assets of the industry depending on the year (declining
trend). The top common shareholder has invested in companies representing up to 82% of the
TOAS of the sector in 2016. Such values are in line with expectations, since top investors tend
to privilege the largest enterprises. However, when this index is weighted according to the par-
ticipation share of investors, the trend inverts, demonstrating that the largest investor holds
a slightly decreasing share of weighted Total Assets. It would seem that top investors (but
this holds for other investors in general) are diluting their investment concentration amongst
a larger number of firms.
Likewise, cross-investment also characterises investment behavior in this sector. The first
three common shareholders in terms of weighted total assets in the Beverages sector are also
part of the market: DIAGEO PLC (UK) with 4.25% of the market TOAS, L’ARCHE GREEN (NL)
with 3.40% and ANHEUSER-BUSCH INBEV (BE) with 2.92%. BlackRock is the first common
shareholder external to the market, with rather large shares in most of the top players, reach-
ing up to 8.82% in a single firm. Overall, in 2016 BlackRock accounted for 2.33% of the market
TOAS. Vanguard and State Street lag behind, with relatively small participations. State Street
in particular is a minor player for the observed year.
This report also explores the link between common shareholding and competition, notably the
idea that higher markups should be observed in markets with higher common shareholding
(Azar et al., 2018). The phenomenon was already present when our observation started in
2007, and remained stable throughout the period of observation, so no specific trend for over-
all common shareholding could be explored for our econometric strategy. Instead, a change
in the identity of the main players is clearly detected, exhibited through the rise of the large
investment funds and a contemporaneous drop in the participation of banks and insurance
companies. Therefore, the proposed model exploits this feature for the econometric identi-
fication. In particular, the 2009 merger of BlackRock with BGI was the largest ’substitution’
event between funds and banks. This event was of unprecedented proportions in the history of
mergers between asset management funds, and has therefore played a crucial role in shaping
the various studies on common shareholding. This is true for all analysed markets, including
Beverages, the market eventually used as test case for the econometric analysis.
The econometric modelling posed several challenges, principally (not addressed in this report)
the lack of an established theory showing how common shareholding affects managers, and
thus competitive outcomes. Additional challenges addressed include (i) the definition of mar-
ket boundaries and proximity, done in collaboration with experts in the field, (ii) the use of a
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measure for common shareholding that overcomes the drawbacks of the measure mostly used
in the literature (the modified HHI) - for this we developed new measures taken from the liter-
ature on sparse matrices and networks; and finally (iii) the use of an appropriate measure of
competition. Although prices remain the preferred indicator for changes in competitive forces
on the market, obtaining data on prices at the required level of specificity is still a challenge.
Instead, we used a measure of market power, approximated by the Lerner index.
The impact of the change in common shareholding induced by the BlackRock-BGI merger is
estimated using a difference-in-differences approach, by comparing - before and after the
event - the markup of firms exposed to the merger (treated group of treated firms) to that
of firms that did not have any pre-merger relations with BlackRock and/or BGI (control group
or control firms). The markup is measured through the Lerner Index, calculated either on the
difference between sales and variable costs or on the difference between operating profits
and financial costs, to account for fixed costs.
The estimations performed indicate that the merger between BlackRock and BGI did in fact
have an effect on markups of the firms in their portfolios. After the merger, firms that were
already held by BlackRock and/or BGI show a Lerner Index on average 0.07 points higher than
control firms, suggesting that the merger triggered an increase in profitability of firms already
exposed to BlackRock and/or BGI. Analogous results are obtained using an alternative compe-
tition measure as the outcome, the Lerner Index adjusted for cost of capital. We find that the
increase in the Lerner Index seems to be driven more by a marked increase in revenues rather
than a decrease in costs. We also find that the impact of the merger seems to be positively
related to time, as the Lerner Index significantly increases with the number of years; 2 and 3
years on from the merger, treated firms show a Lerner Index approximately 0.06 points larger
than that of control firms, reaching the maximum value of a difference of 0.08 points after 7
years, while disappearing in the 8th year. The main intuition behind these findings is that the
merger event prompted a sizable increase in the Lerner Index in treated firms during the initial
years, after which the market self-correction took place. We also explored the possibility that
the degree of exposure to the merger may influence the actual extent of the effect. We find
that the effect is larger for those companies which were only marginally part of the BlackRock
or BGI portfolios before the merger, having benefitted most from the event. In particular, the
impact of the merger for a firm held at 1% by BGI and/or BlackRock leads to an increase of
the Lerner Index of 0.10 points on average. Such an impact significantly reduces to 0.05 if
the shares held increase to 4%. For firms participated in at 5% or more, there seems to be no
significant impact on the Lerner Index.
Our results would appear to suggest a positive association between common shareholding and
the market power of firms. However, the findings of this study should be treated with caution;
in particular, the following caveats should be considered. First, earlier data on the common
shareholding structure of firms would help confirm that BlackRock and BGI in 2007 did not
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specifically target companies that would have performed well after the crisis. We do not find
evidence of this, but our sample is limited. In a similar vein, multiple observations prior to the
merger would strengthen the evidence of a common trend between treated and control firms
- a key identifying assumption of the difference-in-differences design underlying the analysis.
Second, the study focuses only on the Beverages sectors, however, while carefully accounting
for other industries’ specificities and possible data shortcomings, the present methodology
could be applied to possible future investigations in other markets. Third, the Lerner Index
is used - following the literature - as a proxy of market competition; however, data on prices
would help reinforce the evidence on common shareholding and competitive outcomes, as
it would enable controlling for the heterogeneity of products sold by firms. Moreover, any
country/product specific changes in the market could be factored-in.
A final observation is due, concerning possible unobservable factors that may have affected
profitability, other than the merger under consideration. There are a series of possible mech-
anisms of influence through which asset managers may affect a firm’s competitive outcome.
Typically, such mechanisms include network effects, general policy consensus between asset
managers, or even a specific threshold in ownership that allows for effective leverage, under
which a shareholder in practice does not have a strong impact. These factors were not directly
observable in the present study and potentially could be further investigated, depending on
the availability of additional specific data. In reality, the phenomenon of common sharehold-
ing proved to be particularly complex, and disentangling its various effects continues to be
challenging. Given that the literature in this area has not yet investigated in depth the chan-
nels through which influence is exerted, this certainly constitutes a good candidate for future
research.
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Appendix A
The Database of EU Ownership
A dataset comprising the ownership information of companies is a rich resource that can be
used to investigate several research questions about the structure of corporate groups. Such
a dataset also allows to obtain relevant empirical evidence, which can help make informed
decisions based on deeper knowledge of market structures.
Despite the availability of large commercial databases of firm-level micro data, the extraction
and cleaning of the relevant information is in itself a hard task, given the huge size of the data
involved, the complexity of the ownership information, and the need to match it with several
additional firm’s characteristics. The challenge is not new in applied research, as reported, for
instance, in Ribeiro et al. (2010), or Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2015). However, given the specific
focus of each empirical study, different purposely-built sets of data may be needed, rather
than a comprehensive all-inclusive database.
The present Appendix describes the procedure followed in the construction of an ad hoc
dataset with ownership information on a specific target group, i.e. the listed companies active
in the EU between 2007 and 2016. All firm-level data are extracted from Bureau van Dijk’s
Orbis database, which will be presented in detail later.
The set of firms selected for the current study includes not only listed firms registered in one
of the EU countries, but also listed firms registered elsewhere, but holding stakes in EU firms.
Overall, a set of 31,864 different firms are observed, with an average of 26,560 per year;
of these, roughly four in ten are registered outside the EU. The shareholding structures of
these firms comprise more than 100,000 distinct reported owners per year, with over 6 million
shareholder-firm links registered over the period of observation.
The Appendix highlights the challenges encountered in the development of the ad hoc owner-
ship dataset, and discusses the choices made along the way. The final dataset is constructed
with the immediate purpose of specific applications, such as drawing the picture of common
shareholding in the EU, or measuring the possible effect of common shareholding on the mar-
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ket. However, the dataset is rather general and is suitable for several other empirical studies
on firms and their ownership structure.
The procedure used for the construction of the dataset is also quite general, following some
overall principles that are justified and detailed in this Appendix. Such procedure can easily
be adapted - with minor modifications - to the extraction of similar information for different
target groups of companies, or different geographical regions.
The Appendix is organised as follows: Section A.1 presents the structure of the Orbis database.
Section A.2 describes the method of identification and selection of the companies of interest,
i.e. the listed companies which were active in the EU between 2007 and 2016. The same
section also discusses the procedure of firms’ selection used to identify different sectors of
economic activity. Section A.3 describes the Orbis variables that were extracted to be enclosed
in the database, ranging from general company information, to financial variables and finally
to ownership information. Section A.4 describes the organisation and cleaning of the different
parts of the database, which contain, respectively, the legal and the ownership information,
the industry classification and the financial variables. A short version of the ownership data
is also constructed, containing summarised ownership information suitable to be merged with
the financial and industry data. Some new variables defined for the current purpose, which
were constructed based on the Orbis variables, are also presented. Section A.5 contains some
descriptive statistics of the various parts of the database, while Section A.6 compares them to
evidence from official statistics.
A.1 Structure of the Orbis database
BvD provides online access to the Orbis information, with the possibility of downloading a
certain amount of selected data. However, the download process has several shortcomings, as
reported for instance in Kalemli-Oezcan et al. (2015). For example, the presence of a download
cap makes the online consultation more appropriate for a search on a specific (limited) set of
companies rather than for a massive download of a whole country or industry. Moreover,
the occasional reclassification of companies’ identifiers (so-called BvD IDs) makes sometimes
difficult to match companies’ information downloaded at different points in time, since their
identifier might have changed. Although BvD provides a“correspondence table” of BvD IDs,
the task does not always have an easy solution. Finally, some online ownership information
only presents the current situation (such as the current Global Ultimate Owner), but does not
allow to reconstruct the previous historical information.
As an alternative, BvD provides the Orbis data twice a year through the release of flat files,
which mirror the online information at a specific point in time. The flat files information has
the advantage of being consistent in terms of companies’ identifiers, and also provides the full
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historical ownership information. Although the large size of the files calls for the need to split
them into smaller sets of data, there is no imposed cap on the amount of data that can be
processed, being dependent only on the computer’s capacity. A reasonable machine allows to
process much more information at a time than the download. For these (and other) reasons
the present database is constructed starting from the flat files.
BvD provides the data not in a single dataset, but via a number of files, each containing differ-
ent parts of the Orbis database. This is due to the very large dimension of the data provided,
which would make a single database unmanageable.1 BvD provides also an accompanying
document with the list of variables included in each one of the files, together with a brief
explanation on their definition. Hence, the initial key task is to locate and extract from the
various files the information that is needed.
The present database is based on the last release at the time of the study, available since
February 2018, which refers to information updated to December 2017. However, companies’
financial statements for the year 2017 were still not available on that date, as well as many
other variables which need more time to be processed.2 Therefore the present database will
contain only information relative to the period 2007-2016.
Table A.1 provides an overview of the different flat files that compose the Orbis database, and
reports the main variables they contain. The first batch of files provides descriptive information
of the companies. The second batch provides the accounting data (Global Format and Ratios).
Further files provide information on the directorates of a company, its advisors and the stock
market where a company is listed, respectively. Lastly, additional files contain the historical
information on ownership and (current) names and types of all entities.
A.2 Extraction of companies
In order to compose the relevant database for the analysis, the extraction of information from
Orbis should undergo two selection procedures, one relative to the units to be included in
the sample (firms), the other relative to the choice of economic variables to be retained.
This section discusses the selection procedure for firms, while relevant variables retention is
described in Section A.3.
Since the present project refers to the population of listed companies that are active in the EU,
we should first define how this characteristic is identified. Subsequently, we shall discuss how
to identify the industries of interest for the sectoral studies.
1For example, the file with the financial information alone reaches a size of about 100 Gigabytes, while the owner-
ship information (2007-2016) occupies about 330 Gigabytes. Any empirical analysis needs the availability of a very
capable server, with a considerable amount of RAM memory, in order to be able to store, read in and analyse the
data.
2Notice that the release of microdata suffers generally a two-year delay in most common databases.
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Table A.1: Structure of the Orbis database (for acronyms, see p. 227)
Files Main Variables
Contact Info/All Addresses Address, Telephone/Additional Addresses of the Firm
Identifiers/BvD9 Identification numbers/BvD-Identification number, BvD9
Legal Information Listing Status, Delisting Date, Main Exchange
Additional Company Informa-
tion
Changes in the Company Name
Industry Classification NACE Code, US SIC, NAICS
Trade Description Peer Group Specification
Overviews Business lines, Brand names, Production site
Key Financial Indicators Total Assets, Cash Flows, Turnover
Global Format & Financial Ra-
tios
Fixed Assets, Current Assets, EBITDA, ROA, ROE
Directorates Current/Previous Name, Educational Degree, Salary
Bankers Current/Previous Name, Appointment Date
Advisors/Other Advisors Cur-
rent
Name, Appointment Date, Resignation Date
Stock data Stock exchange and Stock Index
Ownership Structure Shareholder Information, Ownership Shares, Ultimate
Owner
Entities BvD-Identification number, Name, ISO Code, Entity Type
A.2.1 Identification of listed companies active in the EU
First, the current listing status of all global companies is obtained from the Legal Informa-
tion file. Only companies that are currently classified as “Listed” or “Delisted” are retained,
whereas all those that are classified as “Unlisted” are discarded.3
Subsequently, the population of “listed companies active in the EU” is extracted from the
previous selection, comprising in the present study two sets of listed/delisted companies:
1. listed/delisted companies registered in one of the EU countries;
2. listed/delisted companies registered outside the EU, but holding shares in at least one
firm registered in the EU in the period 2007-2016.
3“Delisted” status denotes a company that is currently not listed in any exchange, but was listed at some point in
the past; “Unlisted” indicates a company that has never been listed in any exchange.
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In order to identify the companies in group 2., the list of all quoted companies registered
outside the EU is compared with the yearly ownership files. If any of the quoted companies
in this list appears as shareholder of one or more EU firm between 2007 and 2016, then it is
considered “active” in the EU.
The country of registration of listed/delisted companies and of the firms they participate in is
obtained again from the Legal Information file, through the company identifier. In this context
the term EU comprises the 28 countries of the EU as of 2017, excluding candidate countries
and countries which are simply associates of the European Economic Area (EEA).
A.2.2 Identification of sectors of economic activity
There are several international systems of classification of the economic activity of firms,
among which the US-SIC (US Standard Industrial Classification), the I-SIC (International Stan-
dard Industrial Classification), the NAICS (North American Industry Classification System), and
finally the NACE (Nomenclature générale des Activités économiques dans les Communautés
Européennes).
The Orbis database reports, in the Industry Classification file, the NACE, the US-SIC and the
NAICS codes for each company, describing the set of industries where the firm is active at the
time of release of the database, i.e. as of December 2017. Previous industry classifications
or changes in the current classification are not recorded, although for most companies the
economic activities are rather stable over time.
The NACE industry classification is the European statistical classification for economic activi-
ties, and therefore will be the chosen classification system in the present project. The NACE
classification has evolved over time, since previous versions were based on existing national
classification and lacked international compatibility. The present analysis refers to the most
updated version (NACE Revision 2), which has been introduced in the year 2007. This revised
version accounts for the rise of new activities in recent years and guarantees an international
compatibility, due to its alignment with the ISIC codes, the international classification of eco-
nomic activity.
We summarise in the following the main features of this industrial classification, as well as
any further aspects considered relevant for the current project. A detailed description and
discussion of the NACE Rev. 2 codes can be found in Eurostat (2008).
The NACE Codes are composed by four digits, reflecting a hierarchical structure of Sections,
Divisions, Groups and Classes, as detailed below:
- Level 1 - Section: Sections are defined by an alphabetical code, given by letters A-U.
The NACE Rev. 2 classification contains 21 sections, such as Agriculture, Forestry and
Fishing (A), Manufacturing (C), Construction (F), and so on.
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- Level 2 - Division: The divisions are identified by the first two digits of the NACE code,
ranging from 01 to 99. The divisions separate different broad areas of activity within
each Section. For example, within Section A (Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing), division
01 corresponds to “Crop and animal production, hunting and related service activities”,
division 02 to “Forestry and logging”, while division 03 to “Fishing and aquaculture”.
There are 88 Divisions in total.
- Level 3 - Group: Groups are identified by the first three digits of the NACE code, sep-
arating further the activities within each Division. There are 272 Groups in the current
revision.
- Level 4 - Class: Classes are identified by the full four-digit NACE Code, and represent
the most detailed definition of economic activity (615 classes in total).
The NACE Code does not include the alphabetical identifier of the Section. Table A.2 reproduces
an excerpt from Section A, providing an example of the hierarchical structure of the NACE
Code. The full list of the 21 sections and corresponding divisions is reported in Table A.3. The
ISIC and NACE codes contain the same classification at higher levels of the hierarchy, however
the NACE is more detailed in the subgroups.
A single company can present several NACE codes, if involved in more than one economic
activity. The NACE codes reported in Orbis can be of three types: the so-called core code,
which uniquely identifies the main activity of the company according to certain criteria;4 up to
four primary codes, denoting other sectors of activity with a high weight in the total activity of
the firm; and a series of secondary codes identifying further activities of smaller size. Although
in general most companies do not present more than four secondary codes, some companies
can present dozens of them.
Regarding the present analysis, the possible identification of sectors of interest through suit-
able NACE codes has been assessed as follows. First, the NACE classification has been in-
spected, identifying possible codes defining each market at a two-digit level. Divisions 35
(Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply) and 61 (Telecommunications) seem a nat-
ural choice for the first two industries. However, in the case of stock markets no specific
Division seems to correspond to the industry. Subsequently, some key players of each of the
three sectors have been identified in the EU, and the respective four-digit core NACE codes
extracted from Orbis. The following core NACE codes have been observed:
 Energy Generation: codes
- 0610 - Extraction of crude petroleum
- 3511 - Production of electricity
- 3523 - Trade of gas through mains
4For more details about the identification of the core industry of activity, see Chapter 3 in Eurostat (2008).
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Table A.2: NACE Codes
Section Division Group Class Description NACE Code
A Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing
01 Crop and animal production, hunting and 0100
related service activities
...
02 Forestry and logging 0200
...
03 Fishing and aquaculture 0300
03.1 Fishing 0310
03.11 Marine fishing 0311
03.12 Freshwater fishing 0312
03.2 Aquaculture 0320
03.21 Marine Aquaculture 0321
03.22 Freshwater aquaculture 0322
 Stock Markets: codes
- 6492 - Other credit granting
- 6499 - Other financial service activities, except insurance and pension funding n.e.c.
- 6611 - Administration of financial markets
- 6612 - Security and commodity contracts brokerage
 Telecommunications: code 6190 - Other telecommunications activities
The previously highlighted Divisions for the energy and the telecommunication markets seem
to be confirmed (35 and 61), although in the energy market an additional division appears,
06 - Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas. On the other hand, in the case of stock
markets Divisions 64 (Financial service activities, except insurance and pension funding) and
66 (Activities auxiliary to financial services and insurance activities) are very general and com-
prise a wide range of financial services beyond stock markets. For this industry we might wish
to consider the three-digit level, i.e. the Group; for example, Group 66.1 (Activities auxiliary
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Table A.3: Sections and Divisions of NACE Rev. 2
Section Title Divisions
A Agriculture, forestry and fishing 01 – 03
B Mining and quarrying 05 – 09
C Manufacturing 10 – 33
D Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply 35
E Water supply; sewerage, waste management and reme-
diation activities
36 – 39
F Construction 41 – 43
G Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and
motorcycles
45 – 47
H Transportation and storage 49 – 53
I Accommodation and food service activities 55 – 56
J Information and communication 58 – 63
K Financial and insurance activities 64 – 66
L Real estate activities 68
M Professional, scientific and technical activities 69 – 75
N Administrative and support service activities 77 – 82
O Public administration and defence; compulsory social se-
curity
84
P Education 85
Q Human health and social work activities 86 – 88
R Arts, entertainment and recreation 90 – 93
S Other service activities 94 – 96
T Activities of households as employers; undifferentiated
goods- and services-producing activities of households
for own use
97 – 98
U Activities of extraterritorial organisations and bodies 99
to financial services, except insurance and pension funding) includes both Classes 6611 and
6612 listed above, which seem to better identify the given industry. A similar reasoning ap-
plies to Group 64.9 (Other financial service activities, except insurance and pension funding).
Analogous reasoning was followed in the identification of beverages manufacturers. Details of
all sectors’ definitions are reported in Appendix C.
For the identification of a specific market, all companies presenting the chosen NACE code as
core, primary or secondary can be considered as active in that specific industry. However,
this very comprehensive criterion can be restricted - for example - only to core, primary and
first n secondary codes. In this case, a company that declares the chosen activity as being
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its secondary activity of order > n would not be considered as having an important role in the
industry, and therefore would be excluded. The value of n can be decided according to the
purposes of the study.
A.3 Selection of relevant company information
The company information relevant for this project is extracted from five different datasets
within the Orbis database. Starting from the files listed in Table A.1, some general company
information is retrieved from the Legal Information and Entities files, the NACE codes are
obtained from the Industry Classification file, the Global format & Financial Ratios file provides
the financial variables, and the shareholders’ structure comes from the Ownership file.
Some variables from the Legal Information and Industry Classification files have already been
described earlier, in Section A.2, given that they were used for the selection of the relevant
companies to be included in the database. The remaining variables are presented in the
remainder of this section.
A.3.1 General company information
Company ID and definition of country of reference
All files contain the so-called BvD identification number (BvDID), which identifies uniquely each
firm in Orbis, and allows to merge information from different files. The first two digits of the
BvDID mirror the ISO code of the country where the entity is incorporated. Therefore in the
present analysis whenever a firm or a market is identified by country, it should be interpreted
always as the country of registration. Notice that this does not necessarily coincide with the
trading market of the company.
The rest of the BvDID is constituted by the company’s fiscal identification number, if known.
Otherwise the internal identification number of the provider, which has provided the informa-
tion regarding this particular entity, is employed. In the case of shareholders, some may be
individuals rather than firms, in which case the personal fiscal identification number is used.
If the information is retrieved by BvD itself, the latter compose an identification number with
the ISO country code, an asterisk, followed by numerical digits. Whenever BvD cannot identify
the ISO code, the latter is replaced with YY for companies and WW for individuals.
Listed/Delisted/Unlisted variable
The Legal Information file provides a variable classifying each company in one of the following
three categories, as mentioned earlier: “Listed”, “Delisted” or “Unlisted”. This classification
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refers to the latest available information, updated to December 2017, and indicates - respec-
tively - whether the company is currently publicly listed, whether it was listed in the past but
is currently delisted, or finally whether it has never been listed.
Given that the focus of the current database has been restricted only to listed companies ac-
tive in the EU between 2007 and 2016, all companies in our sample are classified either as
“Listed” or as “Delisted”.
Incorporation, IPO and delisting dates
Information on different dates describing the life-cycle of the companies is obtained from the
Legal Information file. These variables comprise the incorporation date of the company, the
initial public offering (IPO) date (the day of the first public selling of shares of the respective
company), and the delisting date in case it has been delisted, as well as a comment on the
reason for delisting.
In order to confirm whether the currently delisted companies were actually active (and when)
in the period 2007-2016, the IPO and delisting dates have been inspected, allowing us to
define yearly dummies identifying for each year the listing status of a firm. This helps also
identify, in the case of currently listed companies, the actual starting year of the “Listed” sta-
tus. The construction of the yearly dummies is described in section A.4.5.
Main exchange
The Legal Information file provides also the identification of the primary stock exchange on
which a company is listed. The stocks might be traded in other stock markets likewise (called
secondary listings), however in smaller volumes.
Type of entity of company
The Entities file contains the basic information regarding each entity, i.e. the Name and the
type of entity (for example Industrial Company, Bank, Fund, Public Authority, Individuals, etc.).
This information is retrieved not only for the companies under study, but also for all the share-
holders and the Global Ultimate Owners of the companies in the database. This allows not
only to identify more quickly who is who via the name rather than an alphanumerical code,
but also to characterise the shareholders’ structure in terms of types.
To each firm and shareholder Orbis assigns a classification (entity type), depending on their
legal status or business field. Table A.4 lists the entity types contained in the database.
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Table A.4: Entity Types
Entity Type Description
A Insurance Company
B Bank
C Industrial Company
D Unnamed private shareholders, aggregated
E Mutual & Pension Fund/ Nominee/ Trust/ Trustee
F Financial Company
H Self Ownership
I One or more known individuals or families
J Foundation/ Research Institute
L
Unnamed shareholders (companies or a mixture of companies and private
owners)
M Employees/ Managers/ Directors
P Private Equity Firms
Q Branch
S Public authorities, States, Governments
V Venture Capital
W Marine Vessels
Y Hedge Fund
Z Public
Notice that “Public” (Z) comprises atomistic shareholders of publicly listed companies. In
contrast, “Unnamed Private Shareholders” (D) and “Unnamed Shareholder (Companies and
Private Owners)” (L) represent atomistic shareholders of non-publicly listed companies. Given
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the present company selection only Z is relevant. Since atomistic shareholder cannot individ-
ually exert control over a company, they are aggregated.
A.3.2 Ownership information
The historical Ownership file defines the relationships (links) between a “subsidiary” and its
shareholders for a given year. The term “subsidiary” here denotes any firm in portfolio,
independent of the quantity held. The information includes
 the BvD ID of both subsidiary and shareholder
 the percentage the shareholder holds (direct and total ownership shares),
 the source from which BvD has received the information,
 the date of the validity of the information,
 a classification of the subsidiary-shareholder relationship (the “type of relation”)
 the ultimate owners according to several definitions
A link with a shareholder is present for a given year whenever the shareholder information has
been confirmed in that year, or when it has been confirmed for the previous and the subse-
quent years. Older shareholder information, which has not been updated in the current year
is considered as still being valid and kept in the database. However, any previous shareholder
that no longer holds shares in the present year is dismissed.
The historical files are updated twice a year, the number of recorded links having increased
after each update. The files contain ownership links from the year 2007 onwards.
Direct and Total ownership shares
Orbis differentiates between direct and total ownership shares. A direct ownership documents
a direct participation of the shareholder in the subsidiary, as it is shown in Figure A.1 a). In
other words, the shareholder owns shares of the subsidiary directly and not via its participa-
tion in a third, intermediate company as depicted in Figure A.1 b) (total ownership).
Whenever the shareholder distinguishes between voting and non voting shares, Orbis reports
the former. Sometimes the direct and total ownership shares are reported using non-numerical
values (direct and total %). The variable “direct % & total % only figures” transforms these
qualitative ownership indications into numeric values according to the conversion in Table A.5.
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Figure A.1: Ownership of Investor A on Firm B. Left: direct, right: indirect through Firm C.
Direct Ownership
A
B
Indirect Ownership
A
C
B
Type of relation
The variable type of relation defines the characteristic of each subsidiary-shareholder link.
It comprises four general types of relationship between the subsidiary and the shareholder
(reported in Table A.6), and various categories describing different types of ultimate owners.
The ultimate owner (UO) is the first independent shareholder in the hierarchy above the sub-
sidiary that holds a minimum percentage of ownership shares (direct or total), according to a
specific value of interest (for example 25%). An entity is defined to be independent when none
of its shareholders holds more than the chosen percentage of its shares. Additionally, all share-
holders belonging to one of the following three entity types are also considered independent:
Individuals and Families, Public authorities/State, or Employees/Managers/Directors.
BvD distinguishes UOs based on their country of registration, defining the Domestic Ultimate
Owner (DUO) as one located in the same country as the respective subsidiary, while the
Global Ultimate Owner (GUO) can be located worldwide. A further distinction is given by
limiting the choice of the UO among only some types of entities, namely banks and finan-
cial/insurance/industrial companies. In such cases the respective UOs are indicated with an
additional “c”, i.e. as GUOc/DUOc.
As for the possible choices of percentages, Orbis presents the options of UOs based on a mini-
mum of 25% or 50% of ownership. Any shareholder that is located in the hierarchy in-between
the subsidiary and the UO must in turn likewise hold either minimum 25% or 50% of the shares
of its subsidiary, i.e. the chosen percentage defines the minimum ownership of all companies
appearing in the path to the UO.
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Table A.5: Construction of the Direct % and Total % - Only Figures
Non-Numeric Value
Direct% and Total %
Corresponds to:
Direct% and Total %
only figures
WO - wholly owned >=98.1-% 98%
MO - majority owned >=50.01% 50.01%
JO - jointly owned =50.00% 50.00%
NG - negligible <=0.01% -
CQ+1 50.00% + 1 share 50.01%
GP - General Partner -
BR - Branch 100.00%
F - Foreign Company 100.00%
T - Sole Trader 100.00%
n.a./ - -
’>X X+0.01%
’<X X-0.01%
+/- X X
All-together, the choice of the percentage of interest, the location of the UO, and its entity type
give rise to eight possible different definitions, that are reported in Table A.7. In some cases
the UOs are not reported simply because they do not exist according to the chosen definitions.
For example, if a firm does not have any shareholder holding more that 25% of its shares, then
none of the above eight types of UOs will exist. On the other hand, if some of its shareholders
hold more than 25% but none more than 50%, then the GUOs/DUOs based on a 25% definition
might exist, while those based on a 50% threshold are not defined.
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Table A.6: Shareholder types
Type Definition
SHH Any kind of shareholder, which has been reported to BvD. The direct and total
ownership shares might be known or not. It can hold any amount of ownership
shares.
ISH A shareholder who directly owns the subsidiary and is in turn directly or indi-
rectly owned by the ultimate owner of that particular subsidiary.
HQ Is the single shareholder of the subsidiary (headquarter), implying that the sub-
sidiary is a branch or foreign company of the shareholder.
CTP A shareholder with both direct and indirect participation, whose total ownership
shares have been obtained by the Calculated Total Percentage method.
Table A.7: Ultimate Owners Types
Type Definition
DUO25 Domestic Ultimate Owner characterised by a minimum of 25% ownership shares
in the path from the subsidiary to the ultimate owner
GUO25 Global Ultimate Owner characterised by a minimum of 25% ownership shares in
the path from the subsidiary to the ultimate owner
DUO50 Same as DUO25, but using a minimum 50% definition
GUO50 Same as GUO25, but using a minimum 50% definition
DUO25C Same as DUO25, but UO only bank or financial/insurance/industrial company
GUO25C Same as GUO25, but UO only bank or financial/insurance/industrial company
DUO50C Same as DUO50, but UO only bank or financial/insurance/industrial company
GUO50C Same as GUO50, but UO only bank or financial/insurance/industrial company
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A.3.3 Financial information
To estimate the plausible causal effect of common shareholding in the analysis, we take into
account firms’ characteristics and their economic and financial performances based on finan-
cial and non-financial measures. The main objective of profit seeking entities is the maximiza-
tion of shareholders’ wealth since shareholders are the legal owners of a company and their
interests should be prioritised. Generally, the shareholders’ wealth maximization is achieved
thought different objectives such as (i) to make profits, since shareholders are interested in
current and future earnings, and (ii) to maintain firm’s growth and development. Both objec-
tives are driven by the financial performance of the firm and can be identified in a number
of ways both financial and non-financial. The most common financial indicators used in the
financial empirical literature refer to profitability, revenues, return on investment, cash flow,
whereas the most used non-financial measures relate to the total sales, number of employees
and market shares.
A first important measure capturing firm’s size is represented by Total Assets (TA). TA refers to
the total amount of assets owned by the firm at its market value. TA includes cash, marketable
securities, inventory, fixed assets, intangibles and goodwill. According to the time taken to
be converted - more or less quickly - into cash, they are classified either current assets or
long-term assets. The balance sheet composition of total assets is very relevant for potential
acquirors, in particular if the value stated in the balance sheet corresponds to its current value.
In case the firm’s asset has a higher current value compared to that reported in the balance
sheet, possible acquirors may have greater incentive to invest in the firm. As a result, we
expect larger firms with higher current and future values to be targeted by large investors,
whereby their investments are distributed across larger companies in the market in the same
proportions as the stock index.
A relevant financial variable, generally considered in empirical financial literature, is Leverage.
Leverage represents how a firm uses debt to finance its activities and asset purchases, and it
is computed as the sum of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities divided by total assets.
Generally, firms with higher leverage are considered riskier and may not be able to increase
the share of debt in their liabilities. However, the optimal capital structure differs across firms
and industries. Empirical evidences predict a positive relationship between firm’s size and
leverage (Rajan and Zingales, 1995) and the main explanation is that large companies suffer
less of asymmetry information problems so that they have an easier access to the market of
debt financing.
A financial variable measuring firm’s performance is the Cash Flow. Cash flow is the net
amount of cash and cash-equivalents flowing in - from customers who buy firm’s products or
services - and out of a firm - for all the payments in the accounting year. We define Cash Flow
as the ratio of earnings after interest and taxes plus depreciation minus common dividends to
Total Assets. Following the pecking order theory, investments should preferably be financed
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with the internal funds, then with debt and finally with equity. As a result, more cash should
be accumulated in companies with the positive cash flow.
Efficiency measures
An alternative variable considered in literature as a substitute for liquid assets (Opler et al.,
1999) is Net Working Capital (NWC). NWC measures firm’s efficiency and indicates if a firm
has enough short term assets to cover its short term debt. NWC is defined as the ratio of
the current assets minus current liabilities and minus savings to assets net of savings. A ratio
below one indicates a negative NWC whereas a ratio higher than two could mean that the firm
is not investing its excess of cash.
As an additional measure of company’s efficiency use of capital is Operational Efficiency (OE),
which shows the ability of firm’s management to generate profit if revenues decrease. OE is
defined as the ratio between operating expense to net sales. This measure is commonly used
to identify the trend of operational efficiency or inefficiency in a firm over a period of time.
When in a trend the ratio goes up it means that the operating environment is working inef-
ficiently and might need to implement cost controls for margin improvement. Conversely, a
decrease in the ratio indicates an efficient operating environment in which operating expenses
represent an increasingly smaller percentage of sales.
Profitability measures
As a measure of firm’s profitability we consider (i) the Net Income (NI), (ii) the Return on
Equity (ROE), (iii) earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) and
(iv) Return on Assets (ROA).
The net income (NI) is an indicator that measures how profitable is a firm over a certain
period of time. NI is computed subtracting from total revenues all the business expenses
and operating costs other than taxes that firm a incurred in doing business. The net income
is relevant because it can be used to compute the earnings for share and consequently the
earnings of each shareholder on the basis of the shares they own.
The variable Return on Equity (ROE) shows how many profits a firm has generated with in-
vestments in capital made by shareholders. ROE represents the amount of profits returned
as a percentage of shareholders’ equity. The ROE is useful for comparing the profitability of
a company to that of other firms operating in the same industry. It illustrates how effective
the company is at turning the cash put into the business into greater gains and growth for the
company and investors. The higher the ROE, the more efficient the company’s operations are
making use of those funds.
As additional metric of profitably we consider the earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation
and amortization (EBITDA). EBIDTA is computed by adding to operating profits (i.e. earnings
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before interest and tax) the firms’ depreciation and amortization expenses. This measure
has the benefit of removing the distorting effects of taxes on profits, interest income and
expenses but also remove the effect of investments in capital in the company. This measure
also provides a picture of a firm’s short-term operational efficiency showing that the firm is
generating enough earnings for payment back of its debt. EBIDTA is also widely used by
investors to analyse capital-intensive and high leveraged companies and compare them in
sectors of activities where depreciation rates and interest payments on debt are larger with
respect to other sectors, such as utilities or telecommunications companies, and in the case
of acquisition targets.
The last profitability measures we consider in the analysis is ROA. Such a metric is informative
about how many earnings the firm generated with the invested capital (assets) or, saying dif-
ferently, how effective the company has been in converting its investments into net income.
ROA is computed as net income (NI) over total assets. Due to high variation of its value across
firms and sectors, ROA is more suitable for a comparison of publicly-traded companies with
similar characteristics that operate in the same industry.
Growth measures
To proxy for a firm’s growth opportunities in their business, we consider several measures.
A first measure refers to “Research and Development expenses” (R&D) and represents the
operating expenses that a firm incurs into to develop new products or services in a year. In
some industries - i.e., technological, industrial, pharmaceutical - R&D expenses are usually
higher compared to those of other sectors. The main reason is that firms have to reinvest
a significant portion of their profits in R&D activities to continuously grow, allowing them to
maintain their market positions or find new areas of opportunistic growth that diversify their
business activities. Firms with higher R&D expenditures are expected to have greater growth
opportunities.
A second measure for growth opportunities is the variable Book-to-Market Ratio. The Book-
to-Market Ratio of listed companies reflects the management’s ability to effectively use firms’
assets to grow, and it is computed as the ratio between common shareholders’ equity at the
book value and the market capitalization determined in the stock market where the firm is
publicly listed. Book-to-Market Ratio is also used to determine whether the market value of a
publicly traded company reflects its real value or just an investor speculation.
The last measure of firm’s growth we consider is the variable Employment. Employment rep-
resents the total number of full time employees of a company in a certain year. An increase in
the job creation means that the firm is growing in its business activities.
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Definition of main financial variables from the Orbis dataset
Tables A.8 and A.9 report the specific definitions of some main financial variables collected in
the Orbis dataset, from the balance sheet and the profit&loss account.
Table A.8: List and definition of Balance Sheet variables collected by Orbis
Acronym Label/Formula Definition
FIAS
Fixed Assets Total amount (after depreciation) of non current assets
IFAS+TFAS+OFAS
(Intangible assets + Tangible assets + Other fixed as-
sets)
IFAS Intangible Fixed Assets
All intangible assets such as formation expenses, re-
search expenses, goodwill, development expenses
and all other expenses with a long term effect
TFAS Tangible Fixed Assets All tangible assets such as buildings, machinery, etc.
OFAS Other Fixed Assets
All other fixed assets such as long term investments,
shares and participations, pension funds etc.
CUAS
Current Assets Total amount of current assets
STOK+DEBT+OCAS (Stocks + Debtors + Other current assets)
STOK Stocks
Total inventories (raw materials + in progress + fin-
ished goods)
DEBT Debtors Trade receivables (from clients and customers only)
OCAS Other Current Assets
All other current assets such as receivables from other
sources (taxes, group Companies), short term invest-
ment of money and Cash at bank and in hand.
TOAS
Total Assets Total assets
FIAS+CUAS (Fixed assets + Current assets)
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Table A.9: List and definition of Profit & Loss Account variables collected by Orbis
Acronym Label/Formula Definition
OPRE
Operating revenue Total operating revenues. The figures do not include VAT.
(Turnover) (Net sales + Other operating revenues+ Stock variations)
TURN Sales Net sales
COST Cost of Goods Sold
Cost of sold goods, production, services. Costs directly
related to the production of the goods sold + depreciation
of those costs
GROS
Gross Profit
Operating revenue - Cost of goods sold
OPRE-COST
MATE Material Costs
Detail of the purchases of goods (raw materials + fin-
ished goods). No services.
STAF Cost of Employees
Detail of all the employees costs of the Company (includ-
ing pension costs)
EBIT Operating P/L
All operating revenues - all operating expenses (Gross
profit-Other operating expenses)
DEPR
Depreciation
Total amount of depreciation and amortization of the assets
& Amortization
AV Added Value
Profit for period + Depreciation + Taxation + Interests
paid + Cost of employees
EBTA
EBITDA
Operating profit + Depreciation
EBIT+DEPR
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A.4 Organisation and cleaning of data
The selection of firms and of variables according to the procedures described in the previous
sections allowed us to extract from Orbis a large amount of data used in the empirical analyses
of the project. This section describes the structures used to organise the data, together with
the cleaning procedures used to treat the raw data.
Due to the heterogeneous format of the various parts of the data, the final firm-level data for
the analysis is organised in four separate datasets containing, respectively, the legal informa-
tion, the industry classification, the ownership links and the financial variables. The legal and
industry information refer to the firms’ situation in December 2017, while the financial and
ownership data are available yearly for the period 2007-2016.
The contents of the four datasets, as well as the choices made in their construction, are
reported in the following. Some descriptive statistics of the data are presented in Section A.5
An assessment of the coverage of the data is presented in Section A.6, where figures from the
present datasets are compared to official statistics.
Unless stated otherwise, all variables contained in the four datasets have been earlier de-
scribed in detail in Section A.3 All datasets can be linked using the BvD ID, the unique firm’s
identifier, according to the specific needs.
A.4.1 The legal information
The first set of data contains for each firm the following information: the firm’s identifier, the
name (trimmed to first 20 characters due to space constraints), the date of incorporation, the
country of registration, a dummy for the EU area, the type of entity, plus a series of variables
about the listing information (listing status as of December 2017, IPO date, main exchange,
delisted date and delisted comment - for delisted companies only).
The firms included in this dataset constitute the population of all listed companies recorded
in Orbis that are or were active in the EU during the period 2007-2016. The selection of this
group of companies from the general Orbis database has been described in Section A.2.
The list of firms’ identifiers can be used as the basis of companies’ selection or searches in
order to extract information of interest from any of the files constituting the Orbis database.
As mentioned earlier, the present project extracted information only from five of those files,
but many more are available for possible use.
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A.4.2 The industry classification
The second set of data reports all NACE codes classifying the sector of economic activity of
each firm in December 2017. Together with the NACE Section (A-U), the core NACE code is
reported, as well as the four primary codes and all twenty available secondary codes. For a
detailed description of the NACE industry classification system, see Section A.2.
The information contained in this dataset can be used to create lists of selected companies
exerting activity in different sectors or industries.
A.4.3 The ownership links
The third set of data is the largest and constitutes the core of the database for the project. For
each year between 2007 and 2016, all available ownership information about the population
of quoted firms active in the EU is retained, independent of their listing status in that specific
year. The decision of whether to use only the firms listed in a specific year can be taken later,
given that firms can be selected easily using the purpose-built dummy variable on the “current
listing status” (see description in Section A.4.5).
Not all firms in our population have ownership information available in all years. This can be
due to several reasons:
(i) the firm did not exist in the specific year - if needed, this can be confirmed through the
date of incorporation in the legal information dataset;
(ii) the firm was independent in the given year, i.e. did not have any shareholders;
(iii) the firm had some shareholders in the given year, but no provider supplied ownership
information to BvD, and BvD itself did not manage to obtain any information.
Case (iii) may occur only if a firm has not yet entered the Orbis database; in fact, if the firm has
some previous ownership information, and no update is available for the year of interest, BvD
still provides ownership for the given year, namely maintains the last available information.
This situation can be identified through the variable “date of information”, when the date
refers to older years.
In each year, a firm can present information on dozens of shareholders, but some firms even
present hundreds of them. Each shareholder can have several roles in its relationship with
a subsidiary, for example it can be the GUO25 and also the DUO25. All different roles are
recorded in the variable “type of relation” presented earlier, implying that for each subsidiary-
shareholder pair several links can be present in Orbis, one for each role.
Table A.10 reports an excerpt of raw ownership data for a given company in 2008, where
the actual firm’s and shareholders’ identifiers have been replaced by fictitious values. The
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example shows the case of multiple links between the subsidiary and some of its sharehold-
ers (second and third blocks), which in this case fulfill several definitions of Ultimate Owner
each, therefore appearing in different UO roles. Notice also that not all dates of information
are updated to the end of 2008, showing that for some shareholders the information was not
provided in the given year, and previous information has been maintained.
Table A.10: Example of raw ownership information. SH=shareholder.
Date of Type of GUO GUO GUO GUO
Firm SH Direct Total information relation 25 50 25C 50C
IT00 CH11 . 46.1 13mar2008 SHH CH33 CH33 CH33 CH33
IT00 IT22 65.73 . 31dec2008 SHH CH33 CH33 CH33 CH33
IT00 IT22 65.73 . 31dec2008 ISH CH33 CH33 CH33 CH33
IT00 IT22 65.73 . 31dec2008 DUO 25 CH33 CH33 CH33 CH33
IT00 IT22 65.73 . 31dec2008 DUO 50 CH33 CH33 CH33 CH33
IT00 IT22 65.73 . 31dec2008 DUO 25C CH33 CH33 CH33 CH33
IT00 IT22 65.73 . 31dec2008 DUO 50C CH33 CH33 CH33 CH33
IT00 CH33 . 65.73 31dec2008 GUO 25 CH33 CH33 CH33 CH33
IT00 CH33 . 65.73 31dec2008 GUO 50 CH33 CH33 CH33 CH33
IT00 CH33 . 65.73 31dec2008 GUO 25C CH33 CH33 CH33 CH33
IT00 CH33 . 65.73 31dec2008 GUO 50C CH33 CH33 CH33 CH33
IT00 IT44 . 4.99 06dec2006 SHH CH33 CH33 CH33 CH33
IT00 LU55 4.66 . 19sep2008 SHH CH33 CH33 CH33 CH33
IT00 FR66 . . 11may2005 SHH CH33 CH33 CH33 CH33
IT00 DE77 . 1.99 14oct2008 SHH CH33 CH33 CH33 CH33
In order to eliminate redundant or duplicate information from the raw data, all cases where
a subsidiary-shareholder link is appearing multiple times undergo the following cleaning pro-
cess: only one record is kept with the subsidiary and shareholder identifiers, the total and
direct ownership share information and the date of information, while all roles recorded in the
variable “type of relation” are registered in additional variables named after the several UO
definitions, where the corresponding shareholder’s identifier will appear. The variable “type of
relation” is then dropped. Table A.11 reports the result of previous example after the cleaning
procedure, where only one link per shareholder appears.
The “current listing status” variable mentioned in Section A.4.5 is then added, together with
the name, entity type and country of registration of each of the shareholders and ultimate
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Table A.11: Example of cleaned ownership information. SH=shareholder.
Date of GUO GUO GUO GUO DUO DUO DUO DUO
Firm SH Direct Total information 25 50 25C 50C 25 50 25C 50C
IT00 CH11 . 46.1 13mar2008 CH33 CH33 CH33 CH33 IT22 IT22 IT22 IT22
IT00 IT22 65.73 . 31dec2008 CH33 CH33 CH33 CH33 IT22 IT22 IT22 IT22
IT00 CH33 . 65.73 31dec2008 CH33 CH33 CH33 CH33 IT22 IT22 IT22 IT22
IT00 IT44 . 4.99 06dec2006 CH33 CH33 CH33 CH33 IT22 IT22 IT22 IT22
IT00 LU55 4.66 . 19sep2008 CH33 CH33 CH33 CH33 IT22 IT22 IT22 IT22
IT00 FR66 . . 11may2005 CH33 CH33 CH33 CH33 IT22 IT22 IT22 IT22
IT00 DE77 . 1.99 14oct2008 CH33 CH33 CH33 CH33 IT22 IT22 IT22 IT22
owners. A dummy is also created to identify “independent” firms, i.e. those for which the
ultimate owners’ are not defined or coincide with the firm itself.
In a second stage, the ownership structure of a subsidiary is summarised into one link per
subsidiary with all essential information, in order to be able to merge it with other parts of
the dataset. For each year of observation, the essential ownership information is summarised
through the minimum and maximum values of direct and total ownership shares owned by
the shareholders, and through the identification number of all ultimate owners. The result is
shown in Table A.12.
The minimum and maximum of “direct” and “total” variables can be used to perform checks
in cases where ultimate owners are not defined - in such cases the maximum of the ownership
shares held should always be less than 25% or 50%. Additional summary information can be
added, such as the total number of shareholders for the given year, or the identification of the
largest shareholder, and so on.
This summarised ownership information of each firm is very useful if we wish to merge it
with the corresponding listing, financial or industry classification data, without having to carry
around the full list of shareholders and their shares, which can be consulted separately.
Table A.12: Firm’s summarised ownership information.
Dir Dir Tot Tot GUO GUO GUO GUO DUO DUO DUO DUO
Firm Min Max Min Max 25 50 25C 50C 25 50 25C 50C
IT00 4.66 65.73 1.99 65.73 CH33 CH33 CH33 CH33 IT22 IT22 IT22 IT22
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A.4.4 The financial information
The last set of data contains about a hundred financial variables coming from the yearly bal-
ance sheets of the firms. The main ones have been described earlier, but many more are
available for selection. For each year, a firm can present more than one account, therefore it
is necessary to set some criteria to select only one account per firm per year.
Accounts may differ according to the type of consolidation, the closing date, the number
of months of reference and the accounting practice. Moreover, not all accounts are equally
populated, so further checks are needed in order to include accounts where the main variables
of interested are not missing. The accounts with closing date in the first quarter of a certain
year are considered to be referring to the financial activity of the previous year.
The criteria used for the selection of the appropriate account for the current project are as
follows (in order of importance):
A) Consolidation type: Orbis presents six possible classifications of the consolidation type
of an account:
- C1 = Consolidated account of a company-headquarter of a group, aggregating all companies
belonging to the group (affiliates, subsidiaries, etc.), where the company-headquarter has
no unconsolidated account
- C2 = Consolidated account as above, but where the company-headquarter also presents an
unconsolidated account
- U1 = Unconsolidated account of a company with no consolidated account
- U2 = Unconsolidated account of a company with a consolidated account
- LF = Limited number of financial items
- NF = No financial items at all
In the construction of the financial database, priority is given to accounts in the order C1, C2,
U1, U2, LF, NF.
B) Number of months: When different accounts for the same year refer to periods of differ-
ent length, the account covering the highest number of months is chosen.
C) Missing variables: Priority is given to accounts with minimum missing values on the fol-
lowing ten variables: total assets, shareholders funds, number of employees, sales, operating
revenue (turnover), net income, EBITDA, Research & Development expenses, ROE and ROA.
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D) Accounting practice: Accounts are reported either by IFRS (International Financial Re-
porting Standards) or GAAP (US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles) standards. Priority
is given to IFRS practice.
A.4.5 Definition of new variables
Annual dummies for current listing status
In each year of the sample, say t, it is important to identify whether a firm is listed or not;
in fact, the listing status of the firms for a specific year is not directly available, since the
Listed/Delisted variable described above gives the last available status (in our case referring
to December 2017).
For this purpose, a indicator variable has been defined for each year, named “current listing
status”. It refers to the year t in which the ownership link is reported, and is derived from
the listing/delisting information of the firm. The full IPO and listing dates are available, but
only the corresponding year is retained for the construction of the yearly listing status. The
assignment rules for different values of the yearly dummies are summarised in Table A.13.
The first case occurs when the IPO year of the firm lies in the past, or at most coincides with
year t itself; if the delisting year lies in the future, the value 1 is assigned to the company,
indicating that it is currently active in the stock market. The assigned value is 0 if both the
IPO and the delisting year are in the past. We assume that a missing indication of the delisting
year is due to the fact that the company has not yet been delisted, therefore in this case the
status variables takes value 1 too.
A second possibility is that the link is recorded before the IPO year, in which case the current
listing status is equal to 0, independent of the delisting year. In other words the company is
not listed in the year of observation.
Whenever the IPO Date is missing, while the delisting year is given, the company is assumed
to having been listed a long time ago, before year t. Therefore the listing status in determined
according to the same criteria as in the first case above.
If both the IPO and the listing dates are missing, but the firm is still listed in 2017, we assume
again that the company was listed a long time ago, and therefore that is listed throughout the
period of observation. On the other hand, if both dates are missing and the firm is delisted
in 2017, then the current status variable is not defined, i.e. is recorded as missing. Specific
assumptions can be considered in order to assign an actual 0/1 value.
In only two cases the delisting date was prior to the IPO date, probably denoting companies
that re-entered the market at a later stage. In such cases they were considered as still listed
in 2017, hence listed in all years after the IPO date (as if the delisting date was missing).
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Table A.13: Construction of the "current listing status" variable for year t.
IPO year Delisting year
Listing Status Current Listing Status
in 2017 in year t
≤ t
≥ t any 1
n.a. any 1
< t any 0
> t any any 0
n.a ≥ t any 1
< t any 0
n.a n.a Listed 1
n.a n.a Delisted –
DUOs and ISH Variables
The Ownership database contains the variables GUO50, GUO50C, GUO25, GUO25C, which
report for every subsidiary-shareholder link the respective global ultimate owner of the sub-
sidiary in that particular year, according to the definitions in Table A.7, in case they exist.
In order to enhance the analysis, we construct similar variables reporting the DUO50, DUO50C,
DUO25, DUO25C and ISH of the subsidiary for the given year (when present), derived from the
variable “type of relation” presented earlier.
Minimum and maximum total and direct ownership percentage
Four new variables are created, reporting for each subsidiary the amount of direct or total
ownership shares held by its biggest and smallest shareholder in that particular year. The
variables are invariant for all links of a respective subsidiary in a given year. Such variables
are useful in analysing the shareholders’ structure of a company, and can also be used to
test the correctness of the ultimate owner information presented in the database. For exam-
ple, whenever the largest shareholder holds less than 50%/25% of the shares, the subsidiary
cannot have an ultimate owner at the 25% or 50% level, or vice-versa.
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A.4.6 Note on cleaning procedures
Since there is a non-negligible fraction of recorded shareholder-subsidiary links that do not
specify the actual amount of participation, an imputation strategy has been adopted in order
to fill in the missing information, where possible.
The imputation criteria adopted for the ownership information are as follows: if there is a non-
reporting for one or two consecutive periods, but the amount of shares is available before or
after, then the missing share is replaced by the value recorded in the previous or following
year. This is a rather conservative operation, given that in general the value of the shares
held is rather stable. In case of a gap of more than two years, no action is taken, considering
that the closest reported amount of shares is too far in time to be considered reliable.
After this first round of imputation, the values that are still missing are filled according to
extra information available from Orbis. If the shareholder is declared to be the GUO (Global
Ultimate Owner) or DUO (Domestic Ultimate Owner) according to a definition of minimum 50%
or 25% of shares, then the missing share is replaced by 50.01% or 25.01%, respectively. If
the shareholder is not the GUO or DUO, then all its portfolio is analysed, and the average
share held in the portfolio is considered to be representative of the shareholder’s investing
behaviour, and is therefore imputed in the missing cases, but these are very few.
After all this procedure, there are still some links with no available share (about 3%). They cor-
respond to the cases where the shareholder is not the GUO or DUO of the subsidiaries, where
for all the years of observation the shareholder-subsidiary link has been recorded with no share
available, and where no average share for the shareholder’s portfolio is available, since for all
subsidiaries of that shareholder no share information is available. This is usually the case of
single shareholders with small participation (<25%), being linked to only one subsidiary in the
market, but with no share information, so in general they are not very important players. For
these cases, the information about the existence of a shareholder-firm link can still be used,
but the indicators requiring the quantification of the shares held cannot be calculated.
As for financial variables, there are no major issues of missing data on the main variables (Total
Assets and Market Capitalisation). The Total Assets are basically almost available. Neverthe-
less, in case of non-reporting in some years, values are imputed from previous or following
years, giving a final coverage of 99% of firm-year. As for Market Capitalisation, it is not always
available, due to the fact that the listing status of firms can change throughout the period of
observation. Therefore, the missing values are mainly related to years where the companies
were still unlisted or have been delisted, hence no imputation is performed on this variable.
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A.5 Dataset descriptive statistics
Following the selection procedure outlined in Section A.2, a historical dataset containing all
listed companies active in the EU in the period 2007-2016 is obtained. The average number of
firms observed each year is 26,560 - as displayed in Table A.14 - where on average about 57%
are registered in the EU countries, the rest being registered outside the EU. The proportion
of EU versus Non-EU registered companies remains roughly constant over time. The total
number of observed firms increases slightly over the years, except for the last, where due to
the reporting lag the number of covered firms is slightly smaller than in the previous year.
Overall, a set of 31,864 different firms are observed.
Table A.14: Sample composition by country of registration and year.
Country 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
EU 14,434 14,849 15,000 15,122 15,171 15,125 15,479 15,564 15,336 15,086
Non-EU 10,423 10,819 11,169 11,398 11,581 11,710 11,756 11,846 11,877 11,856
Total 24,857 25,668 26,169 26,520 26,752 26,835 27,235 27,410 27,213 26,942
The largest groups of EU companies are registered in the UK and Spain (around 20% in each
country), followed by Romania (9%), Germany (8,5%), France (7,5%), Poland (5,5%) and Swe-
den (5%). Again, the distribution stays roughly constant over time. Most of the companies
registered outside the EU are in the US (30%), followed by Japanese companies (9.7%), Cana-
dian (6.78%) and Australian companies (6.6%), while 4,83% of the companies are from India.
Table A.15 reports - for the total sample of 31,864 firms - the coverage of the ownership
information, the NACE industry classification and the financial indicators in the sample. The
number of firms for which none of the information is available is negligible. As an additional
note, 77.78% of such firms have been delisted from the stock markets by the year 2017. On
the other hand, 97.3% of companies present ownership data, and complete ownership, NACE
and financial information is available for 28,931 firms - 91% of the sample.
Although not all companies are observed all years, due to the natural birth and death pro-
cesses of firms, generally the sample is rather stable. About 68% of the companies have
complete records, i.e. they are present throughout the whole 10 years of the period under
analysis, and 80% are observed during at least 7 years; a small percentage of firms (15%)
were recorded maximum during half of the period, i.e. at most for 5 years.
Table A.16 reports the listing status of companies in each year of observation. On average,
every year around 83% of the companies are listed. In about 3.5% of the cases it was not
possible to determine the listing status of the firms by year, given that both the IPO date and
delisting dates were missing, and the firms were classified as "Delisted" in 2017. Over time
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Table A.15: Structure of the Database
No Financials Financials
No Nace Nace Total No Nace Nace Total
No Ownership 63 523 586 4 272 276
Ownership 218 1649 1867 204 28931 29135
Total 231 2172 2453 208 29203 29411
the proportion of quoted companies in a given year decreases slightly. While initially 89% of
the companies were listed, the share drops to 78% in 2016. Among the currently delisted
firms, the large majority (89%) have been listed before or in 2007. i.e. before the beginning of
the period of observation. Only very few companies are listed and delisted within the sample
period. A large proportion of firms (68%) are always listed in all years when they are observed.
Table A.16: Current listing status of firms, by year. If both IPO date and delisting dates are missing, the
listing status is not available (NA).
Year Delisted Listed NA Total
2007 1,602 22,218 1,037 24,857
2008 2,254 22,377 1,037 25,668
2009 3,055 22,070 1,044 26,169
2010 3,477 22,023 1,020 26,520
2011 3,827 22,008 917 26,752
2012 4,122 21,826 887 26,835
2013 4,438 21,938 859 27,235
2014 4,524 22,038 848 27,410
2015 4,515 21,883 815 27,213
2016 5,236 20,914 792 26,942
The bulk of firms are concentrated in few industries. In Table A.17 the proportion of firms active
in the main NACE Sections are reported, with “Manufacturing” (Section C) and “Financial and
insurance activities” (Section K) comprising the largest number of firms. Each one of the
remaining Sections represented less than 2.5% of the total sample.
Table A.18 pictures the number of companies which are classified as being active in any of
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Table A.17: Proportion of firms active in the main NACE Sections
Section Description No Firms %
C Manufacturing 10,242 32.69
K Financial and insurance activities 7,713 24.62
J Information and communication 3,002 9.58
G Wholesale and retail trade 1,889 6.03
M Professional, scientific and technical activities 1,486 4.74
L Real estate activities 1,151 3.67
B Mining and quarrying 1,119 3.57
the sectors of interest identified by the eight Nace Codes discussed in Section A.2. The Core
Nace Codes were inspected, as well as all four Primary Nace Codes (Prim) and the first four
Secondary Nace Codes (Second), respectively. None of the companies presented any of the
eight codes as their third or fourth Primary Codes, therefore they are omitted.
The first Primary Nace Code coincides with the Core Nace Code of the company. The bulk of
firms is classified in these categories by their Core Nace Code or first Secondary Nace Code.
The number of firms who are active in these categories as a second, third or fourth activity is
small. An exception are the classifications “Other financial service activities, except insurance
and pension funding” (Nace Code 6499) and “Security & Commodity Contracts Brokerage”
(Nace Code 6612), where a lot of companies are active as a side activity.
Overall, most of the companies that present some of the eight core Nace Codes are active in
“Other Credit Granting” (Nace Code 6492). This might be due to the fact that this categoriza-
tion is very broad, and therefore not very selective.
The dataset contains 6,070,111 ownership links. On average, each company has about 22
shareholders per year. However, 50% of the companies have at most 7 shareholders in a
given year, while 9,5% of the companies even have only one shareholder. The number of total
links per year rises slightly from 604,385 in 2007 to 617,353 in 2016.
Every year, on average over 87% of the companies report an ultimate owner of some type.
The percentage rises slightly over the sample period from 83.24% in 2007 to 88.49% in 2016.
About 60% of companies have a domestic GUO50, with non-EU companies showing a larger
share (70%) compared to EU (56%).
Overall, 64% of the subsidiary-shareholder links are recorded between entities registered in
the same country (domestic shareholders), the remaining cases denoting a shareholder lo-
cated abroad. The proportion is rather similar in the case of EU or non-EU based companies.
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Table A.18: NACE Codes
Code Core 1 Prim 2 Prim 1 Second 2 Second 3 Second 4 Second
0610 237 237 38 1
3511 273 273 57 5 8
3523 14 1 2
6190 593 593 132 43 23 9
6492 3,029 3,029 33 1,179 50 36 13
6499 236 236 22 501 239 59 648
6611 45 45 32 20 5 3
6612 310 310 327 305 706 5
In terms of financial information, only 1% of the reported accounts presents limited financial
information. Most of the accounts (70%) are consolidated, either of type C1 or C2, while
all remaining are unconsolidated. For what concerns the time and variable coverage, 75% of
accounts refer to a time period of 12 months, and 95% present at least six of the main financial
indicators. The most frequent accounting standard is the GAAP (62%), while the IFRS practice
is used in the remaining cases.
A.6 Comparison with official statistics
The World Bank provides information on the number of listed companies in individual coun-
tries, as well as regions (e.g Europe & Asia/ Arabian World). The data is obtained from the
World Federation of Exchange.
The data include either companies that are either incorporated in the same country as their
exchange, or foreign companies which are exclusively registered in that particular stock mar-
ket. Hence, in comparison to the present dataset, foreign companies which holds shares in a
firm in the EU but are quoted outside the EU are not reported. Nevertheless, we consider it a
good base for comparison.
Table A.19 reports the ratio of the numbers of firms present in our dataset per country and year
compared to the data provided by the World Bank. The ratios are displayed in percentage
points, and only European countries are considered. The latter is the case, as we consider
the number of firms which are foreign but have their exclusive exchange in Europe to be
small. Hence, with this approach companies which are registered and active in Europe are set
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in comparison. Unfortunately, the World bank does not provide listing information for 5 EU
countries (Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Sweden). Overall, the present dataset
contains a higher number of companies in comparison to the data provided by the World Bank.
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Table A.19: Coverage of our dataset in comparison to World Bank (ratio in %)
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Austria 128 134 136 147 147 150 154 150 152 166
Belgium 122 131 138 139 146 150 188 195 184 184
Bulgaria 130 122 128 132 132 135 135
Croatia 96 98 130 153 157 171 188 182 188 216
Cyprus 125 138 151 156 161 171 179 179 205 214
Czech Republic 346 289 338 313 340 306 373 400 367 373
Denmark Not Contained in the World Bank Data
Estonia Not Contained in the World Bank Data
Finland Not Contained in the World Bank Data
France 168 178 183 192 199 201 226 223 221 220
Germany 163 172 184 188 194 196 202 220 229 237
Greece 114 113 112 114 110 108 116 110 111 123
Hungary 115 115 107 106 100 100 100 104 113 119
Ireland 202 212 222 246 260 312 329 319 330 343
Italy 123 127 143 146 135 135 144 141 141 139
Latvia Not Contained in the World Bank Data
Lithuania Not Contained in the World Bank Data
Luxembourg 221 255 307 324 400 436 483 492 448 414
Malta 94 89 95 110 138 141 130 133 148 148
Netherlands 124 135 172 185 193 204 290 288 277 264
Poland 147 137 153 142 122 114 112 111 112 113
Portugal 167 164 169 177 178 184 200 196 191 198
Romania 2617 2265 1943 1900 1800 1784 1675 1649 1629 1562
Slovak Republic 26 48 97 150 93 200 206
Slovenia 93 101 125 133 147 159 176 186 198 237
Spain 84 84 85 87 86 87 98 96 87 87
Sweden Not Contained in the World Bank Data
United Kingdom 120 134 148 151 160 169 168 168 166 164
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Appendix B
Common Shareholding Indices
Chapter 2 overviewed the main tools used in the academic literature to assess the effects of
common shareholding, highlighting pros and cons. It also set up a framework for the analysis
of ownership data, introducing a simplified market example and discussing several measure-
ment issues. Finally, it translated sparsity and network indicators into the common sharehold-
ing context, proposing feasible measures to be computed in the empirical analysis, according
to our data restrictions. In the present technical annex, the above statistical methodologies are
analysed, setting the theoretical background for the identification of new indices of the extent
of common shareholding. The proposed methods explore several new aspects of investors’
behaviour and of portfolios’ composition, which can help us draw a more precise picture of the
phenomenon. The same applies to the analysis of the firms’ shareholding structures, which
can reveal interesting patterns of overlap in a given market.
Although several methodologies were considered, many present limited applicability to the
common shareholding study. Hence, the focus of subsequent developments has been re-
stricted to techniques based on two main groups of methods, coming from the Sparsity and
Network literature respectively. Their applicability to the measurement of common sharehold-
ing is discussed in detail, and the implementation of the proposed measures is illustrated
through a simple example of a fictitious market. Measures that allow comparison with bench-
mark scenarios are also considered. Further insight will be available later from the real-data
applications for listed firms and for the five industries under study.
The concept of sparsity is generally found in the literature on inequality or diversity, and
studies the distribution of a certain phenomenon in a given population, e.g. of income, in
particular in the aspects related to its concentration in the hands of a small number of players.
The higher the concentration of the variable in the population, the higher the inequality of the
distribution. By contrast, a low concentration denotes higher diversity of the phenomenon in
the population. This framework extends easily to the common shareholding analysis, applying
273
the relevant concepts to the distribution of the investments of shareholders across firms in
a given market. Here, a low concentration signals diversification of investments across the
market and therefore goes in the direction of common shareholding.
The second approach comes from the literature on the analysis of networks. This field stud-
ies the empirical structure of the relationships that exist between elements of a population.
Such relationships induce flows of information within the population according to its level of
connectedness, and additionally allow to identify the most important or central players. Con-
sidering the population of the firms and owners of a market, the corporate ownership structure
can naturally be represented through a network, where the network relations are given by the
ownership links between firms and their shareholders.
Section B.1 presents the concept of sparsity and related indices, coming from the inequality
literature, and applies them to the common shareholding analysis. Section B.2 approaches
the market structure as a network of owner-firms relations, adapting network measures to the
current research objective. The real data applications will be of value in determining the best
measure to be used.
B.1 Sparsity
The concept of sparsity is often linked to definitions of inequality or diversity, giving rise to
different interpretations and measures.1 However, a common agreement is that a distribution
with all its information concentrated in one coefficient, and all other zero, is the most sparse.
On the other hand, there is agreement that the least sparse distribution is found when the
information is evenly spread over all coefficients. In the following, this will be the reference
definition of sparsity.
In the inequality literature, maximum and minimum sparsity would correspond to the most un-
equal case and to perfect equality, respectively. In the case of corporate ownership, a sparse
investment behaviour would correspond generically to a high concentration of ownership in
few hands (or few firms), while low sparsity would be observed in case of more widespread in-
vestments across the market. A more detailed analysis of the application of sparsity concepts
to corporate ownership will be discussed in Section B.1.2 below.
B.1.1 Measuring sparsity
There is a large set of sparsity measures in the literature, coming mainly from the fields of
signal processing and information theory. The most common are the Kurtosis, the Gini Index,
the Hoyer measure, the pq-means, the ℓp norms and their combinations. These and other
1A comprehensive review of these and other fields of application can be found in Hurley and Rickard (2009).
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measures are discussed, for instance, in Karvanen and Cichocki (2003), Rickard and Fallon
(2004), Hurley and Rickard (2009), Zonoobi et al. (2011), Pastor et al. (2013), and Pastor et
al. (2015).
Before presenting the details of each measure, it is important to focus on desirable properties
of a generic sparsity function, in order to be able to choose between alternatives. Desirable
criteria that a sparsity measure should fulfill are, among others, the so-called “Robin Hood”
property, the scaling or homogeneity, the “rising tide” property, and the “cloning” property.
These four criteria were initially proposed by Dalton (1920) in the financial setting of inequality
measurement of wealth distribution, but are nowadays generally recognised to be minimum
criteria a “good” measure of sparsity should satisfy, being referred to as “Dalton’s Laws”.
More recently, Rickard and Fallon (2004) added two extra properties, named “Bill Gates” and
“Babies”, respectively, which will be defined below, together with Dalton’s Laws. Additional
axioms and attributes, whose analysis goes beyond the scope of this report, can be found in
Pastor et al. (2013, 2015).
Properties of sparsity measures
- Robin Hood: A “fair” readjustment of coefficients decreases sparsity. Taking some
amount from the larger coefficients and “redistributing” towards smaller coefficients
yields a less concentrated i.e. more equal distribution.
- Scaling: A change in scale of the coefficients does not change sparsity. Multiplying
wealth of all units by an equal factor does not change the level of (in)equality of the
distribution.
- Rising Tide: An identical increase in all coefficients decreases sparsity. Adding a fixed
amount to each coefficient reduces the relative difference between large and small val-
ues, i.e. yields a more equal distribution.
- Cloning: Doubling the number of coefficients by cloning the same values does not
change sparsity. If a second population is cloned, reproducing the same values as the
first one, then the level of (in)equality of the merged populations equals that of the initial
population.
- Bill Gates: A significant increase in one coefficient increases sparsity. When one coeffi-
cient becomes very large, the level of inequality increases.
- Babies: The addition of extra zero coefficients increases sparsity. Adding individuals
with zero wealth to a population increases inequality, by concentrating the (positive)
total wealth in the hands of a smaller share of individuals.
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More details about the above properties can be found in Hurley and Rickard (2009); the paper
also presents sixteen sparsity measures and prove which of them satisfy which properties.
The main result is that only two measures satisfy all six properties, namely the Gini Index and
the pq-means (see below), while all remaining measures satisfy some, but not all of them.
Some common sparsity measures
Table B.1 below presents some among the most common sparsity measures, and reports their
properties. For easier reference in the following, the measures will be sometimes referred to
according to the numbering presented in the table, rather than their full names. The coeffi-
cients of the distribution under analysis are denoted by ck, k = 1 . . . , N, while their ordered
set is indicated by c(k) (in increasing order). Measures 1-4 and 6-7 are presented in their nor-
malised version, which accounts for the length N of the vector representing the distribution.
The normalised versions in general satisfy more properties than the original measures. Prop-
erties only satisfied in the normalised version of the measures, and not in the original ones,
are indicated in brackets.
The measures in Table B.1 do not present a unified notation in the literature; we follow here
the suggestions of Hurley and Rickard (2009), where some measures have been modified -
either with a minus sign or by changing the direction of some inequality - in order to obtain
an homogeneous interpretation in the sense that an increase in sparsity yields a positive
increase in the corresponding measure. In particular, notice that measure 1 is usually defined
in the literature as the count of non-zero values, but this would go in the opposite direction,
increasing when sparsity decreases. For this reason here the definition is reversed, counting
the number of zeros instead. For all these measures, the less sparse the distribution, the
smaller the value of the index, the value increasing with sparsity.
As we can see from Table B.1, most measures fulfill many of the presented properties, if
not all. Karvanen and Cichocki (2003) compare measures 1-4 and 6-7. Quéré and Frélicot
(2012) compare 7 and 8 through a set of simulations on binary (0-1) distributions, testing their
performance in the context of fuzzy partitions. Measure 10 is considered, among others, in
Rickard and Fallon (2004) and Zonoobi et al. (2011). Hurley and Rickard (2009) and Pastor et
al. (2015) propose more comprehensive accounts of original and normalised measures, other
additional measures and properties not discussed here, as well as proofs of the fulfillment of
the respective properties.
Measures 1 and 2 simply compute the proportion of zero or negligible elements of the dis-
tribution; the higher the proportion, the more concentrated the distribution, i.e. the higher
the sparsity. In measure 6, any zero coefficient gives a zero log value in the summation, con-
tributing towards a smaller total; the minus sign reverts the direction of this effect, so that the
more the null coefficients in the sum, the higher the sparsity measure. Measure 7 is based on
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Table B.1: Some common sparsity measures and their properties. Measures 1-4 and 6-7 presented
in version normalised wrt N; ck, k = 1 . . . , N are the distribution’s coefficients; c(k) denote the ordered
coefficients (increasing). Properties as presented earlier: RH = Robin Hood; Sc = Scaling; RT = Rising
Tide; Cl = Cloning; BG = Bill Gates; Ba = Babies. Properties in brackets are only valid for the normalised
version of the measures.
No. Measure Definition RH Sc RT Cl BG Ba
1. ℓ0/N #{k : ck = 0}/N Ø (Ø) Ø
2. ℓ0
ε
/N #{k : ck ≤ ε}/N (Ø) Ø
3. −ℓ1/N − 1N
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k ck Ø (Ø) (Ø)
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k c
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k
1/p
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∑
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∑
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the Kurtosis coefficient κ4 - named by analogy to the measure of peakedness of a probability
distribution - while measure 10 is the well-known Gini Coefficient of inequality.
Measures 3-5 and 8-9 are based on ℓp-type norms, which are sums of the coefficients each
raised to a certain power p, sum that in turn is raised to the power 1/p in order to go back
to the original scale of the coefficients. The ℓp-type norms do not have in general an intuitive
interpretation, except for the ℓ1 norm which is simply the average. However, a special note
should be devoted to two measures, namely ℓ0 and ℓ2, from which several other measures in
the table are derived.
The ℓ0 index is the base for the popular density measure, i.e. the proportion of non-zero el-
ements of a vector. The density concept is complementary to sparseness, and has several
applications both to matrices and to networks, which will be discussed later. Measure 2 re-
stricts the attention to relevant coefficients only, thus ignoring all those of a negligible size. A
corrected density index can be proposed according to this more restrictive exclusion criterion,
only considering values above a certain threshold.
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The ℓ2 norm is also known as Euclidean norm, and for vector C = (c1, . . . , cN) of coefficients is
given by:
ℓ2(C) =
√
√
√
√
N
∑
k=1
c2k
This is one of the most popular norms in several fields of application; it is commonly used
to compute the “length” of vectors of size N, since it corresponds to the distance from the
origin (the null vector) to the point C in an N-dimensional space. The vectors presenting
larger coefficients will have a larger ℓ2 norm, showing that they are further away from the
origin. Based on this norm, several distance measures have been developed, especially in
error minimisation contexts, such as the least squares criterion (which minimises the square
of the ℓ2 norm), or the mean square error measurement (divides by N the square of the ℓ2
norm).
Notice that the ℓ2 norm gives higher weight to larger coefficients, by squaring their values,
contrary to the simple average ℓ1. For this reason, the derived measure number 5, given by
the ratio of ℓ2 to ℓ1, can be seen as assessing the relative weight of larger coefficients over
the coefficients’ total, hence showing larger values for more concentrated distributions, i.e.
for higher sparsity. For example, considering three distributions with same total value and
increasing concentration - say (2, 2, 2), (4, 1, 1) and (5, 1, 0) - measure ℓ2/ ℓ1 takes values
0.58, 0.71 and 0.85 respectively. In the sparsest case, i.e. (6, 0, 0), we get ℓ2/ ℓ1 = 1.
B.1.2 Application to the common shareholding framework
In order to apply the sparsity concept to the common shareholding problem, and in particular
to the two matrices defined in Chapter 2 - Ownership Matrix (OM) and Relation Matrix (RM) -
it is necessary to identify the most and least sparse scenarios and their meaning. The main
issue to be considered is the applicability of the sparsity concept to a matrix, since the concept
itself, as well as the measures, were initially developed in relation to a vector of coefficients -
representing the distribution of wealth.
The extension of a vector measurement to a matrix can be done in three different ways, which
in turn give rise to different benchmark scenarios, as discussed below. Let index  = 1, . . . , 
denote the owners, and j = 1, . . . , J the firms. The sparsity of a given ownership structure can
be studied looking at the following dimensions in the OM and RM:
(1) column dimension: sparsity of the shareholders’ distribution for a given firm.
In the analysis of a column, the maximum sparsity is achieved when a given firm j
presents only one owner who holds 100% of the shares, the least sparse distribution
corresponding instead to having nj shareholders, each with a proportion of 1/nj of the
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shares. For the RM, these cases correspond, respectively, to a vector with one unit ele-
ment and all the rest zero, or to a vector of all ones.
(2) row dimension: sparsity of the investment distribution of a given owner into the firms
constituting the market.
If we look at a row, the sparsest case occurs when an owner only holds shares of one firm
in the market (whatever the percentage), the minimum sparsity being achieved when the
owner owns shares in all firms in the market, at a constant percentage (does not show
preference for any firm in particular).
(3) overall dimension: global sparsity of the market.
In the overall analysis of the matrices we can define maximum sparsity either of all the
rows (one firm only per each owner, for all owners; one firm can have more owners,
 ≥ J), or of all the columns (one owner only per each firm, for all firms; the owner can be
common to other firms,  ≤ J), or of both at the same time (square diagonal matrix, one
owner only per each firm and one firm only per each owner,  = J).
Defining maximum sparsity of a matrix looking at the column dimension would consider
only the shareholders’ structure of a given firm, and not the inter-linking between firms
caused by common shareholders, so does not correspond to the primary objective of our
study. However, this approach can be used to assess other market characteristics in a
later stage. The last approach (joint maximum sparsity of both rows and columns) again
imposes the column maximum sparsity, which is not of central interest at this stage, so
it will be left for later analyses.
It follows that the row-wise approach for the definition of overall maximum sparsity of a
matrix seems more appropriate for our case, as being directly connected to the study of
common shareholding. In fact, in this approach the most sparse matrix corresponds to
the absence of common shareholders, i.e. each row only presents one non-zero element,
while the opposite happens when each row is completely filled with positive and equal
values, that is each owner being linked to all firms in the economy with equal shares (least
sparse scenario). Notice that this last case, being repeated for all owners, implies that
the shareholder structure of all firms is identical. The relative weight of each shareholder
in a firm is not constrained to a specific value, however it will depend on its financial
capacity.
Following these considerations, the most and least sparse versions of the OM and RM of the
initial example are computed in Table B.2, according to the overall dimension (3) above, with
row-wise maximum sparsity definition. These will be the benchmark matrices for the present
study, even though other reference scenarios can be considered according to the different
approaches presented above, if the research objective changes.
Looking at Table B.2, in the least sparse scenario of the OM the shares are not specified
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Table B.2: Ownership (OM) and relation (RM) matrices of the market example from Table 2.1. Maximum
(left) and minimum (right) sparsity. Row-wise approach for the definition of overall sparsity: maximum
sparsity corresponds to absence of common shareholders; minimum sparsity implies equal shareholder
structure for all firms.
OM, maximum sparsity
F1 F2 F3 F4
O1 p1
O2 p2
O3 p3
O4 p4
O5 p5
O6 p6
O7 p7
O8 p8
OM, minimum sparsity
F1 F2 F3 F4
O1 p1 p1 p1 p1
O2 p2 p2 p2 p2
O3 p3 p3 p3 p3
O4 p4 p4 p4 p4
O5 p5 p5 p5 p5
O6 p6 p6 p6 p6
O7 p7 p7 p7 p7
O8 p8 p8 p8 p8
RM, maximum sparsity
F1 F2 F3 F4
O1 1 0 0 0
O2 1 0 0 0
O3 1 0 0 0
O4 0 1 0 0
O5 0 0 1 0
O6 0 0 1 0
O7 0 0 0 1
O8 0 0 0 1
RM, minimum sparsity
F1 F2 F3 F4
O1 1 1 1 1
O2 1 1 1 1
O3 1 1 1 1
O4 1 1 1 1
O5 1 1 1 1
O6 1 1 1 1
O7 1 1 1 1
O8 1 1 1 1
numerically, given the arbitrariness of their value, but they are simply indicated as p for
owner  = 1, . . . ,8, with
∑8
=1 p ≤ 100%. On the other hand, the representation of the RM is
unique in both scenarios, so that the actual values of the coefficients are reported.
Properties of sparsity measures revisited
Given that the properties of sparsity measures were initially considered in a welfare inequality
context, they need to be critically reassessed in the common shareholding framework, specif-
ically in the sense discussed above, i.e. looking at row-wise sparsity (increase in sparsity =
decrease of the extent of common shareholding; decrease in sparsity = stronger presence
of common shareholding). Each property will be analysed initially looking at a change in be-
haviour of one single owner, subsequently extending the same behaviour to all owners in the
market (if meaningful) in order to assess the overall effect on the OM and RM. This exercise
will also help exclude sparsity measures that are inappropriate for our purpose.
Robin Hood: in case an owner holding a large share in a firm decides to divest, redirecting the
investment towards other firms where it holds smaller (or zero) shares, the measure captures
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the change as a decrease in sparsity, i.e. a movement from absence or low level of common
shareholding towards a higher level of common shareholding. The same applies if all owners
change their behaviour in an analogous way: the measure would detect a reduction in sparsity.
This is a desirable property as it goes in the direction of the effect we would like to measure.
Therefore sparsity measures that fulfill the Robin Hood property are appropriate in our context.
Scaling: If an owner, say, doubles the ownership shares held in all the firms participated in, the
measure does not detect a change in sparsity, i.e. the extent of common shareholding is con-
sidered unchanged. For a single row, this change in investment does not alter the presence of
common shareholding, since the number of existing links is unchanged. However, given that
the strength of the links increased, and that the column sum of the shares is constrained to be
≤ 100%, this implies a decrease of the strength of the links other owners have with the same
firms. Such decrease in the limit could even lead to a zero share, therefore eliminating an
existing link, and altering the sparsity. It follows that this property is somewhat controversial,
especially in the case of the OM, which might suffer an (undetected) readjustment of all rows
when one owner changes its investments. The property seems more acceptable for the RM,
which in general will be unchanged under this scenario, although in an extreme case the actual
number of links might be affected, as mentioned earlier. Therefore, a measure fulfilling this
property raises some concerns, and should be tested further. The situation where all owners
would double their shares is an impossible event given the above constraint on the column
totals, therefore is not analysed.
Rising Tide: If an owner increases its ownership shares by k > 0 points in all firms in the mar-
ket (even in those where it had previously no shares), then the sparsity decreases. In the limit,
an owner that only owned shares in one firm, becomes common shareholder of all companies
in the economy, so there is a change toward an increased level of common shareholding. This
property is in line with the dynamics of common shareholding, therefore is acceptable for our
study. If all owners made a similar change in investments, the RM would immediately become
the sparsest one proposed earlier, therefore going again in the direction of this property; how-
ever, in the case of the OM we cannot add indefinitely extra shares to all elements, due to the
column total constraint, so this case will not be contemplated.
Cloning: If the number of firms in the market doubles, and an owner invests in the new firms
exactly the same amounts of shares held in the original set of firms, sparsity does not change.
Duplicating (“cloning”) the initial vector of investments does not change their relative concen-
tration, since the proportion of firms held by the owner is unchanged. However, the absolute
number of firms linked by the owner doubled, introducing more inter-connections between
firms. In the most extreme case, an owner who had invested only in one firm (and there-
fore who was not a common shareholder) will introduce a connection between two firms, and
become a common shareholder. Therefore, measures with this property are acceptable if we
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seek to measure the relative extent of common shareholding, but are less suitable for absolute
measurements.
Bill Gates: If one owner increases largely its investment in one firm, sparsity increases. The
owner will have to divest with respect to other firms held, in order to move funds massively to
that specific firm. Therefore all remaining existing links of that owner will decrease in strength,
some even reaching a zero value, i.e. some links may disappear. The same will happen at col-
umn level, as a larger share held by the owner under consideration makes all other shares of
that specific firm decrease largely, again possibly causing some links of that firm with other
owners to vanish. In both cases this implies an increase in sparsity, therefore the property is
in line with the market dynamics and is acceptable for our analysis.
Babies: Adding an extra firm in the market whose owners are not common to any other firm
increases sparsity. This amounts to adding a new column with the shareholders’ structure of
the added firm, and some new lines corresponding to the new added owners, which were not
present before in the market, since they are not common to any other firms. Therefore, the
column will be filled with zeros, except for the last few elements containing the shares held by
the new owners. This implies that each line corresponding to an existing owner will have an
extra zero, hence increasing the sparsity of that line. On the other hand, since the new owners
are not common to other firms, the degree of common shareholding decreases. It follows that
the market dynamics in this scenario goes in the direction predicted by the property, which
therefore is admissible in the common shareholding framework.
Summarising, all six properties of sparseness measures are overall still meaningful in the
context of common shareholding, although the scaling and cloning properties show some lim-
itations when applied to the OM, being less problematic in the RM case.
Extension of sparsity measures to ownership and relation matrices
Consider now the application of the sparsity measures to either the OM or RM matrix, say X,
whose elements shall be denoted by j; as before, index  = 1 . . . ,  spans the rows i.e. the
owners, and index j = 1 . . . , J the firms in the columns. Recall that the elements represent,
respectively, either the ownership share or the presence/absence of a owner-firm link.
Given the row-wise maximum sparsity definition discussed above, any of the sparsity mea-
sures of Table B.1 can be applied to each row  of X, and then aggregated across rows accord-
ing to some criterion. Denoting generically by S() a sparsity measure applied to row  (i.e.
to elements j, with fixed ), an overall measure of row-wise sparsity for matrix X is given by
S(X) defined as follows:
S(X) =

∑
=1
S()
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This type of aggregation is mentioned in Rickard and Fallon (2004) as a common measure of
matrix sparsity, however other ways of summarising rows information can be considered.
Table B.3 proposes some alternative aggregation methods of row sparsity indices S(), dis-
cussing the interpretation of the resulting matrix measures. Besides the sum of row indices,
the average across rows is considered, as well as the median and other relevant percentiles; as
alternatives, the maximum or minimum row sparsity are also of interest, representing, respec-
tively, the value of sparsity corresponding to the owner with most concentrated investments
(in the limit not a common shareholder), and to the most “democratic” owner, investing more
equally across firms in the market (in principle a common shareholder). In general, low val-
ues of S(X) raise concerns in the common shareholding context, showing more evenly spread
investments of owners across firms in the market, going in the direction of common share-
holding.
Table B.3: Matrix sparsity measures S(X) constructed applying different row aggregation criteria. S()
denotes a generic sparsity measure for the investment behaviour of owner .
No. Criterion S(X) Interpretation
1. Sum

∑
=1
S()
Total owners’ sparsity. A high value denotes high concentration in
the investment behaviour, i.e. owners tend to hold shares of few
firms. A low value denotes tendency of owners to distribute invest-
ments across firms.
2. Average 1


∑
=1
S()
Average owners’ sparsity. Same as above, but normalised by , the
number of owners in the market.
3. Median Med S()
Median sparsity. 50% of owners have an investment behaviour with
sparsity lower than S(X). If S(X) is high, then owners do not diversify
much investments; if low, there is stronger tendency for common
shareholding.
4. pth percentile Qp S()
Same as above, with now p% of owners having investments with
sparsity lower than S(X). Threshold that determines the degree of
sparsity of the p% most “democratic” owners.
5. Minimum min S()
Sparsity of most “democratic” market owner, holding a very similar
proportion of shares in all market firms.
6. Maximum mx S()
Sparsity of most “unequal” market owner, holding very different
proportion of shares across market firms, in the limit having in-
vested only in one firm.
Among the possible row-sparsity measures that can be used to construct the matrix indices,
measure 5 from Table B.1 will be used to illustrate the application to the OM and RM matrices,
the remaining measures presenting in general analogous interpretations. The special case of
measure 1, given its links with other fields in the literature, will be discussed separately below.
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Measure 5 is the ℓ2/ ℓ1 sparsity index; the expression applied to one row of the OM or RM is
given by:
S() =
ℓ2()
ℓ1()
=
√
√
√
J
∑
j=1
2j
J
∑
j=1
j
The general meaning of this measure was discussed in Section B.1.1; in the common share-
holding application, the ℓ2 measure considers one owner  at a time, sums the squares of the
shares the owner holds in each firm j in the market - giving more weight to larger shares -
and finally takes the square root of the total. This measures the (Euclidean) “distance” of the
owner’s investment behaviour from the “null” owner, i.e. an owner that holds zero (or negli-
gible) shares in all firms in the market. The ratio of ℓ2 to the ℓ1 measure (simple sum of the
shares held by the owner in all the firms in portfolio), re-scales such distance according to the
owner’s total investment, giving a relative measure of how concentrated is the owner’s invest-
ment behaviour across the market. Such individual behaviour can then aggregated according
to any method proposed in Table B.3.
The row-wise calculation of the ℓ2/ ℓ1 sparsity index for the OM and RM of our example is given
in Table B.4, together with the overall matrix measures obtained according to the various
aggregation criteria discussed earlier.2 Looking at the row indices, we notice that all owners
that hold shares of only one firm have maximum sparsity score of one in both the RM and OM.
On the other hand, the common shareholders can be ranked according to the scores, where
the RM only accounts for the number of investments among the market firms, while OM adds
the information about the intensity of the investments and their relative distribution. Common
shareholders O1 and O2 are equivalent in terms of number of investments (from matrix RM
both score 0.707), but the values obtained in the OM reveal that O1 has a more concentrated
investment behaviour, having a higher sparsity index (0.898 vs 0.710). Owner O3 scores the
lowest among the common shareholders in both matrices, given not only that it invests in
more firms, but also that the level of investment is rather even across firms; this is the most
“democratic” owner in the market, and its scores will correspond to the minimum criterion
for the matrix measures. Notice that in the case of O3, the actual shares held in firm F2 are
not available, so that the OM score has been computed based only on the three firms where
shares were known.
Among the remaining matrix measures, the sum aggregation criterion is not very meaningful
for this specific sparsity index, while its standardised version given by the average has a more
intuitive interpretation. The average values indicate for both matrices that the investment
behaviour is rather concentrated, while the median shows that at least 50% of the owners are
single owners (have maximum sparsity index). The maximum criterion being equal to one is
2Except percentiles, which were not computed due to the very small number of observations.
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not very informative, simply indicating that the owner with the most concentrated investment
behaviour is actually owner of a single firm.
Table B.4: Matrix sparsity measures for OM and RM of Tables 2.2-B.7, based on ℓ2/ ℓ1 row-sparsity index.
Row index  = 1, . . . ,8.
Row measures

RM OM
ℓ2 ℓ1 ℓ2/ ℓ1 ℓ2 ℓ1 ℓ2/ ℓ1
1
p
2 2 0.707 13.197 14.7 0.898
2
p
2 2 0.707 13.495 19 0.710
3
p
4 4 0.5 9.81 16.8 0.584
4 1 1 1 1 1 1
5 1 1 1 1 1 1
6 1 1 1 1 1 1
7 1 1 1 1 1 1
8 1 1 1 1 1 1
Matrix measures based on ℓ2/ ℓ1
Sum 6.9140 7.1922
Average 0.8643 0.8990
Median 1 1
Min 0.5 0.5842
Max 1 1
A little more attention should be devoted to measure 1, whose link to the vector density
measure was discussed in Section B.1.1. If we choose S() = ℓ0/ J i.e. the proportion of null
elements of row , then the average aggregation criterion would give:
S(X) =
1


∑
=1
S() =
1


∑
=1
#{j : j = 0}
J
=
#{(, j) : j = 0}
J
This is the overall proportion of null elements of the X matrix, the complement of the well-
known matrix density index - an index very widely used in matrix analysis and also in the
networks literature - i.e. the proportion of non-zero elements of the matrix:
density(C) =
#{(, j) : j 6= 0}
J
A thorough discussion of this index in the analysis of networks will follow in Section B.2.3.
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In the ownership application, however, Assumption A6 above implies that all lines of the OM or
RM must have at least one non-zero element, i.e. each owner is included in the matrix if and
only if it owns at least one firm in the market. Therefore, the sparsity index for each row should
compute the proportion of null row elements excluding those that are structurally non-zero,
i.e. should take the expression S() = ℓ0/(J − 1), otherwise the row index would never reach
the maximum of one in the case of maximum sparsity (absence of common shareholding).
This yields the following common shareholding-corrected matrix sparsity measure:
SCS(X) =
#{(, j) : j = 0}
(J − 1)
For the same reason, a common shareholding variation of the matrix density index should also
be considered as follows:
densityCS(X) =
#{(, j) : j 6= 0} − 
(J − 1)
which computes the proportion of non-zero elements only among the entries in the matrix
which can actually be zero, thus excluding the cases that are bound to be non-zero. This
modified density index will reach the minimum value of zero in case of absence of common
shareholders, hence allowing to have a zero-density benchmark for a market with only single
owners.
In both cases, matrices RM and OM in Tables 2.2-B.7 present 19 null elements, therefore
SCS(X) = 19/(8 × 3) = 0.7917, showing a high level of sparsity, in line with the results based
on the ℓ2/ ℓ1 metric. The corrected density, eliminating all “structural” links, accounts only for
(13 − 8) = 5 non-zero entries, out of (J − 1), i.e. densityCS(X) = 5/24 = 0.2083 = 1 − SCS(X).
Similarity measures for comparison to benchmark scenarios
A possible alternative approach to the measurement of the extent of common shareholding,
as mentioned earlier, is the comparison of the observed market structure with an hypothetical
benchmark scenario of interest. As long as it is possible to express the desired benchmark
through a specific matrix - as was illustrated in Table B.2 for our example - then the compar-
ison with the benchmark can be performed through the computation of a similarity measure
between the benchmark matrix and the matrix representing the actual market.
Matrix similarity measures are intended to assess the “distance” d(A,B) between two matrices
A and B, with identical number of rows and columns, not necessarily square. Similarity mea-
sures are usually calculated entry-wise, that is the elements of the two matrices in the same
position are compared (usually calculating differences), and these values are then aggregated
through a matrix norm, a matrix measure similar to the vector measures considered earlier.
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In order to compute a matrix norm, the matrix is basically treated as a long vector, where the
columns (or rows) have been stacked together; the norms treat a × J matrix as a vector of size
J, and apply any vector measure to it. Among the most popular, we have the ℓp-type norms,
the Frobenius norm and the more general family of Lp,q-norms, whose formulas are given in
Table B.5. The structure of these norms is very similar to the sparsity measures presented
earlier, the main differences being that summation is now performed over the two row and
column indices,  and j respectively, to span all elements of the matrix.
Both the L2,1 and the Frobenius norm are particular cases of the family of Lp,q norms, since
the Frobenius is actually an L2,2 norm. The L2,1 norm is a popular error function used in robust
data analysis and in sparse coding, given that the error for each data point (the matrix row in
this case) is not raised to any power, but simply summed over all points (rows).
The Frobenius norm is also rather popular, being the Euclidean norm on the  × J space of
matrix elements. It is invariant under rotations of rows and/or columns, i.e. the order in which
the firms and the owners are arranged into the matrix is irrelevant. For a full account of matrix
theory and applications, see for instance Zhang (2017), or Boyd and Vandenberghe (2018).
For the calculation of the distance between matrices, the chosen norm is not applied to the
original matrices, but to the transformed matrix (of differences). In the right column of Table
B.5, the norms presented above are used for the measurement of matrices similarity, based
on the matrix of differences A − B.
Table B.5: Some common matrix norms, applied either to a single matrix C (left), or to a pair of matrices
A and B (right) in order to determine their distance d(A,B). The elements of the reference matrix are
denoted by pj,  = 1 . . . , , j = 1 . . . , J, were p = , b or c, according to the case.
No. Norm Definition d(A,B)
1. ℓp-type

∑

∑
j |cj|p
1/p ∑

∑
j |j − bj|p
1/p
2. L2,1
∑

Ç
∑
j |cj|2
∑

Ç
∑
j |j − bj|2
3. Frobenius
Ç
∑

∑
j |cj|2
Ç
∑

∑
j |j − bj|2
4. Lp,q

∑


∑
j |cj|p
q/p
1/q 
∑


∑
j |j − bj|p
q/p
1/q
For the sake of the example, we shall compute the similarity measures no. 2 and 3 from
Table B.5 between the usual incidence matrix X of Table B.7 and the two benchmark scenarios
seen before. Denote the maximum and minimum sparsity relation matrices RM by MAR and
MR, as presented earlier in Table B.2, bottom left and bottom right respectively. The matrix
differences X − MAR and X − MR are displayed in Table B.6, together with the quantities
necessary for the calculation of the L2,1 and the Frobenius norms. The L2,1 norm gives the
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following values: d(X,MAR) = 3.7320 and d(X,MR) = 11.4887, while the Frobenius norms
yields d(X,MAR) = 2.236 and d(X,MR) = 4.359. The distance of the incidence matrix from
the maximum sparsity scenario is smaller under both measures, if compared to the distance
from the opposite benchmark, showing that the market considered in the example is closer
to the case of absence of common shareholding than to the case of completely connected
market. This result is in line with the findings obtained through the matrix sparsity indices
analysed earlier, i.e. the market does not show a strong presence of common shareholding.
Table B.6: Differences between incidence matrix X and benchmark matrices MAR and MR represent-
ing relation matrices under maximum and minimum sparsity respectively. Elements of the difference
matrices are denoted generically by dj. Similarity indices computed according to L2,1 and Frobenius
norms.
∑
j |dj|2
X − MAR =
0 0 0 1 1
0 0 1 0 1
0 1 1 1 3
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
L2,1 = 3.7320
Frobenius = 2.236
∑
j |dj|2
X − MR =
0 -1 -1 0 2
0 -1 0 -1 2
0 0 0 0 0
-1 0 -1 -1 3
-1 -1 0 -1 3
-1 -1 0 -1 3
-1 -1 -1 0 3
-1 -1 -1 0 3
L2,1 = 11.4887
Frobenius = 4.359
If we wish to use the density index (or its variation presented earlier) in the case of comparison
of matrices, we can either compute the densities of the two matrices and then compare them,
or compute directly the density of the matrix of differences. Since the density is not a linear
operator, in general Density(A) − Density(B) 6= Density(A − B) (unless A = B, in which case
they are both null). In the first computation on the left-hand side, we assess the difference in
sparsity between A and B; if the difference is positive, then matrix A is more dense i.e. has
more non-zero elements than B, the reverse applying in case of a negative value. On the other
hand, the density of A−B will always be a positive value, computing the proportion of non-zero
values of the difference matrix, i.e. the proportion of cases for which the elements of A and B
are not equal. A small value indicates that the two matrices coincide in most entries, while a
value close to one means that most of the elements of the two matrices are different, hence
producing non-zero entries in the difference matrix.
B.2 Network methods
Social network analysis studies the empirical structure of social relations and associations
that may be expressed in network form. It can therefore be applied to the analysis of the
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corporate ownership structure of a market, which can be easily represented through a network
of relationships between owners and firms.
A light introduction to social networks can be found in Borgatti et al. (2009), while König and
Battiston (2009) present the main features of models of economic networks. For a compre-
hensive account of social networks analysis see, for instance, Scott (2017) or Borgatti et al.
(2018).
A social network is constituted by a set of nodes (also denoted vertices or actors), and a set
of ties (also edges or links) that connect pairs of nodes. There are several measures that can
help characterise features of a given network, based on concepts such as centrality, the study
of the importance of a node based on its position, or cohesion, the extent of connectedness
of the network. Extensive surveys of network measurements can be found, for example, in
Newman (2003) and in Costa et al. (2007).
The nodes can be all of the same type, for example when studying relationships between in-
dividuals, giving rise to a so-called one-mode network. However, in many cases the interest
is in studying the links between actors of different nature, such as individuals and organisa-
tions (affiliation networks), or individuals and events. These kinds of data present several
facets of interactions, considering that - for example - belonging to the same organisation
or club creates links between individuals, but on the other hand common members can also
create mutual influence among organisations. This kind of data can be represented through a
two-mode network, also known as bipartite network. Two interesting applications of bipartite
network methods are developed in the empirical studies by Bonaccorsi and Giuri (2001) and
by Robins and Alexander (2004), where network indices are utilised for the characterisation of
industry dynamics and corporate interlocking, respectively.
The network nodes and ties can be represented through a matrix, where rows and columns
can represent the same set of entities (one-mode matrix), or two distinct groups of actors,
such as individuals and organisations (two-mode matrices), in this case the nodes from one
group being arranged on the rows and those from the other group on the columns. The entries
of the matrices represent the presence (or absence) of a tie or link between the nodes; in the
case of a two-mode network, a tie exists only between one entity of one set and one entity of
the other set, but not between entities belonging to the same set. For example, in the case
of affiliation networks, links are defined only between individuals and organisations, but not
between individuals or between organizations. Links between nodes within each group can
then be derived from the initial links recorded across groups.
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B.2.1 Network representation of the common shareholding frame-
work
In the study of common shareholding, the structure of the market presented in Section 2.2.1,
and in particular assumptions A2-A3 and A7 therein, yielded a natural division of the actors
into the two groups of firms and owners, whose links have been represented through matrices
OM and RM there defined. This structure corresponds precisely to the concept of two-mode
data referred above, and to a two-mode matrix representation; therefore in the following our
attention will focus on two-mode network methods.
Although a common representation of networks is given by graphs, the matrix representation
is preferred in the present approach, given the framework and example introduced in Sections
2.2.1-2.2.2, and the connection to the matrix methods presented in Section B.1, which will be
made explicit later. For the sake of simplicity, the initial presentation of the methods will be
generally based on presence/absence of ties, i.e. on the RM, and not on the complete OM.
The actual value (weight) of the tie will be considered later, with reference to the weighted
networks literature.
The network analysis of two-mode data can be performed according to two different ap-
proaches. The first is a unimodal or separate approach, which projects the data into one-mode
and then looks at relationships within one group of actors at a time; the second approach is bi-
modal or joint, where the two groups of actors are analysed together. The two approaches are
referred to, respectively, as “conversion” and “direct” approach in Borgatti and Halgin (2011).
The direct approach has been preferred in the recent years, on the basis that the conversion
or projection procedure to one-mode would lead to loss of structural information. A discussion
of both approaches is presented in Everett and Borgatti (2013), where the conversion method
is actually revalued and considered equally valid when compared to the direct approach, as
long as both projections to one-mode dimensions are used jointly in the analysis. Moreover,
the authors highlight that the conversion approach can provide different insights compared to
the direct analysis. For these reasons, both approaches will be presented, and subsequently
illustrated with reference to our initial example. For a more comprehensive review of two-
mode network analysis, see for instance Borgatti and Everett (1997) and Borgatti (2012).
Unimodal approach
With reference to the market example introduced in Section 2.2.2, and in particular to the
relation matrix (RM) presented in Table 2.3, let us compute the projection of the ties in the RM
onto each of the groups of agents, namely the owners and the firms.
For easier reference, the Table is reproduced below:
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Table B.7: (Reproduction of Table 2.3) Relation matrix (RM) of the market example from Table 2.1.
F1 F2 F3 F4 Total
O1 1 0 0 1 2
O2 1 0 1 0 2
O3 1 1 1 1 4
O4 0 1 0 0 1
O5 0 0 1 0 1
O6 0 0 1 0 1
O7 0 0 0 1 1
O8 0 0 0 1 1
Total 3 2 4 4 13
Table B.8 presents the two projections into one-mode matrices, with the owners represented
in the left panel, and the firms in the right one. Intuitively, the projection matrices allow us to
capture similarities between owners in terms of their participation into firms, and similarities
between firms due to the shared owners. If the RM matrix is denoted as usual by X (also
referred to as incidence matrix), then the two one-mode projections matrices can be obtained,
respectively, as the products XX′ and X′X, where X′ is the transpose of matrix X.
The one-mode matrices are symmetric, and represent the overlaps between actors belonging
to the same groups, that is, respectively, the number of firms common to each pair of owners
(left), and the number of owners common to each pair of firms (right). The values on the
diagonal represent the number of firms owned by each owner, and the number of owners of
each firm, respectively, i.e. they correspond to row and column totals in Table B.7.
The pairwise overlaps between two distinct actors correspond also to the number of 2-step
paths between them, as pointed out in Borgatti (2012); for example, the fact that F1 and F3
have two owners in common means that we can reach F3 from F1 through two different 2-step
paths, one going through O2 (F1 → O2 → F3) and the other through O3 (F1 → O3 → F3). Of
course the same applies the other way around, that is considering paths from F3 to F1.
Let us consider first the projection into the owners’ group, recalling that owners O1-O3 were
common across more than one firm, while O4-O8 only owned one firm. It follows that the
expected number of ties in the left panel for the non-common shareholders O4-O8 cannot
exceed one, since they can only share one firm with another owner. For example, O5 shares
one firm with O2, one with O3 and one with O6, which incidentally is the same firm F3, the
only one it holds. On the other hand, the common shareholders O1-O3 might share more than
one firm with other owners, therefore the recorded number of ties can be larger than one. This
is highlighted in the left panel, where values relative to the common shareholders are shown
in italics. For example, O1 shares ownership of one firm with O2 (that is F1), and one with O7
and O8 (that is firm F4), while has two firms in common with O3 (both F1 and F4).
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Table B.8: Projection matrices of the relation matrix X from Table B.7. Values in the matrices represent
the number of overlapping ties for any pair of actors in each group. Left: projection into the owners’
group (XX′); on the diagonal number of firms owned by each owner, off-diagonal number of firms shared
by each pair of owners. Right: projection into the firms’ group (X′X); on the diagonal number of recorded
owners per firm, off-diagonal number of owners common to each pair of firms.
O1 O2 O3 O4 O5 O6 O7 O8
O1 2 1 2 0 0 0 1 1
O2 1 2 2 0 1 1 0 0
O3 2 2 4 1 1 1 1 1
O4 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
O5 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0
O6 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0
O7 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1
O8 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1
F1 F2 F3 F4
F1 3 1 2 2
F2 1 2 1 1
F3 2 1 4 1
F4 2 1 1 4
Notice that the maximum possible number of ties corresponds to the total number of firms in
the market, in this example being four. Since we observe that one of the ties actually reaches
the maximum value, in the case of O3 with itself, this fact highlights that O3 owns shares
in all firms in the market, therefore creating a strong interconnection between the firms. A
comparison of the maximum observed tie with the maximum possible value can therefore be
an informative index of the degree of interconnection present in the market.
In the firms’ projection in the right panel, the values off the main diagonal represent the
strength of the ties between firms induced by the presence of common shareholders. In this
simple example, all firms are connected, as all values are non-zero, either through one com-
mon shareholder - like for instance in the case of F1 and F2, which share O3 - or through more
than one common shareholder, as in the case of F1 and F4, which share both O1 and O3.
In case a firm does not share any holder with the rest of the firms in the market, the corre-
sponding line and column would present all zero elements (except on the diagonal). This would
represent a “stand alone” firm, i.e. disconnected from the rest of the actors in the group.
Other patterns can arise from the analysis of this second projection, when for instance distinct
clusters of firms can be identified, having strong internal interconnections induced by common
shareholders, but not sharing any owners with other clusters. This situation would give rise
to blocks filled with null entries in the firms’ matrix, after appropriate rearrangement of the
firms’ order in the rows/columns.
In this cursory overview, the two projection matrices provide a useful summary of the owner-
ship information, suggesting that an appropriate analysis of the sparseness of these matrices
can lead to a quantification of the extent of common shareholding, and more in general of
the strengths of interconnections existing in the market. The analysis can be applied to the
whole matrices, or also to specific blocks of the matrices with a relevant meaning - such as
the top-left block in the owners’ matrix, which was highlighted in italics in Table B.8 - or any
other which could be of interest.
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Besides sparsity indices, other measures can be applied to the unimodal analysis, namely
indices coming from the network literature, linked to the concept of centrality or cohesion
mentioned earlier. Since such measures can be used also in the bimodal approach, they will
be discussed later, after presenting the bimodal framework.
Bimodal approach
In this approach both modes are analysed jointly, via the construction of a so-called bipartite
adjacency matrix, say B, where both groups (owners and firms) appear on the rows and on
the columns. Matrix B is symmetrical and is composed of four blocks, one of them being the
original incidence matrix X displayed in Table B.7, and another its transpose X′, all remaining
elements of the B matrix being zero. The bipartite adjacency matrix for our example is shown
in Table B.9, where X appears in the top-right block, and X′ in the bottom-left. The remaining
blocks are null, since no ties are recorded between actors belonging to the same mode.
Table B.9: Bipartite adjacency matrix B constructed from the relation matrix X of Table B.7.
O1 O2 O3 O4 O5 O6 O7 O8 F1 F2 F3 F4
O1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
O2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
O3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
O4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
O5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
O6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
O7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
O8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
F1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
F2 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
F3 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
F4 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
The pairwise overlaps displayed in the projection matrices of the unimodal approach can be
easily obtained through multiplication of the B matrix by itself. The resulting matrix is still
square and symmetric, say BB, and is divided into four blocks, two of them null, and two of
them corresponding to the two projection matrices. The BB matrix for our example is displayed
in Table B.10.
Contrary to the projection matrices of the unimodal approach, the BB matrix presents several
“structural” zeros, since there are no 2-step paths that can link actors of different modes (re-
member that, as noted earlier, pairwise overlaps correspond to 2-step paths). Therefore any
analysis of such matrix should take this into account. For example, in the calculation of a spar-
sity measure or other connectedness metric, the structural zeros should be distinguished from
the actual zeros denoting absence of a tie between actors of different groups. Unfortunately,
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Table B.10: Matrix BB of pairwise overlaps, giving the number of 2-step paths between nodes.
O1 O2 O3 O4 O5 O6 O7 O8 F1 F2 F3 F4
O1 2 1 2 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
O2 1 2 2 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
O3 2 2 4 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
O4 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
O5 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
O6 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
O7 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
O8 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
F1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 2 2
F2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 1 1
F3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 4 1
F4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 4
few techniques have been developed specifically for this purpose, and most analyses apply
standard network techniques to the bipartite matrices of two-mode data.
An exception is the measurement of centrality, where some specific two-mode measures have
been proposed (see for instance Bonacich, 1991). Besides the problem of occurrence of struc-
tural zeros, Bonacich and Lloyd (2015) underline another feature to be taken into account in
the case of centrality measures of a bipartite network: if the two groups are of different size,
actors of the smaller group have more possible ties available (given by the size of the larger
group) and consequently may appear to be more central. The authors also warn about the
possible existence of exogenous ties (“structural ones”) within a certain group of actors, such
as in the case of siblings in a same classroom, or the case of scientific collaboration between
PhD student and advisor. In the common shareholding problem this could arise when, for
instance, two firms belong to the same corporate group, or two owners are linked by some
structural relationship. In all such cases, appropriate corrections may be introduced; some
possible proposals for centrality measures are given by Bonacich and Lloyd (2015), where the
original error minimisation criteria are adjusted excluding structural zeros and ones.
As an alternative, the results from standard techniques can be corrected a posteriori, for ex-
ample normalising by dividing metrics by bipartite maxima, as discussed in Borgatti (2012).
B.2.2 Alternative representations for one-mode matrices
Borgatti (2012) presents some alternative representations of the one-mode projections, lead-
ing to matrices similar to those in Table B.8, where elements are computed according to dif-
ferent methods that re-scale the mere counts presented there.
Two of such alternatives are discussed below, and can be considered in the analysis of com-
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mon shareholding. For the sake of the example, the alternative methods will be presented
here with reference to the projection matrix of the owners’ group, i.e. the left panel of Table
B.8, analogous reasoning holding for the firms’ projection matrix. Besides the suggestions in
Borgatti (2012), some further alternatives for binary matrices are also considered below.
Following the notation in Borgatti (2012), let X be the original relation matrix (RM), and let
A = XX′ be the projection matrix into the rows’ space (owners); denote by j the correspond-
ing elements of A, counting the number of ties between owners  and j. The maximum number
of ties between two owners is J, i.e. the total number of firms in the market.
(1) A first alternative to the projection in A is given by the matrix of Pearson correlations among
the rows of X, say R, whose entries rj are related to the j as follows:
rj =
j/ J − j
ssj
Here j/ J represents the proportion of common ties between two owners, relative to the maxi-
mum possible number of ties, while the  and s elements are used to standardise the previous
measure, and represent, respectively, the mean and standard deviation of the corresponding
row of X. The row means  can be interpreted as the proportion of links each owner has with
the firms in the market, with respect to the total number of firms. For example, in our case O2
would have  = 0.5, since it owns shares in two out of four firms.
The Pearson correlation coefficient rj varies between −1 and 1, where the two values indicate,
respectively, maximum negative and maximum positive association between the ownership
choices of the two owners. A value of zero denotes absence of association between the two
behaviours. Notice that in case of zero ties existing between two owners (i.e. j = 0), the
value of rj will always be negative, indicating that the two owners go in opposite directions in
their choices, given that they do own some firms, but never the same ones. The analysis of
this matrix, and of the signs of its elements, can reveal further features of the interaction of
owners in the market.
(2) The second alternative to projection matrix A proposed by Borgatti (2012) is a matrix, say
C, whose elements are given by the Jaccard coefficients cj defined below. Such coefficients
are obtained starting from a cross-tabulation of row  and j of the original relation matrix X
(shown below right), which shows the number of firms owned by both owners (), the number
not owned by any of them (d), and the number owned by one but not the other owner (b and
c respectively):
cj =

+b+c
Row j
1 0
Row 
1  b
0 c d
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The Jaccard coefficient cj measures the degree of association between the choices of the two
owners, since is computes the proportion of firms owned by both owners over the total number
of firms owned by any of the two.
The coefficient varies between a minimum of zero (there is no firm in the market that is owned
by both owners, i.e.  = 0), and a maximum of one (all firms owned by owner  are also held
by owner j and vice-versa (b = c = 0). Contrary to the case of matrix R, the elements of C
cannot take up negative values, although the qualitative picture of the association of owners’
behaviour is similar. Incidentally, notice that element  of the contingency table for owners 
and j displayed above corresponds to the previously defined entry j of matrix A, so the cj
coefficients are again a normalisation of the values of A.
Besides the coefficients presented in Borgatti (2012), many other measures of similarity or
association between pairs of rows/columns are available in the case of a binary matrix, like
the RM analysed above. In general, they are based on the contingency table representation
introduced above, like for instance the Goodman and Kruskal’s gamma, or its special case
called Yule’s Q association coefficient, defined as:
Q =
d − bc
d + bc
where elements , . . . , d are those from the contingency table.
For this binary case, the Pearson correlation coefficient introduced earlier has itself a simplified
expression, called Pearson’s  coefficient:
ϕ =
d − bc
p
( + c)(b + d)( + b)(c + d)
again based on elements , . . . , d as above. For more association measures for 2 × 2 contin-
gency table, see for instance Bernard (2012).
In principle, it should be possible to apply these suggestions in the bimodal approach too. In
fact, bipartite matrices can be constructed starting from the adjacency matrix B, following the
alternatives given above for the unimodal problem, i.e. the one-mode blocks appearing in the
BB pairwise overlaps matrix of Table B.10 can be replaced by alternative one-mode matrices
representing, for instance, the Jaccard coefficients or the Pearson correlations discussed ear-
lier. The calculation of appropriate indices starting from these alternative matrices - and their
interpretation in the unimodal and bimodal approaches - will be discussed in Section B.2.3.
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B.2.3 Network measures
The previous sections proposed an overview of various matrix representations that can origi-
nate from the initial relation matrix of a network, both in the unimodal and bimodal approaches
to bipartite networks. From any of the matrices presented above, different measures can be
calculated in order to capture certain network characteristics. Their meaning and interpre-
tation will vary according to the underlying chosen matrix, and to the selected approach, as
discussed in the following. For the sake of simplicity, the measures will be presented and
interpreted here with reference to either incidence matrices or projections matrices based on
counts of links between nodes.
Applications to alternative representations of projection matrices - such as the matrices based
on Pearson coefficients or other nodes’ association measures presented in B.2.2 - are also
possible, but will not be discussed thoroughly in the present note. The application to such
alternative matrices will be analogous to that of the counts matrices, but might require the
modification of the indices accordingly, or the adoption of different indices. A first simple ex-
ample is given in Section B.2.5 below, where a new network index is proposed for the Pearson
coefficients’ matrix, drawing from the measures presented earlier in the sparsity context. Fur-
ther cases can be considered according to the need. Notice that care should also be taken in
the interpretation of the resulting indices, given that the underlying matrices have a different
informational content.
In this section, two sets of measures taken from the network literature will be presented -
respectively cohesion and centrality measures. For a thorough account of network measures,
see for instance the aforementioned reference works of Scott (2017) or Borgatti et al. (2018).
A specific discussion of network measures for large two-mode networks can be found in Latapy
et al. (2008).
The general purpose of centrality and cohesion measures was introduced earlier, namely on
the one hand studying the importance of a node based on its position, and on the other
hand assessing the extent of connectedness of the network, respectively. In the common
shareholding measurement, the focus is more on a global evaluation of the strength of the
ties in the whole network induced by common shareholding, rather than the analysis of the
importance of single actors, or their individual contribution to the cohesiveness of the network.
For this reason, cohesion measures arise as a natural candidate in this context, and their
possible application to the common shareholding problem is straightforward. However, some
centrality measures can also be applied to the common shareholding study, as long as they
are interpreted as a global characteristic of the network, and not used to assess individual
performance of actors. Below the two most common measures of cohesion and centrality are
presented, density and degree, respectively. Their interpretation in the common shareholding
context is discussed, and illustrated based on our fictitious market example. The connection
of each measure to the previous matrix methods is also highlighted and commented upon.
297
Network cohesion
The most popular network cohesion measure is the so-called density, defined as the proportion
of actual links known in the network over the theoretical number of possible relationships.
This measure evaluates the degree of connectedness between the nodes of a network, and
consequently the extent to which different paths facilitate circulation of information among
network’s participants.
The minimum value of the density is zero, corresponding to a totally disconnected network,
while the maximum of one represents a network where all possible links are actually present.
A low value corresponds to a sparse network, where information flows are weaker, since nodes
are less cohesive. As the number of nodes increases, the density tends to decrease, given that
in a larger network the number of possible links increases fast.
The calculation of the density measure varies according to the type of network. For example,
in a simple one-group network a “connection” of a node to itself does not count, since the
relevant ties in such network are only those that link two different nodes; if the network is
constituted by n nodes, then the maximum number of ties is n(n − 1). On the other hand, in
a two-mode network only links across two different groups are possible, therefore the maxi-
mum number of possible ties exclude all within-group connections; if n1 and n2 represent the
number of nodes of each group, then the maximum possible number of connections is n1n2.
The ratio of the actual number of connections to these maxima will measure the density of
the network. The minimum number of connections in the two cases is usually considered to
be zero, i.e. a set of “stand alone” actors in the case of one group, and two separate sets of
actors with no interconnections in the case of a bipartite network.
When a matrix representation of the network is adopted, as in our approach, the density can
be computed with respect to different matrices, obtaining different insights and interpretations
of a network’s properties. For example, in the case of a bipartite network the density index can
be calculated with respect either to the original incidence matrix X, taking into account the
direct (one-step) links between the two groups, or also be applied to the one-mode projection
matrices, evaluating the density of the (two-step) links induced within each group by the
connections in X. Notice that, even if the X matrix is rather sparse (and hence presents low
density), it is sufficient to have one element of a group having links to all members of the
second group to obtain a totally (two-step) connected second group. This is exactly the case
of owner O3 in our example, which “links” all four firms in the market, giving rise to a totally
connected one-mode firms matrix, as shown in Table B.8 (right), whose density is one.
The calculation of the density index of a network matrix will differ in the case of one-mode and
of two-mode matrices, as discussed in the following.
298
In a one-mode matrix - say A - like those in Table B.8, all self-links should be ignored, i.e. all
elements on the diagonal are excluded. It follows that the density for a one-mode matrix with
n nodes is given by a corrected version of the expression introduced in Section B.1.2, namely:
d1M =
#{(, j),  6= j : j 6= 0}
n(n − 1)
As pointed out earlier, in the common shareholding framework the additional specificity of
the matrices deriving from Assumption A6 should be taken into account, i.e. that all actors
of one group must have at least one link to one actor of the other group. For the one-mode
density, the only effect is on the interpretation of the index, not on the formula above (which
is still valid): the measure applied to the two projection matrices will then refer to the density
of links between all owners in the market, but will represent the density of connections only
between the non-independent firms of the market, i.e. only between firms that have at least
one recorded owner, therefore should not be interpreted as density of the whole market firms.
The two projection matrices of our example (Table B.8) present 28 and 12 non-zero off-diagonal
elements, in the owners’ and firms’ case respectively; given that the size of the two matrices is
8 for the owners and 4 for the firms, it follows that one-mode densities are computed according
to the above formula as doners1M = 28/(8 × 7) = 0.5 and d
ƒ rms
1M = 12/(4 × 3) = 1, as expected.
In our bipartite network, these values refer to two-step links within the groups, induced by
the direct links observed across groups; therefore the computed densities reveal that the
cross-groups connections induce only 50% of all possible links between owners in the market,
while activate all possible interconnections between (non-independent) firms, in line with what
observed earlier.
In terms of a two-mode matrix of a general network, all recorded links are of interest, therefore
the density can be calculated with the usual matrix density expression of Section B.1.2. For a
two-mode incidence matrix in the common shareholding context, the modified density index
proposed in Section B.1.2 should be adopted, again due to Assumption A6. Assuming without
loss of generality that  ≥ J, i.e. that there are more owners than firms, then the minimum
possible number of ties in the incidence matrix X equals  - the number of owners. Hence we
subtract from the recorded number of ties the number of owners, in order to attain the desired
minimum value of zero in case of absence of common shareholding. Therefore, the density of
X is given by:
d2M =
#{(, j) : j 6= 0} − 
(J − 1)
As for the density of the two-mode incidence matrix X, we have 13 non-zero entries (Table
B.7), with  = 8 and J = 4, giving a density of dX2M = (13 − 8)/(8 × 3) = 0.21, i.e. the market
presents only 21% of the possible “extra” links of owners beyond the first firm they own,
denoting a low overall level of common shareholding. This result seems to be in contrast
with the higher densities obtained within groups, but we should keep in mind that index dX2M
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measures the density of the direct connections between the two sets of entities, while the
previous indices assesses the intra-group induced cohesion for each set of actors separately,
therefore measuring a different dimension of the market structure.
It is easy to confirm that in the two benchmark scenarios of minimum and maximum sparsity
of Table B.2, the above formula gives the expected values of zero density for absence of
common shareholders (RM, maximum sparsity), and unit density for the totally connected
minimum sparsity case.
In case the bimodal approach is adopted, the structural zeros present in the bipartite adja-
cency matrix B or in the BB matrix of pairwise overlaps should be accounted for, modifying
formulas accordingly.
Node centrality
An alternative common network characteristic is the degree of a node - which is a centrality
measure - given by the number of connections or ties that a node has to other nodes. The
degree can be normalised dividing by the maximum number of possible ties; this normalisation
is even more relevant in a bipartite network, since the maximum number of ties of a node
depends on the group the node belongs to. In fact, as mentioned earlier, nodes in the smaller
group would look more central without normalisation, given the larger number of possible ties
(equal to the size of the larger group).
Notice that the row and column totals of the incidence matrix X of a bipartite network corre-
spond exactly to the number of connections of the nodes in the two groups, i.e. to the degree
of each node. The same values can also be read on the diagonal of the two projection matrices
into the one-mode spaces, as mentioned earlier.
If we denote by d and dj the degree of owner  or firm j of X, respectively, then the normalised
degree of the nodes in the bipartite network is given by:
d∗

=
d
J
nd d∗
j
=
dj

For example, in our simplified market the maximum possible ties of an owner  are J = 4 (one
for each firm), while a firm j can present at most  = 8 ties (one for each owner). The maximum
degree in our example is observed for owner O3, which is linked to all four firm (100% degree),
while the firms with highest degree are F3 and F4, each presenting links to four of the eight
owners (50% degree). The actor (firm or owner) presenting highest degree is considered to be
the most central actor.
Although the degree in itself is usually computed as a measure of the centrality of one node,
in order to identify the most important actors, this measure can be useful also in identifying
general patterns in the network. This can be achieved by analysing the distribution of the
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degree over the whole network, called the degree distribution, giving for each integer k the
proportion pk of nodes with degree equal to k. Many aspects of this distribution can be stud-
ied, such as the average or its maximum value, which represents the maximum number of
connections stemming from a single actor. The distribution is generally very asymmetric, with
a long right tail, due to the heterogeneity of real-world networks, where the majority of nodes
have a low degree, but still some nodes can present a very high degree.
In a bipartite network, the degree distribution of each group of actors should be analysed
separately, giving rise to two different degree distributions, for example one for the firms and
one for the owners. A high degree in one distribution does not necessarily correspond to a
high value in the other; for example, a market can present complete absence of common
shareholding, so that all owners have degree one, but each firm can have a large number of
owners, therefore showing large values for the firms’ degree distribution. The average degree
for each group of actors can be a useful indicator of the level of connectedness of the network.
In our example, the degrees for the four firms in the market are (3,2,4,4) respectively, with
a quite even distribution around the middle of the possible values (range between 1 and 8).
The average is 3.25 out of 8, showing a medium level of centrality of firms. For the case of
owners, the degrees are (2,2,4,1,1,1,1,1), a much more asymmetric distribution, with the
majority of the owners having minimum degree of one, but one firm achieving the maximum
degree of four. The average degree for the owners is 1.625 connections out of 4. The average
values tend to hide the difference in symmetry between the two distributions, so different
measures such as the range, minimum or maximum can be more useful in characterising
the distributions. In particular, the maximum degree is a popular network measure, which in
general will depend on the network size, as noticed earlier (see for instance Newman, 2003,
and Costa et al., 2007).
A full characterisation of the degree distribution of a network can also be achieved, based on
certain probability distributions. The study of the parameters governing such distributions can
be of help in identifying the behaviour of the network through the degree. Several scholars
model the degree distribution pk , k = 0,1, . . . by fitting a power law, where pk ∼ k−α; the value
of the exponent α summarises in one coefficient the behaviour of the network connectedness.
The power law is widely recognised as being an appropriate representation of the degree
distribution for large real-world networks; Latapy et al. (2008) report that empirically the
exponent α takes values between 2 and 3.5, reflecting an heterogeneous degree behaviour
with a typical long right tail.
Further details about the degree distribution and power laws, as well as other degree measures
such as average or maximum degree, can be found, for example, in Newman (2003).
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B.2.4 Modified indices for weighted networks
Some of the previous indices have been modified in the context of weighted networks, i.e.
when the ties between nodes are characterised by a weight representing the strength of the
tie, rather than a simple binary indicator of presence/absence. Such weighted representation
of the network resembles the representation of corporate ownership through the full own-
ership information of matrix OM, hence some additional indices of the market structure can
be derived from this literature. The popular node strength index, extension of the node de-
gree presented above, will be discussed here. For further indices see for instance Egghe and
Rousseau (2003), Antoniou and Tsompa (2008) or Opsahl et al. (2010).
The node strength is defined as the sum of the weights of all ties stemming from one node,
i.e. the total strength of all relationships of that node. In the simple (unweighted) network all
ties have weight one, therefore the node strength simply counts the number of ties per node,
i.e. corresponds to the node degree as defined earlier. If j represent the strength of the
relationship between node  and node j, the node strength is obtained, respectively, as:
s =
J
∑
j=1
j nd sj =

∑
=1
j
corresponding to the row and column total of the weighted network matrix representation.
The definition is valid both for a one-mode and a two-mode network.
Given that the information about the total strength of the ties is complementary to the number
of ties, both should be accounted for in the analysis of a node’s centrality. Opsahl et al. (2010)
propose a degree centrality measure that combines both aspects, given by:
Cα

= d

s
d
α
where d is the degree of node  and s the node strength. The exponent α is a positive tuning
parameter, whose value is chosen according to the research objectives. If 0 < α < 1, a high
degree is taken as favourable, while the opposite occurs if α > 1. Further details about this
measure can be found in Opsahl et al. (2010).
In our application, the rows and columns refer to the owners and firms, respectively, so that
the row and column totals of matrix OM correspond exactly to the nodes’ strength. In Table 2.2
column totals were displayed, since they had the direct meaning of the proportion of shares
held by recorded shareholders of a firm. The firm with highest strength is firm F3 with a
total weight of 100%. The row totals were not displayed, as not having a specific economic
interpretation, but nevertheless gain this new meaning in the network context. In this case,
the owner with highest strength is O5, with a total weight of 66.3%. Notice that the row totals
can exceed 100%, since they sum ownership shares on different firms, while the total (direct)
shares owned by the different owners of a firm are bounded above by 100%.
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B.2.5 Other matrix summary indices
Additional indices coming from the matrix literature presented in Section B.1 can be consid-
ered in the study of networks. The main advantage of such indices is that they can be applied
to any kind of matrix, i.e. not only to the relation matrix recording presence or absence of
owner-firm links, or its derived matrices.
For example, if we consider the alternative matrix representations for one-mode groups - such
as the case of the matrix R of Pearson correlation coefficients between actors rj - interest
could lie only on non-zero correlations that pass a specific threshold, rather than considering
all non-zero elements.
In this case, an alternative definition of density based on the sparsity measure ℓ0
ε
(see measure
2 in Table B.1) could be considered, giving rise to the following one-mode index:
d′1M =
#{(, j),  6= j : rj ≥ ε}
n(n − 1)
This index evaluates the proportion of actors in the group presenting a “high” correlation in
their investment behaviour (or in their ownership structure), where threshold ε will determine
the relevant correlation strength.
Additionally, notice that matrix or sparsity indices can also be applied to the full ownership
matrix, taking into account the actual shares involved in each ownership link. For example,
the above modified density could be applied to a matrix with Pearson correlations based on
the full ownership information in OM, or to a matrix whose elements are given by the Euclidean
distance between the rows (or columns) of the OM.
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Appendix C
Identification of Sectors
C.1 Selection of companies and definition of sectors
Any meaningful analysis of common shareholding crucially depends on the correct identifica-
tion of the firms operating in each of the analysed sectors. At first, for each sector and EU
country, the identification of companies has been done using the official NACE-four digit code
of economic activity associated to each of the listed firms, active in Europe (core, primary and
secondary NACE codes1). The rationale behind the choice of using also Secondary Codes was
that of minimising the probability of losing important market players by having the largest
possible set of firms.
In a successive step, we then trimmed this list excluding possibly irrelevant companies. In
fact, the broad definition of some NACE categories led to the selection of some companies
that - despite being related to the field of interest - did not match precisely the actual defi-
nition sought in terms of economic activity. For example, in the Energy market transmission
system operators had to be excluded, given that transmission is a highly regulated activity.
In many cases, this refinement involved manual checks of companies to verify their precise
trade description.
To the original set of listed firms active in the EU, we also added a variable number of unlisted
companies to be sure to include the main market players. The final list of companies for each
sector has been constructed in agreement and collaboration with our colleagues at DG COMP,
taking advantage of their detailed field knowledge.
As possible complement to the above selection, we also explored the possibility to link com-
pany identification to its dimension (measured with assets or turnover), thereby trimming all
firms with a low asset value. In order to check the impact of this selection procedure on the
1Each firm can have, besides one Core NACE code, many Primary and Secondary codes depending on the value
added coming from its different productive activities.
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reliability of common shareholding indicators, we computed the common shareholding indices
based on matrix methods both on the original set of firms and on the reduced set (after ex-
cluding firms with low or absent turnover). We performed the check for both the Electricity and
the Oil&Gas markets. In both sets, the indices gave an analogous picture; in fact, for the in-
dices based on financial values, the firms with no record are automatically dropped, and those
with small assets have a very low impact, so that they do not alter the general results. For
indices based on headcount (e.g. share of firms in a common shareholder’s portfolio, etc.), the
inclusion of small firms changed the scale but not the time trends; relative values remained
unaffected.
These results confirm that the crucial issue remains the inclusion of relevant players and not
the exclusion of irrelevant ones. For the first, we finally discarded a refinement simply based
on assets, preferring that based on NACE codes, expert judgments and on manual verification
of firms’ identity and importance. This also acknowledges the fluid nature of some of these
markets. We present below the peculiarities of firms’ selection for each sector.
C.2 Energy sector, split into Oil&Gas and Electricity
All companies that presented at least one NACE code starting with "35" (Electricity, gas, steam
and air conditioning supply) among Core, Primary or Secondary have been initially selected
as potential candidates for the Energy sector. We noticed the importance to consider also
the Secondary codes especially in the Oil&Gas sector to capture relevant companies having
their Core and Primary codes in Mining (610, 620) or Manufacturing (1920). Firms were then
classified into the "Electricity" or "Oil&Gas" sectors according to the following criteria:
1. Electricity: codes 3511, 3512, 3513, 3514 among Core or first three Primary codes
 production of electricity (NACE: 3511)
 transmission of electricity (NACE: 3512)
 distribution of electricity (NACE: 3513)
 trade of electricity (NACE: 3514)
2. Oil&Gas: codes 0610, 0620, 1920, 3521, 3522, 3523 among Core or first three Primary
codes, corresponding to:
 extraction of crude petroleum (NACE: 0610)
 extraction of natural gas (NACE: 0620)
 manufacture of refined petroleum products (NACE: 1920)
 manufacture of gas (NACE: 3521)
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 distribution of gaseous fuels through mains (NACE: 3522)
 trade of gas through mains (NACE: 3523)
According to the selection outlined above, we obtained 360 firms active in the EU for the Elec-
tricity sector. As for the Oil&Gas, this procedure selected 112 firms. Of these, 19 firms actually
met both criteria 1) and 2) above, i.e. were active both in the Electricity and in the Oil&Gas
sectors, so they were included in both datasets. As suggested by our colleagues in DG COMP,
we removed transmission system operators (TSOs) from the list, given that transmission is
a highly regulated activity. This implied the removal of six companies from the Electricity
dataset and one from the Oil&Gas.
Additional 42 unlisted firms for Electricity and 42 for Oil&Gas were added to complement the
dataset, based on expert opinion. For unlisted firms we proceeded to the extraction of all
available financial and ownership information, which was not included in the original database
of only listed firms. The final dataset used for the analysis has 396 companies for the Electricity
sector and 153 companies for the Oil&Gas sector.
C.3 Trading Platforms for Financial Instruments
The initial attempt of capturing through NACE codes the industry of Trading Platforms for Fi-
nancial Instruments failed to identify the relevant companies. Given that a specific NACE code
for Trading Platforms does not actually exist, possible codes have been selected based on
what reported by the main players of this sector. Unfortunately, such categories were either
too broad ("6492: Other credit granting"; "6499: Other financial service activities, except
insurance and pension funding n.e.c.") or too narrow ("6611: Administration of financial mar-
kets"; "6612: Security and commodity contracts brokerage"), therefore were of no help for the
identification of the other players of the industry.
As a consequence, the list of Trading Venues and Systematic Internalisers operating in the EU
has been constructed manually, using the list of markets maintained by the European Secu-
rities Market Authorities (ESMA). First, four separate lists for different categories of Trading
Venues were compiled: Regulated Markets, Multilateral Trading Facilities, Organised Trading
Facilities, and Systematic Internalisers. Then, together with colleagues in DG COMP, we iden-
tified a single list of 176 companies operating such platforms in the EU. The Trading Platforms
operators reflect the actual players active in this industry, and are hence considered the rele-
vant companies for this sector.
This list entailed the manual check of each company name and the match with its BvD iden-
tifier. Of the identified operators, only 48 were listed companies, and therefore present in
the original database; for the remaining 128 unlisted operators, all financial and ownership
information had to be extracted anew.
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C.4 Telecommunications - Mobile networks
The NACE codes "60: programming and broadcasting activities" and "61: telecommunica-
tions" have been used as base to select, in each EU country, the initial list of Mobile Network
Operators (MNOs). This list was updated and complemented by our colleagues in DG COMP by
trimming unrelated companies and adding additional MNOs and 153 Mobile Virtual Network
Operators (MVNOs).
For all 255 companies finally selected we had to manually match firm’s name and BvD iden-
tifier. Only in a limited number of cases, in fact, the MNOs or the MVNOs corresponded to
the initial list provided by DG COMP, as we privileged mobile telecom operators rather than
mother companies when the operator was an active commercial firm. For example, the sec-
ond MNO in Austria is T-Mobile Austria, part of the Deutsche Telekom group. This company is
actually present on Orbis as T-MOBILE AUSTRIA GMBH, so we included this company in the list
and discarded Deutsche Telekom for Austria.
Most of the MVNOs were not actually identifiable companies but rather commercial initiatives.
In that case, we included preferably the mother companies at the country level - when clas-
sified as telecoms - or the international conglomerate when a national reference company
operating in the telecom sector was not available. We never included public bodies (govern-
ment and its departments) as mother companies. In some cases, domestic operators were
subsidiaries of large international conglomerates operating in very different fields (e.g. large
retails such as MediaMarkt, COOP or SPAR holding). In that case, we retained the largest
controlling company operating in the telecom sector if available.
In a few cases, we had to select the company among a list of very similar names (e.g. Telnet,
Telnet holding, Telnet group, all located in Belgium, the first classified as telecom, the second
as financial holding, the third as post and telecoms). In that case, again, we selected the
last controlling domestic company classified as telecoms. Finally, four companies currently
dissolved but with financial data for the period 2007-2016 were also included.
Of the 255 operators included in the country-level list, some are repeated due to one (or
both) of the following reasons: (i) they are active in more than one country (for example, A1
TELEKOM AUSTRIA is active both in Austria and in Bulgaria as an MNO); (ii) they are active in
a same country both as an MNO and as an MVNO (taking again the example of A1 TELEKOM
AUSTRIA, which is a MNO in Austria, but also operates in the same country the MVNO "Ge
org!"). After removing the repeated operators, we obtain a final list of 231 firms.
This list is a first attempt to define this industry. It may benefit from further refinements,
for example dropping minor companies (especially MNVOs). Since the MVNOs are smaller
entities, sometimes representing only a specific mobile package and not an actual identifiable
company, for the sake of robustness we also adopt an alternative definition of the sector which
does not include them. All-together, we are left with 105 MNOs active in the EU. The set of
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MNOs is then complemented with the corresponding controlling parents in the period 2007-
2016, so as to include all relevant companies that exert influence in the industry, even though
they are not directly mobile operators.
The choice of including the controlling parents has several facets. Indeed, it is usually the
case that big investors and potential common shareholders choose to hold shares in the par-
ent company, through which they manage to influence all subject companies, rather than
investing directly in the smaller subsidiaries. It is also often the case that the parent com-
pany is listed, while the other firms in the corporate group are unlisted, hence the investor’s
preference can also be linked to the listing status. Moreover, several parent companies exert
influence in the industry even though they are not directly mobile operators. For example,
DEUTSCHE TELEKOM AG is not an MNO, but controls several mobile operators, such as T-
MOBILE AUSTRIA GMB, T-MOBILE NETHERLANDS and TELEKOM DEUTSCHLAND. Some other
parent companies may even not be active directly in the telecoms, being holding or financial
companies; nevertheless, being controlling parents of MNOs they still influence the market. It
follows that, in order to study the extent of common shareholding in the mobile market, the
inclusion of such mother companies and the analysis of their ownership structure is crucial.
The choice of the relevant parent company has been based on the definition of Global Ultimate
Owner (GUO), according to a minimum participation of 50% (GUO50). The GUO50 is provided
directly in the Orbis database, and is not reconstructed manually from the ownership informa-
tion. Nevertheless, several quality checks have been performed on this variable, having found
it consistently defined and reliable.
Orbis defines the GUO50 as being the Global Ultimate Owner characterised by a minimum of
50% ownership shares in the path from the subsidiary to the ultimate owner. If the GUO holds
direct participation in the subsidiary, then it owns more than 50% of shares. If there are any
intermediate ownership steps between the company and the GUO, all of them present more
than 50% of ownership.
The types of GUOs considered for this analysis are only banks or financial/insurance/industrial
companies, i.e. only entities of types A, B, C and F according to Orbis definition (see Table
A.4 in Appendix A). This definition implies that entities such as individuals, states or public
administrations are not considered as controlling parents, given that these last entities would
not present any ownership structure themselves.
In general the GUO50 is rather constant over the ten years of observation, but there are
occasional changes when there is a change in ownership due to either a merger or acquisition,
or simply an increase/decrease in participation.
All-together, in 2007-2016 we identified 107 controlling parents for the 105 MNOs. Some of the
parents are themselves MNOs (35 companies), so they are already included in the initial list.
The remaining 72 parents are partly companies active in the telecoms industry, partly holding
or financial companies. Adding these parents to the initial list of MNOs, we obtain a final list
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of 177 companies that represent all firms active in or influencing mobile telecommunications
in the EU over 2007-2016.
In this report, we will discuss our metrics according to the second industry definition. Results
including the smaller entities (MVNOs) are qualitatively the same (available upon request).
C.5 Beverages manufacturers
The set of firms active in the Beverages sector in the EU has been obtained in two steps,
following the criteria explained below.
First, a selection has been made starting from the database of listed firms, based on the
following NACE codes for beverages manufacturing: code 1105 (Manufacture of beer); code
1107 (Manufacture of soft drinks; production of mineral waters and other bottled waters); and
code 1032 (Manufacture of fruit and vegetable juice). All listed firms active in the EU which
present at least one of the above codes as primary or secondary activity2 are included in the
sample.
Following this initial selection, a number of unlisted relevant players has been added based
on the expert opinion of colleagues from DG COMP, representing unlisted companies with
significant market share or presence in European countries. In some cases the added firms
are part of larger corporate groups, partially owned by one or more firms from the initial group
of listed enterprises. In general, the added unlisted companies presented at least one of the
above NACE codes as primary or secondary activity.
After this selection, a manual check was performed on firms classified as manufacturers of
beverages only as secondary activity, to ensure that they are actually active in the market.
Following this investigation, five cases were excluded from the sample, due to the following
situations: some companies had a beverages business in the past, but had sold it before 2007,
and are currently concentrating on other activities as their core business; in a couple of cases
we were unable to trace any link to beverages manufacturing - these were dropped supposing
that the industry classification in one of the NACE codes above might be a strategy to "hoard"
codes for possible future needs, and does not reflect an actual current activity in the market.
All-together, we obtain a list of 290 firms, of which 214 are listed (or delisted) manufacturers
of Soft Drinks, Beer or Juices. The remaining 76 firms are the relevant unlisted players.
The main features of the five markets are summarised in Table C.1.
2Up to 20 secondary activities.
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Table C.1: Definition of the five markets under analysis. Total number of distinct firms active over 2007-
2016. Total number of distinct shareholders investing in market over 2007-2016. Criteria for inclusion of
firms in each market.
Market
No.
firms
No.
SH
Inclusion criteria
Oil&Gas 153 4882
All listed firms active in the EU1 classified with the following NACE codes
among Core or first three Primary codes of industrial activity: extraction of
crude petroleum (0610); extraction of natural gas (0620); manufacture of
refined petroleum products (1920); manufacture of gas (3521); distribution
of gaseous fuels through mains (3522); trade of gas through mains (3523).
Removed transmission system operators (TSOs). Few extra unlisted firms
added based on expert opinion.
Electricity 396 9115
All listed firms active in the EU1 classified with the following NACE codes
among Core or first three Primary codes of industrial activity: production
of electricity (3511); transmission of electricity (3512); distribution of elec-
tricity (3513); trade of electricity (3514). Removed transmission system
operators (TSOs). Few extra unlisted firms added based on expert opinion.
Trading
Platforms 176 4165
All companies (listed and unlisted) operating trading venues in the EU. The
list of Trading Platforms was supplied by the European Securities Market
Authorities (ESMA), and includes regulated markets, multilateral trading fa-
cilities, organised trading facilities, and systematic internalisers. The list of
companies operating each platform was supplied by DG COMP.
Telecoms 177 3199
All Mobile Network Operators (MNOs) active in the EU, together with their
respective controlling parents throughout 2007-2016. The controlling parent
is identified with the GUO502. The list of MNOs was supplied by DG COMP,
while the identification of the controlling parent was obtained from Orbis
data.
Beverages 290 5498
All listed firms active in the EU1 classified with the following NACE codes of
industrial activity (among Core, or first four Primary codes, or first twenty
Secondary codes): manufacture of beer (1105); manufacture of soft drinks,
production of mineral waters and other bottled waters (1107); manufacture
of fruit and vegetable juice (1032). Few dozens of extra unlisted firms added
based on expert opinion.
1 Definition of firm active in the EU: either registered in the EU, or registered outside the EU but holding shares in at least one firm
registered in the EU.
2 Orbis defines the GUO50 as being the Global Ultimate Owner characterised by a minimum of 50% ownership shares in the path from
the subsidiary to the ultimate owner.
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Appendix D
Complements to the Econometric
Analysis
D.1 Ownership changes between investors
Given that the BlackRock-BGI merger represented a once-in-a-lifetime event, we investigated
the possible existence of other minor changes in ownership at the investors’ level, which in
turn might have caused a relevant change in the degree of common shareholding of the firms
active in each sector. In each of the five markets, besides the usual set of top global investors,1
a second group of relevant shareholders holding slightly smaller portfolios has been identified;
this second group of investors represents a possible target of M&A from the largest investors,
therefore being likely candidates of changes in ownership events.
The selection procedure for these “secondary top investors” (or alternatively, sector specific
top investors) occurred based on two criteria: a threshold for minimum investments of at
least x% in at least y% of firms over the entire period. This selection procedure has been
applied to the set of shareholders of each sector, after eliminating the global main investors.
As a robustness check, the selection procedure has also been applied to the whole set of
shareholders, and all primary investors resulted in the list of extracted shareholders, indicating
that the selection criteria is robust.
The global main investors are the usual 20 top shareholders used in previous ownership-based
analysis, with the addition of four new global main investors for the purpose of this exercise.
These additional four were funds that resulted comparable in size to the other 20, and were
not included in the original list only for the cutoff imposed at 20. When looking at ownership
jumps between investors, they behave similarly to the top global 20.
1Also denoted as “primary investors”. See previous dedicated sections in Chapter 4.
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Table D.1 reports the list of primary investors (common to all five markets) and a compilation
of the main secondary investors, i.e. those appearing in most of the markets. The group
of secondary players includes several funds or financial intermediaries that, despite having
several holdings across industries, globally were too small to be considered at the same level of
the main global investors. Most of the investors listed in the table had already been identified
in the initial analyses as top-ranking shareholders based on the five density-based common
shareholding indices, therefore confirming again the robustness of the selection procedure.
Some sector-specific investors have not been included in the list for the sake of brevity. Cross-
investors have been excluded from the set of secondary shareholders, given that they belong
to the list of firms active in each market, and here the objective was to identify movements at
the higher level of shareholding.
Table D.1: Primary and secondary investors.
PRIMARY
INVESTORS
ALLIANZ SE; AXA SA; BANK OF AMERICA CORP; BANK OF NEW YORK
MELLON; BARCLAYS PLC; BLACKROCK INC; BNP PARIBAS; CREDIT SU-
ISSE GROUP; DEUTSCHE BANK AG; DIMENSIONAL FUND ADV; EATON
VANCE CORP; FMR LLC; GOLDMAN SACHS GROUP; ING GROEP NV;
INVESCO LTD; JPMORGAN CHASE & CO; MORGAN STANLEY; NORTH-
ERN TRUST CORP; NORWAY; STATE STREET CORP; STICHTING PEN-
SIOENFO; TEACHERS INSURANCE; UBS AG; VANGUARD GROUP INC
SECONDARY
INVESTORS
ABERDEEN ASSET MANAGENT; AFFILIATED MANAGERS; AGEAS SA-
NV; AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL; AMERIPRISE FINANCIAL; ASGARD IN-
VESTMENT CO; ASSICURAZIONI GENERALI; AVIVA PLC; BANCO SAN-
TANDER SA; BANK OF MONTREAL; BANQUE PICTET & CIE BPCE SA;
CANADIAN IMPERIAL BANK; CAPITAL GROUP CO INC; CITIGROUP INC;
CRÉDIT AGRICOLE S.A; FIDELITY INTERNATIONAL; FIRST EAGLE IN-
VESTMENT; FRANKLIN RESOURCES; HSBC HOLDINGS PLC; INTESA
SANPAOLO; JANUS CAPITAL GROUP; JANUS HENDERSON GROUP;
JUPITER FUND MANAGEMENT; KBC GROEP NV/ KBC GR; LAZARD
LIMITED; LEGAL & GENERAL GROUP; LEGG MASON INC; LEHMAN
BROTHERS HOLDING; LLOYDS BANKING GROUP; LORD ABBETT &
CO; MACQUARIE GROUP LTD; MASSACHUSETTS MUTUAL; MERRILL
LYNCH & CO.; OLD MUTUAL PLC; PRUDENTIAL PLC; ROYAL BANK
OF CANADA; SCHRODERS PLC; SOCIÉTÉ GÉNÉRALE; STANDARD LIFE
ABERDEEN; SUN LIFE FINANCIAL; SWEDBANK AB; T ROWE PRICE
GROUP; TORONTO DOMINION BANK; UBS GROUP AG; UNICREDIT
SPA; WELLINGTON MANAGEMENT; WELLS FARGO & CO; WINDY CITY
INVESTMENT
The purpose of the first selection (minimum investment level) is to eliminate those shareholder-
firm links that are too minor to be considered of interest. Similarly, the second criteria only
considers those investors that over the entirety of the period had these ’significant’ invest-
ments in at least a certain percent of firms in the sample. This second criteria is quite lax in
general, but experimenting with different values (5 or 10 percent for example) the resulting
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investors extracted are often the same ones identified in earlier phases of the study.
This analysis required then the extraction of the ownership information for each secondary
investor selected. With this information, we were able to check all the jumps in ownership
that the global main investors made into our secondary sector specific investors per year,
separating by positive and negative investment jumps. Figures D.1-D.3 below plot this, where
the selection of the secondary investors has been based on thresholds of minimum 5% invest-
ment in at least 10% of the firms active in the decade of observation. The only exception was
the MNOs and Parents sector, where 1% and 5% cut-offs were used; the different thresholds
were necessary due to the strongest presence of corporate groups, as noted earlier. Further
fine-tuning of the selection thresholds can be applied.
The ownership jumps were weighted by a proxy of the size of the secondary investor, based
on an index of TOAS density of its respective portfolio. This information for TOAS density was
previously calculated from ORBIS financial data for all shareholders, as one of the density-
based common shareholding indices (see definition in previous sectoral analyses). For those
investors where ORBIS did not provide information on portfolio Total Assets, as can happen for
some of these smaller financial firms, an average of the yearly TOAS density of shareholders of
the same entity type was calculated, and used as a substitute where the weight was missing.
The patterns in the graphs are similar to those already seen in the discussion specific to the
’Big Three’ and the BlackRock-BGI merger in Chapters 5 and 6. In almost every sector there
is a sharp increase in ownership jumps of BlackRock in the sector, driven by its acquisition of
BGI, and in turn a sharp sell-off on behalf of Barclays as they sell their division. By far these
ownership jumps are the most significant in each sector.
Figure D.1: Ownership changes between primary and secondary investors - Oil&Gas sector.
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Figure D.2: Ownership changes between primary and secondary investors - Electricity and Trading
Platforms sectors.
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Figure D.3: Ownership changes between primary and secondary investors - Telecoms and Beverages
sector.
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D.2 Sample exclusion due to missing values
Table 7.1 reported the number of observations which were dropped each year from the analy-
sis, due to unavailable data on either the response variable or the controls. Few extra values
were dropped once the outcome variable was limited to the interval [−1,1], following IMF
(2019).
In order to understand possible implications on the empirical results, the excluded observa-
tions were studied so as to identify possible concerns. Table D.2 below reports some descrip-
tive statistics about the observations excluded from the sample.
The first column reports the number of years (out of ten) a firm was excluded from the analysis
due to missing or trimmed values. In the large majority of cases, firms are excluded only for
a limited number of years. An exception is given by a set of firms which are systematically
excluded from the sample for the whole period of observation. For this group we observe that
almost all firms were delisted or unlisted in 2017, and registered in Germany. This suggests
that exclusion from the sample may be due to total absence of financial data, given the less
stringent reporting obligations of this type of firms and legal framework. Even for those firms
missing for a smaller number of years, it is still predominant the unlisted/delisted status, as
well as registration in Germany.
Table D.2: Number of firms with missing values, by listing status and country of registration
No years No. Listing status in 2017 Country
missing firms
Listed Delist./Unlist. DE Other
1 37 19 18 11 26
2 23 8 15 2 21
3 17 8 9 5 12
4 14 4 10 4 10
5 8 3 5 0 8
6 7 2 5 0 7
7 3 0 3 0 3
8 7 1 6 2 5
9 9 0 9 1 8
10 31 3 28 26 5
Total 156 48 108 51 105
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D.3 Evolution of ownership over time
In Figures D.4-D.5, we provide descriptive statistics of the evolution of ownership among some
of the largest firms active in the EU, registered both in and out of the EU.
The graphs display the trajectories of ownership by BlackRock and BGI individually, the total
shares held by the "Big2" (State Street and Vanguard), and firms size measured in logarithms
of total assets. As regards other dimensions that might be of interest, trends in industry
classification are not analysed, given that it is constant over time. Finally, it is important to
keep in mind that the treatment variable is defined using ownership figures from 2007.
In many cases, a steep increase in BlackRock participation is evident after the merger, to-
gether with a large drop in BGI’s shares. The ownership by the Big2 has been overall increasing
in the decade of observation.
Figure D.4: Evolution of ownership among some largest firms active in the EU
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Figure D.5: Evolution of ownership among some largest firms active in the EU (cont.)
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D.4 Alternative competition measure
Table D.3: Adjusted Lerner Index as dependent variable
Dep. var.: Lerner Index Adjusted (1) (2) (3)
Treated*post 0.091** 0.093** 0.147***
(0.036) (0.037) (0.049)
(log) Total assets 0.000 -0.001
(0.006) (0.009)
Shareholders’ HHI -0.001 -0.007
(0.006) (0.008)
Shares top 4 owners 0.001 -0.007
(0.043) (0.080)
Firm’s Integration -0.009 0.016
(0.030) (0.046)
Shares owned by Big2 -0.318 1.524
(0.552) (0.992)
(log) Total assets*post 0.001
(0.008)
Shareholders’ HHI*post 0.008
(0.006)
Shares top 4 owners*post 0.017
(0.078)
Firm’s Integration*post -0.031
(0.040)
Shares owned by Big2*post -1.452*
(0.798)
Observations 1,730 1,730 1,730
Year fixed effects yes yes yes
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes
R-squared within 0.031 0.032 0.042
R-squared overall 0.917 0.917 0.917
Number of firms 225 225 225
Robust standard errors, clustered at the firm levels, are shown in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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D.5 Heterogeneity of exposure
Ownership of companies exposed to the merger
We further inspect the relative size of ownership between BGI and BlackRock. The composition
of the overall exposure to the merger is examined in particular for firms that are held by both
BGI and BlackRock, and few other relevant players with high participations by one of them.
The cross-section distribution of the treated firms in 2007 is reported in Table D.4, where the
number of treated firms is grouped into classes according to the relative size of the ownership
of BGI and BlackRock. This joint distribution is also instrumental to interpret the relevance of
the shock in the sample under analysis and the (in)ability to measure its effect with sufficient
precision.
Table D.4: Number of firms by relevant shareholder composition in 2007
Shares held by BlackRock
0% 0-1% 1- 2% 2-3% 3-5% 5-7% 7-10% >10% Total
S
h
a
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s
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ld
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B
G
I
0% 118 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 121
0-1% 12 5 0 0 0 1 0 0 18
1-2% 6 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 10
2-3% 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
3-5% 5 2 4 0 1 0 0 0 12
5-7 % 1 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 5
7-10% 2 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 4
>10% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 144 17 7 1 1 1 0 0 171
The same pattern emerges in the Figure D.6, with BGI having a more sizeable ownership in
most cases. This is not surprising because the portfolio of BlackRock in the late 2000s was not
as large as that of Barclays/BGI. Companies with a more sizeable participation of BGI and/or
BlackRock among their shareholders are identified explicitly in the graph.
Table D.5 reports some summary statistics of classes of exposure, where classes are defined
according to the sum of the shares held by BlackRock and BGI in 2007. We display the number
of firms and the number of observations belonging to the specific exposure class over the
entire period of observation. Please note that the panel structure of the available data is not
perfectly balanced and hence the number of observations can be smaller than 10 times the
number of unique firms.
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Figure D.6: Treated firms by shares owned by merging investors
Among the descriptive statistics for each class, Table D.5 reports the average size of firms (as
measured by the log of Total Assets), and the number of firms in the class that are breweries
(core NACE code = 1105) or manufacturers of soft drinks/mineral waters (core NACE code =
1107). A detailed description of the firms belonging to each exposure class, including among
others size and industry is provided in Table D.6.
Table D.5: Summary statistics of exposure classes
Exposure Nr. of obs. Nr. of firms (log) assets Breweries Sodas/waters
0-1% 162 19 20.99 10 2
1-2% 81 9 22.16 2 2
2-3% 26 3 22.91 1 0
3-4% 60 6 22.26 2 4
4-5% 64 7 21.53 1 2
5-12% 98 13 22.12 6 5
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Firm Nace % BR % BGI Assets Global Ultimate Owner
Exposure class [ 0% ; 1% )
ANADOLU EFES BIRACIL 1105 0.25 0.11 21.54 ANADOLU EFES BIRACIL
ANHEUSER-BUSCH INBEV 1105 0 0.34 23.22 ANHEUSER-BUSCH INBEV
ARCA CONTINENTAL SAB 1107 0.34 0 20.80 ARCA CONTINENTAL SAB
BARRY CALLEBAUT AG 1082 0.22 0 21.38 JACOBS HOLDING AG
CHINA HUIYUAN JUICE 1031 0.55 0 20.28 CHINA HUIYUAN JUICE
CHRIST WATER TECHNOL 3600 0.31 0.23 18.56 CHRIST WATER TECHNOL
COMPANHIA DE BEBIDAS 1105 0.73 0.2 23.33 ANHEUSER-BUSCH INBEV
DATACOLOR AG 1105 0 0.16 18.89 DATACOLOR AG
DAVIDE CAMPARI - MIL 1101 0.36 0.11 21.04 DAVIDE CAMPARI - MIL
GRUPO MODELO, S.A.B. 1105 0 0.72 22.55 GRUPO MODELO, S.A.B.
HEINEKEN NV 1105 0 0.52 23.20 L’ARCHE GREEN N.V.
HITE JINRO HOLDINGS 1105 0 0.52 21.42 HITE JINRO HOLDINGS
IHLAS HOLDING A.S. 8690 0 0.13 20.04 IHLAS HOLDING A.S.
JERONIMO MARTINS SGP 4711 0 0.11 20.88 SOCIEDADE FRANCISCO
SAPPORO HOLDINGS LIM 1105 0 0.99 21.93 SAPPORO HOLDINGS LIM
SUMOL+COMPAL, S.A. 1107 0 0.33 18.56 REFRIGOR, S.A.
TAKARA HOLDINGS INC 1102 0 0.67 21.00 TAKARA HOLDINGS INC
TSINGTAO BREWERY COM 1105 0 0.3 20.38 TSINGTAO BREWERY COM
YOUNG & CO’S BREWERY 1105 0 0.51 19.73 YOUNG & CO’S BREWERY
Exposure class [ 1% ; 2% )
ABI SAB GROUP HOLDIN 1105 0 1.89 23.84 ABI SAB GROUP HOLDIN
C&C GROUP PLC 1102 0 1.27 20.54 C&C GROUP PLC
COCA-COLA FEMSA SAB 1107 0 1.2 22.37 FOMENTO ECONOMICO
DANONE 1051 0.26 1.25 23.64 DANONE
FOSTER’S GROUP PTY L 1105 0 1.15 22.51 FOSTER’S GROUP PTY L
NESTLE S.A. 1089 0.37 0.64 24.96 NESTLE S.A.
NICHOLS PLC 1107 0 1.17 17.76 NICHOLS PLC
SWIRE PACIFIC LIMITE 6831 0 1.1 23.53 JOHN SWIRE & SONS LI
WIMM-BILL-DANN FOODS 1051 0 1.46 20.26 WIMM-BILL-DANN FOODS
Exposure class [ 2% ; 3% )
CAMPBELL SOUP CO 1089 0.45 2.08 22.15 CAMPBELL SOUP CO
FRASER & NEAVE LTD 1105 0.97 1.91 22.53 FRASER & NEAVE LTD
UNILEVER NV 1089 1.33 1.08 24.04 UNILEVER NV
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Exposure class [ 3% ; 4% )
COCA COLA BOTTLING C 1107 0 3.14 20.59 COCA COLA BOTTLING C
COCA-COLA CO 1107 0.61 2.92 24.10 COCA-COLA CO
COTT CORP 1107 0 3.45 20.47 COTT CORP
FOMENTO ECONOMICO 1107 1.24 1.8 23.06 FOMENTO ECONOMICO
KIRIN HOLDINGS CO., 1105 0.28 3.58 23.41 KIRIN HOLDINGS CO.,
MARSTON’S PLC 1105 0 3.35 21.94 MARSTON’S PLC
Exposure class [ 4% ; 5% )
A.G. BARR P.L.C. 1107 0 4.24 18.93 A.G. BARR P.L.C.
DEAN FOODS CO 1052 1.12 3.19 22.29 DEAN FOODS CO
FULLER SMITH & TURNE 1105 0 4.23 19.98 FULLER SMITH & TURNE
KRAFT HEINZ FOODS CO 1039 1.26 3.33 22.72 KRAFT HEINZ FOODS CO
LANDEC CORP 2016 0.17 3.97 18.39 LANDEC CORP
MONDELEZ INTERNATION 1051 1.18 3.12 24.56 ALTRIA GROUP INC
PEPSICO INC 1107 0.73 3.98 23.88 PEPSICO INC
Exposure class [ 5% ; 12% )
ANHEUSER-BUSCH CO 1105 0.49 5.67 23.18 ANHEUSER-BUSCH CO
ASAHI GROUP HOLDINGS 1105 1.27 6.11 22.58 ASAHI GROUP HOLDINGS
BEIJING ENTERPRISES 1105 6.76 0.39 22.08 BEIJING ENTERPRISES
BRITVIC PLC 1107 0 7.07 20.72 BRITVIC PLC
CHIQUITA BRANDS INTE 1031 1.08 4.69 21.32 CHIQUITA BRANDS INTE
COCA-COLA AMATIL LIM 1107 0.21 5.53 21.75 COCA-COLA AMATIL LIM
GENERAL MILLS INC 1089 2.28 5.4 23.23 GENERAL MILLS INC
GREENE KING PLC 1105 0 6.27 22.15 GREENE KING PLC
MOLSON COORS BREW 1105 0.54 6.2 22.94 MOLSON COORS BREW
MONSTER BEVERAGE 1107 4.05 3.55 19.73 MONSTER BEVERAGE
PEPSI BOTTLING GROUP 1107 2.36 9.47 22.91 PEPSI BOTTLING GROUP
PEPSIAMERICAS INC 1107 0.97 8.88 22.01 PEPSIAMERICAS INC
SCOTTISH & NEWCASTLE 1105 0 7.4 22.98 SCOTTISH & NEWCASTLE
Table D.6: Summary of firm’s characteristics by exposure classes. Nace core classification. Values of
shares held by BlackRock (BR) and BGI, (log) Assets and GUO refer to the year 2007.
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